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Abstract
The Palestinian Authority's (PA) claim to embody the spirit of the “Arab Spring”, through its recent “state-building” agenda – including its elevation to “non-member observer status” at the United Nations – is disingenuous. This conclusion rests on three key arguments outlined in this article. First, this article identifies a continuation of broader patterns of authoritarianism represented by the PA's lack of adherence to democratic practices, the deprivation of access for the Palestinian population to basic resources and the wider issue of the continued absence of Palestinian sovereignty. Second, it identifies the intensification of some authoritarian practices within Palestine, particularly in the areas of security and policing, for example by the use of force against protestors. Finally, this article identifies that civil-society groups and opposition supporters throughout 2011–2012 have more genuinely embodied evidence of resistance to authoritarianism in popular demonstrations against the PA.
Notes on contributor
Philip Leech is a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Liverpool. His research focuses on political economy, democratization, globalization and political thought with particular reference to the Middle East. He is the author of Building the Palestinian state: Drivers and Impediments (Forthcoming: Ashgate, 2015).
Notes
1. Dalacoura, “Uprisings in the Arab Middle East”; Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism” (inter alia).
2. Brown, Palestinian Politics After the Oslo Accords, 5.
3. Ibid.
4. See Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism.”
5. Jamal, Barriers to Democracy, Ch. 2; Human Rights Watch, “Palestinian Authority/Israel”; Jamal, Media Politics and Democracy in Palestine.
6. Roy, “De-development Revisited”; Roy, “The Crisis Within”; Roy, “Palestinian Society and Economy.”
7. Brown, Palestinian Politics After the Oslo Accords, 9, 16.
8. Henry and Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East, Ch. 4.
9. The “Vision Statement” of the Palestine Reform and Development Plan (PRDP), describing the future state it intended to build. Published by the Palestinian Authority at the Paris donor conference in 2007.
10. The “Oslo process” refers to a series of negotiations that took place, initially in secret at the Fafo institute in Norway, following the US-sponsored Madrid Peace Summit at the end of the 1991 Gulf War.
11. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, Ch. 23–26.
12. Khalidi, The Iron Cage, 160.
13. Hanieh, “The Internationalisation of Gulf Capital and Palestinian Class Formation.”
14. Samara, “Globalization, the Palestinian Economy, and the ‘Peace Process.’”
15. Pearlman, Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement, 222.
16. Pearlman, “Spoiling Inside and Out”; Bhasin and Hallward, “Hamas as a Political Party.”
17. Milton-Edwards and Farrell, Hamas, Ch. 5.
18. Malka, “Forcing Choices,” 45.
19. Sayigh, “Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt.”
20. Gordon, Israel's Occupation, Ch. 8.
21. Jamal, The Palestinian National Movement, 164–165.
22. Pearlman, Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement, 220.
23. Gordon and Flic, “The Destruction of Risk Society and the Ascendancy of Hamas”; see also Chehab, Inside Hamas; Gunning, Hamas in Politics.
24. Rose, “The Gaza Bombshell”; Cobain, “CIA Working with Palestinian Security Agents”; Black and Milne, “Palestine Papers Reveal MI6 Drew up Plan for Crackdown on Hamas”; Zanotti, U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority; Crouch, Meigs, and Slocombe, Security First.
25. Farraj, Mansour, and Tamari, “A Palestinian State in Two Years.” The Prime Minister of the PA, Salam Fayyad made the second point explicitly but also referred to how, by appealing to the US government directly, he had managed to achieve the direct transfer of $200 million to overcome Israeli-imposed restrictions on the distribution of tax revenue.
26. See Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State (2009) and Homestretch to Freedom (2010). The full texts of each are available online via the Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Planning website: www.mopad.pna.ps/en/ (accessed 7 March 2012).
27. The Palestinian elections were observed by the Carter Center, which stated: “Except for restraints in East Jerusalem, the election process was open and highly competitive.”
28. Kanafani, “As if there is No Occupation.”
29. Hilal and Khan, “Stateformation Under the PNA.”
30. “Palestine Reform and Development Plan (PRDP).”
31. The next highest was “Efficient and Effective Government” at $72 million.
32. Dayton, “Speech to the Washington Institute.”
33. Byrne, “Building a Police State in Palestine.”
34. USAID funded both of these developments and the Nablus Moqata'a is described as a “National Guard Building, Ministry of Interior Building And Governorate Building [sic.]” in English (but not in Arabic) on external signs.
35. Cobain, “CIA Working with Palestinian Security Agents.”
36. Ibid.: The intelligence agencies of both the UK and US governments also have strong links with the Israeli secret services and it is reasonable to assume that intelligence gathered during these operations was shared by all agencies.
37. Sayigh, “Policing the People, Building the State.”
38. Sayigh, “Inducing a Failed State in Palestine,” 8.
39. Ibid.
40. PRDP. Further, the PA also launched a campaign of boycotts against Israeli settlements, which was designed to supplement this appeal for legitimacy.
41. There is some significant justification for this concern. The total sum lost to corruption in the PA is difficult to assess, though in 2006 an investigation by the then PA Attorney General, Ahmed al-Meghami, suggested that: under Arafat, PA officials might have caused the loss of at least $700 million worth of public moneys through embezzlement and mismanagement, Chris McGreal, “Palestinian Authority ‘May Have Lost Billions,’” The Guardian, February 6, 2006.
42. Hilal and Khan, “Stateformation Under the PNA.”
43. “UNCTAD Assistance to the Palestinian People.”
44. “Labour Market in the West Bank.”
45. Save the Children, “Life on the Edge.” Which stated that “in 2010, the poverty line and deep poverty line for the reference household (two adults and three children) stood at 2,237 NIS (609 US$) and 1,783 NIS (478 US$) respectively … slightly more than one out of four Individuals (25.7%) were living below poverty line in 2010, (18.3% in the West Bank and 38.0% in Gaza Strip). This is similar to the corresponding rate of nearly 26.2% in 2009, (19.4% in the West Bank and 38.3% in Gaza Strip).”
46. “UNRWA West Bank Livelihood Programme.”
47. Save the Children, “Life on the Edge.” “According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, there are 418 villages with at least part of their built up area located in Area C, including 161 villages with a majority of their built up area in Area C and 130 villages completely inside Area C. OCHA estimates that 44,100 Palestinians live in the 130 villages completely inside Area C. Given the number of mixed A/B/C villages, the actual population is certainly much higher.”
48. Save the Children, “Life on the Edge.” The seam zone “refers to those areas of the West Bank that are situated between the Green Line (the 1949 Armistice Line) and the Separation Wall. While there is an overlap between population figures for the seam zone and Area C, the population living in the seam zone areas is particularly vulnerable to Israeli policies and practices. In a study of the humanitarian impact of the Wall and its associated permit regime in the northern West Bank, OCHA estimates based on community sources indicate that over 9000 Palestinians were living in the seam zone areas declared ‘closed’ by Israeli military order in the Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqiliya and Salfit districts. While not a comprehensive estimate this figure points to a sizeable population that is both extremely marginalized and vulnerable.”
49. Ibid.
50. Khalidi and Samour, “Neoliberalism as Liberation,” 13–14.
51. “Incidents of protest” is utilized as a unit of measurement because the data drawn from Ma‘an News Agency do not clarify the specific number of protesters at each demonstration. The unit is used here in the following way: where Ma‘an's agency reported that a protest, or multiple protests around the same theme but in different places, occurred on a particular day this is recorded as a single ‘incident of protest’. Where the reporting states that multiple protests occurred in different place on the same day and on different themes, then each protest is recorded as a separate “incident of protest”. Similarly, when large protests continued over several days, each day is recorded as a separate “incident of protest”.
52. The phrase “related institutions” is used describe institutions that fall under the PA's direct or indirect influence, for example schools and universities.
53. “Abbas Protests US Veto in Ramallah.”
54. See “Palestinian Youth Protest at EU Office in Ramallah”; “Protest in Ramallah over Clinton Visit”; “Protesters Call for UN Action Outside Ramallah Office” (inter alia). These included protests against the EU, UN (and UN institutions), and the US.
55. See “Ramallah Protesters Remain Unbowed” for an example. All of these incidents took place in March 2011.
56. For example, “Clashes, Stone-throwing Break Out in West Bank Price Protests.”
57. For example, “Protesters Demand Release of Prisoners in PA Jails.”
58. For example, “Protesters Rally in Ramallah in Solidarity with Egyptians.”
59. Leech and Quzmar, “Palestine: The Precarious Present.”
60. Amnesty International, “Shut up We Are the Police”.
61. Ibid.