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Abstract
How do we make sense of the potential role of civil society in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in bringing the region into a new era of reform and political participation? This article critically examines how the civil society landscape in the region has been conceptualized in the past and proposes a new typology of MENA civil society actors. I employ this typology in two cases – the revolutionary uprising in Egypt in 2011 and “evolutionary” long-term efforts to broaden the space for political participation in Lebanon. Comparing these two very different cases illustrates the utility of a typology of civil society actors (CSAs) that (a) emphasizes temporary coalitions between diverse actors; (b) highlights the both contentious and collaborative struggles through which political change actually happens; and (c) recognizes that different types of CSAs face different constraints and opportunities. I argue that employing such a typology can help structure comparison between disparate cases of civil society efforts for democratization and bring to the forefront issues of authenticity and legitimacy – challenges emanating not only from an oppressive state, but from within civil society itself.
Notes on contributor
Anders C. Härdig is a Professorial Lecturer in the School of International Service, American University, in Washington, DC.
Notes
1. In recent years, popular protests have had significant consequences elsewhere in the region – in 2009 Iran's “Green Movement” failed in removing President Ahmadinejad; Yemen's uprising in 2011 led to a “quiet” removal of President Saleh; in Bahrain protesters were harshly dealt with that same year; in Syria, what began in 2011 as a popular non-violent movement devolved (with international assistance) into violent civil war by 2012.
2. Singerman, “Restoring the Family to Civil Society.”
3. Norton, Civil Society in the Middle East; and Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence.
4. “Secular-liberal” should not imply that CSOs of this type subscribe to a “neoliberal agenda,” as reflected in the Washington Consensus, but rather that these are secular in outlook and conform to the classical liberal description of NGOs.
5. I use the term “civil society actor,” instead of “civil society organization,” deliberately. “Actor” includes informal networks that do not operate within formal organizational structures, which constitute a significant category in the typology presented here.
6. Owen, Power and Politics, 201.
7. Gellner, Conditions of Liberty; Putnam, Making Democracy Work; Sadowski, “The New Orientalism”; and Diamond, “Toward Democratic Consolidation.”
8. Tempest, “Myths from Eastern Europe”; Sardamov, “Civil Society and the Limits of Democratic Assistance”; and Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm.”
9. Berman, “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society.” See also Foley and Edwards, “The Paradox of Civil Society”; Volpi, “Pseudo-democracy in the Muslim World”; Hinnebusch, “Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory”; Ben Nefissa et al., NGOs and Governance in the Arab World; and Wiktorowicz, “Civil Society as Social Control.” On Islamist movements, see Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism; and Wickham, Mobilizing Islam.
10. Handoussa et al., “Egypt's Social Contract.”
11. See, for instance, McInerney, “The Federal Budget and Appropriations.”
12. Center for Development Studies, “An Overview of Civil Society in Egypt,” 20.
13. Hizbullah has a wide range of NGOs in its orbit, including the construction NGO Jihad al-Bina‘ and the think tank Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation (CCSD). Harb, “Faith-Based Organizations as Effective Development Partners?”
14. Langohr, “Too Much Civil Society,” 194.
15. Gramsci, The Prison Notebooks.
16. For an in-depth discussion on Gramsci's thinking applied on MENA, see Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State.
17. Such a snapshot may indeed be useful – but as Cannon and Hume have argued, following Robert Cox, “actually existing ‘civil society’ … is formed dialectically by the struggles between … different social, political and institutional forces.” Consequently, in the words of Cox: “Any fixed definition of the content of the concept ‘civil society’ would just freeze a particular moment in history and privilege the relations of social forces then prevailing.” Cannon and Hume, “Central America, Civil Society,” 1043; and Cox, “Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium,” 5.
18. See, for instance, Cavatorta and Durac, Civil Society and Democratization; Aarts and Cavatorta, Civil Society in Syria and Iran; and Cavatorta, Civil Society Activism.
19. Sadowski, “The New Orientalism.”
20. See Browers, Democracy and Civil Society; and Filali-Ansary, “State, Society and Creed.”
21. See, for instance, Joseph, “Working-Class Women's Networks”; Singerman, Avenues of Participation; Singerman, “The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements”; and Wiktorowicz and Farouki, “Islamic NGOs and Muslim Politics.”
22. For instance, Nasser's corporatist model in Egypt was very much based on patron–client relationships, rather than an institutionalized framework for state–civil society relations. Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State.
23. The number of family associations in the region has increased dramatically in recent years, parallel to the growth of secular-liberal NGOs. Baylouny, “Creating Kin.”
24. The over 100 NGOs supported by the Hariri Foundation are indirectly connected to the Future Movement, the political party led by the Hariri family. LADE activist, interview with the author, Beirut, July 2009.
25. This impression dovetails with the findings of Özlem Altan-Olcay and Ahmet İçduygu's study of civil society actors' self-perceived role in Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey. Altan-Olcay and İçduygu, “Mapping Civil Society in the Middle East.”
26. Said, Orientalism; and Sadowski, “The New Orientalism.”
27. Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa.”
28. Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, 3.
29. Owen, Power and Politics.
30. See, for instance, Bellin, “Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders.”
31. See, for instance, Handoussa et al., “Egypt's Social Contract,” 89.
32. Egyptian civil society activist, interview with the author, 15 September 2013.
33. For an overview of the camp, see BBC News, “Egypt: The Camp That Toppled a President.”
34. For several accounts of non-violent discipline in the anti-Mubarak demonstrations, see El-Ghobashy, “The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution.”
35. On the mixed record of urban mass protests in the region, see Bayat, “Activism and Social Development.”
36. Egyptian protester, interview with the author, 25 September 2013.
37. Egyptian blogger, interview with author, 31 August 2013.
38. Egyptian protester, interview with author, 25 September 2013.
39. Egyptian journalist, interview with author, 31 August 2013.
40. Kefaya (“Enough”), announced in 2005, gathered Nasserists, Secularists, Islamists, Liberals, and Marxists in a coalition whose main aim was ending Mubarak's regime. Shorbagy, “Understanding Kefaya”; and Oweidat et al. “The Kefaya Movement.”
41. While technically swallowed up by the state in corporatist Egypt, al-Azhar is a complex system of campuses and institutes and contains within it significant diversity. See Brown, “Post-Revolutionary Al-Azhar”; and Zeghal, “What Were the Ulama Doing?”
42. Democracy Now, “Journalists and Human Rights Activists.”
43. Egyptian protester, interview with the author, 25 September 2013.
44. For instance, seven NGOs publicized their refusal to meet with the deputy prime minister for political development and democratic transition because of continuing violations of human rights by security organs. See EIPR, “NGOs Refuse to Meet with Governing Authorities.”
45. See, for instance, Al Jazeera, “Workers Boost Egypt Protests.”
46. Egyptian protester, interview with author, 25 September 2013.
47. The Judges Club in Egypt had no formal role in the 2011 revolution, but in the 2012–2013 protests against President Morsi it vocally supported the protesters. See Bernard-Maugiron, Judges and Political Reform; and Kirkpatrick, “Egyptian Judges Challenge Morsi.”
48. BBC News, “Egyptian Army Chief Calls for Street Protests.”
49. Egyptian civil society activist, interview with the author, 24 July 2013.
50. Montagu, “Civil Society and the Voluntary Sector.” See also Kanie, “Civil Society in Saudi Arabia.”
51. Ibid.
52. The “Independence Intifada” of 2005 saw a broad-based coalition of CSAs and political actors come together in a mobilization against the Syrian domination of Lebanon, similar to that against Mubarak in Egypt in 2011. See Jaafar and Stephan, “Lebanon's Independence Intifada.”
53. Karam, “Civil Associations, Social Movements, and Political Participation”; Karam, Le Mouvement Civil au Liban; and Kingston, “Promoting Civil Society Advocacy.”
54. Kingston, “Patrons, Clients, and Civil Society.”
55. Bennett, “Lebanon”; and Cavatorta and Elananza, “Show Me the Money!”
56. Researcher with the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS), interview with the author, August 2008.
57. Karam, Le Mouvement Civil au Liban.
58. Ruedas et al., “Toward a Citizen's State.”
59. Gramsci, The Prison Notebooks.
60. LPHU activist, interview with the author, Washington, DC, March 2010.
61. Na-am activist, interview with the author, Beirut, April 2009.
62. Hizbullah activist, interview with the author, Beirut, April 2009.