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Abstract
This article considers Hungary's political system from 2010 to 2014 with Fidesz in power and domestic and international actors’ responses to the challenge of populists-in-government. The article argues that domestic responses were weakened by Fidesz’ use of its supermajority for a partisan redrafting of the country's constitutional order, but also by its mainstream competitors’ failure to offer a contrasting yet positive vision for the electorate. External actors, and the European Union (EU) in particular, may therefore have emerged as the main bulwark against the effects of populists-in-government. However, the EU was relatively ill-equipped to deal with systemic violations of the common values of the Union with respect to its member states, and arguably even the available measures were not used to their full potential. The main explanation for this lies in Fidesz’ origins: rather than starting its life on the fringes of the electoral space, the party had been the major, mainstream centre-right alternative. This position in Hungary's party system had in turn endowed Fidesz with strong transnational links which outlasted the party's own transformation and continued to act to dampen EU action.
Notes on contributor
Agnes Batory is Professor of Public Policy and convener of the Erasmus Mundus Masters Program in Public Policy at Central European University.
Notes
1 Canovan, Populism; for a review of the literature see Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart, in this issue.
2 See for example, Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy.
3 Preuss, “The Political Meaning of Constitutionalism,” 12, 24–5.
4 Linz, Problems of Democratic Transition, 6.
5 Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” 543.
6 Wiles, “A Syndrome, Not a Doctrine,” 166.
7 Balázs and Enyedi, “Hungarian Case Studies,” 62–3.
8 Enyedi, “Party Politics,” 231; Palonen, “Political Polarisation.”
9 Müller, “The Hungarian Tragedy,” 6.
10 Palonen, “Political Polarisation,” 326.
11 Linz, Problems of Democratic Transition, 6.
12 Ionescu, “Eastern Europe.”
13 Lee, European Dictatorships.
14 This point was made in 2009 by Schöpflin, “Democracy, Populism.”
15 From The Financial Times, 23 July 2010, 26 May 2014, 10 April 2014; The Washington Post, 7 April 2014, 15 March 2013.
16 The website of the Prime Minister's Office; http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk. Quotations are the author's translation from Hungarian.
17 Canovan, Populism, 261.
18 Taggart, Populism, 94.
19 The Fidesz slogan for the 2014 European elections was “Our message to Brussels: respect for the Hungarians.”
20 “The Tavares report is a leftwing action,” radio interview with Viktor Orbán, Kossuth Radio, 5 July 2013.
21 Ibid.
22 Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp, 30 July 2014.
23 Report of the National Election Office, accessed 30 June 2014 at http://valasztas.hu/hu/ovb/content/kozlemeny/ovb_kozlemeny_20100510.pdf
24 Approximately half the seats were decided in single-member constituencies. Sitter, “Absolute Power?”; Batory, “Hungarian Parliamentary Elections.”
25 Scheppele, “Hungary: An Election in Question.” New York Times, 28 February 2014. http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/hungary-an-election-in-question-part-4/
26 National Election Office, accessed 30 June 2014 at http://valasztas.hu/hu/ogyv2014/861/861_0_index.html
27 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Statement of Preliminary Findings.
28 Pew Research, “End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations.” 2 November 2009, accessed 30 June 2014 at http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/11/02/end-of-communism-cheered-but-now-with-more-reservations/
29 News site Origo referring to a survey by the Nézőpont Institute, 25 October 2011, accessed 30 June 2014 at http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20111025-nezopont-az-emberek-kozel-harmada-felvaltana-a-demokraciat-a-gyors.html
30 Müller, “The Hungarian Tragedy,” 6.
31 Ceka, “The Perils of Political Competition.”
32 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, “Populism,” 503.
33 Taggart, Populism, 100.
34 For a review of the literature see Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart, in this issue.
35 Bale et al., “If You Can't Beat Them.”
36 Ivan Krastev, “Orbán's European Influence is Second Only to Merkel's”; Financial Times, 10 April 2014.
37 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics”; Jenne and Mudde, “Can Outsiders Help?” 149.
38 Scheppele, “The Rule of Law,” 561.
39 See for example, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Opinion.
40 Taggart, Populism, 74.
41 Ibid.; “Le Pen Refuses Alliance with Jobbik [in the European Parliament],” Nepszabadsag, 29 May 2014.
42 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, “Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism.”
43 Batory, “Uploading as Political Strategy.”
44 European Parliament Resolution of 3 July 2013.
45 “Clinton Concerned about Democratic Freedoms in Hungary,” Reuters, 30 June 2011, accessed 2 December 2014 at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/06/30/hungary-clinton-idUKN1E75S2AP20110630
46 “Hungary's Tax Chief Says She is On U.S. Travel Ban List.” Reuters, 5 November 2014, accessed 2 December 2014 at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/05/us-hungary-usa-corruption-idUSKBN0IP10J20141105
47 Levitsky and Way, “Linkage versus Leverage.”
48 See generally Haughton, “Half Full but also Half Empty”; Epstein and Sedelmeier, International Influence.
49 Dawson and Muir, “Enforcing Fundamental Values,” 471.
50 “Norway Condemns Hungary NGO Crack-down,” Reuters, 9 September 2014, accessed at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/09/uk-hungary-norway-idUKKBN0H41LU20140909
51 Scheppele, “The Rule of Law,” 560.
52 Sitter, “Absolute Power?”
53 Müller, “The Hungarian Tragedy.”
54 Scheppele, “The Rule of Law.”