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Abstract
Recent scholarship has increasingly focused on the international dimensions of authoritarian rule, and the idea of autocracy promotion has gained considerable academic currency. While the literature on autocracy promotion has identified some clear patterns of external support for autocratic incumbents, it has so far failed to demonstrate that these efforts can best be understood as a unified, coherent set of foreign policies that constitute intentional efforts to promote a particular regime type abroad. This article identifies the key deficiencies of existing treatments of the concept and identifies a roadmap to establish some conceptual clarity on the topic. It advances a “strict” definition of autocracy promotion that requires a clear intent on the part of an external actor to bolster autocracy as a form of political regime as well as an underlying motivation that rests in significant part on an ideological commitment to autocracy itself. It also introduces a new typology that places autocracy promotion within the wider context of the international politics of authoritarian rule.
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank John Gledhill, Jakbob Tolstrup, Sharon Wolchik and the journal referees for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Disclosure statement
Research for this article has been funded by the European Research Council.
Notes on contributor
Oisín Tansey is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the Department of War Studies, King's College London. He is the author of the forthcoming book, The International Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Oxford University Press).
Notes
1. Ambrosio, “Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion”; Koesel and Bunce, “Diffusion-Proofing”; Heydemann and Leenders, “Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience”; Tolstrup, Russia vs. the EU; Bader, China's Foreign Relations and the Survival of Autocracies.
2. Ambrosio, “Democratic States and Authoritarian Firewalls”; Bader et al., “Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy?”; Burnell, “Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?”; Burnell and Schlumberger, “Promoting Democracy–Promoting Autocracy?”; Vanderhill, Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad.
3. Burnell, “Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?”; Ambrosio, Authoritarian Backlash; Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams; Melnykovska et al., “Do Russia and China Promote Autocracy in Central Asia?”; Bader et al., “Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy?”; Vanderhill, Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad.
4. Nodia, “The Revenge of Geopolitics,” 142; Von Soest, “Democracy Prevention”; Tolstrup, “Problems in Studying the International Dimension of Authoritarianism.”
5. Ambrosio, “Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion”; Heydemann and Leenders, “Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience”; Koesel and Bunce, “Diffusion-Proofing.”
6. Morrison, “Nontax Revenue, Social Cleavages, and Authoritarian Stability in Mexico and Kenya.”
7. Kono and Montinola, “Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats?”
8. Diamond, “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession”; Gat, “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers.”
9. Brownlee, Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance; Ambrosio, “Democratic States and Authoritarian Firewalls.”
10. Tolstrup, “Problems in Studying the International Dimension of Authoritarianism.”
11. Burnell, “Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?”; Ambrosio, Authoritarian Backlash; Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams; Melnykovska et al., “Do Russia and China Promote Autocracy in Central Asia?”; Bader et al., “Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy?”; Vanderhill, Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad.
12. Tolstrup, “Studying a Negative External Actor”; Jackson, “The Role of External Factors.”
13. Carothers, “Democracy Aid at 25,” 59; Burnell, Democracy Assistance, 5; Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance,” 48.
14. Whitehead, “Anti-Democracy Promotion.”
15. Burnell, “Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?”
16. Ibid., 5.
17. Vanderhill, Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad.
18. Ibid., 9.
19. Ibid., 8.
20. Melnykovska et al., “Do Russia and China Promote Autocracy in Central Asia?”
21. Ibid., 79.
22. Yakouchyk, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ambitious.”
23. Ibid., 6.
24. Ibid.
25. Gerring, “What Makes a Concept Good?”
26. Ibid., 368–70.
27. Ibid., 370.
28. Ibid., 373, 375; Collier and Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives.”
29. Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics.”
30. Similar conceptual considerations have been used in the debates over the definition of humanitarian intervention, which are more advanced than those relating to autocracy promotion. See Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, Chapter 6; Caney, Justice beyond Borders, 228–9; Bellamy, “Motives, Outcomes, Intent and the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention.”
31. On the rise of “democracy-contingent benefits” in international politics, see Hyde, The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma, Chapter 3.
32. Burnell, “Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?,” 5.
33. Ibid., 6.
34. Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries.
35. Yakouchyk, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ambitious,” 6.
36. Burnell, Democracy Assistance, 5.
37. Vanderhill, Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad, 45.
38. Ibid., 144; Byman, Deadly Connections, 91.
39. Melnykovska et al., “Do Russia and China Promote Autocracy in Central Asia?,” 79.
40. Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, 163.
41. Cummins, “Saudi Arabia Voices Support for Mubarak.”
42. Nordland, “Saudi Arabia Promises to Aid Egypt's Regime.”
43. On the differences between the intentions and motivations of external actors, see Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, 154.
44. For some exceptions see Tolstrup, “Black Knights and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes”; Von Soest, “Democracy Prevention”; Way, “The Limits of Autocracy Promotion.”
45. Sarotte, “China's Fear of Contagion”; Weyland, “The Diffusion of Regime Contention in European Democratization.”
46. Von Soest, “Democracy Prevention.”
47. Brownlee, Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance.
48. Whitehead, “Anti-Democracy Promotion”; Von Soest, “Democracy Prevention”; Nodia, “The Revenge of Geopolitics,” 142.
49. Corrales, “Conflicting Goals in Venezuela's Foreign Policy.”
50. Owen IV, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics, 257.
51. al-Alkim, Dynamics of Arab Foreign Policy-Making.
52. Gause, “Is Saudi Arabia Really Counter-Revolutionary?”
53. Yakouchyk, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ambitious,” 6–7.
54. Burnell, “Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?,” 5.
55. Melnykovska et al., “Do Russia and China Promote Autocracy in Central Asia?,” 77.
56. Way, “The Limits of Autocracy Promotion.”
57. Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad; Finkel et al., “The Effects of US Foreign Assistance”; Crawford, “Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality”; Ethier, “Is Democracy Promotion Effective?”; Knack, “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?”
58. For a similar critique, and an alternative typology that focuses specifically on the role of external actors, see Tolstrup, “Problems in Studying the International Dimension of Authoritarianism”.
59. Weyland, “Theories of Policy Diffusion”; Heydemann and Leenders, “Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience”; Sarotte, “China's Fear of Contagion”; Ambrosio, “Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion.”
60. Boix, “Democracy, Development, and the International System”; McFaul, “The Missing Variable”; Narizny, “Anglo-American Primacy and the Global Spread of Democracy”; Gunitsky, “From Shocks to Waves.”
61. Hurrell, “The International Dimensions of Democratization in Latin America”; Morrison, “Nontax Revenue, Social Cleavages, and Authoritarian Stability in Mexico and Kenya”; Morrison, “Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability”; Li and Reuveny, “Economic Globalization and Democracy.”
62. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism; Tolstrup, Russia vs. the EU; Cameron and Orenstein, “Post-Soviet Authoritarianism”; Sasse, “Linkages and the Promotion of Democracy.”
63. Sarotte, “China's Fear of Contagion.”
64. Heydemann and Leenders, “Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience.”
65. Roessler, “Donor-Induced Democratization and the Privatization of State Violence in Kenya and Rwanda”; Carothers, “The Backlash against Democracy Promotion.”
66. Djankov et al., “The Curse of Aid”; Moss et al., “An Aid-Institutions Paradox?”; Kono and Montinola, “Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats?”
67. Peksen and Drury, “Coercive or Corrosive”; Escribà-Folch, “Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure Spending.”
68. This definition is adapted from Byman's definition of international sponsorship of terrorism; Byman, Deadly Connections, 10.
69. Melnykovska et al., “Do Russia and China Promote Autocracy in Central Asia?”; Yakouchyk, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ambitious”; Vanderhill, Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad.
70. Tsygankov, Russia's Foreign Policy, 119; Nodia, “The Revenge of Geopolitics,” 142–3.
71. Way, “The Limits of Autocracy Promotion.”
72. Owen IV, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics.
73. Bauerkämper, “Transnational Fascism”; McDermott and Agnew, The Comintern.
74. Kramer, “Stalin, Soviet Policy, and the Consolidation of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe, 1944–1953.”
75. Tismaneanu, Stalinism Revisited, 3–4.
76. Zubok, A Failed Empire, x, 21; Applebaum, Iron Curtain, Introduction.
77. Owen IV, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics, 256–61.
78. Gerring, “What Makes a Concept Good?,” 378.
79. Brownlee, Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance, 167.
80. Odinius and Kuntz, “The Limits of Authoritarian Solidarity.”