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ABSTRACT
What determines the balance that democratizing constitutions strike between majority empowerment and individual rights? Some constitutions deliberately handicap state power to forestall threats to liberty, while others try to empower the government to hold the country together. We answer this question in the context of post-Arab Spring constitution-making, hypothesizing a U-shaped relationship between polarization among politically significant factions and net majority-empowering provisions in constitutions of new democracies, a relationship mediated by breadth of inclusion in the constitutional drafting process. We test the hypothesis through a controlled case comparison of Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, the three Arab-majority countries in which protestors successfully toppled authoritarian regimes.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Ester Cross is a Master's student in International Relations at Oxford University.
Jason Sorens is Lecturer of Government at Dartmouth College.
Notes
1. Elster, “Deliberation and Constitution Making,” 118.
2. Ibid., 117.
3. See Arato, Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy; Segura and Bejarano, “¡Ni una asamblea más sin nosotros!”; Brown, “Reason, Interest, Rationality, and Passion in Constitution Drafting.”
4. Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring”; Campante and Chor, “Why Was the Arab World Poised for Revolution?”; Stepan and Linz, “Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring’”; Volpi, “Explaining (And Re-Explaining) Political Change in the Middle East.”
5. Stepan and Linz, “Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring.'”
6. The Federalist No. 51 in Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, The Federalist Papers.
7. Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering.
8. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy.
9. Tsebelis, Veto Players.
10. This is not to say that the constitutional drafting process lacks its own rules or procedures. For instance, the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly adopted internal rules for proposing and adopting constitutional provisions. But those rules themselves, along with the decision to include or exclude various factions from the Constituent Assembly, had to be decided.
11. Carey and Shugart, Executive Decree Authority; Pereira et al., “Under What Conditions Do Presidents Resort.”
12. Brownlee et al., Modest Harvest.
13. Brown, “Bargaining and Imposing Constitutions,” 75.
14. Elkins et al., Endurance of National Constitutions.
15. Brown, “Bargaining and Imposing Constitutions.”
16. Tepe, “Perils of Polarization and Religious Parties.”
17. Brown, “Reason, Interest, Rationality, and Passion,” 684.
18. Segura and Bejarano, “¡Ni una asamblea.”
19. Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, 202.
20. Blount and Ginsburg, “Participation in Constitutional Design,” 25.
21. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market.
22. Toft, Geography of Ethnic Violence.
23. Elkins et al., The Endurance of National Constitutions.
24. Schwarz, “Political Economy of State-Formation.”
25. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”; Tsui, “More Oil, Less Democracy.”
26. Schwarz, “Political Economy of State-Formation.”
27. Brownlee et al., Modest Harvest, 97.
28. Ibid., 165.
29. Yahya, Beyond Tunisia's Constitution.
30. Szmolka, “Political Change in North Africa and the Arab Middle East.”
31. Grote, New 2014 Tunisian Constitution.
32. Cavatorta and Merone, “Moderation Through Exclusion?”; Brownlee et al., Modest Harvest.
33. Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization.
34. Harb, “The Egyptian Military in Politics.”
35. Tadros, “Egypt Military's Economic Empire”; Brownlee et al., Modest Harvest.
36. Barany, “The Role of the Military.”
37. Mahdi, “Enough!”
38. Naguib Sawiris Launches Liberal Party; Egypt's Christians Prepare for New Political Climate.
39. Brownlee et al., Modest Harvest.
40. Mahdi, “Enough!”
41. Brownlee et al., Modest Harvest.
42. Albrecht, Egypt's 2012 Constitution.
43. Six More Constituent Assembly Members Resign.
44. Dagher, “Egypt Constitution Sparks Outrage.”
45. Ashour, “Collusion to Crackdown,” 14.
46. Blount and Ginsburg, “Participation in Constitutional Design,” 23.
47. Kirkpatrick, “Army Ousts Egypt's President; Morsi is Taken into Military Custody.”
48. Khalil, “Egypt's Way Forward: New Transition Plan Draws Immediate Fire.”
49. Ottaway, “The Egyptian Constitution.”
50. Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya; Vandewalle, “After Qaddafi.”
51. Libya Tribes: Who's Who.
52. Mezran, “Constitutionalism and Islam in Libya.”
53. Ibid., 522.
54. Stephen and Harding, “Libyan PM Snubs Islamists.”
55. Black, “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.”
56. NTC Hands Power to Newly Elected Assembly.
57. Libyan Protestors Storm Government Headquarters.
58. Vandewalle, “After Qaddafi.”
59. Human Rights Watch, “Murder Brigades of Misrata.”
60. Scores Dead in Southern Libya Tribal Clashes; Harding, “Libya Beset by Ethnic Tension.”
61. Armed Men Surround Ministry in Libya.
62. Shuaib, “Hifter to Face ‘Decisive Confrontation’.”
63. That it should come to this.
64. Vandewalle, “After Qaddafi.”
65. Laessing, “Libya's runaway parliament seeks refuge.”
66. DePauw and Martin, “Legislative Party Discipline.”
67. Ashour, “Collusion to Crackdown,” 16. Ashour sees the military's “superiority complex” and factional politics as key complements to this rationalist explanation of the coup.
68. Laub, “Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood.”