Military loyalty and the failure of democratization in Africa: how ethnic armies shape the capacity of presidents to defy term limits

ABSTRACT

The military plays a crucial role in furthering or hindering democratization in Africa. Beyond direct intervention through coups, armies more subtly and perniciously condition the political trajectory of states through their loyalty. Leaders who can rely on unwavering military support for protection against internal unrest face fewer risks and greater chances of success in rolling back liberalization and entrenching authoritarian practices. Constructing ethnic armies, which tie the fate of soldiers to the regime, is a profoundly powerful way to affect such loyalty. Through a mixed methods analysis of presidential bids to challenge term limits, including a paired comparison of Senegal and Cameroon, I demonstrate that ethnic armies triple the chances of success and, in so doing, encourage defiance in the first place: 82% of presidents backed by ethnic armies attempt to defy their constitutions and extend their hold on power, as opposed to 31% of other leaders. Conversely, ethnically diverse armies are far more likely to defend constitutional politics and constrain leaders to abide by term limits. The ethnic composition of the military thus critically shapes the prospects for African liberalization.

KEYWORDS:

• Term limits
• civil-military relations
• ethnic politics
• African politics
• Senegal
• Cameroon

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Aedan Collins and Kirsty MacIntosh for research assistance. I would also like to thank Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Alexander Lanoszka, and two anonymous reviewers for feedback on prior drafts.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Note on contributor

Kristen A. Harkness is a lecturer in International Relations at the University of St Andrews. After receiving her PhD in Comparative Politics and International Relations from Princeton University, she held a Postdoctoral Fellowship at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

Notes

1. Democracy is a heavily contested concept. I focus instead on liberalization or democratization, terms that denote the transition away from authoritarian practices towards greater respect for political, civil, and human freedoms.

2. Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, 10.

3. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016. Larry Diamond argues that 25 democracies have broken down since 2000, with 32% of these in Africa. Diamond, “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession,” 144.

4. Other studies reverse the relationship and analyse the effect of democratization on coups, largely arguing that increased liberalization diminishes the frequency of coup attempts. See Clark, “The Decline of the African Military Coup”; Lindberg and Clark, “Does Democratization Reduce the Risk of Military Interventions”; and Wobig, “Defending Democracy with International Law.” Additionally, a literature with older roots, focused primarily on Latin America and southern Europe but with extensions to other regions, analysed the conditions under which military regimes could be coaxed out of power via pacted transitions and the consequences of these pacts, which often included amnesty provisions and an institutionalized political voice for the military, on democratic consolidation. See Barany, “Democratic Consolidation and the Military”; Hagopian, “Democracy by Undemocratic Means?”; Luckham, “Democracy and the Military”; O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 39–40; and Shah, “Constraining Consolidation.”

5. Collier, “Let Us Now Praise Coups.”

6. Thyne and Powell, “Coup d’État or Coup d’Autocracy?”

7. Marinov and Goemans, “Coups and Democracy.”

8. Gürsoy, “The Changing Role of the Military in Turkish Politics.”

9. Tusalem, “Bringing the Military Back In.”

10. Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State.”

11. Yarwood, “The Power of Protest,” 51.

12. See Carter, “How International Pressure Can Help,” 38–41; Maltz, “The Case for Presidential Term Limits”; Posner and Young, “Term Limits and the Transfer of Power,” 12–13; and Riedl, “The Advantages – and Drawbacks – of Presidential Term Limits.”

13. Posner and Young, “Term Limits and the Transfer of Power.”

14. Freedom House, “Burundi”; Human Rights Watch, “Deadly Police Response to Protests”; and Niyungeko and Bilefsky, “Burundi Government Says It Has Crushed Coup Attempt.”

15. Freedom House, “Burundi”; Human Rights Watch. “Abductions, Killings, Spread Fear”; Human Rights Watch, “President’s Speech Instills Fear”; Human Rights Watch, “Spate of Arbitrary Arrests, Torture”; Mail and Guardian, “Burundi Crisis Spreads Outside the Capital”; Ssuuna and Kaneza, “Burundi Army Defections Show Dangerous Ethnic Divisions”; and Vircoulon, “Insights from the Burundian Crisis.”

16. Eizenga, “Burkina Faso Elections Mark Turning Point”; Fessy, “How Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaore Sparked His Own Downfall”; Freedom House, “Burkina Faso”; Henshaw, “Burkina Faso’s Military Coup Overturned”; Taoko et al., “Violent Protests Topple Government in Burkina Faso”; and The Telegraph, “Burkina Faso Coup – As It Happened.”

17. Dulani, “African Publics Strongly Support Term Limits,” 3.

18. Posner and Young, “Term Limits and the Transfer of Power.”

19. Svolik, Politics of Authoritarian Rule, 2.

20. Ibid., 10.

21. Svolik, “Contracting on Violence,” 767; and Svolik, Politics of Authoritarian Rule, 125–127.

22. Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 46–50; and Chenoweth and Stephan, “Why Civil Resistance Works,” 13.

23. Barany, “Comparing the Arab Revolts.”

24. De Bruin, “Preventing Coups d’État.”

25. Powell et al., “Give Them Toys.”

26. Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State.”

27. Adekson, “Army in a Multi-Ethnic Society,” 154; and Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, 105–106.

28. Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State,” 592–593. See also Decalo, Civil-Military Relations in Africa; Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers; Goldsworthy, “Civilian Control of the Military in Black Africa”; and Harkness, “Security Assistance in Africa.”

29. Hale, The Foundations of Ethnic Politics, 33–40.

30. See Beblawi and Luciani, The Rentier State; Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”; and Ross “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse.”

31. Posner and Young, “Term Limits and the Transfer of Power,” Table 1.

32. Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State,” 594.

33. This is a rough measurement instrument that cannot distinguish between degrees of ethnic stacking across leaders. While more fine-grained data is desirable, the contemporary time frame of analysis means that internal military and other archival records remain classified, precluding its collection.

34. N’Diaye, The Challenge of Institutionalizing Civilian Control, 130–131; and Hornsby, Kenya: A History Since Independence, 712–713.

35. Posner and Young, “Term Limits and the Transfer of Power.”

36. Leys and Saul, Namibia’s Liberation Struggle, 58.

37. Yarwood, “The Power of Protest.”

38. Clark, “Imperialism, Independence, and Islam,” 160; and Fatton, “Clientalism and Patronage in Senegal.”

39. Galvan, “Political Turnover and Social Change,” 59; Nunley, “African Elections Database”; and Villalón, “Cautious Democrats,” 312.

40. Dahou and Foucher, “Senegal since 2000,” 21; Freedom House, “Senegal”; and Kelly, “Senegal: What Will Turnover Bring?,” 121.

41. Kelly, “Senegal: What Will Turnover Bring?,” 127–128.

42. Diop and Paye, “The Army and Political Power in Senegal,” 319; Keegan, World Armies, 514–515; Markovitz, Léopold Sédar Senghor and the Politics of Negritude, 111–113; and Nelson, Area Handbook for Senegal, 340.

43. Ibid, 126–128.

44. Freedom House, “Senegal.”

45. For example, observers were despatched to over 11,000 polling stations to observe the proceedings and text-message vote counts to volunteer collation centres in Dakar. In this way, civil society activists and journalists could monitor local vote counts and observe any attempts to alter tallies as the votes were aggregated. The Economist, “Lucky Macky.”

46. Ibid.

47. Konings, “The Post-Colonial State and Economic and Political Reforms in Cameroon,” 248; and Takougang, “The Nature of Politics in Cameroon,” 76.

48. DeLancey, “The Construction of the Cameroon Political System,” 17; and Minorities at Risk 2009.

49. Gros, “The Hard Lessons of Cameroon,” 122; Konings, “The Post-Colonial State and Economic and Political Reforms in Cameroon,” 251; and Minorities at Risk 2009.

50. Gros, “The Hard Lessons of Cameroon,” 117–120; and Takougang, “The Post-Ahidjo Era in Cameroon,” 296.

51. Gros, “The Hard Lessons of Cameroon,” 121.

52. Opalo, “African Elections,” 88.

53. Freedom House, “Cameroon.”

54. Opalo, “African Elections,” 80.