Meeting the Dalai Lama and perceptions of democracy in China: a quasi-natural experiment

ABSTRACT

How does the international human rights community affect the likelihood of democratization? Scholarship on Chinese citizens’ preferences about their political system has not explored the importance of the external environment, perhaps surprising given the extensive foreign pressure on China’s authoritarian system over the last 30 years. I use a quasi-natural experiment around the meeting between President Obama and the Dalai Lama in 2011 to examine the impact of foreign pressure on citizens’ perceptions of democracy in China in real time. I show that the meeting significantly increased the Chinese public’s belief that their country is democratic, with those of above average patriotism over 11 percentage points more likely to believe China is democratic in the five days following the meeting than before. The findings suggest that some kinds of external pressure may help to increase satisfaction with authoritarian rule, ultimately boosting autocrats’ ability to hold on to power.

KEYWORDS:

• China
• perceptions of democracy
• human rights
• Dalai Lama
• United States
• public opinion

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Wang, “Public Support for Democracy.”

2 Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma.

3 Lu and Shi, “Battle of Ideas.”

4 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization; Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre; Nathan and Shi, “Cultural Requisites for Democracy”; Wright, Accepting Authoritarianism; Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience”; Truex, Making Autocracy Work; Chen, Pan, and Xu, “Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness.”

5 See, for example, Kritenbrink, “U.S. Policy Toward the People’s Republic of China.”

6 Author’s database. Data available upon request.

7 Nathan and Shi, “Cultural Requisites for Democracy”; Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization; Wang, “Public Support for Democracy”; Han and Chen, “Who Supports Democracy?”; Wu, Chang, and Pan. “Does China’s Middle Class Prefer (Liberal) Democracy?”

8 Wang, “Public Support for Democracy.”

9 Chen, A Middle Class without Democracy; Nathan, “The Puzzle of the Chinese Middle Class.”

10 Chen and Lu, “Democratization”; Tang, Woods, and Zhao, “Attitudes of the Chinese Middle Class.”

11 Smith, “Legitimate Grievances.”

12 Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Lu and Shi, “Battle of Ideas.”

16 The view espoused by liberal elites like Yu Keping, “Democracy is a Good Thing.”

17 Mao, People’s Democratic Dictatorship.

18 Wright, Accepting Authoritarianism; Wang, “Public Support for Democracy.”

19 Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience.”

20 Truex, Making Autocracy Work.

21 Chen, Pan, and Xu, “Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness.”

22 Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience.” See Truex, “Consultative Authoritarianism.”

23 Hyde and Lamb, “Microlevel Consequences.”

24 McEntire et al., “Human Rights Organizations.”

25 Wallace, “International Law and Public Attitudes Toward Torture”; Chilton, “Influence of Human Rights Agreements.”

26 Davis, Murdie, and Steinmetz, “Makers and Shapers”; Ausderan, “Human Rights Perceptions.”

27 Bush and Jamal, “Anti-Americanism.”

28 Marinov, “International Actors.”

29 Pan and Xu, “China’s Ideological Spectrum,” 1.

30 http://www.asianbarometer.org

31 See appendix.

32 “Statement of US Support for Democratic Dissidents,” White House Press Secretary, 1 May 2008.

33 “Reagan Meets 96 Soviet Dissidents,” Los Angeles Times, 31 May 1988.

34 Sharansky, “The Dissident Choice.”

35 “Readout of the President’s Meeting with His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama,” White House, 21 February 2014.

36 “China Opposes Obama’s Meeting with the Dalai Lama,” Global Times, 16 July 2011.

37 “The President’s Meeting with His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama,” White House Press Office, 17 July 2011.

38 “Barack Obama Meets the Dalai Lama at the White House,” Guardian, 16 July 2011.

39 In Pakistan for example: “Obama Meets with Dalai Lama Despite Chinese Opposition,” Express Tribune, 17 July 2011.

40 Chinese time: “China Calls on US to Cancel Dalai Lama Meeting,” Reuters, 15 July 2011.

41 “China Opposes Obama’s Meeting,” Global Times.

42 “Trying to Cover Up Interference,” People’s Daily, 17 July 2011.

43 “Obama Meets Dalai Lama,” Global Times, 17 July 2011.

44 The y-axis in Figure 1 is a comparative indicator of search volume. A score of 61 for 达赖 (Dalai) on 18 July compares to 36 for 胡锦涛 (Hu).

45 Davis, Murdie, and Steinmetz, “Makers and Shapers.”

46 Tajfel, Differentiation.

47 “As Long as Tibet is Stable, Dalai is Just a Pawn,” Global Times, 18 July 2011.

48 Ibid.

49 “Obama Meets the Dalai, China Expresses Indignation,” Global Times, 18 July 2011.

50 Ibid.

51 de Hoog, “Processing of Social Identity Threats.”

52 Sinclair and Kunda, “Reactions to a Black Professional.”

53 Branscombe et al., “Intragroup and Intergroup Evaluation.”

54 Sherman et al., “The Group as a Resource”; Lüders et al., “Between the Lines”; Spencer-Rodgers et al., “The Power of Affirming Group Values.”

55 Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion; Dinesen and Jæger, “The Effect of Terror on Institutional Trust.”

56 Davis and Silver, “Civil Liberties vs. Security.”

57 Skocpol, “9/11 and Terror.”

58 Castano et al., “Who May Enter?”

59 Denis-Remis, Lebraty, and Philippe, “2008 Anti-French Demonstrations.”

60 “China’s Foreign Diplomats and Consulates Are Attacked by Tibetan Independence Elements,” People’s Daily, 22 March 2008.

61 “Chinese Web Users Give Sarkozy a Roasting,” Observer, 12 May 2008.

62 For example, Wang, “Public Support for Democracy.”

63 Not including household income, as the number who refused to answer is high, and significantly reduces observations. Including this variable makes little difference.

64 Hainmueller, “Entropy Balancing for Causal Effects.”

65 Appendix Table 1.

66 Appendix Table 5.

67 Appendix Table 13.

68 Appendix Table 10.

69 Appendix Table 11.

70 Appendix Table 12.

71 Appendix Table 15.

72 Appendix Table 21.

73 Appendix Table 6.

74 Appendix Table 8.

75 Appendix table 7.

76 Appendix Table 1.

77 Hainmueller, “Entropy Balancing for Causal Effects.”

78 Appendix Table 9.

79 Appendix Table 22.

80 Appendix Table 3.

81 Appendix Table 4.

82 Appendix Table 19.

83 Appendix Table 19.

84 Appendix Table 20.

85 Appendix Table 20.

86 “Xinjiang’s Hotan Police Station Attacked by a Mob,” Xinhua, 19 July 2011.

87 “14 Rioters Shot Down in Xinjiang Attack,” China Daily, 20 July 2011.

88 Controlling for both interactions with national pride, the meeting and patriotism interaction remains positive and significant, while the attacks and patriotism interaction is negative and non-significant. Appendix Table 16.

89 Appendix Table 17.

90 Davis and Silver, “Civil Liberties vs. Security”; Merolla and Zechmeister, Democracy at Risk.

91 Jiang and Yang, “Lying or Believing?”

92 Neither for support nor perceptions. Appendix Table 23.

93 For “attending a protest march or demonstration.” Appendix Table 24.

94 See King, Pan, and Roberts, “Censorship in China.”

95 “Deep Care: A Great Leap Forward,” People’s Daily, 17 July 2011.

96 Bullock et al. “Partisan Bias.”

97 “Actively Promote the Military Academy Education,” People’s Daily, 9 July 2011.

98 “First Half-year GDP Grew by 9.6%,” People’s Daily, 9 July 2011.

99 Bullock et al., “Partisan Bias.”

100 For example, Schaffner and Roche, “Misinformation and Motivated Reasoning.”

101 Appendix Table 25.

102 Appendix Table 25.

103 Appendix Table 26.

104 Appendix Table 27.

105 Appendix Table 14.

106 Zaller, “The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.”

107 Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience”; Li, “The End of the CCP’s Resilient Authoritarianism?”; Gandhi and Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions.”

108 Weiss, “Popular Protest”; Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed.”

109 See Kinzelbach, “Resisting the Power of Human Rights”; Keck and Sikkink, “Activists Beyond Borders,” 118.

110 Kent, “China, the United Nations, and Human Rights.”

111 “Tibet Ordered to Ramp Up Propaganda Education against Dalai Lama,” Associated Press, 3 April 2008.

112 Western criticism of the arrest of activist Xu Zhiyong was featured in media accounts of his arrest: “Xu Zhiyong Sentenced to 4 Years,” Global Times, 27 January 2014.

113 “Supporting Chinese Dissidents: The West’s Conspiracy,” Global Times, 28 January 2014.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jamie J. Gruffydd-Jones

Jamie J. Gruffydd-Jones is a doctoral candidate in Security Studies at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.