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ABSTRACT
How can populists potentially extend their time in power? Departing from the notion that populism is a “thin-centered” ideology, the article argues that as long as populists manage to continuously (a) reconstruct “the elite” and “the people,” (b) reinforce the antagonistic relationship between “the corrupt elite” and “the pure people,” and (c) remodel popular sovereignty, it is likely that they can lengthen the life expectancy of their regime. Analyzing the case of Hungary starting in 2010, the article demonstrates that Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán was successful with respect to this “three-course approach.” He managed to reconstruct “the elite” from “representatives of the past” to a “homo sorosensus,” and widened the scope of “the people” from “we, Hungarians” to “we, the sovereign nations.” Similarly, Orbán renewed the conflict between the ever changing elite and “the people,” turning from economic-driven to identity politics. Finally, Orbán reinvented a toolkit of new, innovative measures that reflected a preference for greater popular sovereignty. The article builds on an analysis of Orbán’s selected speeches and corresponding political and legal measures initiated by the regime that formed an integrative part of the “three-course approach” in Hungary.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Mudde, “Populist Zeitgeist,” 563.
2. Heinisch, “Success in Opposition.”
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4. Albertazzi and McDonnell, Populists in Power.
5. Stanley, “The Thin Ideology of Populism.”
6. Laclau, On Populist Reason.
7. Although the discursive and ideological approaches have been conflated before (cf. Kaltwasser, “Latin American Populism,” 496; Hawkins and Kaltwasser, “The Ideational Approach to Populism,” 514), the Laclauian theory of populism differs from the ideational approach on three separate accounts. First, while Laclau sees the emergence of populism as a liberating force that could bring about the end of a liberal political status quo, the ideational approach does not take such a normative stance. Furthermore, while Laclau addresses the issue of emergence of populism in opposition, the ideational approach allows to study populism in power without the normative, liberating pressure. Secondly, for Laclau, the logic of equivalence’ is necessary to mobilize around a transformative political project, and populism is therefore driven by a (popular as opposed to democratic) demand, Arditi, “Populism is Hegemony is Politics? on Ernesto Laclau's On Populist Reason,” 489, where the supply side (i.e. a crisis in the old system) is only derivative rather than constitutive to the process (Ibid., 494). In contrast, the ideational approach allows other types of redemptive discourses as well, and rather focuses on the supply side of the discourse which is often constituted by populists themselves. Thirdly, “Laclau's notion of a discourse blends the substance of populist ideas with how they actually play out in the political sphere” (Hawkins and Kaltwasser, “The Ideational Approach to Populism,” 516). The ideational approach analytically separates the existence of a populist language from its effects on politics. For these reasons the article is built on the ideational approach over Laclau's, although it still relies on discourse analysis.
8. Mudde and Kaltwasser, Populism – A Very Short Introduction.
9. Cf. Batory, “Populists in Government?”
10. Kaltwasser and Taggart, “Dealing with Populists in Government.”
11. Hawkins and Kaltwasser, “What the (Ideational) Study of Populism Can Teach Us.”
12. Moffitt and Tormey, “Rethinking Populism”; Aslanidis, “Is Populism an Ideology?”
13. Kaltwasser and Taggart, “Dealing with Populists in Government,” 204.
14. Stanley, “The Thin Ideology of Populism”; Hawkins and Kaltwasser, “The Ideational Approach to Populism.”
15. Mudde, “Populist Zeitgeist,” 543.
16. Abts and Rummens, “Populism Versus Democracy.”
17. Kaltwasser, “Latin-American Populism.”
18. Canovan, “Trust the People!”
19. Castanho Silva et al., “The Elite is up to Something,” 425.
20. Aslanidis, “Is Populism an Ideology?”
21. Moffitt and Tormey, “Rethinking Populism,” 391.
22. Mudde, “Populist Zeitgeist,” 560.
23. Brubaker, “Between Nationalism and Civilizationism.”
24. Ibid.
25. Abts and Rummens, “Populism Versus Democracy,” 417.
26. Kaltwasser, “Latin-American Populism,” 501.
27. De la Torre, “Populism and the Politics of the Extraordinary.”
28. Hadiz and Chryssogelos, “Populism in World Politics.”
29. Rupnik, “From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backlash.”
30. Moffitt and Tormey, “Rethinking Populism,” 391.
31. A term used in a public lecture by Michael Ignatieff, entitled Academic Freedom and the New Populism at LSE, February 8, 2018.
32. Ivaldi et al., “Varieties of Populism.”
33. Brubaker, “Between Nationalism and Civilizationism.”
34. Laclau, “Why Constructing a People is the Main Task of Radical Politics.”
35. Cf. Hawkins and Kaltwasser, “What the (Ideational) Study of Populism Can Teach Us.”
36. Moffitt and Tormey, “Rethinking Populism,” 389.
37. Brubaker, “Between Nationalism and Civilizationism.”
38. Müller, “The People must be Extracted from Within the People.”
39. In case of Hungary see Kreko and Enyedi, “Orbán's Laboratory of Illiberalism.”
40. Moffitt and Tormey, “Rethinking Populism,” 391.
41. Rico et al., “The Emotional Underpinnings of Populism,” 2.
42. Montgomery, “Post-Truth Politics?”
43. Coy and Woehrle, Social Conflicts.
44. Brubaker, “Between Nationalism and Civilizationism,” 1193.
45. Kalyvas, “Popular Sovereignty.”
46. Müller, “The People must be Extracted from Within the People,” 489.
47. Moffitt and Tormey, “Rethinking Populism,” 392.
48. Kaltwasser, “The Ambivalence of Populism.”
49. Viktor Orbán came back to power after a landslide electoral victory in 2010. Since then he secured additional two consecutive victories in parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2018. His politics has often been labelled as populist ever since 2010, although his political roots can be considered rather mainstream. Nevertheless, he is one of few populist leaders around the world who managed to extend his time in government.
50. Becker, “The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Hungary.”
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61. “We won’t yield to IMF”, Hungary says in ad campaign. The Wall Street Journal, October 9, 2012.
62. Fidesz launches smear campaign targeting opposition leaders. The Budapest Beacon, February 2, 2018.
63. Hungarian media law triggers EU debate on press freedom. Euractiv.com, February 23, 2011.
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65. “Let’s Stop Brussels!”: Here is the new National Consultation. The Budapest Beacon, April 3, 2017.
66. In a survey done by the close-to-government pollster, Századvég, 53% of the people considered the “Soros Network” rather harmful for Hungary. https://szazadveg.hu/hu/kutatasok/az-alapitvany-kutatasai/piackutatas-kozvelemeny-kutatas/a-tobbseg-kritikus-soros-gyorgy-szervezeteivel-szemben. Last accessed July 7, 2018.
67. Thousands of Hungarians rally to back embattled PM Orban. BBC News, January 21, 2012.
68. Orban loses his referendum gamble, remains defiant. Euractiv.com, October 3, 2016.
69. A loose cooperation between the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
70. Juhasz et al., Refugees, Asylum and Migration.
71. In a poll made by the government-friendly think tank, Nézőpont in October 2010, 78% of Fidesz voters agreed with the introduction of special taxes, compared to 68% of the total population. http://nezopontintezet.hu/analysis/kormanyparti-ellenzekiek-2/. Last accessed: July 7, 2018.
72. http://www.webaudit.hu/object.8a6eab8d-ef69-4c3e-a040-7c75d6877b32.ivy. Last accessed: July 7, 2018.
73. Laszlo, Ismeretek és attitűdök, 13.
74. http://www.median.hu/printcikk.ivy?artid=1abd034f-eb44-4105-9e48-0794bd1bf60c. Last accessed: July 5, 2018.
75. Barat, “Populist Discourses.”
76. A survey carried out by the Závecz Research shows that it is mainly Fidesz voters who participated in the national consultations while non-Fidesz voters tend to abstain from sending the forms back to the government. https://index.hu/belfold/2017/05/12/csak_a_fideszesek_hajlandoak_konzultalni_a_kormannyal_a_tobbseget_zavarja_az_egesz/. Last accessed: July 7, 2018.
77. Molnar, “Civil Society.”
78. A survey carried out by close-to-government pollster, Századvég. https://szazadveg.hu/hu/kutatasok/az-alapitvany-kutatasai/piackutatas-kozvelemeny-kutatas/a-soros-jelenseg-a-kozvelemenyben. Last accessed: July 7, 2018.
79. In a much debated poll it was also shown that 81% of Fidesz voters thought that the Party of George Soros, which does not exist, was going to run in the 2018 elections but would not win. Only 12% knew that such a party did not exist. https://zoom.hu/hir/2018/01/29/a-pirezek-utan-a-soros-part-letezeseben-is-hisznek-a-magyarok/. last accessed: July 7, 2018.
80. Még a fideszesek sem hisznek Soros “ördögi tervében.” Zoom.hu, February 12, 2018.
81. Majtenyi et al., Constitutional Othering.
82. Brubaker, “Between Nationalism and Civilizationism,” 1207.
83. Wolkenstein, “What Can We Hold against Populism?”
84. Laszlo, Ismeretek és attitűdök, 16.
85. http://www.median.hu/printcikk.ivy?artid=1abd034f-eb44-4105-9e48-0794bd1bf60c. Last accessed: July 5, 2018.
86. The question of the referendum was: “Do you want the European Union to be able to mandate the obligatory resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens into Hungary even without the approval of the National Assembly?”
87. www.project28.eu
88. Hawkins and Kaltwasser, “What the (Ideational) Study of Populism Can Teach Us.”
89. Mudde, “Three Decades of Populist Radical Right,” 11.
90. Kaltwasser and Taggart, “Dealing with Populists in Government.”
91. Taggart and Kaltwasser, “Dealing with Populists in Government,” 356.
92. Batory, “Populists in Government?”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Robert Csehi
Robert Csehi has been a Lecturer and Post-Doc Researcher at the Chair of European and Global Governance at the Hochschule für Politik München since January 2018. His area of interest involves comparative and European politics. More specifically, he studies comparative federalism, European integration theory, European economic governance and democratic developments of the EU. His previous research involvements include the FP7 bEUcitizen, and the H2020 EMU Choices projects which both analyzed different aspects of the euro crisis. He received his PhD from Central European University and holds an MA in international relations and economics from Corvinus University in Budapest. He worked as a Visiting Professor at CEU’s School of Public Policy and as a researcher at CEU’s Center for European Union Research from 2014 to 2017. His latest work appeared in the Journal of European Public Policy.