Veto power and power-sharing: insights from Burundi (2000–2018)

ABSTRACT

Veto power is a key institutional pillar of consociational power-sharing. However, the literature is divided on its impact for institutional functionality. While the founding father of consociational theory, Arend Lijphart, expects veto rights to be exercised sparingly by segmental elites, more recent scholarship emphasizes the need for restrictions (in terms of veto players, veto issues, veto points and procedure) in order to avoid abusive and disruptive veto practice. Burundi’s transition from ethnic conflict to ethnic pacification was strongly based on the use of military and political power-sharing, including consociationalism. This article examines the design of veto rights and their practice in Burundi over the past two decades. The analysis confirms that the institutional design of veto power matters, but it counters the hypothesis that a too enabling veto design induces the abuse of veto rights and disrupts consociational functionality. The Burundi case-study shows that the impact and “shelf-life” of veto rights are best understood by taking into consideration the intersection of veto power with other power-sharing institutions and practices, both formal and informal.

KEYWORDS:

• Burundi
• consociationalism
• mutual veto
• functionality
• institutional design
• ethnic conflict management

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

ORCID

Allison McCulloch http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8670-9496

Stef Vandeginste http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2349-837X

Notes

1 Sullivan, “The Missing Pillars,” 88.

2 See, i.e. Reyntjens, “Burundi: Institutionalizing Ethnicity,” 27–50; Wolpe, Making Peace after Genocide, 70.

3 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 25.

4 Lijphart, “The Power-Sharing Approach,” 491–509.

5 Ram and Strøm, “Mutual Veto,” 344.

6 Lemarchand, “Consociationalism and Power Sharing,” 12.

7 Raffoul, “The Politics of Association,” 8.

8 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 37.

9 McEvoy, “We Forbid!,” 253–277.

10 McGarry and O’Leary, “Iraq’s Constitution,” 670–698.

11 Horowitz, “Ethnic Power Sharing” 8–10; Stojanović, “Political Marginalization of ‘Others’,” 343.

12 Mitchell, “Extremist Outbidding,” 403.

13 Roeder and Rothchild, “Power Sharing as Impediment,” 9.

14 Horowitz, “Ethnic Power Sharing,” 7.

15 McEvoy, “We Forbid,” 263.

16 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies; Horowitz, “Ethnic Power Sharing”.

17 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 37.

18 Bieber, “Power-Sharing After Yugoslavia,” 95.

19 McEvoy, “We Forbid,” 255.

20 McCulloch, “The Use and Abuse of Veto Rights,” 736.

21 Van Eck, Burundi Report, 6.

22 Nyangoma was one of the leading figures of Melchior Ndadaye’s FRODEBU party. After Ndadaye’s assassination, he established the CNDD (National Council for the Defence of Democracy), the predominantly Hutu rebel movement of which the main break-away faction, the CNDD-FDD, was led by current President Pierre Nkurunziza from 2001 onwards.

23 Buyoya, Mission Possible, 135.

24 International Crisis Group, The Mandela Effect, 27.

25 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 37.

26 Horowitz, “Ethnic Power Sharing,” 8.

27 Vandeginste, “Power-sharing in Burundi,” 175.

28 Schneckener, “Making Power-Sharing Work,” 221. To define indirect veto power, Schneckener refers to specific conditions that have to be met for legislation to pass in parliament (which is the case in Burundi), such as the principle of double majority (not required in Burundi).

29 Burundians who identify themselves as Ganwa, Waswahili or non-ethnic citizens (including naturalized Burundians) can only run for elected office as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa candidates. Ganwa (descendants of the monarch) mostly run as Tutsi. Ethnicity is normally determined by patrilineal descent, although there are some (rare) exceptions. For instance, the First Vice-President after the 2015 elections, Gaston Sindimwo, has a Congolese father and Burundian Tutsi mother and is therefore considered Tutsi.

30 Vandeginste, “Political Representation of Minorities,” 7.

31 These estimated demographic proportions, not based on any post-colonial census, are generally used both in academic literature and in policy documents. They were also used during the Arusha peace talks, with some Hutu parties denouncing the proposed over-representation of the Tutsi minority.

32 Lijphart, Thinking About Democracy, 67.

33 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 37.

34 International Crisis Group, Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections, 3.

35 Vandeginste, “Legal Loopholes,” 43.

36 Curtis, “The International Peacebuilding Paradox,” 72.

37 Raffoul, “The Politics of Association,” 11.

38 Vandeginste, Stones Left Unturned, 398–401.

39 Rufyikiri, “The Post-wartime Trajectory,” 235.

40 Vandeginste, “Legal Loopholes,” 52.

41 Présidence de la République du Burundi, Mémorandum.

42 Rufyikiri, “The Post-wartime Trajectory,” 220–48.

43 Separate Hutu and Tutsi nomination processes, in combination with a 50/50% Hutu-Tutsi quota system and other more consociational instruments is also what the predominantly Tutsi MORENA party (in exile) proposed as the solution for the 2015 crisis. MORENA, Manifeste, 8.

44 McCulloch, “Pathways from Power-sharing,” 422.

45 Wilen et al., “Sending Peacekeepers Abroad,” 308.

46 Human Rights Watch, We Will Beat You, 16.

47 Rufyikiri, “The Post-wartime Trajectory,” 235.

48 McEvoy, “We Forbid,” 255; Kelleher, “Minority Veto Rights,” 1; Bieber, “Power-Sharing After Yugoslavia,” 95.

49 Lijphart, Thinking About Democracy, 37.

50 McEvoy, “We Forbid,” 272.

51 Ram and Strøm, “Mutual Veto,” 348.

52 O’Leary, “Debating Consociational Politics,” 20–2.

53 Sisk, “Power-Sharing in Civil War,” 110 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 227; McCulloch, “Pathways from Power-sharing,” 420.

54 Vandeginste, Exit Arusha?, 6.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Allison McCulloch

Allison McCulloch is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Brandon University, Canada. Her research considers the design of power-sharing institutions in deeply divided societies. Specifically, she is interested in the incentives for ethnopolitical moderation and extremism that power sharing offers and how power sharing can be made more inclusive of identities beyond the ethnonational divide.

Stef Vandeginste

Stef Vandeginste is a Senior Lecturer in the Institute of Development Policy at the University of Antwerp, Belgium. His research focuses on political governance in Burundi and Central Africa, with a particular interest for political transitions, power-sharing, constitutional law and politics and transitional justice.