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ABSTRACT
Since the 1990s, comparative scholars and constructivists have recognized the universally liberal character of democracy promotion and yet continued the analysis of difference in this area. Mainly in studies of German and US democracy promotion, constructivists have demonstrated the recurring and difference-generating impact of ideational factors. In this article, I hence assume the likeliness of difference and address the question of how we can analyse and explain those differences through a comparison of German and US democracy assistance in transitional Tunisia. I conceive of Germany and the US as a dissimilar pair and adopt a broad perspective to uncover differences at the diplomatic level and between and within the respective approaches to democracy assistance in Tunisia. Theoretically, I argue that national role conceptions hardly impact democracy assistance in a clear manner, and that roles are renegotiated in the process. I rather focus on liberal and reform liberal conceptions of democracy, which shape perceptions of the local context, and democracy assistance agencies different organizational cultures, which impact civil society support. Finally, I account for transnational dialogue and coordination as a factor mitigating differences in democracy promotion.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Burnell, “Democracy Assistance: The State of the Art,” 342. I like to thank Jonas Wolff, Jens Steffek, and Thomas Carothers for their constructive comments.
2 Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy,” 121.
3 Youngs and Wittes, “Europe, the United States, and Middle Eastern Democracy,” 99–100.
4 Schmitter and Brouwer, “Conceptualizing,” 1–6.
5 Wetzel, “The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion,” 3.
6 Poppe, Leininger, and Wolff “Beyond Contestation.”
7 Carothers, “Foreword”; for a Gramscian, materialist conception of democracy promotion, see Robbinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 3.
8 Most important tare Hobson and Kurki (Citation2012) and Wetzel and Orbie, The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion.
9 Wolff, “Democracy Promotion as International Politics.”
10 Huber, Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy, 27; Wolff and Schewe, “Norms Versus Interests.”
11 Wolff, “Democracy Promotion as International Politics,” 276–8; Wolff, “The Conceptual Politics,” 128.
12 Constructivists depict differences in the form of ideal types. They order complex foreign policies by highlighting some features as typical. Yet, the civilian power concept especially is used as a descriptive-evaluative ideal type by scholars who seek to turn their visions into a self-fulfilling prophecy. See: Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers.” For formulas, see Cooper and Farooq, “Emerging Donors.”
13 Ratka and Stahl, “Germany and Tunisia: Friendship in the Making?”; Bridoux, “Shaking Off the Neoliberal Shackles.”
14 Personal conversation, January 24, 2019.
15 I refer to about 20 semi-structured interviews with German, US, and international democracy promotion practitioners and, to a lesser degree, their local partners. They were conducted in November 2017, January 2018, and January 2019 in Tunis. In addition, I am basing my findings on four telephone interviews conducted in October 2017, March 2018, and October 2018, and one interview conducted in Frankfurt in January 2019. I first approached German and then US actors. I targeted practitioners based in Tunisia who are involved in democracy promotion – for instance, through working for the German foundations. I aimed at a balance and by reaching out to individuals working for the embassy, foundations, and semi-independent state agencies in the German and US case. The interviews contained open sections and semi-structured sections on, for instance, aid priorities and cooperation with the Tunisian civil society, and I organized the obtained data accordingly. The information gained from the interviews often proved to be more illuminating for understanding nuances in the aid priorities and local partnerships. I also interviewed local partners and thus gained information confirming and extending the donors’ self-reports. However, due to the local partners’ interest in the subsequent funding, I did not expect criticism of German or US democracy assistance. In any case, I have been keenly aware of the fact that the answers of my interviewees may be driven by normative or occupational self-interests and accounted for this fact in my evaluations. Some interviewees asked for the application of Chatham House rules. Hence, I cite only interviews with high-level experts directly.
16 Kirste and Maull, “Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie.”
17 Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” 94.
18 Wolff, “Democracy Promotion and Civilian Power.”
19 Graham, “Money and Multilateralism,” 185.
20 Interview with an international practitioner, March 9, 2018; An informal rule says that security council members cannot join IDEA.
21 Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link, 81.
22 Poppe, Woitschach, and Wolff, “Freedom Fighter Versus Civilian Power.”
23 Lawson and Epstein, “Democracy Assistance,” 19; Carothers, “Revitalizing U.S. Democracy Assistance,” 14.
24 Interview with Annika Savill, Executive Head of UNDEF, October 31, 2017.
25 Petrova, “International, National or Local?”
26 Meyer, Praxis der Sozialen Demokratie.
27 Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” 94.
28 Adam, “Vom Mühsamen Geschäft der Demokratieförderung,” 34.
29 BMZ, “Players – Political Foundations.”
30 BMZ, “Afrika und Europa”; Wolff, “Democracy Promotion and Civilian Power.”
31 Kurki, “Human Rights and Democracy Promotion.”
32 Grävingholt, Entwicklungspolitik.
33 Smith, American Mission, Introduction.
34 Schimmelpfennig, “How Substantial is Substance?” 732–3.
35 Wolff, “Democracy Promotion as International Politics,” 269.
36 Christensen, “Interpreting the Organizational Practices”; Nelson and Weber, “Organizational Culture,” 923; Schmitter and Brouwer, “Conceptualizing,” 28–9.
37 Mair, “Germany’s Stiftungen and Democracy Assistance.”
38 Betz, “Die Demokratieexortpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” 209.
39 Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 30.
40 Abrams, Realism and Democracy, 228.
41 For a detailed outline and critique of this practice, which is also used by the European Union, see Kurki, “Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion,” 358.
42 Christensen, “Interpreting the Organizational Practices”; Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistence, 151.
43 Abrams, Realism and Democracy, xi.
44 Abderrahim and Besbes, “The U.S. And Tunisia,” 196.
45 Gana, The Making of the Tunisian Revolution.
46 Carothers and Gramont, Develoment Aid Confronts Politics, 196.
47 Porta, Where Did the Revolution Go? 259.
48 Freedom House, “Freedom of the World. Tunisia.”
49 Yardımcı-Geyikçi and Tür, “Rethinking the Tunisian Miracle,” 798; Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link, 8.
50 Bridoux, “Shaking Off the Neoliberal Shackles”; Yardımcı-Geyikçi and Tür, “Rethinking the Tunisian Miracle,” 797.
51 Teti and Abbott, “What Do ‘the People’ Want?”; Porta, Where Did the Revolution Go?
52 Kausch, “Foreign Funding in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia.”
53 Marks, “Tunisia. Completing the Transition,” 20–1.
54 Wolff and Spanger, “The Interaction of Interests and Norms,” 81–2.
55 Ratka and Stahl, “Germany and Tunisia: Friendship in the Making?”; Westerwelle, “Regierungserklärung des Bundesaußenminister Guido Westerwelle.”
56 Ratka and Stahl, “Germany and Tunisia: Friendship in the Making?”
57 Auswärtiges Amt, “Gemeinsame Erklärung.”
58 Merkel’s speech is online accessible, see: https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Rede/2017/03/2017-03-05-rede-merkel-parlament-tunis.html.
59 German Embassy, “Deutsche Botschaft Tunis.”
60 Interviews with German practitioners and Tunisian policy analysts, January 2019.
61 BMZ, “Encouraging Transformation in North Africa and the Middle East.”
62 Auswärtiges Amt, “Beziehungen zu Deutschland.”
63 Auswärtiges Amt, “Beziehungen zu Deutschland.”
64 BMZ, “Afrika und Europa,” 6.
65 KfW, “Kommunalfinanzierung.”
66 Auswärtiges Amt, “Gemeinsame Erklärung”; Interview with German practitioners, January 2018; Holthaus, “Furthering Pluralism.”
67 Interview with an international practitioner, January 29, 2019.
68 Interviews with German practitioners, February 25, and March 26, 2018; GIZ, “Tunesien.”
69 Interview with the German ambassador Dr. Reinicke, October 15, 2018.
70 Interviews with German practitioners, November 6, 2017, and January 24, 2018.
71 Interview with the German ambassador Dr. Reinicke, October 15, 2018. My own translation.
72 For an overview of the foundations’ activities before 2011, see Marzo, “Supporting Political Debate”; for an analysis of their post-2011 civil society support, see Holthaus, “Furthering Pluralism.”
73 Yardımcı-Geyikçi and Tür, “Rethinking the Tunisian Miracle,” 790; Interview with a German practitioner, November 4, 2017.
74 Weissenbach, “Political Party Assistance in Transition.”
75 Faath, “Zeiten des Umbruchs in Tunesien seit 2011.”
76 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, “Soziale Marktwirschaft.”
77 Interviews with German practitioners, November 6, 2017, and January 24, 2018; Holthaus, “Furthering Pluralism.”
78 BMZ, “Afrika und Europa.”
79 Bridoux and Kurki, “Cosmetic Agreements and the Cracks Beneath.”
80 Rice, Democracy. Stories from the Long Road to Freedom, 410.
81 Borg, “The Arab Uprisings,” 216.
82 Aberrahim, “The U.S. and Tunisia,” 99; Interviews with US practitioner, October 26 and 29, 2018.
83 The World Bank Group, “Mena Transition Fund,” 6.
84 Kausch, “Foreign Funding in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia,” 12.
85 Own calculation based on NED project description, see NED, “Where NED Works,” last access January 1, 2019.
86 My figures are based on four available factsheets and project descriptions, see USAID, “Tunisia.”
87 Interview with a German practitioner, January 26, 2019.
88 Abderrahim, “American Democracy Promotion in Transitioning Tunisia.”
89 Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistences, 193–5.
90 Interview with an US practitioner, October 16, 2018.
91 Carothers and Gramont, Develoment Aid Confronts Politics, 197–8.
92 Abderrahim, “The U.S. and Tunisia”; Abderrahim, “American Democracy Promotion in Transitioning Tunisia”; Interview with an US practitioner, October 29, 2018.
93 Interview with an US practitioner, October 29, 2018.
94 USAID, “Tunisia Country Development Strategy,” 5.
95 NED, “Annual Report 2011.”
96 My views are based on an analysis of NED projects 2015-17, see NED, “Tunisia 2017.”
97 Interview with an US practitioner, October 16, 2018.
98 Interview with an US practitioner, October 26, 2018.
99 This is evident in a long version of the project description “Stärkung kommunaler Demokratie in Tunesien.” Personal correspondence.
100 Teti and Abbott, “Perceptions of the EU,” 2.
101 U.S. Embassy in Tunisia, “Ambassador Inaugurates New Projects.”
102 Bridoux, “Shaking Off the Neoliberal Shackles”; My observation rests on an analysis of the USAID strategy paper (2016), project descriptions of post-2011 GIZ projects, project descriptions of 2018 NED projects, and the internet presence of the German and US embassies.
103 Germany’s political foundations are not per se party assistance agencies, as the Abrams claims. See: Abrams, Realism and Democracy, 228; Merkel, Strategie in der Politikwissenschaft, 167.
104 Interview with the German ambassador Dr. Reinicke, October 15, 2018.
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Leonie Holthaus
Leonie Holthaus is a Senior Research Fellow at Technische Universität Darmstadt. She was a visiting fellow at Aberystwyth University, the University of Queensland, and the University of Cambridge. Her research has focused on democratisation and international relations. Previous articles have appeared, inter alia, in the Review of International Studies, European Journal of International Relations, and Voluntas.