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ABSTRACT
In the last decade, autocrats and democrats alike have used a wide range of innovative illiberal methods to cement or expand their power. Especially in democracies, however, these techniques have often been difficult to detect as they are typically packaged as acts of democracy defense, not erosion. This article discusses the deployment of authoritarian innovations in Indonesia, where the elite as a collective, the opposition and the executive each launched illiberal initiatives that caused a notable decline in the country’s democratic quality. These illiberal strategies concern a narrowing of electoral competitiveness, the mobilization of identity politics, and attempts at power concentration and maximization by the executive. The wide spread of anti-democratic actors in Indonesia differs from other cases of increasing illiberalism, in which executive leaders have been the main drivers. But Indonesia also stands out because the residual resources of its defective but persistent electoral democracy have mitigated the effectiveness of the authoritarian innovations, preventing (thus far) the polity’s full descent into autocracy or populist illiberalism.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Larry Diamond has been the leading proponent of the idea of a global democratic recession (see Diamond, “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession”). For an opposing view, see Levitsky and Way, “The Myth of Democratic Recession.”
2 Diamond, “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession,” 144 (all quotes in this paragraph).
3 Smith and Ziegler, “Liberal and Illiberal Democracy in Latin America.”
4 Fossati and Curato, “Authoritarian Innovations.”
5 Acharya, Indonesia Matters.
6 Tomsa, “Indonesian Politics in 2010.”
7 Power, “Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn.”
8 Mietzner, “Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism.”
9 Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies.”
10 Simonyi, “Putin, Erdogan and Orbán.”
11 Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” 38.
12 Reilly, Democracy and Diversity.
13 Mietzner, Money, Power and Ideology, 66.
14 Reilly, Political Engineering and Party Politics.
15 Hadiz, “The Indonesian Labour Movement.”
16 Mudhoffir, “Millenials Won’t Rescue Indonesia.”
17 Power, “Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn,” 321.
18 Ibrahim, “Naik-Turun Jumlah Calon.”
19 Aspinall et al., Vote Buying in Indonesia; Ufen, “Electoral Campaigning in Indonesia.”
20 Van Biezen, “State Intervention in Party Politics.”
21 Mietzner, “Dysfunction by Design.”
22 Muhtadi, “Buying Votes in Indonesia.”
23 Data from Yayasan Api, Panduan Parlamen Indonesia; Wajah DPR dan DPD; as well as information sent to the author by Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW).
24 Interview with a Golkar legislator, Jakarta, 15 May 2014.
25 Katz and Mair, “The Cartel Party Thesis.”
26 Slater, “Party Cartelization, Indonesian-Style.”
27 Davidson and Henley, The Revival of Tradition.
28 Fukuyama, “Against Identity Politics.”
29 Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” 40.
30 Cohen, “‘Us’ vs ‘Them’.”
31 Aspinall, Mietzner and Tomsa, “The Moderating President.”
32 In 2014, he used to word “antek asing,” or foreign accomplice, to describe rich elites associated with foreign interests. While not made explicit, it was widely understood in Indonesia to at least prominently include ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs.
33 Dunia Muallaf, “Jokowi Pembawa Masalah.”
34 Aspinall and Mietzner, “Vote for Me.”
35 Scherpen, “Is Hardline Islam Really Rising in Indonesia?”
36 Mietzner and Muhtadi, “Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation.”
37 Bennett, “The Personalization of Politics.”
38 Kawamura, “Politics of Inequality.”
39 Mietzner and Muhtadi, “The Mobilisation of Intolerance.”
40 Bangka Pos, “Amien Rais.”
41 Data provided to the author by Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI).
42 Bayuni, “Less Polarised Indonesia.”
43 Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” 50.
44 Interview with two close Jokowi advisers, Jakarta 10 November 2016.
45 For the details of how this was done, see Mietzner, “Coercing Loyalty.”
46 Interview with a Jokowi minister, Jakarta, 15 May 2016.
47 Aspinall, “Twenty Years of Indonesian Democracy.”
48 Interview with a senior official in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the President, Jakarta, 13 September 2017.
49 Inews, “Dipolisikan, Begini Nasib Pelaku Penghina Jokowi.”
50 Tapsell, Media Power in Indonesia.
51 Nielsen Indonesia, “Audience Share.”
52 Apinino, “Ramai-Ramai Pemilik Media.”
53 Power, “Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn,” 333.
54 Interview with a Golkar legislator, Jakarta, 21 September 2018.
55 Aspinall, “Twenty Years of Indonesian Democracy.”
56 Johnson Tan, “Reining In the Reign of the Parties.”
57 Lim, “Freedom to Hate.”
58 Satisfaction with the way democracy is practiced in Indonesia rose from 69% to 73% between 2017 and 2018. Data provided by Lembaga Survei Indonesia.
59 Hadiz, “Indonesia’s Year of Democratic Setbacks”; Warburton and Aspinall, “Indonesian Democracy.”
60 Greskovits, “The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy.”
61 LSI, Survey on Religious Tolerance.
62 Pivarnyik, “Hungarians want an Expert Government.”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Marcus Mietzner
Marcus Mietzner is an Associate Professor at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University in Canberra. During the time of writing, he was Visiting Research Scholar at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Kyoto University. He is the author of Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi's Rise, Democracy, and Political Contestation in Indonesia (East West Center, Hawaii).