https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8920-7934
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ABSTRACT
In countries where legislators can sponsor bills, but these bills have few chances of promulgation, motives other than seeing a bill become law must also account for bill sponsorship. After discussing the theoretical determinants of bill sponsorship, we propose five hypotheses that account for a legislator’s bill sponsorship. We test these hypotheses for the case of Chile’s presidential system, where only 8.6% of legislative bills were promulgated as laws between 1990 and 2014. We use data for 4602 bills presented by the 728 members of the Chamber of Deputies during those six legislative terms, totalling 30,986 individual sponsorships. Deputies with discrete career ambitions sponsor fewer bills than legislators with progressive or static ambitions. Legislators with a longer tenure sponsor fewer bill. Opposition legislators do not sponsor more bills than government legislators. Legislators sponsor fewer bills in the first and last years of every term. As they have few chances of seeing their bills become laws, Chilean legislators use bills as a tool to advance their political careers and do so responding to the incentives of the electoral cycle.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Campbell, “The Return of the Incumbents”; Rocca and Gordon, “The Position-Taking Value”.
2 Ibid.
3 Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan; Cox and McCubbins, Setting the Agenda.
4 Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection; Gilligan and Krehbiel. “Asymmetric Information”.
5 Weingast and Marshall, “The Industrial Organization of Congress”.
6 Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization.
7 Cox and McCubbins, Setting the Agenda.
8 Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan.
9 Ibid.
10 Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics; Mayhew, Congress; Herrick and Moore, “Political Ambition’s Effect”; Campbell, “Cosponsoring Legislation”.
11 Squire, “Career Opportunities and Membership Stability”; Maestas, “The Incentive to Listen”.
12 Botero and Renno, “Career Choice and Legislative Reelection”; Botero, “Carreras políticas en América Latina”.
13 Alemán and Calvo, “Explaining Policy Ties”.
14 Mayhew, Congress.
15 Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization.
16 Black, “A Theory of Political Ambition”; Squire, “Career Opportunities and Membership Stability”.
17 Bratton and Rouse, “Networks in the Legislative Arena”.
18 Schiller, “Senators as Political Entrepreneurs”.
19 Woon, “Bill Sponsorship in Congress”; Bräuninger et al., “Personal Vote-Seeking”.
20 Rocca and Gordon, “The Position-taking Value”.
21 Rocca and Sanchez, “The Effect of Race and Ethnicity”. Fowler, “Connecting the Congress”.
22 Carnes and Lupu, “Do Voters Dislike Working-class Candidates?”.
23 Schwindt-Bayer, “Still Supermadres?”. Htun et al., “Does Women’s Presence Change”.
24 Alemán and Calvo, “Explaining Policy Ties”.
25 Alemán and Calvo, “Unified Government, Bill Approval”.
26 Micozzi, “Alliance for Progress?”.
27 Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics; Maestas, “The Incentive to Listen”.
28 Maestas, “The Incentive to Listen,” 40.
29 Nacif, “Understanding Party Discipline”.
30 Carey and Shugart, “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote”.
31 Crisp et al., “The Reputations Legislators Build”; Bräuninger et al., “Personal Vote-seeking”.
32 Nacif, “Understanding Party Discipline”, 2002.
33 Botero, “Carreras políticas en América Latina”.
34 Samuels, Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil.
35 Samuels, “Ambition and Competition”.
36 Bárcena, “Involucramiento legislativo sin reelección”.
37 Erikson, “The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections”.
38 Campbell, “The Return of the Incumbents”; Cox and Katz, “Why did the Incumbency Advantage Grow”.
39 Mayhew, Congress; Bräuninger et al., “Personal Vote-seeking”.
40 King, “Constituency Service and Incumbency Advantage,” 122.
41 Campbell, “Cosponsoring Legislation”.
42 Micozzi, “Does Electoral Accountability Make a Difference?”.
43 Herrick and Moore, “Political Ambition’s Effect”; Schiller, “Senators as Political Entrepreneurs”.
44 Cheibub et al., “Government Coalitions and Legislative Success”.
45 Figueiredo and Limongi, “Presidential Power, Legislative Organization”.
46 Jones et al., “Government and Opposition in the Argentine Congress”.
47 Figueiredo and Limongi. “Presidential Power, Legislative Organization”.
48 Morgenstern and Nacif, Legislative Politics in Latin America; Londregan, Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile; Crisp and Botero, “Multicountry Studies of Latin American Legislatures”.
49 Morgenstern and Nacif, Legislative Politics in Latin America.
50 Tsebelis and Alemán. “Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting Power”; Chasquetti, “El secreto del éxito”.
51 Chasquetti and Micozzi, “The Subnational Connection”.
52 Basabe-Serrano, “Carreras legislativas discretas”.
53 Rivers and Rose, “Passing the President’s Program”.
54 Canes-Wrone and de Marchi, “Presidential Approval and Legislative Success”.
55 Bond et al., “The Marginal and Time-Varying Effect”; Canes-Wrone and de Marchi, “Presidential Approval and Legislative Success”.
56 Morgenstern, Patterns of Legislative Politics.
57 Chasquetti and Micozzi, “The Subnational Connection”.
58 Bárcena, “Involucramiento legislativo sin reelección”.
59 Kerevel, “The Legislative Consequences of Mexico … ”.
60 Lucardi and Micozzi. “The Effect of the Electoral Calendar”.
61 Alemán and Navia. “Institutions and the Legislative Success”.
62 Siavelis, The President and Congress in Post-Authoritarian Chile.
63 Huneeus and Berríos. “El Congreso Nacional”.
64 Morgenstern, “Explaining Legislative Politics in Latin America”.
65 Huneeus and Berríos. “El Congreso Nacional”; Alemán and Navia. “Institutions and the Legislative Success”.
66 Campos-Parra and Navia, “Disciplina Legislativa”.
67 Siavelis, The President and Congress in Post-Authoritarian Chile; Baldez and Carey, “Presidential agenda control”; Berríos and Gamboa, “El Congreso Nacional chileno”; Aninat, “Balance de Poderes Legislativos”; Alemán and Pachón, “Las comisiones de conciliación”; Alemán and Navia. “Institutions and the Legislative Success”.
68 Siavelis, The President and Congress in Post-Authoritarian Chile; Berríos and Gamboa, “El Congreso Nacional chileno”; Aninat, “Balance de Poderes Legislativos”.
69 Ibid.; Carey, “Parties, Coalitions, and the Chilean Congress”.
70 Visconti, “Comportamiento diacrónico del Congreso”. Arana Araya, “Budgetary Negotiations”. Toro-Maureira and Hurtado. “The Executive on the Battlefield”.
71 Arana Araya, “Budgetary Negotiations”.
72 Dockendorff, “Who is Ready to Climb the Hill?”.
73 Dockendorff, “When do Legislators Respond”.
74 Alemán et al., “The Hidden Electoral Connection”.
75 Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics.
76 Bunker and Navia. “Incumbency Advantage and Tenure Length”.
77 Micozzi, “Does Electoral Accountability Make a Difference?”.
78 Figueiredo and Limongi. “Presidential Power, Legislative Organization”.
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Isai Escobedo Aránguiz
Isai Escobedo Aránguiz is a political scientist and an associate researcher at the Political Electoral Observatory at Universidad Diego Portales. Her is also pursuing a degree in business administration. His research interests are on legislative politics and he is currently working a project on the determinants of legislative success for legislative–initiated bills in Chile.
Patricio Navia
Patricio Navia is a full professor of political science at Universidad Diego Portales in Chile and a full clinical professor of Liberal Studies at New York University. He is the director of the Political Electoral Observatory at Universidad Diego Portales. He has authored several books on Chilean politics and elections and has widely published on Chile and Latin American politics. He is a regular columnist at the Americas Quarterly.