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ABSTRACT
This article considers authoritarian linkage politics and its relationship to regime stability. Between 2012 and 2018, Cambodia experienced its worst political crisis in a decade. During this period, China’s economic assistance, diplomatic backing and military exchanges have cemented it as the ruling Cambodian People’s Party’s (CPP) most important foreign partner. This article’s findings support the linkage thesis: that ties between authoritarian regimes enhance their survival in moments of crisis. The article provides evidence for the specific forms of linkages that proved vital to the CPP during a transition from competitive to hegemonic authoritarianism. It shows that alongside more familiar linkage ties, the CPP also drew on more diffuse types of authoritarian cooperation and emulation, while Chinese discourses on non-interference and the right to develop provided an authoritarian nexus supporting CPP legitimation narratives in defiance of challengers. The article reflects on Cambodia’s variant of hegemonic authoritarianism in light of these observations. Finally, the argument draws attention to leverage exercised on Cambodia by China as a consequence of these linkages, which have been beneficial to China’s strategic and military interests in Southeast Asia. In the current moment of autocratization and great power competition globally, this has implications for research beyond Cambodia.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Dr Michael Buhler, Dr Steve Heder and Professor Ward Berenschot for insightful comments on earlier versions of this draft.The article was also improved with the input of a number of generous reviewers.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Morgenbesser, “Cambodia’s Transition.”
2 IRI, “Malign Influence,” 11.
3 Tansey et al., “Ties to the Rest,” 1222.
4 Hackenesch, “Not as Bad.”
5 Lührmann and Lindberg, “Third Wave.”
6 Kroenig, The Return.
7 EC, “EU-China.”
8 Lührmann and Lindberg, “Third Wave.”
9 According to Levitsky and Way, “hegemonic regimes are those in which elections are so marred by repression, candidate restrictions, and/or fraud that there is no uncertainty about their outcome.” Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 7.
10 Loughlin, “Reassessing Cambodia’s Patronage”; Un, Return to Authoritarianism.
11 The exception being Un, Return to Authoritarianism, 55–8.
12 Wong, “Chinese Influence.”
13 Author interview with embassy military analyst, Phnom Penh, 9 December 2018.
14 Tansey et al., “Ties to the Rest,” 1225–7.
15 Morgenbesser, Rise of Sophisticated Authoritarianism, 8.
16 Nguon, “Adaptive Authoritarian Resilience,” 2020.
17 Recent scholarship by Morgenbesser has noted the CPP’s innovations. Morgenbesser, “Menu.”
18 Chang, “Post-Pandemic.”
19 Gerschewski, “Three Pillars,” 14.
20 Hasenkamp, “China’s Autocracy,” Chapter 7.
21 Loughlin, “Reassessing Cambodia’s Patronage.”
22 Author interview with senior election monitor, Phnom Penh, August 2017.
23 Lawrence, “Outlawing Opposition.”
24 “Hegemonic regimes are those in which elections are so marred by repression, candidate restrictions, and/or fraud that there is no uncertainty about their outcome.” Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 7.
25 Wong, “Chinese Influence.”
26 Cambodian People’s Party, History of the Struggle, 99.
27 Ibid., 99–100.
28 Ibid., 101.
29 Ibid., 315.
30 Notes supplied to the author on the debriefing of an attendee of a meeting at Bodyguard Command on 23 July 2015.
31 Gerschewski, “Three Pillars.”
32 Tansey et al., “Ties to the Rest,” 1225.
33 Heder, “Hun Sen’s Consolidation.”
34 For the articulation of this philosophy, see Hun, “Selected Impromptu.”
35 SHAVIV, “Public Opinion Research Cambodia” (2016).
36 Loughlin, “Reassessing Cambodia’s Patronage.”
37 Un, “China’s Foreign Investment.”
38 OECD, Investment Policy Reviews, 49.
39 Hughes, “Understanding the Elections,” 15.
40 Author interview with leading construction and real estate tycoon, Phnom Penh, 28 February 2017.
41 Author interview with Chinese real estate broker, Phnom Penh, 22 January 2017.
42 Hun, “Excerpts.”
43 Author interview with General Sao Sokha, Deputy Head of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), Phnom Penh, 17 February 2017.
44 Loughlin, “Reassessing Cambodia’s Patronage.”
45 World Bank, “Military Expenditure.”
46 Author interview with embassy military analyst, Phnom Penh, 10 February 2017.
47 Tansey et al., “Ties to the Rest,” 1226.
48 European Commission, “Trade/Human Rights.”
49 Un, Return to Authoritarianism, 47.
50 Author interview with foreign trade official, Skype, December 2018.
51 For example: author interview with development practitioner 4 February 2020; interview with international human rights monitor 1, Phnom Penh, March 2020.
52 HRW, “Japan Should.”
53 Hun, “Discourse.”
54 Tansey et al., “Ties to the Rest,” 1227.
55 Chang, “Post-Pandemic.”
56 Oud, “Harmonic Convergence,” 83–4.
57 See for example a speech quoted in Eckhardt and Fontaine, “Hun Sen Dwells.”
58 MFAIC, “Stability and Development First,” 5.
59 CPP, History of the Struggle, 202.
60 Presentation by Chhay Sinarith to provincial police chiefs, 2016. No title. Document in author’s possession.
61 PQRU, “Strengthening of the Nation.”
62 Ambrosio, “Insulating Russia.”
63 State Council, “China’s Military Strategy,” i.
64 Yongding, “China’s Color Coded Crackdown.”
65 HRW, “Cambodia: Crackdown.”
66 Interview with development worker, Phnom Penh, November 2019.
67 For example, Freshnews Asia, “Fresh News, in Collaboration with Xinhua, Brings you Rich International News” [Fresh News សហការជាមួយ ទីភ្នាក់ងារព័ត៌មានចិន Xinhua នាំមកនូវព័ត៌មានអន្តរជាតិដ៏សម្បូរបែប ជូនលោកអ្នក]. https://freshnewsasia.com/index.php/en/localnews/15856-2016-01-13-10-39-21.html
68 Some recent examples by Asian Vision Institute include: “Why Should China Embrace Chinese Investment” and “Perspectives on Cambodia-China Relations,” all of which are unblinkingly supportive of the CPP’s linkages with China. https://asianvision.org/avi-commentary/avi-commentary-2020/
69 Case, “Electoral Authoritarianism,” 311.
70 Loughlin, “Reassessing Cambodia’s Patronage,” 503–4.
71 Norén-Nilsson, “Fresh News.”
72 Nathan, “The Puzzle,” 162.
73 Kerkvliet, Speaking Out.
74 Loughlin and Milne, “After the Grab?”
75 Tran, “Rebalance to Asia.”
76 Author interview with senior human rights monitor 1, Phnom Penh, 20 January 2017.
77 Senate Committee on Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat,” 29.
78 Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, Art. 54.
79 Ibid., Art. 151.
80 Author interview with foreign expert with extensive knowledge of land development in the area, March 2020.
81 Author interview with embassy military analyst, Phnom Penh, March 2020.
82 Ibid.
83 Personal communication with military analysts, May 2020.
84 US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions.”
85 Author interview with embassy military analyst, Phnom Penh, March 2020.
86 Author interview with embassy military analyst, Phnom Penh, 9 December 2017.
87 Pictures of the road enhancement shared with author.
88 Debriefing from the meeting shared with author. Private correspondence.
89 Author interview with Cambodian political analyst 3, Phnom Penh, November 2018.
90 Author interview with Cambodian political analyst 2, Phnom Penh, November 2018.
91 Loughlin, “Reassessing Cambodia’s Patronage.”
92 Wong, “Chinese Influence.”
Additional information
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Neil Loughlin
Neil Loughlin is a postdoctoral researcher in political science at the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV). He also lectures on authoritarian politics and development studies at the University of Amsterdam and Leiden University respectively. His research interests include democratization and authoritarianism, conflict and civil–military relations, and the political economy of resource extraction, land dispossession, and development.