Opening up the notion of “closing space”: accounting for normative, actor, and political system diversity

ABSTRACT

Our understanding of the “closing space” argument is much nuanced if we widen the conceptualizations of both “closing” and “space”. “Closing” would thus include state attempts to restrict not only the promotion of democratic/human rights norms, but also other types of norms (conservative, right-wing, Islamist). A broader definition of “space” would likewise include not only the space occupied by CSOs, but also that of other politically important actors, such as political parties and religious communities. Lastly, we stand to gain from putting the spotlight on democratic states' efforts to control outside influences on its domestic political sphere. The article thus proposes an analytical framework focusing on state regulations of foreign funding to CSOs, political parties, and religious communities, which is applied in two exploratory case studies of Israel and Tunisia. The article finds that the two states attempt to control norm diffusion not only via domestic CSOs, but also through political parties and religious groups. Regulations do not always target human rights and democratic norms. Foreign funding regulations have at times favoured foreign funding for nationalistic, right-wing norms: at others, democratic norms over Islamic norms. Thus, the “closing space” phenomenon is more complex than usually understood.

KEYWORDS:

• Norm contestation
• democracy promotion
• autocracy promotion
• closing space
• financing religious communities
• political party financing
• Israel, Tunisia

Acknowledgements

The research assistance provided by Lene Krog is gratefully acknowledged. Likewise, the insights of Sarah Azzopardi-Ljubibratic and Asma Nouira have been very valuable. Comments and suggestions provided on earlier drafts by Assem Dandashly, Joe Debono and Stefano Moncada were most helpful, and I am sincerely grateful for their time. I also received valuable comments during an Author Workshop at Maastricht University – Campus Brussels, in June 2019, at the 2019 EISA Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Sofia University, as well as at an IBB Seminar at the University of Malta in February 2020. Moreover, the article greatly benefitted from unusually thoughtful and constructive comments from two anonymous reviewers. Any errors, of course, remain solely the responsibility of the author.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Mendelson, “Dark Days”; Carothers and Brechenmacher, “Closing Space”; and Bakke, Mitchell and Smidt, “When States Crack Down.”

2 See e.g. advocacy centres including CIVICUS, Funders Initiative for Civil Society, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, International Consortium on Closing Civic Space, and the World Movement for Democracy Civil Space Initiative, as well as donors (EU and the US); Youngs and Echagüe, “Shrinking space for civil society.”

3 Dandashly and Noutcheva, “Conceptualizing Norm Diffusion.”

4 Ibid.

5 Albeit in the category “flawed democracies”: no Neighbourhood country is classified as a full democracy (EIU, “Democracy Index 2019”).

6 Countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood (excluding candidate countries) are all classified as “hybrid” or “authoritarian” regimes (Table 7, EIU, “Democracy Index 2019”). Other indexes (e.g. Polity; Freedom House) come to somewhat different conclusions. However, this author has found the EIU rankings the most sophisticated and nuanced. (Another index, the BTI transformation index, does not cover all countries.)

7 e.g. Chaudhry, “Uncivil Societies”; Carothers and Brechenmacher, “Closing Space.”

8 Swiney, “The Counter-Associational Revolution.”

9 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report – Tunisia; Bertelsmann Stiftung, SGI 2020 Country Report – Israel.

10 Reiter, “Exploratory Research.”

11 Tansey, “Problem with Autocracy Promotion”; Weyland, “Autocratic Diffusion and Cooperation.”

12 Ambrosio and Tolstrup, “Authoritarian Diffusion, Illusion?”; Ambrosio, “Democratic States, Authoritarian Firewalls.”

13 Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash, “Hands Off My Regime!”; Tolstrup, “Gatekeepers and Linkages.”

14 Swiney, “Counter-Associational Revolution.”

15 Bromley, Schofer, and Longhofer, “Contentions over World Culture.”

16 Smidt et al., “Silencing Their Critics.”

17 International IDEA, “International IDEA Political Finance Database.”

18 European Commission for Democracy Through Law, “Guidelines on Political Party Regulation,” 37, see also the OECD, “Financing Democracy.”

19 The aid of political party foundations – including the long-standing German foundations such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (linked to the CDU) and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (linked to the SDP) and their US counterparts, the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI)– is generally informed by their ideological background.

20 Shapira, Campaign Financing in Israel.

21 Levush, “Israel”; Political Parties Financing Law 1973; International IDEA, “Political Finance Database.”

22 Levush, “Israel”; Parties Law 1992, Art. 28f; International IDEA, “Political Finance Database.”

23 Bertelsmann Stiftung, Israel Report 2019, 38.

24 Halon, “Israel's political parties”; Lewis, “Jerusalem’s Mayor Dined.”

25 Bertelsmann Stiftung, SGI 2020 Country Report – Israel, 42, Wootliff, “Law Limiting Funding.”

26 Officially the Parties' Bill (Amendment No. 24), 5768–2018.

27 Hoffman, “Knesset bans contributions.” Knesset News, “Knesset Gives Final Approval.” The reasons that Likud favoured this change are several, Importantly, it covers only larger parties which hold primaries, thus excluding several Knesset parties (Kenig and Atmor, “Candidate Spending”). Moreover, the law provides full funding only to incumbent Knesset members, with no automatic funding to new candidates. Such candidates must instead take a loan, which will be turned into a grant only if they are elected. In short, it favours incumbents (email interview, Assaf Shapira, The Israel Democracy Institute. 26 May 2021).

28 Hoffman, “American, British Tycoons.”

29 Frenkel, “These American Families.”

30 Rebala, “American Donors.”

31 Hoffman, “Knesset Bans Contributions.”

32 Décret-loi n° 2011-87, Articles 19, 28, 29, and 30.

33 Loi organique n° 2014-16; Loi organique n° 2017-7.

34 Décret-loi n° 2011-88, Arts 4 and 22.

35 Cour des Comptes, “General Report.”

36 Telephone interview, Fadhila Gargouri, Chamber President, Court of Auditors, 16 September 2021.

37 Telephone interview Youssef Jmour, Coordinateur des programmes politiques, Friedrich Ebert Foundation 26 August 2021.

38 Zoom interview, Nidhal Attia, Heinrich Böll Foundation, 26 August 2021; telephone interview Youssef Jmour, Coordinateur des programmes politiques, Friedrich Ebert Foundation 26 August 2021; Teams interview, employee of international party foundation with a longstanding presence in Tunisia 8 September 2021; Teams interview, representative of democracy promotion actor in Tunisia 8 September 2021.

39 Telephone interview Fadhila Gargouri, Chamber President, Court of Auditors, 16 September 2021.

40 Derbali, Le NDI à l’ARP, Zoom interview, UNDP Officer, Tunisia, 17 September 2021.

41 Ghorbal, “L’hypocrisie du financement”; Haddad, “La Tunisie n’est pas prête.”

42 Middle East Eye, “Row in Tunisia.”

43 Cherif, “Tunisia’s Fledgling Gulf Relations.”

44 Middle East Eye, “Tunisia's Ghannouchi Granted Damages.”

45 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making this point.

46 Derbali, “Le NDI à l’ARP.”

47 Budget Foundations Law; Sapir and Statman, “Minority Religions in Israel.”

48 US Department of State, “International Religious Freedom 2017.”

49 Sapir and Statman, “Minority Religions in Israel”; US Department of State, “2018 Report Religious Freedom: Israel.”

50 The drawn-out controversy over the funding of Christian schools, where the schools accused the government of forcing them to become state-funded and – controlled by squeezing other sources of funding, is another example.

51 US Department of State, “2020 Report Religious Freedom: Israel.”

52 Ibid.

53 Ahituv “Israeli Jehovah's Witnesses.”

54 Jewish Federations of North America, “Religion and State in Israel.”

55 Al-Burai, “Cold War Brewing.”

56 Rubin, “Why Israel Outlawed Branch”; Cook, “Behind Islamic Movement Ban.”

57 Loi 88-34 relative aux mosquées; Décret n° 94-558.

58 Webdo, “Restauration confiée aux Turcs!”

59 US State Department, “Tunisia 2018 Religious Freedom.”

60 Ibid.

61 Loi 1958-78, Article 13.4.

62 Visit to Tunisia: Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief 2019.

63 Quattrini, “Tunisian Religious Minorities.”

64 Quattrini, “Tunisian Religious Minorities,” 73.

65 Hajjaj, “Sectarian Minorities Coexist.”

66 Quattrini, “Tunisian Religious Minorities”; US State Department, “Tunisia 2020 Religious Freedom.”

67 Geisser, “Tunisie république laïque.”

68 As concluded from a comparison of the respective country entries in International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, Civic Freedom Monitor.

69 Law on Associations.

70 Law on Associations, para. 36 A.

71 Law on Disclosure Requirements.

72 NGO Monitor, “Israeli NGOs: Foreign Funding,” para. 1.

73 Transparency Requirements Bill 5766-2016; Knesset, “Knesset, NGO Transparency Law.”

74 Knesset, “Knesset, NGO Transparency Law.”

75 Beaumont, “Israel Passes Law.”

76 Ibid.

77 BBC, “EU Criticises Israel Law.”

78 See also Ministry of Strategic Affairs and Public Diplomacy, The Money Trail.

79 BBC, “EU Criticises Israel Law”; Knesset, “Knesset, NGO Transparency Law”; Staff, “Left-Wing Slam Law.”

80 Donors compiled from NGO Monitor 2020, based on a review of 2019 funding data for top 4 NGOs receivers of foreign donations.

81 Beaumont, “Israel Passes Law”; Jewish Telegraphic Agency, “Knesset Passes Controversial Law”; Staff, “Left-Wing Slam Law.” Opponents of the bill made an unsuccessful counterproposal, under which reporting regulations would have been identical regardless of whether funding came from foreign private or public entities (Harkov, “Israel to Clamp Down”).

82 Chekir, “L’importance et les acquis,” 16.

83 Decree 2011-88, Arts. 35 and 41.

84 Sigillò, “Islamic Charities.”

85 Boussen, “Erosion de la liberté.”

86 Thus, while Glasius, Schalk, and De Lange (“Illiberal Norm Diffusion,” 457) posit that states copy others’ NGO restrictions, such learning is assumed to be linked to “shared history, linguistic or cultural similarities, ease of travel, and personal ties.”

87 Adolph and Prakash, “Economic Decline”; Glasius, Schalk, and De Lange, “Illiberal Norm Diffusion.”

88 Adolph and Prakash, “Economic Decline”; Christensen and Weinstein, “Defunding Dissent”; Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash, “Hands Off My Regime!”

89 Dandashly and Noutcheva, “Conceptualizing Norm Diffusion”; Casier, “Russia and the diffusion.”

90 Poppe and Wolff, “The Contested Spaces.”

91 Christensen and Weinstein, “Defunding Dissent,” 79.

92 Poppe, Leininger, and Wolff, “Negotiating Promotion of Democracy.”

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Anna Khakee

Dr. Anna Khakee is Senior Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, University of Malta. She has previously published on the topic of democracy promotion and the external dimensions of democratization in the Journal of North African Studies, Mediterranean Politics, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, and East European Politics and Societies as well as for various think tanks.