When handpicked successors of charismatic leaders prosper: the surprising success of Juan Manuel Santos in Colombia

ABSTRACT

Charismatic leaders, who loathe sharing power, often anoint sycophantic successors who fail to become powerful leaders in their own right. Curiously, however, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos (2010–2018), the handpicked successor of Alvaro Uribe (2002–2010), became a remarkably effective leader who served two terms and oversaw Colombia’s landmark 2016 peace agreement. We investigate this unlikely outcome and develop a novel theory to reveal a pathway through which some handpicked successors of charismatic leaders can establish independent authority. We argue that success is more likely when the successor breaks away from the predecessor. However, doing so requires the successor to engage in a sequential and highly strategic process we label tightrope walking, in which the new leader gains the predecessor’s endorsement to win office, expands his/her coalition by incorporating new allies from outside the predecessor’s base, and reforms the predecessor’s unsustainable policies and narrative. To substantiate our theory, we trace how Santos moved through each stage of the tightrope-walking process and ultimately broke from Uribe to achieve independent authority. The results suggest a rare but important mechanism through which charismatic movements can be challenged from the inside out, curtailing or reversing democratic erosion.

KEYWORDS:

• Charisma
• leadership
• political succession
• democratic erosion
• Colombia
• Juan Manuel Santos
• Alvaro Uribe
• peace agreement

Acknowledgments

We wish to thank Carlos Gervasoni, Murat Somer, Elizabeth Zechmeister, Kenneth Roberts, Tiffany Barnes, James McGuire, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on a previous version of this article. We are also grateful to the participants of the University of Utah's Center for Latin American Studies faculty seminar.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 We define charisma as a property of leadership that can result in the development of asymmetrical, unmediated, and emotional attachments between the leader and his/her followers. In turn, a charismatic movement is a political force that rests on the followers’ shared identification with the charismatic leader, whom they view as their savior (see Andrews-Lee, The Emergence and Revival of Charismatic Movements, 15–18).

2 Kostadinova and Levitt, “Toward a Theory of Personalist Parties”; Weber, Economy and Society.

3 At the time of writing in August 2021, Nicolás Maduro has served president of Venezuela for over eight years since replacing Hugo Chávez. However, he has done so only through brazen authoritarian rule, as he oversees unprecedented humanitarian crisis. Due to Maduro’s scant popular legitimacy (his approval has stood at or below 30% since 2015, see Carlin et al.) his need to turn to authoritarian measures to remain in power, and his inability to prevent the economic and social implosion, we categorise his presidency as a failure.

4 Carlin et al., Executive Approval Database 2.0; Gamboa, “Latin America’s Shifting Politics.”

5 This definition success follows that of other scholars of leadership succession, who emphasise the new leader’s capacity to establish independent authority (See: Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make) and enact his/her own policy agenda (See: Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference?; Bynander and Hart, “When Power Changes Hands”).

6 Because the vast majority of charismatic leaders are men, we use male pronouns to refer to the predecessor throughout the article. In contrast, we refer to successors using both male and female pronouns.

7 See Bynander and ‘t Hart, “When Power Changes Hands”; Helms, “Heir Apparent Prime Ministers”; Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make.

8 Bennister et al., Understanding Political Leadership, 7.

9 Ibid.; Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference?; Bynander and ‘t Hart, “When Power Changes Hands”; Calvert, The Process of Political Succession; Helms, “Heir Apparent Prime Ministers”; Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make.

10 Weber, Economy and Society.

11 Zúquete, “Missionary Politics,” 263–64.

12 Horiuchi, Laing, and Hart, “Hard Acts to Follow,” 358.

13 Ibid., 359.

14 Andrews-Lee, Emergence and Revival, Chapter 6.

15 Ostiguy, “Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach,” 75–76.

16 Those successors who genuinely value loyalty above all else may still opt for continuity despite the consequences. Yet, we argue that ambitious leaders are likely to recognise the debilitating limitations of continuity and therefore prefer a pathway of change.

17 Horiuchi et al., “Hard Acts to Follow,” 260.

18 Bynander and ‘t Hart, “When Power Changes Hands,” 727.

19 Andrews-Lee, Emergence and Revival; Bynander and Hart, “When Power Changes Hands”; Horiuchi et al., “Hard Acts to Follow”; Kostadinova and Levitt, “Toward a Theory of Personalist Parties”; Weber, Economy and Society.

20 Anria, “Delegative Democracy Revisited,” 100.

21 Bynander and Hart, “When Power Changes Hands,” 717.

22 Helms, “Heir Apparent Prime Ministers,” 263.

23 Renshon, “Political Leadership as Social Capital,” 199; Bennister et al., Understanding Political Leadership, 4.

24 Gibson, “The Populist Road to Market Reform,” 342.

25 Anria and Cyr, “Inside Revolutionary Parties,” 1267.

26 Stoyan, “Ambitious Reform Via Constituent Assemblies,” 101.

27 Gibson, “The Populist Road to Market Reform,” 340.

28 Ortiz Ayala and García Sánchez, “Porque Te Quiero Te Apoyo”; García-Sánchez and Rodríguez-Raga, “Personalidad y Un Enemigo Interno.”

29 Uribe Vélez, “Manifiesto Democrático.”

30 Ibid.

31 Gamboa, “Opposition at the Margins”; Mayka, “Colombia’s Surprising Resilience.”

32 Rojas Bolaños and Benavides Silva, Ejecuciones Extrajudiciales En Colombia.

33 Granada et al., “El Agotamiento de La Política de Seguridad,” 103.

34 Carlin et al., Executive Approval Database 2.0.

35 Tappe Ortiz, “Political Leadership for Peace Processes,” 10.

36 “Relanzamiento Campaña Juan Manuel Santos” May 3, 2010, Speech by Santos, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7STeft1Jvww.

37 IPSOS-Napoleón Franco, “La Gran Encuesta 2010.”

38 López, “‘La Refundación de La Patria,’” 55.

39 Sierra, “Alvaro Uribe: Un Presidente de Teflón.”

40 Granada et al., “El Agotamiento de La Política de Seguridad,” 103.

41 Rojas Bolaños and Benavides Silva, Ejecuciones Extrajudiciales En Colombia, 58–91; Granada et al., “El Agotamiento de La Política de Seguridad,” 97–101. The Democratic Security Policy established rewards for guerrilla casualties. To receive those benefits, members of the armed forces engaged in the extra-judicial killing of 6,402 young men and women who were kidnapped and killed, only to be reported as FARC casualties (Comunicado 019 de 2019, Justicia Especial de Paz, Accessed February 18, 2021).

42 Granada et al., “El Agotamiento de La Política de Seguridad,” 97–101.

43 Carlin et al., Executive Approval Database 2.0. For context, Hugo Chávez’s approval rating before he died was 53%.

44 Botero and Gamboa, “Corte al Congreso.”

45 Gamboa, “Latin America’s Shifting Politics.”

46 Posada-Carbó, “Latin America.”

47 Paredes, “Referendo Reeleccionista”.

48 Cepeda and Rojas, A las puertas de El Ubérrimo; Romero, Parapolítica.

49 In Colombia there is a strong correlation between land accumulation and the armed conflict. Specifically, paramilitary groups, have used forced displacement to vacate ill-titled small land holdings, making them available to wealthier neighbours (Gutiérrez Sanín 2014).

50 “The Americas Barometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)” 2014.

51 Coppedge et al., “V-Dem Dataset V11.1.”

52 Gamboa, “Opposition at the Margins.”

53 Coppedge et al., “V-Dem Dataset V11.1.”

54 The Liberal Democracy Index score in Venezuela from .47 when Chávez rose in 1999 to .11 when he died in 2013; the same score in Ecuador fell from .42 when Correa rose in 2007 to .33 when he left power in 207, hitting a low point of .27 from 2013 to 2016 (See: Coppedge et al.).

55 Singer, “Who Says ‘It’s the Economy’?” 288.

56 Ibid., 284–85.

57 Wills Otero, “Colombia,” 195.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Caitlin Andrews-Lee

Caitlin Andrews-Lee is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at Ryerson University in Toronto. Previously, she was a Post-Doctoral Fellow at Tulane University's Center for Inter-American Policy and Research (CIPR) and received her Ph.D. in Government from the University of Texas at Austin. Her research and published work focuses on charismatic leadership, political identity and behavior, political movements and parties, democracy, and multi-method research, with a regional emphasis on Latin America. For more information, please see: https://www.caitlinandrewslee.com

Laura Gamboa

Laura Gamboa is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Utah. She has a PhD in Political Science from the University of Notre Dame and a M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of Texas at Austin. Her research focuses on regimes and regime change, democratic institutions, and voting behavior. Her forthcoming book analyzes opposition strategies against the erosion of democracy in Colombia and Venezuela. For more information, please see: https://www.laura-gamboa.com/