Democratizing EU democracy support in Uganda: embedding democracy aid within local negotiations of justice in Acholiland

ABSTRACT

This article scrutinizes the way the European Union’s (EU) democracy aid corresponds to how “a just society” is negotiated among the Acholi – an ethnic group in Northern Uganda. Through document analysis of EU aid projects, qualitative interviews with project implementers and through secondary analysis of ethnographic literature, this article finds that EU democracy aid in Acholiland – through its emphasis on individual responsibility, entrepreneurship, and its exclusion of elders – selectively aligns with the life worlds of urban youths. Such approach, however, risks further antagonizing Acholi social cohesion. As such, this article points attention to the fact that democracy support will always intervene in a contentious debate on what is perceived as locally just and whom participates in such negotiation. When considering questions of how international democracy support could be improved, it is, therefore, necessary to first of all deconstruct the validity of one’s underlying conceptions of what is a just political order, and secondly, to acknowledge that any reconstruction on the grounds of including a plurality of alternatives will always require a political intervention. Such considerations, it is argued, would open up the debate on improving EU democracy support to concerns of how such democracy support itself can become more democratic.

KEYWORDS:

• European Union
• democracy support
• Acholi
• Uganda
• alignment
• ownership

Introduction

Since 2016 Uganda has experienced a consistent decline in the level of democracy, as more recently observed with the flawed 2021 presidential and parliamentary elections. In line with wider calls for international democracy support to be rejuvenated,¹ the general sentiment is that the European Union’s (EU) democracy support in Uganda must fundamentally change; that the EU must reconsider its relationship with the Government of Uganda (GoU).²

In determining the effectiveness of international democracy support (and the ways to improve it), however, observers often rely on the perceptions of either civil society organizations, political leaders or opinion formers.³ Yet, when taking into account that these different entities more often than not sufficiently represent the grassroots,⁴ markedly absent in debates on improving international democracy support have been the actual “beneficiaries” of such support, namely the general population. Also in Northern Uganda: with regards to the implementation of human rights projects it has been observed that “[t]he perceptions and interpretations of the ‘target populations’ who, depending on the discourse, are to suffer or benefit from the imposition of ‘Western’ norms and rights discourses, have often been ignored.”⁵

Hence, whereas the EU may indeed have to change its democracy support vis-à-vis the GoU, the question whether or how EU democracy support fits the way the Ugandan population understands democracy remains unaddressed. Put differently, there has so far been insufficient attention to the question to what extent the EU’s democracy support itself is democratic; i.e. to what extent it corresponds to local negotiations of democracy, and what the potential effects of this may be. Therefore, and encouraged by David Mosse’s invitation not to assess “whether” development projects work but “how,”⁶ the guiding question for analysis is: “How do EU democracy aid projects align with local Acholi negotiations of what is a just society?” Four further clarifications concerning the scope of the research question are in place.

First of all, the research question deliberately builds on the understanding that since the very aim of democracy support is to restore a perceived discrepancy between what could be a just society and what is a current society, democracy support fundamentally concerns a question of supporting justice.⁷ Moreover, since such justice lens does not restrict “democracy” to either political, economic or legal definitions, it allows to empirically better capture the broader dimensions of how a just society may be understood within the Ugandan demos.

Secondly, being a question of justice, democracy support inherently involves contestation. Amongst others, there is a “conflict of principle” (cf. what defines justice?) and a “conflict of recognition” (cf. whom seeks to define justice?).⁸ Whereas these conflicts can play out within donors or between donors and recipients, this article seeks to first understand how they play out within the recipient itself: what is debated and by whom? In a second step, it seeks to understand how the EU’s democracy aid positions itself within such local debate: what sections within society does EU aid align itself with, if at all? As such, other than more prescriptive definitions of alignment as for example used in the “Aid effectiveness” debate,⁹ “alignment” here is analysed from a descriptive, comparative point of view (cf. is there any conformity between EU objectives and differentiated local preferences?).

Third, since the Ugandan society is ethnically diverse, the scope of the “demos” is here limited to the Acholi, an ethnic group in Northern Uganda.¹⁰ While the Acholi were the backbone of the Ugandan military and at the heart of state power through much of the early independence decades, they have now become one of the most marginalized ethnic groups in Uganda. In socio-economic terms, the Human Development Index for the Acholi region remains well below the levels in the rest of the country.¹¹ In public administration terms, the Acholi have largely been excluded from, or given the least consequential positions in the government, military and civil service.¹² Moreover, as to their relation with the GoU, due to years of state-run violence in Northern Uganda, it has been observed that the Acholi relate to the state primarily through fear, submission or aversion.¹³ As such, the Acholi provide for an interesting explorative case study to analyse the fit of the EU’s democracy aid in Uganda; an argument which is further strengthened by the fact that Acholiland has been the scene of a large humanitarian-, post-conflict reconstruction-, and development “industry.”¹⁴

Finally, “EU democracy aid projects” here are seen to empirically comprise all aid projects between 2014 and 2020 which have been implemented in Acholiland, and within any given aid programme with the stated aim to establish, strengthen, or defend democracy.¹⁵ While these programmes should pursue the explicit and declared aim to support democracy, this does not require that democracy should be the sole objective, nor that a given programme or project effectively promotes democracy. On the basis of this definition, through consultation with the EU Delegation in Kampala, and through reviewing calls for proposals and the EU’s Financial Transparency System for funding recipients, this article has identified four EU aid programmes with an overall or specific objective to support or improve the state of democracy in Uganda. Within these four programmes, eight aid projects (totalling 3,7 million EUR) have been implemented in Acholiland in particular [see Table 1].¹⁶ Methodologically, through content analysis of these aid projects¹⁷ supplemented with 10 semi-structured interviews with key project implementers¹⁸ (interviews were held online between April – June 2021; see Appendix 1), the substance of these aid projects will be mirrored to data drawn from published and peer reviewed ethnographies on how the Acholi negotiate the ideal of a just society.

Table 1. EU democracy aid projects 2014–2020.

Programme Reference	Instr.	Publ. date	Project	Districts	Targets
155232	EIDHR	2018	Strengthening the implementation of the CRPD with women with disabilities in Kenya and Uganda	Gulu; Amuru; Nwoya; Omoro	Women with a disability
165006	EIDHR	2019	Protection and empowerment of land rights defenders in Northern Uganda (Pelard-N).	Gulu, Lamwo, Nwoya, Amuru	Land rights defenders
165220	CSO-LA	2019	Growing Rural Opportunities for Work and Wellbeing in Acholi (GROWW)	Nwoya, Omoro	Rural unemployed youths
			Bridging opportunities for effective and productive livelihoods of youth prison inmates and ex-inmates in Northern Uganda	Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum	Youth (ex-) prison inmates
			Youth Engagement and Empowerment Project (YEEP)	Gulu	Rural unemployed youths
			Enhanced Meaningful Opportunities, Participation and Livelihoods of Youth for Effective Development (EMPLOYED)	Gulu, Kitgum	Rural unemployed youths
			Enhancing Media Capacity for inclusive development	Countrywide	Journalists
164469	EDF	2019	Strengthening Performance and Accountability through Community Engagement (SPACE)	Gulu	Women

This article finds that whereas “justice” is contentiously debated among particularly Acholi youths and elders, the EU selectively aligns with the (urban) youths. Such alignment, however, is likely cause further generational tensions within the very foundation of Acholi society, which is Acholi family life. As such, analysis shows that EU democracy support is fundamentally and perhaps inescapably political on a local level insofar as it always intervenes in a contested terrain, and that it enables and elevates some voices over others. Going forward, it is argued that such political intervention should itself be done democratically, and that therefore both the study and practice of democracy support should more fundamentally reconsider the validity of one’s underlying conceptions of what is a just political order. Secondly, both should acknowledge the political grounds in the decision whom to include in its reconstruction.

Problematizing ownership of democracy aid in Acholiland

Undergirding this article’s research question lies a difficult yet important struggle when designing (or improving) development interventions, which is: “how to link a politics of recognition with a politics of social justice and economic transformation in meaningful ways.”¹⁹ One important aspect of this is whom to hold ownership over democracy aid? Whereas the EU has often emphasized the need for “democracy” to grow from below, and whereas the EU has asserted that “democracy cannot be imposed from the outside,” but that EU external democracy support can only play an assisting role in relation to national and local actors who retain ownership of the genuine change processes required to build and enhance democracy,²⁰ the EU does not define whom those local actors should be. Considering the adagio that democracy entails “government of the people, by the people, for the people,” and considering that democracy aid often directly concerns the people (e.g. through civic education), this article contends that the people themselves should have a more central say in determining the effectiveness, legitimacy and sustainability of international democracy aid; the more so in authoritarian contexts.

However, in the past, Acholi ownership over aid projects has often been found wanting. For example, it has been observed that during and in the immediate aftermath of the war between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the GoU (cf. infra), the World bank implemented a number of projects which failed to resonate with the priorities of the Acholi, and in fact further deteriorated their social cohesion.²¹ Moreover, these neoliberal projects bolstered “the construction of a security state and the prolongation of war and violence,” thereby being more closely aligned with the GoU’s interests and priorities rather than with the actual recipients.²² Additionally, and here explicitly engaging with the theme of restoring justice, it has been noted that in their explicit referral to “traditional justice” and reliance on “traditional chiefs” as a vehicle to bring peace and reconciliation after the LRA war, international donors “reinvented” rituals and tradition rather than working with the grain of how the Acholi perceived justice.²³

Yet, since today much of this aid industry has left to focus on other regions (e.g. South Sudan), and since aid providers often claim to learn from past experiences,²⁴ has EU democracy support been any different?

Acholi negotiations of “justice”

The 1986–2006 civil war between the LRA and GoU – a war in which both parties were guilty of rapes, killings and abductions – heavily impacted the lives of the Acholi and other Northerners. Perhaps most impacting was the fact that the Ugandan military forcefully displaced an estimated 1.8 million Northerners – including Acholi – from their lands into huge “Internally Displaced People” (IDP) camps, allegedly to protect the people from the LRA’s attacks in the countryside. Indeed, more than the war itself, this displacement in particular is understood to be the most significant factor in the destruction of the Acholi society. It made the Acholi largely aid dependent and almost overnight it uprooted, devastated and radically changed the Acholi societal and cultural fabric.²⁵ To this day, many Acholi still claim to feel “lost.”²⁶

Whereas such stories of lostness point to the destruction of the Acholi society, they should also be seen as “political narratives that engage the imagination […] in helping to articulate a vision of an alternative world.”²⁷ Put differently, these descriptions of lostness just as well point to different and contested ways of how to restore a more just society. Indeed, it has been observed that social change in Acholiland is a “very complex phenomenon, and positions regarding its desirability and extent depend on a number of factors in the Acholi society: age, gender, educational background, class, setting (urban or rural), as well as changing circumstances and situations.”²⁸

In what follows, this debate will be explored in light of contested notions of Acholi family life: since Acholi “family life” is observed to be one of the most fundamental aspects of Acholi culture and social ordering,²⁹ debates about the restauration of a just society first and foremost also concern how such family structures should take form.

Acholi family life and social harmony as a foundation for “justice”

More than a decade since the end of a devastating conflict and extended encampment, most Acholi have returned to and resettled in their pre-war lands where they have largely re-established their communities along cultural principles and practices.³⁰ Most notably, Acholi communities are structured around a family hierarchy which “places older men at the pinnacle of power, with older women and younger men in the middle, and younger women at the bottom.”³¹ While these family structures constantly come into being and evolve, with various factors motivating groups to split away,³² they nevertheless continue to dictate many aspects of daily life: other than being key to the allocation of land,³³ these (extended) family structures are also key to dealing with issues of wrongdoing, immorality and justice overall.³⁴

Central to such family structure is the primary value of social harmony: notions of social harmony within the family context largely determine what is considered “right behaviour,”³⁵ what to do when dealing with varied circumstances ranging from suicide to rape,³⁶ and how to deal with “land ownership.” With regards to the latter, it has been observed that most rural families do not have a notion of individuated land ownership. Instead, land is conceived as belonging collectively to a clan-based land holding group to be held in trust for both the living and yet unborn.³⁷ In turn, such insistence on social harmony also predicates the generally held belief that decisions should be made in inclusive and communally agreeable ways, with benefits accruing to everyone.³⁸ For example, whereas “land development” has strong favourable support, its favourability is strongly dependent on the condition that the local community should have a voice in the process and that the community should not be denied community benefits. Indeed, as observed in different studies, Acholi communities often reject development projects that only benefit a few or the government, or projects which are negotiated with individuals rather than with the communities in question.³⁹

Yet, in contrast to the ideal of social harmony, the reality is often different: due to a context of severe poverty such family structures are in fact structures open to “familial dynamics of competition, animosity or jealousy.” Indeed, Acholi households are “rarely peaceful places of contentment and cooperation,”⁴⁰ and as will be elaborated below, conflicts increasingly play out between elders and youths. While some revival of “traditional authority” appears to be widely supported among the Acholi, there is controversy over just what this authority should comprise.⁴¹

The elders in search of authority

According to elders, an important factor contributing to the current context of lostness is the erosion of traditional cultural norms; a condition which is seen to be exacerbated by a Western culture of individualism which young people have adopted. Specifically, elders have often been observed to criticize youths for allowing low standards of morality to continue long after the war and displacement ended, thereby labelling youths “good for nothing,” “lazy” and “useless.”⁴² Faced with such a reality – and partly informed by group memories of older men’s power position in the past – elders see it as their responsibility to step up; to provide for a moral compass in the preservation of Acholi society and families in particular. For example, in studying gender–age relations among the Acholi, Collette Harris observed that older men often look forward to the restoration of their responsibilities and respect in society.⁴³ Specifically, Harris argues that male elders still hold on to the idea of “dispositional power,” meaning that they expect a general and unquestioning acknowledgement of their authority as legitimate. If their position in society is not acknowledged, they are prone to resort to “episodic power,” meaning that they are willing to use strategies which more actively assert their authority, not seldom violence.⁴⁴

Within Acholi society, the dispositional authority has often been acknowledged due to a strong societal appeal to spiritual and religious arguments,⁴⁵ or due to a common societal distrust in and disengagement from “external entities,” be it either government institutions or NGOs.⁴⁶ Yet, years of civil war and displacement have nevertheless severally weakened their material resources to strengthen and enforce such authority; i.e. power over and through land and cattle. As such, in order to maintain authority elders understand the need to adapt. In particular, and without questioning their dispositional power, male elders now also rely on a strategy of “inclusion” whereby the legitimate claims to authority are broadened.⁴⁷ Indeed, findings suggest that “authority” today is more hybrid, and that such authority is more open to claims made by both women and youths.⁴⁸

Rebellious youths?

Urban youths, for one, increasingly critique the authority of elders. On the one hand such critique is informed by a loss of respect because of the perception that elders do not always uphold what is expected of them, that elders are selfish and corrupt, or by the fact that youths are excluded from decision-making.⁴⁹ On the other hand, such critique of the elders is also informed by the embrace of different interests, and more specifically by an attempt to challenge and break free from the older men’s project of restoring traditional levels of authority. Building on this latter point it has been observed that these youths see themselves as central actors in defining the future of Acholi society; that they see themselves as links between the past and future, between Acholi and Western culture. In order to overcome “backwardness” they feel the need to follow the Western model which is both associated with economic development as well as the values of independence, individual freedom, civic rights. The Western model is understood to enable them in disabling patriarchal and gerontocratic structures.⁵⁰

For example, some youths – and in particular urban youths – resent spending time “digging” their family fields within a patrilineal context (cf. inheritance of land from father to son). Instead, they increasingly pursue different (often non-agrarian) ways of earning cash; often in an attempt of either owning land themselves or for educational purposes.⁵¹ Additionally, elders’ authority over land has also increasingly been bypassed through the ballot box: perhaps more so than in other regions in Uganda, “access to land” has proven to be the central issue in mobilizing youths to take part in elections. In contrast to elders, it is shown that these youths are more susceptible to political arguments in favour of using and selling land for business or for attracting development investments.⁵² Finally, youths’ increasing attraction to the “opportunity space” also stands example for their quest for independence, and in particular their engagement in youth groups: these youth groups have been observed to combine market-based revenue-generating undertakings with social activities such as peer education, sports activities, and skills training programmes. Additionally, these youth groups have increasingly taken it upon themselves to “rekindle culture” and to “mobilize the community,” whereby emphasis is put on the rediscovery of traditions and cultural practices from pre-war times that have been more or less dormant in the post-war context (e.g. traditional Acholi dance and music).⁵³ As such, in a context of job scarcity, and in a context where many politicians and elders are perceived not to do enough to enable Acholi youth to rise, these groups represent “shifting generational values in Acholi society, and a break-down and reformulation of social, cultural, political and economic interests.”⁵⁴

EU democracy support in Acholiland

As already indicated above, due to years of civil war and marginalization by the GoU, Acholiland scores low on socio-economic development and “political engagement.” With regards to the latter, other than distrusting or fearing central government, there has however also been a drop in support for democratic values – amongst others support for the rule of law, freedom of the press, parliamentary oversight, multipartyism, and freedom of assembly and association – with particular deficits among women, the less-educated, and rural residents.⁵⁵ Moreover, it has been observed that often especially youths perceive politics to be a corrupt practice and to be contrary to Acholi values.⁵⁶ Then, where to start in terms of EU democracy support? What should be the priority objectives, and whom should be the prime recipients?

Skills training and service delivery

According to aid project documents – as well as observed by interview respondents – unemployment, poverty, low levels of qualification and limited job opportunities are important factors contributing to the enduring marginalization of the Acholi society, and for the precarious state of democracy in Acholiland and in Uganda overall. Project managers frequently observed that poverty and social deprivation prevent the Acholi from imagining political rights and civil liberties. Given that political and civic rights are so alien to their daily reality, they believe the Acholi in fact mostly care about socio-economic development instead.⁵⁷ Additionally, the Acholi are also understood to have a particular culture of “having to be given”: rather than claiming their rights, it is noted the Acholi think of their leaders as someone that grants them rights: clean water, schools, etc.⁵⁸ Hence, aid projects point to the need for the Acholi to realize they have rights: both through providing better conditions that enable the imagination of “having rights” and through actively changing Acholi mindsets. Indeed, democracy aid objectives predominantly focus on either (i) increasing the capacity of the Acholi to develop their own livelihoods, with capacity understood to encapsulate access to both skills and credit; and/or on (ii) improving awareness among office holders and the wider public through increased civic participation, which would then lead to more effective service delivery which is adapted to local needs.

Yet, far from pursuing these objectives simultaneously, (business) skills and equity development is usually seen as a precondition for democratic participation. Indeed, project managers all stress the importance of focussing on the improvement of the livelihoods of Acholi communities as a precondition for democratic progress; as a precondition for the realization that rights can be claimed. Hence, almost all observed aid projects pursue “livelihood improvement” through prioritizing “capacity development,” whereby participants are introduced to subjects like improving personal effectiveness and goal setting, and subjects relating to entrepreneurship, agricultural production and marketing. Overall, it is believed these trainings serve to create “productive members of society.”⁵⁹ The common idea is that when participants are first enabled to increase their own capacity, only then can they step up and help develop their communities as well. Trained participants are encouraged to set up different local networks – be it either private sector formations, village savings groups, community based organizations – which would then allow to diffuse the gained knowledge more broadly.

Only once participants have been given capacity or a “stake” in society, they are considered for and included in the decision-making process. Indeed, “informed experience” is noted to be the precondition for “meaningful” political engagement, or as one respondent noted: “If people are not empowered holistically – economically, socially – they cannot effectively engage in governance processes. They cannot meaningfully make contributions in those processes. It has bearing on the question of democracy.”⁶⁰ Similarly, a different project with the stated aim to “increase participation of youth in decision-making processes” only opened up its district wide “youth parliaments” to include youths whom had gone through the prior skills programme which focussed on business and marketing.⁶¹

There was, however, one project which did focus more directly on community dialogue and engagement without the prior requirement for participants to be trained in “entrepreneurship.” The specific aim of this project was to build back structures of community dialogue; structures which in many places have been lost since the War. To that extent the project focussed on getting conversations going between elected leaders and the population at village level about how to improve service delivery. Nevertheless, similar to other projects, this project just as well eventually came to rely on trainings. Project implementers found participants to have a lack of understanding of the words democracy and accountability, and as such, despite budget constraints, trainings were conducted through either poster campaigns, focus group discussions, or engaging loose networks of grassroots organizations in civic education.⁶²

Focus on women and rural youths

In terms of identifying aid targets, the overall EU aid policy can be characterized to be guided by “equity” as a central aspect of development planning. Equitable development planning involves a deliberate and intentional effort to meet the needs of underserved communities, and to reduce disparities within and across countries in the development process.⁶³ For example, both the 2015 EU Action Plan on Democracy and Human Rights and the New European Consensus on Development – both of which provide the policy framework for EU external democracy support in Acholiland – stipulate that all (democracy) aid efforts should be targeted toward reducing vulnerabilities and addressing inequalities to ensure that “no-one is left behind.” Specifically, aid efforts should particularly address the multiple discriminations faced by vulnerable and marginalized sections of society; with special attention to youths and women.⁶⁴

Mirroring these policy intentions to the eight selected EU democracy aid projects – and in line with international development aid in the Acholi region more generally⁶⁵ – we can equally observe that these projects also emphasize the most vulnerable, be it (ex-)prison inmates, the unemployed, single parents, the disabled or school dropouts [see Table 1]. In particular, when we seek to refine these targets a bit more, we can note that most – if not all – of these projects identify these vulnerable sections of society in terms of women and youths on the one hand, and rural communities on the other. For example, four out of eight projects identified either women or youths (or both) as an explicit target for empowerment. As to the projects that did not explicitly target a particular section of society – but the community as a whole – in practice “community” was nevertheless still primarily limited to the inclusion of youths and women.⁶⁶ Additionally, in terms of emphasizing rural communities – while Acholi districts are predominantly rural anyway, especially when compared to other (southern) districts in Uganda – most projects attempted to reach the most remote and rural communities within the selected districts.⁶⁷ Indeed, also the projects which were implemented in more urban districts (e.g. Gulu and Kitgum) in fact deliberately targeted the more rural sub-counties within.⁶⁸

Identifying targets of democracy aid inherently opens up questions of whom is excluded from project activities. In that regard, remarkably, none of the training activities directly engage the elders or cultural – and religious leaders. While these actors in society are often approached to mobilize attendance or to identify vulnerable individuals within society, they are not participants in the project activities as such. As to why, such non-selection often follows budget constraints: since money is little, it has to be put where it is expected to have most impact.⁶⁹ Also, the design of the project activities often disproportionately excludes. For example, to be able to effectively participate participants can be required to have “a lot of energy” or to have a “certificate of Primary Leaving Examination.”⁷⁰ Yet, considering that in the different Acholi districts illiteracy among the 60 + age group lies between 60% and 70%, as compared to 20%–25% overall, such requirement disproportionately disadvantages the elderly population. Finally, elders are also often not included because they may either already be considered “productive members of society,”⁷¹ or to the contrary, because their productivity is perceived to be beyond repair. With regards to the latter, elders are sometimes understood to still be very reminiscent of the War, an experience which prevents them from imagining change in favour of maintaining the status quo.⁷² Additionally, these elders are also sometimes understood to have lost moral authority. More so than in the past, these elders are believed to now be more susceptible to bribery, manipulation, and partiality.⁷³

Neoliberal in orientation

Overall, the design and implementation of EU democracy aid objectives in Acholiland could be understood in light of the recent EU policy turn in which the EU increasingly has declared to “invest in the resilience of states and societies.”⁷⁴ In theory, such “resilience building” entails working toward “the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises.” However, in practice such policy is understood to secure a predetermined neoliberal form of social rule which emphasizes the empowerment of the self, which prioritizes the responsibility of the individual to govern themselves in appropriate ways, and which frames images of successful development around the skills and capacities of the individual.⁷⁵

In the same vein, other than more overt neoliberal objectives such as “entrepreneurship” or “business development,” we can also discern neoliberal “logics” in the EU’s democracy aid projects in Acholiland. Indeed, EU democracy aid projects also emphasize self-reliance, adaptability, preparedness, and individual responsibility (in particular of the youths). The question at hand is now to determine what these objectives seek to achieve and for whom, or to put it differently: with what sections of society they are aligned, if at all.

The selective alignment of EU democracy support

Arguably, the EU’s projects are not designed to align with the Acholi at large, but to selectively align with mostly the Acholi urban youths. As has become particularly clear with youths in Gulu as compared to more rural areas, the social and political conditions of urban life contribute to them having different imaginaries of what is considered “freedom” and “justice.”⁷⁶ Indeed, urban youths have been noted to be more prone to values of individualism, to be more independent from hierarchal family structures, to be more exposed to a Western and humanitarian economy, and to have better access to business infrastructures (e.g. trading centres).⁷⁷ Then, it is with this faction of Acholi society that the EU’s aid objectives are likely to find a more welcome reception.

Yet, notably, the EU’s projects are not implemented in urban centres, but deliberately seek out youths in the more rural areas. While clear evidence is hard to come by, anecdotal observations suggest that in contrast to urban youths, rural youths are more likely to perceive the role of traditional authority as legitimate, in particular given such authority’s role in solving conflict, land wrangles and dealing with evil spirits.⁷⁸ Also, rural youths have been noted to resent the “equalization of members of formally distinct social categories” which leads to the dissolution of established authority structures.⁷⁹ Finally, such differences between urban and rural settings are also strengthened by the observation that Acholi urban youths frequently talk about the culture of young people living in rural areas in an essentialist and derogatory manner, i.e. them being “backward.”⁸⁰

Hence, the EU’s insistence on empowering youths in terms of individual entrepreneurship outside traditional power structures is likely to be less welcomed in more rural areas (which is most of Acholiland) – the more so when we also consider the perception of elders and villagers more in general. For example, elders have frequently been noted to perceive “town life” – and thus also aid which is understood to enable town life conditions – as “a world turned upside-down, a fundamental corruption of Acholi society and its values.”⁸¹ Also, aid projects which have been implemented without the involvement of elders and which have disregarded customary norms have antagonized the elders in the past.⁸² Finally, rural villagers more in general have also been found to adhere more to principles of “communality” and to be highly averse to the expansion of capitalist markets and the monetary economy.⁸³

To conclude, it also becomes clear that the EU’s aid projects align with the GoU’s interest, and moreover, that they empower the GoU’s hold on the region. Since Uganda has one of the youngest populations in the world – a section of the population among which the GoU increasingly struggles to create legitimacy⁸⁴ – and since the government frequently puts emphasis on individualization and privatization through job creation and the need to modernize agriculture in the Northern region,⁸⁵ any effort to engage these youths in terms of business development is likely to find support with the GoU. Additionally, since an emphasis on “resilience” – inter alia through responsibilizing the individual to govern themselves (cf. supra) – weakens traditional hierarchies, it could also be argued that the EU not only strengthens its own position in the region (yet this time avoiding charges of neo-colonialism⁸⁶), but that of the GoU as well. After all, “divide and rule” has long been a go-to policy tool of the GoU.⁸⁷

Reconsidering EU democracy support

Returning to the normative requirement not to empower authoritarian rule, and following from the observation that current alignment of EU democracy aid risks antagonizing rather than empowering societal relations, there is a bottom-up argument in favour rejuvenating EU democracy support in Uganda, and Acholiland in particular. However, equally it becomes clear that the Acholi aren’t homogeneous, and hence, that conceptions of a just society are debated locally. Any local implementation of EU democracy aid will therefore in effect always intervene in a contested terrain; the result of which perhaps inescapably elevates some voices over others. Then, as to the question how to rethink EU democracy support in terms of alignment, how to do this differently? Here, it is argued that if there is a belief that the EU’s democracy support is to democratically support the people in making their own decisions, a necessary start for both the study and practice of democracy support would be to become more self-reflexive about what the EU is to support, and to politically reformulate the grounds of such intervention.

Specifically, if the EU is to take seriously the principles of ownership and contestation, this first of all requires self-reflection about the validity of the EU’s own conceptions of what is a good political order.⁸⁸ In concrete terms, it is time for the EU to finally deconstruct the neoliberal foundation of its aid objectives, in particular how such neoliberal logic – through its hegemonic structure and in line with governmentality analyses – prevents the emergence of alternative and/or locally rooted knowledge claims.⁸⁹ It is argued such deconstruction would enable to acknowledge and appreciate that in fact the Acholi already have capacity to debate social justice and that indeed such negotiations are in fact already underway. Following from this, the very rationale for holding “trainings” would be reversed: from educating others to others educating oneself. While this recommendation applies to the EU, it also applies to us, the academic scholarship in particular. Indeed, as argued elsewhere, since current literature predominantly maintains normative and essentialist ideals when defining “democracy,” it is prevented from adequately envisioning difference.⁹⁰

Only once the hegemonic structures of knowledge production have been deconstructed, it is possible to have a more grounded appreciation of the different “social justice claimants,” and hence to also reconstruct how EU democracy support should be rejuvenated.⁹¹ To that extent, a closer deference to both the cultural position and life worlds of elders should be explored, in particular since their position is still highly regarded within society. Moreover, working against the grain of Acholi family structures has already proven to be detrimental to efforts aimed at reforming land tenure or gender dynamics.⁹² Additionally, and more generally, it has been observed that the “revival of culture might be more likely to lead to overall change than blanket condemnation of culture.”⁹³ In the same vein, also academic literature should do more to explore the contested nature of “the local.” Indeed, recent calls for increased “resilience of”⁹⁴ and “negotiations with”⁹⁵ target societies in authoritarian contexts will not prove to be the silver bullet if such propositions do not consider the contentious debate on what is perceived as locally just and whom participates in such negotiation.

Finally, when it comes to “including” different voices in the very practice of reconstruction, the EU should acknowledge that the act of such inclusion is still a political intervention, meaning that it will always set certain boundaries and hence exclude. In concrete terms, rather than hiding behind “rational” or “universal” indicators – e.g. unemployment, vulnerability, effectiveness, etc. – the EU should not evade to make explicit whom it understands to be legitimate local justice claimants and how they contribute to “democracy.” Such declaration would clarify how the EU exactly seeks to reconstruct, and hence enable to also challenge such reconstruction in the name of democracy. As such, it would keep open the debate and create space for a plurality of alternatives to the EU’s approach to supporting democracy.

Concluding remarks

In policy as well as academic circles there has been a growing acknowledgment of the need for aid to be adapted to the local context. Yet, while “ownership,” “bottom-up approaches,” “inclusion,” “participation” and “partnership” have all become buzzwords of development discourse,⁹⁶ the voice of common “people” have nevertheless often remained subaltern. With this in mind, and considering the calls for the EU to fundamentally change its democracy aid in Uganda, this article set off to reassess how EU democracy aid projects in Acholiland align with local negotiations of what is a just society and how to achieve it.

Analysis has shown that there is a generational debate among the Acholi on what is considered just, and that it is into this pre-existing field of disagreement that the EU enters. Guided by notions of “vulnerability,” the EU de facto designs its aid so that it aligns mostly with the lived realities of “urban youths,” thereby often excluding elders. Specifically, EU aid projects aim for youths to become “productive members of society” primarily through capacity training in terms of entrepreneurship and taking up individual responsibility. Yet, both the substance of such aid and the selective alignment with urban youths is likely to cause further tensions within society, in particular since EU aid projects in fact are implemented in more rural areas. In contrast to “individuality,” existing ethnographic research has indicated that rural villagers and elders are more inclined to values of “communality,” yet within a hierarchal “family structure.”

As such, this article points attention to the following: by the very act of intervention, EU democracy support will always elevate some voices over others, which inescapably causes tension. In other words, far from being depoliticized or technocratic,⁹⁷ it becomes clear that aid is and always will be a political intervention when dealing with local stakeholders. The question how exactly such “politicization” develops is however up for further empirical research to explore.⁹⁸ For example, this could be explored on the basis of actual ethnographic fieldwork on the ground, and be differentiated according to different types of EU democracy aid – e.g. civic education, local governance, women’s representation, etc.

Nevertheless, as to the normative question how to democratically deal with such political reality in terms of rejuvenating EU democracy support, this article argues in favour of first of all deconstructing the neoliberal conceptual underpinnings of the EU’s understanding of democracy support. This would allow for a plurality of alternatives to emerge and with which to engage. However, any decision to include these alternatives in the name of reconstructing democracy support will always remain a political intervention, and should be acknowledged accordingly. Again, in presenting these arguments for improving democracy support, the point here is not to delve into all the nuances and difficulties that need to be considered when undertaking such endeavour. The point is to contribute to the debate on how democracy aid could at least begin to adapt to a democratic politics of recognition, rather than to solve it.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Nathan Vandeputte

Nathan Vandeputte is a PhD researcher and teaching assistant at the Ghent Institute for International and European Studies, Ghent University. His research concerns EU democracy support in Uganda, whereby he approaches “democracy” from a decentered, radical democratic theoretical perspective. Before starting his PhD, he obtained his master's degree in EU studies at Ghent University in 2016 and did two internships: one at the EU Delegation in Uganda, and one at the European Partnership for Democracy (a leading democracy NGO in Brussels). Email: [email protected]

Notes

1 Carothers, “Rejuvenating Democracy Promotion”.

2 Wine, “The West”; European Parliament, “(2021/2545(RSP))”; Abrahamsen and Bareebe, “International Aid”.

3 E.g. Poppe, Leininger, and Wolff, “Beyond Contestation”; Birkholz, Scherf, and Schroeder, “International Interventions”.

4 Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance.

5 Vorhölter, Youth at the Cross-Roads, 232. See also Hopwood, “An Inherited Animus to Communal Land”, 4.

6 Mosse, Cultivating Development, 8.

7 Poppe and Wolff, “Justice Conflicts”.

8 Ibid.

9 E.g. Rogerson, “Aid Harmonisation and Alignment”.

10 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, “Census 2014”. According to the 2014 census the Acholi are the 8th largest ethnic group and represent 4.4% of total Ugandan population.

11 Oxfam, “Who Is Growing?”; UNDP, “Uganda Human Development Report 2015”. According to the UNDP, 48.7% are multidimensionally poor as compared to 31.4% in the rest of the country.

12 Lindemann, “Change of Guard?”.

13 Alava, “Subdued Citizenship”, 90; Branch and Yen, “Neoliberal Discipline”.

14 Komujuni and Büscher, “Chiefly Authority”.

15 This region includes the administrative districts of Agago, Amuru, Gulu, Omoro, Kitgum, Lamwo, Nwoya and Pader.

16 However, an important EU contribution to democracy has also been through the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF). This is a pool fund which the EU co-finances through the European Development Fund. Being a pool fund, and since specific projects and contributions are difficult to delineate, this aid facility has been excluded from analysis.

17 Content analysis draws from EU Calls for Proposals, project websites, press releases and news reports.

18 All but one interviewee are Ugandan nationals, two of which also are Acholi. All interviewees had direct experience with both designing and implementing the projects. All interviewees held more senior positions within their organization – be it either project manager, country manager or CEO – indicating their experience with the aid industry.

19 Hickey, “The Government of Chronic Poverty”, 1152.

20 Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions”.

21 Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, “Governing Chronic Poverty”, 1227.

22 Atkinson, “Our Friends at the Bank?” 60.

23 Meier, “Death Does Not Rot”; Allen, “Bitter Roots”, 249–54; Komujuni and Büscher, “Chiefly Authority”.

24 Interviews 2, 3, 9.

25 Vorhölter, Youth at the Cross-Roads, 94–98.

26 Whyte and Acio, “Youth Have No Voice”, 21; Alava, “Acholi Youth Are Lost”; Vorhölter, Youth at the Cross-Roads.

27 Alava, “Acholi Youth Are Lost”, 174. Emphasis mine.

28 Vorhölter, Youth at the Cross-Roads, 238. See also Amanela et al., “The Mental Landscape”, Part 2, 9; Divon and Owor, “Aguu”, 92.

29 Hopwood, “An Inherited Animus to Communal Land”, 14; Harris, “Gender-Age Systems”, 485.

30 Atkinson et al., “Customary Land Ownership”, 68.

31 Harris, “Gender-Age Systems”, 486.

32 Hopwood, “An Inherited Animus to Communal Land”, 9.

33 Whyte and Acio, “Generations and Access to Land”.

34 Porter, “Mango Trees”.

35 Amanela et al., “The Mental Landscape”, Part 3, 1.

36 Oboke and Whyte, “Anger and Bitter Hearts”, 625; Porter, “Mango Trees”.

37 Atkinson et al., “Customary Land Ownership”, 30–31.

38 Kapidžić, “Public Authority”.

39 Atkinson et al., “Customary Land Ownership”, 58; Sjögren, “Scrambling for the Promised Land”, 67–70; Martiniello, “Social Struggles”.

40 Hopwood, “An Inherited Animus to Communal Land”, 12. See also Whyte and Acio, “Generations and Access to Land”.

41 Branch, “Gulu”, 3160.

42 Omach, “International Peacebuilding”, 10; Divon and Owor, “Aguu”, 87; Vorhölter, Youth at the Cross-Roads, 239; interviews 4, 5, 10.

43 Harris, “Gender-Age Systems”. See also Branch, “Gulu”, 3160–1.

44 Ibid., 481–85.

45 Harris, “Gender-Age Systems”, 482; Alava, “Acholi Youth Are Lost”, 166.

46 Lindemann, “Change of Guard?”; Komujuni and Büscher, “Chiefly Authority”, 110–11; Langevang and Namatovu, “Social Bricolage”, 12.

47 Harris, “Gender-Age Systems”, 487.

48 Omach, “International Peacebuilding”, 8; Hopwood, “Women’s Land Claims”, 391; Kapidžić, “Public Authority”, 134.

49 Atkinson et al., “Customary Land Ownership”, 40–49; Whyte and Acio, “Generations and Access to Land”, 23.

50 Vorhölter, Youth at the Cross-Roads, 219.

51 Harris, “Gender-Age Systems”, 486; Whyte and Acio, “Generations and Access to Land”, 31–33.

52 Meinert and Kjær, “Politicians’ Use of Land Issues”, 770–3.

53 Vorhölter, Youth at the Cross-Roads, 171–79; Langevang and Namatovu, “Social Bricolage”.

54 Divon and Owor, “Aguu”, 93.

55 Kibirige, “Slowly Growing or Stunted?”.

56 Alava, “Acholi Youth Are Lost”, 168; Komujuni and Büscher, “Chiefly Authority”, 115.

57 Interviews 1, 2, 6.

58 Interviews 1, 10.

59 Interview 1.

60 Interview 9.

61 Interviews 1, 10.

62 Interviews 7, 8.

63 Chi, Bulage, and Østby, “Equity in Aid Allocation”.

64 Council of the European Union, “Action Plan”; European Commission, “The New European Consensus on Development”.

65 Chi, Bulage, and Østby, “Equity in Aid Allocation”.

66 Interviews 2, 3, 7.

67 The identified EU projects covered all but two Acholi districts: Pader and Agago.

68 Interviews 1, 4; see also Table 1.

69 Interview 4, 9.

70 Interview 5.

71 Interview 1.

72 Interviews 7, 10.

73 Interview 5.

74 Joseph and Juncos, “Resilience as an Emergent European Project?”.

75 Joseph, “Resilience as Embedded Neoliberalism”.

76 Branch, “Gulu”, 157–60.

77 Vorhölter, Youth at the Cross-Roads, 98; Divon and Owor, “Aguu”, 88.

78 Vorhölter, Youth at the Cross-Roads, 128.

79 Ibid., 155–57.

80 Ibid., 206. See also Langevang and Namatovu, “Social Bricolage”, 11–12.

81 Branch, “Gulu”, 3157.

82 Omach, “International Peacebuilding”, 8–9; Branch, “Gulu”, 3157–8; Harris, “Gender-Age Systems”, 481.

83 Sjögren, “Scrambling for the Promised Land”; Martiniello, “Social Struggles”.

84 Reuss and Titeca, “When Revolutionaries Grow Old”.

85 Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, “Governing Chronic Poverty”, 1221; Hopwood, “Women’s Land Claims”, 388.

86 Juncos, “Resilience”, 7. See also Vorhölter, Youth at the Crossroads, 256–60.

87 Titeca, “More Is Less”.

88 Poppe and Wolff, “Justice Conflicts”; see also Koelble and Lipuma, “Democratizing Democracy”.

89 Bridoux, “Democratic Emergence”. See also Joseph and Juncos, “Resilience as an Emergent European Project?”.

90 Vandeputte, “Thinking about the Political with Capital P.”

91 See e.g. Onar and Nicolaïdis, “The Decentring Agenda”.

92 Hopwood, “An Inherited Animus to Communal Land”, 15. Porter, “Mango Trees”.

93 Omach, “International Peacebuilding”, 11.

94 Lührmann, “Disrupting the Autocratization Sequence”.

95 Poppe, Leininger, and Wolff, “Beyond Contestation”.

96 Cornwall and Deborah, Buzzwords and Fuzzwords.

97 Kurki, “Democracy through Technocracy?”.

98 See Amanela et al., “The Mental Landscape”, Part 4. For example, according to this study much more consideration should be given to how the individual perceives inclusion to be fair. After all, standards of what people experience as fair and inclusive often vary depending on the individual, whereby those recalling their experience of conflict express higher standards.

Appendix 1:

list of interviews

1. Local NGO based in Kampala, CEO, 05 May 2021.

2. An international ‘executive non-departmental public body’ based in Kampala, project manager, 20 April 2021.

3. International NGO based in Kampala, country manager, 21 April 2020.

4. International NGO based in Acholiland, project manager, 20 May 2021.

5. Local NGO based in Acholiland, project manager, 26 May 2021.

6. Local NGO based in Kampala, project manager, 29 April 2021.

7. International NGO based in Kampala, project manager, 18 June 2021.

8. International NGO based in Kampala, project manager, 22 June 2021.

9. International NGO based in Kampala, country manager, 25 May 2021.

10. Local NGO based in Kampala, programme coordinator, 02 June 2021.