Defining democratic inclusion from the perspective of democracy and citizenship theory

ABSTRACT

In political science, we deal with a series of ideas, which are primarily political ideals. In comparative politics, we need concepts that are able to “travel” across countries and regions and capable of being measured. Inclusion is an equivocal notion in which both aspects converge: On the one hand, inclusion is used as a code for normative claims regarding, for example, participation, equality, social justice and recognition. On the other hand, it can be applied as an analytical tool for assessing a quality of political regimes. How can inclusion be defined in order to maintain its value orientation and serve at the same time as an empirical concept for systematic-qualitative comparative research? Combining the perspectives of democracy and citizenship theory—two strands that run parallel to each other without much interaction—I define and operationalize inclusion as a property of democratic political systems. Starting from a normative conception of democracy and citizenship that leads to a procedural definition, I conceive of democratic inclusion as civic and political inclusion and lay out dimensions for comparatively assessing political regimes from the perspective of inclusionexclusion.

KEYWORDS:

• inclusion
• exclusion
• equality
• liberty
• democracy
• citizenship
• rule of law
• accountability

Introduction

In the context of social science, the notion of inclusion usually refers to heterogeneous groups’ participation in society on an equal footing, e.g. their equitable sharing of social goods. Frequently, inclusion also denotes the targeted efforts to culturally, socially, economically, civically, or politically incorporate underprivileged, disadvantaged, marginalized, or subaltern social groups. This is, for example, the case of the definition that Talcott Parsons gives in his contribution “Full Citizenship for the Negro American? A Sociological Problem”: “The process by which previously excluded groups attain full citizenship or membership in the societal community will […] be called inclusion.”¹ As one dimension of the duality inclusion/exclusion, the concept serves for discussing a variety of problems such as the lack of social justice, equal opportunity, and social recognition as well as the existence of marginalization, discrimination, and oppression from different theoretical angles.²

Inclusive claims have been particularly raised in the language of democracy and citizenship. Robert E. Goodin bemoans that, in scholarly writings and in politics, talks on inclusion have been used as a code for many different demands.³ Peter Kivisto indicates that some theorists have increasingly framed their discussion of inclusion in terms of citizenship, social justice, and/or the pursuit of recognition.⁴ Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman state: “It is not clear whether adopting the perspective of citizenship really leads to different policy conclusions than the more familiar perspectives of justice and democracy.”⁵ Finally, Iris Marion Young warns: “The concepts of exclusion and inclusion lose meaning if they are used to label all problems of social conflict and injustice.”⁶

Although the three notions inclusion, democracy, and citizenship are not synonymous, their semantic fields partly overlap. Thus, the first question for any theory of democracy as well as of citizenship is who is included – included as members of the political community or polity.⁷ In democratic theory voters as well as elected representatives and appointed officials are in the first instance citizens. In citizenship theory, a democratic context is usually taken for granted. In this sense, citizenship is more than mere membership in a polity: Citizenship is inherent to polity-members in a democracy. Democracy requires rule of law, which is based on effective civil rights. Democratic representation and participation build also upon political rights. Civil and political rights are constitutive elements of citizenship.

Within the broad realm of social sciences, it is political science that has been dedicated – not exclusively but in a comprehensive fashion – to the study of polities. From this perspective, democracy is by definition a highly inclusionary political regime. Inclusion is a key dimension of democracy that underlines the principles of liberty and civic and political equality for all and finds its clearest expression in universal suffrage. In this sense, inclusion is requirement (input) and at the same time achievement (output) of democracy – a double source of its legitimacy. However, strictly speaking, fully inclusionary representative democracies do not empirically exist. Democracy’s principles, structures, and functions necessarily require moments of exclusion. In representative democracies minors and non-nationals have no voting rights. Electoral thresholds might prevent small parties from entering parliament. Political parties that are racist and opposed to the democratic constitution might be banned. Therefore, external and internal inclusionary/exclusionary boundaries are formally and factually inherent to democracy. From a normative perspective of the theory of democracy and citizenship, not every type of exclusion is problematic.

In this article, I pursue a double objective: I aim to (1) integrate democracy and citizenship theory in order to (2) define and operationalize the concept of inclusion as a property of political systems. Although democracy and citizenship theory typically examine similar aspects and problems, they frequently do not relate to each other, offering unconnected but quite symmetric views to common issues. Therefore, my double purpose is to integrate democracy and citizenship theory from the perspective of inclusion into an enriched concept – with normative roots and analytical power – of civic and political inclusion, which I simply call democratic inclusion. In this way, I wish to make democratic inclusion a useful category for the assessment and comparison of representative democracies.

The structure of this article is as follows: In the second section, I specify the main features of the proposed approach taking into account cross-national indices for measuring democracy and unifying frameworks of citizenship conceptualizations. Then, I go into the theoretical-deductive procedure: First, in the third section, I relate inclusion to democratic theory. My starting point is a normative characterization of democracy as based on the principles of liberty and equality that leads to a procedural definition of democracy which encompasses a civic and a political dimension. Against this backdrop, I discuss four problems of representative democracy that put the principles of liberty and equality under pressure and serve at the same time as evaluative dimensions for democratic inclusiveness. I call them the dilemmas of demos’ boundary, incongruity, disparity, and foreclosure. In the fourth section, through shifting the theoretical angle, I demarcate the meaning of inclusion from the perspective of citizenship theory and identify three ways the inclusiveness of citizenship can be altered: I call them deepening, extension and expansion. In the fifth section, I combine both theoretical perspectives and develop a bridging concept, distinguishing operational dimensions, which allow for the qualitative assessment of democracy from the perspective of inclusion. Finally, in the sixth section, I offer a summary of my arguments and stipulations and elaborate on the added value of my approach.

Distinct features of the proposed approach

Inclusion is a multi-faceted concept that denotes access to a plurality of entitlements and material as well as immaterial resources in different social systems or societal realms. It is strongly connected to democracy, since the latter is considered the most inclusive political regime. At the same time, democracy is a complex phenomenon and its definition is highly contested. Accordingly, “there is no consensus about how to conceptualize and measure regimes.”⁸ Yet, a great amount of indices have been developed in order to assess the democratic quality of political regimes, as Freedom House⁹, Polity Project¹⁰ and Varieties of Democracy¹¹ among others. They differ in their conceptual starting point and in the kind and amount of dimensions that they derive from it or aggregate inductively.¹² What they have in common, however, is that they consider inclusion/inclusiveness as one dimension of democracy together with others or as a quality of further categories such as participation and representation.

In accordance with these indices, my main concern is with representative democracy, since it is the most widespread empirical realization of the democratic regime. Within large polities with sizeable population, i.e. in modern states, governance requires the representative element – “though it certainly does not preclude more direct forms of citizen governance existing side-by-side with representative institutions.”¹³

Whereas the purpose of these indices is to comprehensively measure the democratic quality of political regimes, my aim is to evaluate the degree of inclusiveness of democracies. This does not mean considering inclusion the only relevant indicator for assessing democracy. For instance, performance¹⁴ or effectiveness in problem solving might be a further quality factor of representative democracy. And one can think of several qualities that might be in tension with each other – so that maximizing all and each of them at the same time would be empirically impossible.

Focussing on inclusion makes my approach more limited in its scope but allows for a more in-depth analysis of this specific democracy dimension at different levels within a polity. As a result, it goes beyond the usual understanding of inclusive democracy (political participation without discrimination) and inclusive citizenship (“the degree to which all citizens and permanent residents enjoy the protection of the law”¹⁵). It strives to be highly sensitive for the detection of inclusionary/exclusionary changes in a variety of realms, be these changes institutional (e.g. the introduction of proportional representation) or liberties-based (e.g. stronger anti-media-monopoly regulation), and be they legal (e.g. the recognition of gay marriage) or symbolic-discursive (e.g. the broadening of “we” as demos notion that includes immigrants). Consequently, my approach is neither an alternative nor an improved version of those indices. It rather looks at democracy from a different angle.

Similar to Smith’s proposal for a unifying framework of “legal citizenship” and “lived citizenship,”¹⁶ my approach is based on an inclusive understanding of citizenship and combines normative an empirical aspects. However, I do not seek to unite different conceptualizations of citizenship into a shared theoretical framework, but two integrate democracy and citizenship theory into a comprehensive concept of inclusion – offering at the same time wide-ranged disaggregation of it.

To sum up, the proposed approach: (1) is strongly theoretical deductive: it departs from a normative-procedural definition of democracy and derives from it relevant aspects of inclusion in a systematic and detailed way; (2) is theoretical integrative: it combines democracy and citizenship theory into an enriched and comprehensive conceptualization of inclusion; (3) deals with democracy as an ideal as well as an specific concretization: it elaborates on the challenges that representative democracy poses for the fulfilment of democratic principles, and (4) is meant to be a contribution to empirical research: it delivers analytical tools for comparison over time and across polities.

Democracy and inclusion

Democracy as liberty and equality

Democracy is a highly contested concept that has been defined in multiple and very different ways. However, broadly speaking, it is possible to identify over most of the concepts of democracy a double meaning: Democracy usually refers normatively to an ideal and analytically to an empirical political regime. This article is guided by the conception of democracy as a desirable goal, an ideal, normatively grounded on the recognition of liberty and equality – and on the promise of actualizing them.

Liberty can be understood in a liberal (negative) sense as non-domination and in a republican (positive) sense as self-government (see Table 1).¹⁷ In the former negative sense, liberty means the absence of arbitrary interference, i.e. the protection of rights and freedoms. It also implies rule of law and limitation of authority: “No one, including the most highly placed official, is above the law.”¹⁸ Liberty as non-domination applies not only with regard to a single ruler but also to a popular majority whose authority is also constrained by the subjection to the law and the protection of rights and freedoms (of minorities). In the latter positive sense, liberty means autonomy, the subjection to laws that oneself has made; i.e. “the principle that all members of a political community whose interests are affected by collective decisions should have a say in them.”¹⁹ The concepts of constitutionalism and popular sovereignty usually allude respectively to these two meanings of liberty as non-domination and self-government – and can be seen at the same time as mirror-images to the civic and political elements of citizenship, i.e. they encompass civil and political rights (more on this in the following chapter).

Table 1. Democracy’s Principles

Liberty	Negative Sense	Protections of rights and freedoms	Equality before the law	Civic	Equality
		Non-domination
		Constitutionalism
	Positive Sense	Participation in policy making	Equal consideration of preferences	Political
		Self-government
		Popular sovereignty

Source: Own elaboration

Equality, in turn, means civic and political equality, i.e. equality between citizens in terms of civil and political rights. Civic equality underlines legal equality as civic status, equality before the law. Political equality is “a condition in which all citizens have equal influence on the collective decision making of a political community,”²⁰ the equal consideration of preferences in a political system. “Not only should all those affected be nominally included in decision-making, but they should be included on equal terms.”²¹ According to Robert Dahl, two assumptions underline the principle of political equality: (1) “the moral judgment that all human beings are of equal intrinsic worth” and thus that the “interest of each person must be given equal consideration”; (2) “among adults, no persons are so definitely better qualified than others to govern that they should be entrusted with complete and final authority over the government of the state.”²²

In line with this, Dietrich Rueschemeyer states that “political equality is an acknowledgment of the decisively similar dignity of all citizens as human beings who are entitled to the rule of reciprocity.”²³ According to this definition, civic and political equality are grounded in the equal worth and dignity of all citizens and transverses both meanings of liberty: non-domination/constitutionalism (equality before the law) and self-government/popular sovereignty (equal consideration of preferences).

If we accept these understandings, then we have to conclude twofold: First, in the ideal community politically organized as a democracy and therefore on the basis of liberty and civic and political equality, all citizens enjoy equal rights and chances to participate in the public sphere, to have an impact upon the definition of common goods and the decision on common goals. Secondly, the idea of democracy as based on the principles of liberty and of civic and political equality is necessarily linked to the rule of law and participation; without both of them civil and political rights cannot be realized. In this sense, the notions “liberal democracy” or “constitutional democracy” as well as “participatory democracy” or “popular democracy” might stress a particular dimension of democracy (non-domination vs. self-government or – what is equivalent – constitutionalism vs. popular sovereignty) but the adjectives are strictly speaking redundant.²⁴

Unlike the above-mentioned notions of democracy with adjectives,²⁵ the specifications “representative democracy” and “majority rule” are not superfluous, since they constitute particular concretizations of the democratic principles in large societies. As Dieter Nohlen²⁶ states, conceptually, at the core of democracy is the inclusion of all members of society with equal rights into the process of decision making but not a specific mode of inclusion or of decision rule. Because, among other reasons, self-government, i.e. popular sovereignty, can hardly be directly exercised by a large number of citizens, modern democracies rely (primarily) on representation, which is an indirect inclusion mode.²⁷ Furthermore, because citizens (and representatives) might have different and divergent values, ideas, and interests – in short: preferences – and it is not possible to consider all of them at the same time, modern democracies operate according to majority rule, which elevates the preferences of the majority to the general will – as one of the possible solutions to the decision question.²⁸

According to these conceptual distinctions, many democracies with adjective as “liberal democracy,” “participatory democracy” or “deliberative democracy” are in essence (still) representative democracies. Since my object of investigation is representative democracy, what I develop here applies also to those “subtypes” of democracy with adjective in which the representative moment might be empirically or discursively complemented by further dimensions but not abolished.

A procedural concept of democracy

As conceptualized here, both twin principles, liberty (non-domination and self-government) and (civic and political) equality, are equiprimordial or co-original, i.e. they are both intrinsic to democracy. By contrast, this is not the case of social and economic equality. Advocates of substantive conceptions of democracy also consider material equality as one of its defining features. Doubtless, it remains a democratic challenge to guarantee civic and political equality when significant economic disparities prevail. If economic inequality is not substantially counterbalanced or compensated, then civic and political equality might be limited.²⁹ A similar problem arises regarding innate abilities. For instance, individuals with heterogeneous rhetoric skills or organizational creativity may differ with regard to their ability to articulate their preferences and, therefore, to their ability to convince others and advocate their political preferences.

In line with this, John Rawls distinguishes two specific inequalities: on the one hand, the unequal (natural) distribution of assets and abilities; on the other hand, the contingency of social circumstance, e.g. familiar and national precedence.³⁰ Rawls designates both cases as a “lottery,” i.e. a question of luck.³¹ I conceive both inequalities as extrinsic to democracy. Rather, they constitute inequalities that have an impact on democracy,³² i.e. a democracy has to deal with. In this sense, the equalization of natural talents and of social and economic situations might be an objective of democratic policy or a performance result (output). Yet, equality of natural capacity, as well as social and economic equality, is neither a theoretical requirement nor a conceptually constitutive feature of democracy. For they may also be realized or striven in a non-democratic polity; thus, they are not democracy-specific. Therefore, as for its constitutive normative basis, neither social and economic equality nor equality of skills but the existence of civic and political equality between citizens is a fundamental premise of democracy.³³

Four dilemmas of representative democracy

Conventional representative democracy brings with it two differentiations that compromise the principles of liberty and equality: On the one hand, a vertical one, between rulers or elected representatives (as well as appointed officials, i.e. the bureaucracy responsible to them) and the ruled or represented people (constituencies). Thus, the democratic foundation of representation (only) consists in a relative equality between representatives and constituencies, since (nearly) everyone has the right to stand as candidate in elections and become a mandate-holder. Furthermore, representative roles are temporary, i.e. the hierarchical relation of domination should not be permanent and structural but time limited and contingent.³⁴ This non-enduring situation fosters the (vertical) accountability and responsiveness of incumbents towards the constituents.

On the other hand, representative democracy introduces a horizontal differentiation between preferences which are (strongly) represented or considered in the decision making process and those which are only weakly represented or not considered at all,³⁵ due to the fact that, for instance, they have low support, are in conflict with others, lack organizational potential, or stem from marginalized actors.³⁶ Thus, from the perspective of those citizens whose preferences might not be included in the process of policy-making but who are nevertheless bound to or affected by political decisions, representative democracy might resemble heteronomy.³⁷

In this sense, a tension between representation and liberty and equality arises because of the vertical power gap, i.e. the dilemma of incongruity between representatives and constituents as well as of the horizontal power gap, i.e. the dilemma of disparity between more and less politically influential preferences.³⁸ Closely linked to both dilemmas is a double risk of representative democracy that endangers liberty and equality: the risk of the tyranny of the ruling minority, i.e. of the governing elite, and the risk of the tyranny of the majority’s will.

From a diachronic perspective, there also exists a third risk, namely, that today’s majority or ruling minority deeply constrains the political choices available in the future. This affects, on the one hand, the equality between generations, i.e. between today’s and tomorrow’s citizens. On the other hand, it restricts the possibility of learning processes and/or changes of mind.³⁹ Therefore, the inclusive time dimension implies the warranty of optionality, allowing future choice, as well as of reversibility, allowing future change. To put it in Dahl’s normative terms: “No majority should have the right, moral or constitutional, to foreclose decisions by future majorities.”⁴⁰

The group of reference for the formulation of all these problems and risks of representative democracy is the political community – but who does belong to it? Who is included? This question concerns the dilemma of demos’ definition. The boundary problem, identified by Robert Dahl,⁴¹ “alludes to a basic question: what constitutes ‘a people’ for the purpose of democratic government? Neither empirical nor normative theories tend to deal with this question, because they normally assume that ‘a people’ already exists’.”⁴² In this context, the term usually means the people living within a (nation) state having the right to self-government. However, this implies a tautology, because people cannot be defined by state boundaries since the latter derive from the constitutional power of the people; it is the people that authorize the establishment of the state. This is not only logically true but also “in a practical-historical sense: decisions about the terms of any actually existing democracy cannot themselves have stemmed from democratic processes of decision-making.”⁴³ Not without reason, in contractualist theories, foundational consensual situations are imaginary or hypothetical, i.e. they are heuristic constructions. Therefore, the idea of popular sovereignty entails a moment of vagueness leaving space for struggles for the definition of the demos (and its boundaries). The contentiousness of people’s definition does not exclusively affect foundational situations. It may rather be an ongoing process with stable as well as accommodation phases.

As can be inferred from the above and with reference to the four dilemmas of representative democracy, there are four basic (mutually non-excluding) ways or strategies by which a democracy may become more inclusive:

1. The definition of the demos may be symbolically, politically, and legally widened, e.g. by politically recognizing marginalized groups as full members of society, by lowering the voting age and thus enlarging the electorate or by incorporating foreigners as new citizens into the polity. Strictly speaking, in many situations, this strategy may not reduce the inequality between members and non-members of the political community (since those who remain non-members do remain excluded) but it may reduce the group of non-members or not recognized members in a society or the degree of their exclusion (for example, when foreigners are entitled to vote at the local level).

2. The incongruity dilemma of (vertical) inequality between representatives and constituents and the risk of the tyranny of the ruling minority may be attenuated by introducing power control and power dispersion mechanisms, i.e. increasing responsiveness, enhancing vertical, and horizontal accountability.

3. The disparity dilemma of (horizontal) inequality between structurally strong and weak, more and less powerful preferences and the risk of the tyranny of majority’s will may be reduced, e.g. by protecting minorities, enhancing pluralism, diversifying representation, fostering participation, etc.

4. The risk of future choices’ foreclosure, i.e. the restriction of the political options of future generations of citizens, the (diachronic) inequality between present and future citizens, may be ameliorated, for instance, by promoting system openness, preventing the sustained ideologization of the state according to the political orientation of the current government.

As these four aspects reveal and as Table 2 summarizes, inclusion has a lot to do with generating more equality on the basis of liberty, i.e. with reducing power gaps.

Table 2. Democracy and Inclusion

Representative Democracy’s Dilemmas		Inclusionary Strategies
Demos boundary	Inequality between polity members and non-members	Demos’ widening
Incongruity	Inequality between representatives/officials and constituents (tyranny of the ruling minority)	Power control and dispersion/ responsiveness, accountability
Disparity	Inequality between strong and weak preferences (tyranny of the majority)	Minority protection, enhancement of pluralism and diversity in participation, representation and policy impact
Foreclosure	Inequality between present and future citizens	System openness/ distinction between current government and enduring state

Source: Own elaboration.

Thus, (1) widening the demos or the electorate, (2) narrowing the political power gap between rulers and ruled ones, (3) equalizing chances among citizens of preference articulation, representation, and implementation as well as (4) increasing future political optionality can be seen as four basic ways or strategies that would make representative democracy more inclusive. Conversely, democracy may become more exclusive when (1) the demos’ conception turns more restrictive, (2) the political power gap between rulers and ruled citizens widens, (3) the chances of success of preferences become more asymmetric, and (4) current actors strongly block future preferences and possibilities of change.

Citizenship and inclusion

Citizenship’s dimensions

Citizenship designates full membership in a democratically organized political community based on the rule of law. Under the legal rule, citizens are holders of rights – they are not, for instance, subjects of the crown, but subjects of law.⁴⁴ From this perspective, citizenship can be conceived as the legal status that bundles a series of rights.⁴⁵ With a view to citizenship, inclusion refers, on the one hand, to the incorporation of people into the ranks of citizens and their access to rights and entitlements and, on the other hand, to the terms of incorporation and access.⁴⁶

Following Talcott Parsons, I stick to a pluralistic understanding of citizenship. A key aspect in this context is that “the status of citizenship comes to be institutionalized in terms independent of [… .] ascriptive criteria” as ethnicity, religion or social class.⁴⁷ Full citizenship implies a fundamental equality of rights in the polity – not equality in all senses, but despite differences. The fact that other differences remain, turns the process of gaining full citizenship a question of inclusion in a pluralistic political structure and not of assimilation, i.e. not of becoming as similar as the dominating social group.⁴⁸ As Parsons puts it: “Full inclusion and multiple role participation are compatible with the maintenance of distinctive ethnic and/or religious identity.”⁴⁹

In “Citizenship and Social Class,” Thomas H. Marshall offers a remarkable analysis of the tensions between the principle of equality, which underlies the concept of citizenship, on the one hand, and the empirical inequalities on which the social class system is based, on the other hand.⁵⁰ Elaborating on citizenship, i.e. the status of full membership in a (national-state) society founded upon the principle of human equality, Marshall distinguishes three parts or elements:⁵¹ First, the civic element composed of the rights necessary for individuals (negative) freedoms (of thought, speech, faith, etc.) as well as the right to justice. Second, the political element concerns the (positive) rights to participate in the exercise of political power, as a voter, a member of an institution, an office-holder, etc. Finally, third, the social element regards the right to have a share in material standards prevailing in the society, the sphere of economic welfare, and social security.

As Martin Bulmer and Anthony M. Rees point out – with special focus on social citizenship – Marshall's “Citizenship and social class” is also about inclusion and exclusion, even though he does not use these terms and prefers to talk instead of “equality” and “inequality.”⁵² Thus, Marshall’s story of inclusion is a schematic depiction of the gradual evolution of citizenship. He structures it by a sequence of three phases that partly overlap on the empirical level, however. Yet, “Marshall was not charting an inevitable progression to the sunny uplands of the 1950s and a then contemporary version of the end of history.”⁵³ Rather, his distinction of the development of civil, political, and social rights should be seen as a heuristic device.

Accordingly, inclusion should not be generally understood as a teleological inexorable process towards full citizenship. Empirically, at least three reasons compel us to be cautious in this respect: First, today, not only the extension of social but also of civil and political rights is still being discussed in many world regions – also in Europe. Thus, not even the incorporation of civic and political elements into the notion of citizenship can be seen as two already completed phases. Second, democratic regressions, i.e. autocratic tendencies, may lead to exclusionary backslides. New exclusions on the national level may also arise from developments such as regionalization and globalization. Third, new viewpoints may be considered transversal to established categories and lead to the acknowledgment of new categories of rights, as it is the case of the cultural rights.⁵⁴ However, they may also be classified as (protective) civil rights like freedom of religion – considering religion also a cultural expression.

Despite all these empirical restrictions and backslashes, the inclusionary expansion of citizenship’s conceptualization may be twofold: It may concern the number and range of entitled people (extension) as well as the number and range of recognized or granted entitlements (expansion). This “passive” perspective corresponds to a “thin” understanding of “citizenship-as-legal-status.”⁵⁵ From an “active” perspective, the extent and quality of citizenship is a function of citizens’ participation in the community.⁵⁶

Democracies may diverge in terms of the realization of citizenship (depth), i.e. to the extent that civil, political, and social rights are not only recognized in principle but can also be enjoyed in practice. For, while all citizens are nominally or legally endowed with extended rights, specific groups may be actually limited to exercise them. Thus, the distinction between formal inclusion (de jure), on the one hand, and factual, effective or substantive inclusion (de facto), on the other hand, is extremely relevant. In this line, Bulmer and Rees address the importance of what they call partial citizenship which consists in the simultaneous combination of inclusionary and exclusionary situations: “There are several groups that may better be viewed as part in, and part out, of citizenship.”⁵⁷

Citizenship and uneven rule of law application

Citizenship implies entitlements that also concern security – and this goes beyond the right to mental and physical integrity. Citizenship rights are linked to the territory of the individual state that strives to monopolize coercion (with uneven success). “If the state succeeds in monopolizing coercive power, democratic equality is protected only if the use of that power is regulated by law and if equality before law is sufficiently realized to rule out political advantage from differential intimidation.”⁵⁸ The tolerance of extra-legal realms and informal spheres, selective non-enforcement, pockets of private coercive power, and state force abuse are further sources of uneven citizenship. It is also the case, when the law is selectively used against some, while privileged sectors are enjoying exemptions,⁵⁹ because this represents a discriminatory law application. Thus, effective citizenship requires equal enforcement of sanctions and protection by institutions.⁶⁰ They are needed in order to prevent or attenuate the translation of personal, social, and economic inequalities into civic and political inequalities as well as into asymmetric power that allows some people to deny the citizenship rights to others. In the first case, the aim is to empower all citizens;⁶¹ in the latter, to control power – thus, these tasks are linked not only to political equality but also to liberty. In any case, the tensions between the democratic principle of political equality and the existing inequalities cannot be completely eradicated.

Therefore, equalization in terms of civic, political, and social inclusion is always a dynamic counterbalancing based on both, basic arrangements as well as complementary corrective measures – with democratic theory elaborating more concretely on specific institutional provisions. It is about minimizing the obstacles to full citizenship rights for all in a democratic context. What exactly those arrangements and measures ought to be, is a matter of intensive theoretical and political debate – reaching from orthodox liberal positions which reject any kind of discrimination (including positive discrimination as affirmative action), over the recognition of minority rights in the context of a liberal conception of “multicultural citizenship”,⁶² to the case for replacing universal with “differentiated citizenship.”⁶³ According to this latter cultural pluralistic view, “members of certain groups would be incorporated into the political community not only as individuals but also through the group, and their rights would depend, in part, on their group.”⁶⁴ From a liberal pluralistic perspective, in turn, group-differentiated citizenship represents a contradiction in terms since “citizenship is, by definition, a matter of treating people as individuals with equal rights under the law”.⁶⁵ Accordingly, inclusion ought to cut the structural link between disadvantages and categorical grouping. It ought to lead to non-discrimination, to the elimination of any category defined as inferior in itself.⁶⁶ Thus, one of the theoretical divides rests upon the question whether citizenship should transcend or recognize difference, i.e. between universalist and differentialist conceptions of citizenship. However, even the differentialist positions legitimate inclusionary claims with recourse to universal values as equality and justice.

On an empirical level, most real-world societies rely on a mixed approach when it comes to fostering inclusion. Since categorical grouping-blindness might be an illusion, inclusion should at least conduce to the loosening of relevance of those categories for the (universal, i.e. non-differential) realization of rights. In this line, Parsons believes that once categories lose the stigma of inferiority, it is likely that these will cease to be salient issues.⁶⁷ In his view, the pluralist solution is neither one of separatism nor of assimilation but one of full citizenship combined with the preservation of identity.

Regardless of whether a universalist or a differentialist conception prevails, there are three basic ways or strategies citizenship can become more inclusive (see Table 3):

1. Formally existing civil, political, and social rights (de jure) may be deepened by enforcing them, i.e. by enlarging the sphere of their effective validity (de facto), incorporating citizens and groups into the circle of those who can effectively enjoy nominally existing rights.

2. Existing civil, political, and social rights may be extended by (formally) entitling new social groups.

3. Citizenship may be expanded by (formally) recognizing new civil, political and social rights – for all or for certain (minority) groups. Thus, citizenship may be expanded on a universal or differentiated basis.

Table 3. Citizenship and Inclusion

Deepening (≠ Erosion)	Enforcement = Enlargement of the sphere of effective validity of (formally) recognized rights
Extension (≠ Restriction)	Formal incorporation of new groups into legally acknowledged rights
Expansion (≠ Curtailment)	Official introduction of new rights for all or for certain groups

Source: Own elaboration

In the first two cases of deepening and extending citizenship, inclusion fosters at the same time equality among citizens. Regarding citizenship expansion, it is the introduction of differentiated group rights that might seek to compensate or counterbalance existing asymmetries. Finally, the important question of who is to be considered a citizen is implicitly contained in citizenship extension, which corresponds to the democratic question of defining the demos.

If, on the empirical level, as Peter Kivisto and Thomas Faist in their book “Citizenship” state: “There is no reason to assume that the development of citizenship [is] an inexorable historical teleology” but that it is potentially subject to reversal, then concepts for the comprehension of its devolution are needed.⁶⁸ Thus, I call erosion the reduction of the sphere of effective validity of (formally) recognized rights; restriction the formal exclusion of some groups from the circle of those who were heretofore officially entitled with certain rights; and curtailment the official suspension or abolishment of certain rights (for all).

Civic and political inclusion

Theoretical convergence

In the above, I looked at the phenomena of inclusion/exclusion within the political system from two different theoretical angles. I believe the democratic and citizenship perspectives are convergent but they have missed to enrich each other and to deliver a comprehensive view of the inclusion problem due to the lack of an explicit theoretical linkage in political science. A bridging approach on inclusion/exclusion, as pursued in this article, should meet at least two goals: First, it should reveal the overlapping fields between democratic and citizenship theory. Second, it should integrate those aspects that belong specifically to each of both theories. In either case, the question of inclusion/exclusion shapes and justifies theoretical perspectivity and analytical selectivity.

From a topographic perspective, citizenship theory is at the “bottom” of democratic theory: The democratic principles of liberty and civic and political equality are grounded in citizenship rights. Non-domination (constitutionalism) and self-government (popular sovereignty) under conditions of civic and political equality are realized respectively through the recognition and enforcement of civil and political rights. In this sense, David Beetham rightly states: “Draw out any strand of the complex web of democracy, and you will find it leads to some specific civil or political right, without whose security the fabric will start to unravel” (Table 4).⁶⁹

Table 4. Convergence between Democracy and Citizenship Theory

Democracy	Liberty	Protections of rights and freedoms	< Equality >	Civil rights	Rights	Citizenship
		Non-domination
		Constitutionalism
		Participation in policy making		Political rights
		Self-government
		Popular sovereignty

Source: Own elaboration

While citizenship underlies democracy, inclusionary processes consisting in the deepening, extension, or expansion of civil and political rights may require institutional and/or political changes. This is also true for the opposite, i.e. for exclusionary processes consisting in the erosion, restriction, or curtailment of civil and political rights. Moreover, one single civic or political right may usually be realized through a variety of stipulations. For instance, the implementation of the voting right entails a series of normative and institutional requirements. In the case of elections, not only suffrage but also further rights (freedom of speech, of press, of assembly) are involved.

This does not imply a hyper-institutionalist or exclusively state-based, i.e. a top-down understanding of processes of growing civic and political inclusion. On the contrary, historically – with the exception of some small idealist elite groups – most inclusionary processes have been the result of straggles by marginalized groups, they have been achieved through pressure from below or by power elites anticipating that pressure and trying to avoid it. In the end, however, greater inclusion succeeds when inclusionary claims are recognized in a substantial and sustained manner by institutionalization.

To sum up: We should consider multiple ways in which inclusion/exclusion may affect different dimensions of democracy and citizenship: (1) they may concern representative democracy’s four dilemmas, namely demos’ boundary, incongruity, disparity, and foreclosure; (2) they may alter the depth, extension, and expansion of civil and political rights. Of course, an accurate and comprehensive theory-led empirical analysis of inclusion/exclusion should go beyond the “nominalist” or “formalist” observation that a new law or decree was enacted. Thus, the “working” or “implementation” of a new norm in its particular context is extremely important. Moreover, instead of classifying every single politically relevant decision according to this trilogy, exploring patterns of inclusion/exclusion requires a stronger deductive departing point that combines aspects of democracy and citizenship theory. As shown in the following Table 5, the four dilemmas of representative democracy can serve as an initial structuring distinction.

Table 5. Dimensions of civic and political inclusion

Demos’ boundary	Incongruity	Disparity	Foreclosure
Civic definition	Vertical accountability/power control	Civic status (identity, religion, safety, etc.)	Distinction between political contingency and fundamental structures
Political definition	Horizontal accountability/power dispersion	Individual and group participation (impact)	Distinction between government and state
Symbolic definition		Individual and group representation (impact)

Source: Own elaboration.

Demos’ boundary

As for the demos’ boundary, a civic, a political and a symbolic dimension can be distinguished. Firstly, the civic definition of the people is particularly relevant. Who is considered a citizen in terms of the membership in the political community by birth or naturalization? This question points at what may also be called nationality or state membership and at the principles underlying it: jus soli (right of soil) vs. jus sanguinis (right of blood). In the first case, the place of birth is determinant for the right to nationality, in the latter the descent. In some cases, both may apply simultaneously. In this context, it is also crucial to consider the requirements resident aliens must fulfil in order to become citizens.

It is equally relevant, secondly, to examine who is also politically included in the demos’ definition. Who is a member of the electorate? There is a significant overlap between the civic and political concept of demos. Yet, both groups are not identical. Minors might be citizens, yet without voting rights. Resident foreigners might be non-citizens but entitled to vote at some level. Besides the questions of nationality and age, further electoral provisions regarding, for instance, mental health, literacy, membership in the armed forces, prisoners, etc. might exist. Moreover, not only active voting rights are important in this context, but also the stipulations around passive voting rights, i.e. the requirements citizens have to fulfil in order to be admitted as candidates for specific offices.

Thirdly, how is the demos symbolically constructed? Who is meant by “we”? The answers to these questions may be found, for instance, in the constitutional text, the discourse of the incumbents, and the self-conceptions of institutions. They may also underline difference or not and may be based in pluralistic or monolithic conceptions of the demos (diversity vs. homogeneity).

The civic, political, and symbolic demarcation of the demos may entail the recognition of universal or group rights and the establishment of specific institutions, affecting the depth, extension, and expansion of citizenship.

Incongruity dilemma

The incongruity dilemma concerns the inequality or power gap between representatives, on the one hand, and constituents, on the other hand, as well as the risk of the tyranny of the ruling minority. Today representative democracy interposes a professional state apparatus (answerable to elected officials) between rulers and ruled citizens. The existence of such a bureaucracy, i.e. an appointive civil service,⁷⁰ as well as of security agents may accentuate the incongruity dilemma. Thus, the vertical inequality concerns not only the power gap between citizens and elected officials but also appointed officials, members of the bureaucracy, the military, the police, and the intelligence services. Holding them accountable for committing abuses of civil and political rights contributes to ameliorate the incongruity dilemma and increases inclusion.

Accountability is a relationship between two sets of persons or organizations in which one is answerable or responsible to the other in terms of information and actions. Accountability mechanisms are those which induce and enable power dispersion, power control, and the sanction of power abuse; they are key tools for coping with the incongruity dilemma.⁷¹ Political accountability must be institutionalized if it is to work effectively, i.e. it has to be embedded in a pre-established set of rules.⁷² Some of these rules may be formalized in constitutions, laws, or regulations, but they might also emerge from political praxis.

Accountability can be either vertical or horizontal. Vertical accountability refers to what citizens/electors (on the bottom) can demand from their officials (on the top). Vertical accountability contributes to the responsiveness of (elected or selected) persons in positions of authority, i.e. their willingness to consider citizens’ preferences and to abstain from infringing on rights. In elections and recall referendums, electors may reward or sanction representatives for their decisions and non-decisions.

Horizontal accountability, in turn, concerns the relation between government branches and other institutions. Provisions that enhance or undermine separation of power (e.g. magistrates’ selection mode) and reciprocal control (e.g. an ombudsperson’s institutional strength) are especially important in this context.

Moreover, not only elections, information, and institutional monitoring are crucial accountability aspects, but also rules and mechanisms to prevent, combat and sanction corruption, since it constitutes an aggravation of the incongruity problem, an intensification of the inequality between rulers and ruled people; but it also indirectly affects the disparity problem, since it leads to an uneven treatment of citizens.

Disparity dilemma

The asymmetry of preferences between citizens, i.e. the inequality in the chances of their articulation and advancement, bears a disparity dilemma. Bringing the citizenship perspective in, it can also be extended to the uneven (formal or factual) enjoyment of civil and political rights. Thus, the inclusion/exclusion question here concerns three prominent aspects:

1. Civic equity refers to the civic status of individuals and groups along specific criteria as gender, identity, religion, etc. and the question of parity/disparity between them. The legal recognition or non-recognition of same-sex marriage, transgender identities, national or group holidays for different religions (with even/uneven status), a diversity of official languages, among others, fall under the category of an inclusionary/exclusionary civic status. This is also the case for access to justice (legal equality) and the right to mental and bodily integrity (security equality).

2. Citizens’ participation concerns the conditions for individual and group based, direct as well as institutionalized political engagement. Are they even or uneven because of a strong discriminatory bias or regional marginalization? For instance: Do all citizens have equal access to vote polls? Is vote buying widely practiced? Do only certain groups get access to policy makers or the permission for public demonstrations while others are systematically kept away from the centres or decision-making or the streets? Are diverse sectoral and social organizations involved in consultations and decision-making processes?

3. Individual and group-based representation, as understood here, is restricted to the personal allocation in elected positions and representative institutions, which – of course – strongly depends on the electoral system. Is the electoral system severely biased? Do citizen and groups have equal chances to be represented? Is there any kind of representation quotas in parliament or for power sharing in executive branches – if so, for whom and with what effect?

These are only some examples for evaluating inclusion from the perspective of the disparity problem and with reference to civic status, participation and representation.

Foreclosure problem

Inclusion/exclusion in terms of the foreclosure/optionality of future decisions is especially difficult to grasp. The protection and perdurability of the qualities of a democratic regime depend on the rigidity of several stipulations, e.g. high barriers for constitutional reforms. The dilemma is then: How to conciliate the needs for system stability and system openness? Furthermore, constitutions do not only set the frame for the political system but also the socioeconomic order, restraining the scope of economic policy (which should be an output of political contestation and policy-making). Thus, it is difficult to draw the line between stipulations regarding the structural rules of the game on the one hand and situational contentious politics on the other hand. Easier to identify may be cases where the elected political force coins the state with its own party ideology.

Conclusion

In the context of political science, a great number of criteria catalogues and indices have been developed in order to assess democratic quality or different qualities of democracy. It was neither my aim to offer an alternative comprehensive framework of empirical evaluation and measurement of democracy or political regimes nor to develop a general concept of inclusion for the analysis of a variety of social (sub)systems. Rather, my purpose was to define and operationalize a concept of inclusion – restricted to the political system and rooted in democracy and citizenship theory – that allows for the assessment of democracies from this very quality perspective. The object of inquiry was representative democracy, a wide category that encompasses those varieties of democracy or subtypes of democracies with adjectives that do not fully renounce to a moment of representation, i.e. the election of representatives.

My theoretical point of departure was a normative understanding of democracy, based on the twin principles of liberty and equality, i.e. negative liberty (non-domination/ constitutionalism/ protection of rights and freedoms) and positive liberty (self-government/ popular sovereignty/ participation in policy-making) as well as civic equality (equality before the law) and political equality (equal consideration of preferences). This conceptual demarcation led to a procedural definition of democracy that contains a civic and a political dimension but consequently does not encompass the substantive dimension of socioeconomic equality. Rather, differential power based on heterogeneous material resources (as well as personal talents) constitutes a challenge democracy has to deal with. Against this backdrop, I identified four dilemmas of representative democracy that compromise the double principles of liberty and equality, which I called: (1) demos’ boundary, (2) incongruity, (3) disparity, and (4) foreclosure. Then, I elaborate on citizenship, distinguishing between civil, political, and social rights. From this second theoretical angle, I defined inclusion as the (1) deepening, (2) extension, and (3) expansion of rights. In a further step, I integrated both theoretical perspectives into a concept of civic and political inclusion – short: democratic inclusion – with empiric-analytical potential: (1) the demos’ boundary can be widened in civic, political, and symbolic terms; (2) vertical accountability (power control), as well as horizontal accountability (power dispersion), reduces the power gap between rulers and ruled ones (incongruity); (3) equal civic status, as well as even conditions for participation and representation, attenuates the asymmetry between influential and marginalized preferences (disparity); and, finally, (4) the distinction between political contingency and structural provisions fosters system openness, i.e. future optionality. Modifications in all these four dimensions may be based on changes regarding the formal recognition of new (civil and political) rights (expansion), new holders (extension), and the grade of validity/scope of application of civil and political rights (deepening).

I believe, part of the value of my endeavor lies on two double efforts: (1) Theoretically, (a) to bring democracy and citizenship theory together into dialogue in order to enrich the concept of inclusion providing it with a civic and a political dimension; and (b) to discuss the dilemmas democracy faces when confronting its normative premises with its empirical implementation as representative democracy. (2) Methodologically, (a) to define democratic inclusion in a way that the concept maintains its value orientation and serves at the same time as an empirical-analytical concept for systematic-qualitative comparative research; and (b) to develop the criteria for democratic inclusion not in an inductive-summative but in a strictly theoretical-deductive manner.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank both institutions for their support.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This article is based on research conducted during a visiting fellowship (2014-2015) at Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (USA) funded by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung (Germany).

Notes on contributors

Claudia Zilla

Claudia Zilla is Senior Fellow in the Research Division the Americas of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, which she joined in 2005. From 2012 to 2019 she was Head of the Research Division. During 2014-2015, she was Fritz Thyssen Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. She studied Political Science, Sociology and Psychology at University of Heidelberg, from which she also holds a PhD in Political Science. In her research, she focusses regionally on Latin America, and thematically on democracy and populism, representation and participation, religion and politics, development and inclusion, foreign policy and regional organizations, and German/EU-Latin American relations.

Notes

1 Parsons, “Full Citizenship of the Negro American?” 1015.

2 Zilla, “Inklusion,” 272.

3 Goodin, “Inclusion and Exclusion.”

4 Kivisto, “Inclusion,” 294f.

5 Kymlicka and Norman, “Return of the Citizen,” 368.

6 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 13.

7 In this article, I use “political community” and “polity” as synonyms.

8 Coppedge and Gerring, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy,” 247.

9 Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org/.

10 Polity Project: https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.

11 Varieties of Democracy: https://www.v-dem.net/.

12 Giannone, “Political and Ideological Aspects.”

13 Coppedge and Gerring, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy”, 252.

14 On democracy’s capacity of improving human wellbeing: Gerring et al., “Democracy and Human Development.”

15 See component 33. Coppedge and Gerring, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy”, 256.

16 Smith, “Legal Civic Orders”, 101.

17 Urbinati, “Competing for Liberty.”

18 O’Donnell, “Why the Rule of Law Matters,” 5, 8.

19 Rueschemeyer, “Political Equality,” 819.

20 Ibid., 818.

21 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 23.

22 Dahl, On Political Equality, 4.

23 Rueschemeyer, “Political Equality,” 819.

24 Beetham, “Freedom as the Foundation,” 32f.

25 Collier and Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives.”

26 Nohlen, “Introducción. El principio mayoritario.” 2f.

27 For this reason, “direct democracy” is usually understood as opposite to “representative democracy”.

28 Nohlen, “El principio de mayoría,” 1. Representation and majority rule are not necessarily connected. One can imagine a direct democracy working on the majority rule (as realized in the Greek polis) as well as a representative democracy with randomly selected officials, i.e. a “demarchy” or “lottocracy”.

29 Rueschemeyer, “Political Equality,” 819.

30 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 12.

31 Ibid.

32 Diamond and Morlino, “Introduction,” xxvii.

33 Dahl, On Political Equality, IX.

34 Borchert, “Demokratisches Versprechen und demokratischer Zweifel,” 238.

35 Thaa, “Einführung,” 9.

36 Waas, “Repräsentation durch (Massen-)Partizipation und (Eliten-)Kompetenz,” 55; Olson, The Logic of Collective Action.

37 Thaa, “Weder Ethos noch Betroffenheit,” 108; Zürn, “Democracy and Representation.”

38 Linden, “Interessensymmetrie trotz Vielfalt?” 61ff.

39 In his contribution “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” Immanuel Kant vehemently defends this normative idea of refraining today from foreclosing future decisions. He derives this aspect of equality between ages and generations from the question of enlightenment and emancipation, emphasizing the value of learning processes over time. Kant, “Was ist Aufklärung?” 61f.

40 Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution? 148.

41 Dahl, Polyarchy.

42 Rovira Kaltwasser, “The Responses of Populism,” 472.

43 Calder, “Inclusion and Participation,” 186.

44 This aspect distinguishes constitutional monarchy from other types of monarchy.

45 Kymlicka and Norman, “Return of the Citizen,” 353.

46 Kivisto and Faist, Citizenship, 6f.

47 Parsons, “Full Citizenship of the Negro American?” 1011.

48 Ibid., 1015f.

49 Ibid., 1016.

50 Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class.

51 Marshall and Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class, 8.

52 Bulmer and Rees, “Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century,” 272.

53 Rees, “T.H. Marshall and the Progress of Citizenship,” 21.

54 Zilla, “Inklusion.”

55 Kymlicka and Norman, “Return of the Citizen,” 353f.

56 Ibid.

57 Bulmer and Rees, “Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century,” 275.

58 Rueschemeyer, “Addressing Inequality,” 53.

59 O’Donnell, “Why the Rule of Law Matters,” 5.

60 Dahrendorf, “Citizenship and Social Class,” 34.

61 Acknowledging the relevance of empowerment, Talcott Parsons states: “The obverse of this is the definition of the terms on which capacities, as matched with opportunities, can be involved in the process of inclusion. This is a special context of the problem of ‘qualifying’ for inclusion”. Parsons, “Full Citizenship of the Negro American?” 1018.

62 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship.

63 Young, “Polity and Group Difference.”

64 Kymlicka and Norman, “Return of the Citizen,” 370.

65 Ibid., 370.

66 Parsons, “Full Citizenship of the Negro American?” 1018; 1039; 1050.

67 Parsons, “Full Citizenship of the Negro American?” 1050.

68 Kivisto and Faist, Citizenship, 17.

69 Beetham, “Freedom as the Foundation,” 36.

70 Parsons, “Full Citizenship of the Negro American?” 1011.

71 Nohlen, “Accountability,” 3.

72 Schmitter, “The Ambiguous Virtues of Accountability,” 19.