Looking beyond democratic backsliding: analysing the political economy context of Turkey’s regime trajectory through a mode of participation approach

ABSTRACT

This article challenges the “democratic backsliding” accounts of Turkey’s recent regime trajectory that are conceptually premised on a neo-Weberian understanding of the relationship between the state and society/markets. It uses a “modes of participation” (MOP) approach that is informed by a Gramscian theorization of the state-society complex. It is argued that Turkey’s neo-liberal capitalist development during the Justice and Development Party (AKP) era has not been conducive to allowing for the formation of cohesive alliances in support of liberal democratic representation. Instead, the country’s already oppressed and divided labour force has further been fragmented under the neo-liberal economic policy, while its middle and business classes have supported democracy only when it has been in their interest, and intellectuals have been co-opted. Hence, the way the AKP governs Turkey is not because of weak or ineffective state institutions. It is rather rooted in the structural tensions in Turkey’s capitalist development that require the ruling elites’ mediation through a variety of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary mechanisms of resource allocation to maintain their dominant position in the political arena.

KEYWORDS:

• political regimes
• socio-political conflict
• inclusion
• exclusion
• backsliding
• Turkey

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers of Democratization, and Ms Frecia Vinluan and other members of the Taylor and Francis production team for their assistance during the publication process. Special thanks go to Ms Astrid Schnitzer-Skjønsberg for yet another excellent delivery of research assistance in this publication project.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Hameiri and Jones, “Southeast Asia’s Political Economy,” 6.

2 Ibid., 19.

3 Jayasuriya and Rodan, “Beyond Hybrid Regimes.”

4 The Murdoch School refers to a group of researchers of political economy who have worked or completed their doctoral study at the Asia Research Centre of Murdoch University in Perth, Australia. Richard Robison, known as the “founding father” of the Murdoch School, has developed the Centre’s research agenda on the basis of social and political conflicts in the context of Southeast Asian countries’ capitalist development to explain why liberal politics has been fragile in the region. For more information, see Hameiri and Jones, “Murdoch International: The ‘Murdoch School’ in International Relations.”

5 Jayasuriya and Rodan, “Beyond Hybrid Regimes.”

6 Esen and Gumuscu, “Rising Competitive Authoritarianism.”

7 Somer, “Conquering versus Democratizing the State.”

8 Esen and Gumuscu, “Rising Competitive Authoritarianism”; Somer, “Conquering versus Democratizing”; Özbudun, “Turkey’s Judiciary”; Sarfati, “How Turkey’s Slide”; Çalışkan, “Toward A New Political Regime.”

9 Esen and Gumuscu, “Building a Competitive Authoritarian Regime”; Esen and Gumuscu, “Why Did Turkish Democracy Collapse?.”

10 Esen and Gumuscu, “Building A Competitive”; Esen and Gumuscu, “Why Did Turkish?”; Somer, “Conquering versus Democratizing.”

11 Pepinsky, “The Institutional Turn.”

12 Jayasuriya and Rodan, “Beyond Hybrid Regimes”; Hameiri, “Capacity and its Fallacies.”

13 Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders.”

14 Hameiri, “Capacity and its Fallacies,” 64.

15 Öniş, “Turkey Under the Challenge of State Capitalism.”

16 Kutlay, “The Politics of State Capitalism.”

17 Öniş, “Turkey Under the Challenge”; Kutlay, “The Politics of State.”

18 Öniş and Kutlay, “Rising Powers in a Changing Global Order.”

19 Kutlay, “The Politics of State”; Öniş, “Turkey Under the Challenge.”

20 Öniş, “Turkey Under the Challenge.”

21 Hameiri and Jones, “Theorising Political Economy in Southeast Asia.”

22 Acemoglu and Robinson, “The Political Economy of Turkey.”

23 Acemoglu and Robinson, The Narrow Corridor.

24 Tansel, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Democratic Backsliding.”

25 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 2.

26 Hameiri, “Capacity and Its Fallacies.”

27 Tansel, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Democratic Backsliding.”

28 Bedirhanoglu, “Social Constitution of the State”; Yalman, “Crisis in or of Neoliberalism?”; Akçay, “Authoritarian Consolidation Dynamics.”

29 Jayasuriya and Rodan, “Beyond Hybrid Regimes.”

30 Chacko and Jayasuriya, “Asia’s Conservative Moment,” 532.

31 Jayasuriya and Rodan, “Beyond Hybrid Regimes,” 782–3; Rodan, Participation, 33–4.

32 Rodan, “Participation without Democracy.”

33 Ibid.

34 Jayasuriya and Rodan, “Beyond Hybrid Regimes”; Rodan and Baker, “Explaining Political Regimes.”

35 Zarakol, “Revisiting Second Image Reversed.”

36 Boratav, “Devletçilik ve Kemalist İktidar Politikaları.”

37 Pamuk, “Political Economy of Industrialization in Turkey,” 26.

38 Ibid., 26; Ahmad, “The Development of Capitalism in Turkey,” 139.

39 Yalpat, “Turkey’s Economy under the Generals,” 17.

40 Ahmad, “The Development of Capitalism,” 142.

41 Pamuk, “Political Economy of Industrialization in Turkey,” 26.

42 Ahmad, “The Development of Capitalism,” 142.

43 TUSIAD (Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businesses) was founded by giant conglomerates in 1971.

44 Yavuz, “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey,” 88.

45 Akyuz and Boratav, “The Making of the Turkish Financial Crisis”; Boratav, Yeldan, and Köse, “Turkey: Globalization, Distribution and Social Policy.”

46 Orhangazi and Yeldan, “The Re-making of the Turkish Crisis.”

47 Bozkurt-Güngen, “Labour and Authoritarian Neoliberalism”; Orhangazi and Yeldan, “The Re-Making of the Turkish Crisis.”

48 Özdemir, “AKP’s Neoliberal Populism.”

49 Ibid.

50 Öniş, “Globalisation and Party Transformation”; Akçay, “Authoritarian Consolidation Dynamics.”

51 Rupert, Producing Hegemony.

52 Ersoy and Üstüner, “‘Liberal Intellectuals’’ Narration.”

53 Ibid.

54 The Gülen movement was founded by the state-salaried preacher Fethullah Gülen in the 1960s with the objective of fighting against communism and raising a “golden generation” of pious, hardworking, well-educated individuals with a strong sense of loyalty and discipline. The alliance between the AKP and his followers in the state bureaucracy facilitated the purging of Kemalist officers, bureaucrats, academics, and journalists through controversial court cases between 2008 and 2010, and organizing a constitutional referendum in September 2010, which brought significant changes to the structure of the higher judiciary bodies, such as the constitutional court, supreme court, and the supreme board of the judges and prosecutors. Yet, intensifying rivalries between the AKP and the Gülenists over the control of the state apparatus culminated in a failed coup attempt in July 2016. For details, see Gumuscu, “The Clash of Islamists.”

55 Examples of these culturalist analyses include Mardin’s (1973) conceptualization of modern Turkish politics in terms of a disconnect between an aggressively modernising/Westernising strong centre (that is, the state elite) and a weak but culturally authentic periphery (civil society), and Göle’s (1997) reductionist depiction of the elite rivalries as a “clash of worldviews” – conflict between secularists and Islamists.

56 Mercan and Ozşeker, “Just a Handful of Looters!.”

57 Bayulgen, Arbatli, and Canbolat, “Elite Survival Strategies and Authoritarian Reversal in Turkey.”

58 Bozkurt-Güngen, “Labour and Authoritarian Neoliberalism”; Erol, “State and Labour”; Ozkiziltan, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism in AKP’s Turkey.”

59 BIMER was transformed into CIMER (Communication Centre of the Presidency) following the country’s transition into an executive presidentialism in 2017.

60 Boyraz, “Neoliberal Populism.”

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid; Somer, “Understanding Turkey’s Democratic Breakdown.”

63 Orhangazi and Yeldan, “The Re-Making of the Turkish Crisis,” 493.

64 Toksöz, “Transition from ‘Woman’ to ‘Family’,” 76.

65 Orhangazi and Yeldan, “The Re-Making of the Turkish Crisis,” 493.

66 Bozkurt-Güngen, “Labour and Authoritarian Neoliberalism”; Ozkiziltan, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism in AKP’s Turkey.”

67 Ozkiziltan, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism in AKP’s Turkey.”

68 Yabanci, “Populism as the Problem Child”; Ozkiziltan, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism in AKP’s Turkey.”

69 Yabanci, “Populism as the Problem Child.”

70 Erol, “State and Labour.”

71 STGM, “Outlook of Freedom of Association.”

72 Ozkiziltan, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism in AKP’s Turkey”; Erol, “State and Labour”; Bozkurt-Güngen, “Labour and Authoritarian Neoliberalism.”

73 Özkiziltan, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism in AKP’s Turkey”; Özdemir, “AKP’s Neoliberal Populism”; Akçay, “Authoritarian Consolidation Dynamics.”

74 Yavuz and Öztürk, “Turkish Secularism and Islam under the Reign of Erdoğan,” 5.

75 Öztürk, “An Alternative Reading of Religion and Authoritarianism,” 94, emphasis in the original.

76 According to the OECD data, Turkey’s Gini coefficient was measured as 0.415 in 2019. This makes it the third highest unequal wealth distribution country among OECD countries. https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm#indicator-chart OECD (2023), Income inequality (indicator). doi:10.1787/459aa7f1-en. Accessed 8 January 2023.

77 The Guardian, “Turkey Mine Disaster.”

78 Cited in Haaretz, Haaretz (2022). “‘Fate’s Design’ Says Erdogan.”

79 Tansel, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Democratic Backsliding.”

80 Neyaptı, “Turkey’s Experience.”

81 Tansel, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Democratic Backsliding.”

82 Ibid.

83 Vural, “Restricted But Significant”; Erol, “State and Labour.”

84 Vural, “Restricted But Significant.”

85 Ibid.

86 Erol, “State and Labour”; Ozkiziltan, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism in AKP’s Turkey.”

87 Zaman, “Turkey Plans Further Clampdown.”

88 Gokay, “Taksim Gezi, 2013.”

89 Yabanci, “Turkey’s Tamed Civil Society,” 294–5.

90 Yilmaz, “‘Strengthening the Family’ Policies.”

91 Yabanci, “Turkey’s Tamed Civil Society.”

92 Ibid.

93 It states that “Those who print or publish declarations or announcements of terrorist organisations which legitimise, praise or encourage the employment of their coercive, violent and threatening methods are imprisonable by one to three years”.

94 STGM, “Outlook of Freedom of Association.”

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid

97 Yabanci, “Turkey’s Tamed Civil Society.”

98 Author’s interview with a Women’s Rights Organisation, March 2021.

99 Yabanci, “Turkey’s Tamed Civil Society,” 293–4.

100 Author’s Interview with A Youth NGO, March 2021.

101 Author’s Interviews, March 2021.

102 Author’s Interview with An Education Foundation, April 2021.

103 Author’s Interview, April 2021.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Selver B. Sahin

Selver B. Sahin is an assistant professor of international relations at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. She is the author of International Intervention and State- Making: How the Exception Became the Norm (Routledge, 2015). Her research is focused on the socio-political foundations of institutional and governmental outcomes and has been published in Development Policy Review, Democratization, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Contemporary Politics, Asian Studies Review, Australian Journal of International Affairs and International Peacekeeping.