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ABSTRACT
This article proposes the use of the indicator of elite rotation to deepen the understanding of the phenomenon of authoritarian cooptation. The high frequency of changes in the ruling coalition can have a twofold effect on authoritarian regimes. On the one hand, it makes it possible to include new leaders in the ruling coalition in a timely fashion, remove potential opponents and maintain loyalty among the nobility. On the other hand, constant rotation creates a situation of high uncertainty and deprives some elites of access to previously received benefits. This study offers an empirical test of these assumptions: an analysis of all authoritarian regimes that existed between 1968 and 2010 (as well as all dictators who ruled between 1968 and 2008) leads to the conclusion that a low level of elite rotation generally contributes to the resilience of authoritarian regimes and leaders.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
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7 Вueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival; Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship; Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.
8 Вueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival.
9 Geddes et al., How Dictatorships Work.
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15 Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization”; Treisman, “Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover.”
16 Ulfelder, “Natural-Resource Wealth”; Hanson, “State Capacity and the Resilience of Electoral Authoritarianism.”
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22 Вueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival.
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26 Svolik, “Power Sharing and Leadership”; The politics of Authoritarian Rule; Boix and Svolik, “The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government.”
27 Magaloni, “Credible Power-Sharing.”
28 Gandhi and Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions”; Magaloni, “Credible Power-Sharing”; Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.
29 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.
30 Bove and Rivera, “Elite Co-Optation, Repression, and Coups.”
31 Magaloni, “Credible Power-Sharing”; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, “A Dictator's Toolkit.”
32 Sudduth, “Strategic Logic of Elite Purges,” 1770.
33 Polyshin, Bitvi generala Lebedya.
34 Pertsev, “Changing the Guard: The End of Russia's Bodyguards-Turned-Governors.”
35 Meaker, “How the Kremlin Infiltrated Russia's Facebook.”
36 Baturo, “Democracy, Development, and Career Trajectories.”
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38 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.
39 Geddes et al., How Dictatorships Work; Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization.
40 Berkeley, The Graves Are Not Yet Full.
41 Вueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival.
42 Geddes et al., How Dictatorships Work.
43 Sinkkonen, “Dynamic Dictators.”
44 Rice, “The Reckless Plot to Overthrow Africa's Most Absurd Dictator.”
45 Вueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival.
46 Manion, “Authoritarian Parochialism.”
47 Geddes et al., “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions.”
48 Radnitz, “Weapons of the Wealthy.”
49 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. “Leadership Change in Dictatorships, 1946–2008” dataset.
50 Nyrup and Bramwell, “Who Governs?”
51 Shawn et al., “Organized Violence 1989–2021 and Drone Warfare.”
52 Вueno de Mesquita et al., “War and the Fate.”
53 Wintrobe, The Political Economy of Dictatorship; Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.
54 Treisman, “Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover.”
55 Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization”; Pepinsky, Economic Crises and the Breakdown.
56 Smith, “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival”; Cuaresma et al., “Oil and the Duration of Dictatorships.”
57 Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization”; “Autocratic Breakdown.”
58 Wintrobe, The Political Economy of Dictatorship, 20; Treisman, “Democracy by Mistake.”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Ilia Nadporozhskii
Ilia Nadporozhskii is a master’s student in the Department of Political Science at the European University at Saint Petersburg. His research focuses on authoritarian regimes, protest mobilization, social media during electoral campaigns, and Russian politics.