https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3514-1618
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ABSTRACT
Recent research has identified a strong correlation between polarization and democratic backsliding. The creation of antithetical groups in society is a necessary element in this type of autocratization process. Nevertheless, the agency-driven mechanisms through which elite polarization becomes harmful for democracy have been less explored in the literature. By resorting to process tracing methodology, the article analyses how elite polarization contributed to derailing the democratization process in Tunisia. The article identifies three necessary mechanisms through which elite polarization became a risk for democracy: politicization reinforcing pre-existing party cleavages; exclusion politics based on ontological contestation (“either us or them”); and the systematic delegitimization of democratic institutions and processes. In Tunisia, Parti Destourien Libre’s (PDL) political campaign followed these steps creating the context in which President Saied could start a democratic backsliding process.
Acknowledgements
I warmly thank my PhD supervisor, Dr. Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, for her continued support, as well as the members of the Thesis Committee for their highly valuable comments on this work. I am also grateful to the interviewees for sharing their insights on Tunisian politics with me. Finally, I am indebted to the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. This work was conducted as part of the PhD programme in Politics, Policies and International Relations of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Johansson-Nogués and Rivera-Escartin, “Supporting the Tunisian transition?”; Holthaus, “Democracy Promotion?”.
2 See Huber and Pisciotta, “From Democracy to Hybrid Regime”; Ozen et al., “Polarized Citizens”; Ridge, “Dismantling New Democracies”.
3 Arbatli and Rosenberg, “United We Stand”; Diamond, “Democratic Regression”; McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, “The Global Crisis”, Somer et al., “Pernicious Polarization”.
4 Svolik, “Polarization versus Democracy”.
5 Carothers and O’Donohue, “Democracies Divided”; McCoy and Somer, “Pernicious Polarization”.
6 Ibid.
7 Carothers and O’Donohue, “Democracies Divided,” 4.
8 Tilly, “Democracy,” 39,
9 Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood being Qatar and Turkey and opponents the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Egypt. See Cherif, “Tunisia, Battlefield of The Gulf Countries”.
10 De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke, “Differentiated Politicization”.
11 See Speakman, “Tunisian MP Wears Crash Helmet”.
12 Saied, “سعيّد ينشر فضائح المجلس .”
13 Haggard and Kaufman, Backsliding.
14 Ibid.
15 See Huber and Pisciotta, “Hybrid Regime”.
16 Human Rights Watch et al., Joint Statement; I Watch, على إثر الأمر الرئاسي عد 117.
17 EuroMed Rights et al., Tunisie: Les révocations arbitraires de magistrats.
18 Amnesty International, Tunisie 2021.
19 Human Rights Watch, Q&A: Tunisia’s Constitutional Referendum.
20 See note 3 above.
21 McCoy and Somer, “Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization”.
22 Arbatli and Rosenberg, “United We Stand”; Diamond, “Democratic Regression”.
23 Ridge, “Dismantling New Democracies”.
24 See Carothers and O’Donohue, “Democracies Divided”; McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, “The Global Crisis”.
25 See note 8 above.
26 See Wolff, “Post-Conflict State Building”.
27 See note 7 above.
28 See note 14 above.
29 See note 20 above.
30 See Ash, “Protesting for Autocracy”; Ozen, A. Bennett and E. Karakoc, “Polarized Citizens”; Resta, “Polarization in Tunisia and Egypt”; Ridge, “Dismantling New Democracies”.
31 Teti, Abbott, and Cavatorta, “Beyond Elections”.
32 Ridge, “Dismantling New Democracies”.
33 Rivera-Escartin, “Tunisia’s Democratization Process”.
34 Checkel, “Tracing Causal Mechanisms”, 363.
35 See note 10 above.
36 De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtk, “Differentiated Politicization,” 4.
37 Ibid.
38 See note 22 above.
39 De Wilde, “No Polity for Old Politics?”.
40 Lipset and Rokkan, “Party Systems and Voter Alignments”.
41 Tepe, “The perils of polarization”.
42 Cheong and Haggard, “Political polarization”.
43 Bosco and Verney, “Polarisation in Southern Europe”.
44 See note 37 above, 14.
45 Jenkins, “The Difference Genealogy Makes”.
46 See note 37 above.
47 McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, “The Global Crisis”.
48 See note 48 above.
49 See note 14 above.
50 Bernaerts et al., “Consensus Democracies”.
51 See note 22 above, 235.
52 See note 3 above.
53 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism.
54 Wunsch and Blanchard, “Patterns of Democratic Backsliding,” 282.
55 Zilla, “Defining Democratic Inclusion”.
56 Aspinall et al., “Elites, Masses, and Democratic Decline”.
57 Somer, McCoy, and Luke, “Pernicious Polarization”.
58 Bogaards, “Case-based Research”.
59 See note 35 above, 363.
60 Beach and Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods, 11.
61 See note 35 above.
62 Capoccia and Kelemen, “Critical Junctures”.
63 Carothers and O’Donohue, “Democracies Divided”; Schmitter and Sika, “Democratization in the Middle East”; Stepan, Democratic Transition.
64 Redissi et al., La transition bloquée; Rivera-Ecartin, “Tunisia’s Democratization Process”.
65 Interview material, fall 2020 (online) and spring 2021 (Tunisia).
66 Boubekeur, “Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites”.
67 Abderrahim et al., Tunisia’s International Relations.
68 Cherif, “Tunisia, Battlefield of The Gulf Countries”; Cherif, “A Battle Ground for the Intra-sunni Cold War”
69 Various interviews, June 2021, Tunis.
70 Jelassi, “Projects d’accord bilatéraux”.
71 See note 70 above.
72 Parliamentary minutes of 4 May 2021 as retrieved from Al Bawsala database.
73 Interview with International Development organization, April 2021, Tunis.
74 Middle East Monitor, “Tunisia's president criticised for attacking Islamists”.
75 See note 68 above.
76 Parliamentary minutes of 3 June 2020 as retrieved from Al Bawsala database.
77 Mansour, “Maghrebi Rivalries”.
78 Mecham, “Islamist Parties and Foreign Policy”.
79 See note 77 above.
80 Interview with Tunisian expert 2, June 2021, Tunis.
81 See note 34 above.
82 See note 66 above.
83 Interview with senior member of FTDES, September 2020, online.
84 Observation of the Facebook sites of Abir Moussi and the PDL.
85 Grida, “Guerre Médiatique entre États du Golfe”.
86 Naar, “Muslim Brotherhood Members Receiving Foreign Funds”.
87 See Benrjeb, “L’Union Mondiale des Savants Musulmans”.
88 See note 78 above.
89 Nemlaghi, “Manifestation à Tunis”
90 See note 85 above.
91 Mosaïque FM, “اعتصام الدستوري الحر”.
92 La Presse, “Les Agents et Cadres du Parlement Protestent”.
93 Jelassi, “Chaos et Violence à l’ARP”
94 Observation of PDL’s Facebook site, 29 June 2021.
95 Various interviews, April–June 2021, Tunis.
96 Interview with Tunisian expert 1, June 2021, Tunis.
97 See note 79 above.
98 Reporters sans frontières, Des Dizaines de Journalistes Agressés.
99 Interview with senior member of UGTT, October 2020, online
100 See Somer, McCoy, and Luke, “Pernicious Polarization”.
101 See note 12 above.
102 Ben Salah, “معركة الأحزمة”.
103 Ibid.
104 Interview with member of CSO, October 2021, Other.
105 See note 19 above.
106 Mosaïque FM, “Rien à Craindre”.
107 La Presse, “Le PDL Appelle à la Dissolution du Parlement”.
108 See note 105 above.
109 Dahmani, “Tunisie – Abir Moussi”.
110 See note 7 above, 1–2.
111 See note 14 above.
112 See note 43 above.
113 See Mainwaring and Zoco, “Electoral Volatility in Old and New Democracies”.
114 See note 35 above.
115 Slovik, “Polarization versus Democracy”; Wunsch and Blanchard, “Patterns of Democratic Backsliding”.
116 See note 32 above.
117 See note 31 above.
118 See note 67 above.
Additional information
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Adrià Rivera-Escartin
Adrià Rivera Escartin is a postdoctoral researcher at Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI).