https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8446-2100
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ABSTRACT
What is the relationship between the type of electoral system and the degree of party fragmentation in electoral autocracies? According to Duverger’s hypothesis, proportional representation (PR) is positively associated with party fragmentation. This study investigates whether this hypothesis holds true in non-democratic political systems that hold elections. I propose that, unlike in democracies, PR is negatively correlated with the level of party fragmentation in electoral autocracies. To test this hypothesis, I utilize panel data encompassing 37 non-democratic nations that held elections from 1975 to 2010. The results demonstrate that PR is inversely linked to both the number and size of political parties. The effective number of parties (ENP) is employed as a measure of party fragmentation, estimating the weighted size and quantity of political parties.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 In this article I rely on Schedler’s, “Elections without Democracy,” 36–7, definition of electoral authoritarian regimes “Electoral authoritarian regimes neither practice democracy nor resort regularly to naked repression. By organizing periodic elections, they try to obtain at least a semblance of democratic legitimacy, hoping to satisfy external as well as internal actors. At the same time, by placing those elections under tight authoritarian controls they try to cement their continued hold on power.”
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Additional information
Notes on contributors
Valeria Umanets
Valeria Umanets is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Her research interests include women and politics, authoritarian politics, political parties, post-Communist states, and Russian politics. In her current book project, she examines the effects of Soviet state-sponsored feminism on women's political participation in Russia using archival materials, electoral data, interviews, and fieldwork observations.