‘Building democracy’ through foreign aid: The limitations of United States political conditionalities, 1992–96

Abstract

This article examines the record of the United States government in promoting democratic reform through the manipulation of development aid flows between 1992 and 1996. The first section reviews the origins of the policy of political conditionality and the subsequent changes in the US Agency for International Development. The next section evaluates the policy's execution by considering trends in the volume and distribution of US official development assistance, statistical linkages between that aid and recipient democratization, and the relationship with other potential foreign policy goals. The study finds that, contrary to the government's pledges, democratic and democratizing states have not received a greater share of aid. Instead, the distribution has been closely linked with security concerns ‐ a pattern consistent with the cold war record ‐ and US economic self‐interests have also been evident. Finally, three obstacles to the policy of ‘building democracy’ are considered: domestic ambivalence over the US's grand strategy in the post‐cold war era; coexistent foreign policy objectives that conflict with democratization; and the practical difficulties of eliciting reform overseas through the blunt instrument of development assistance.