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Abstract
This research evaluates the relative and absolute importance of group identity processes in an individual's decision to become and remain active in a social movement organization (SMO). Mainly through interview research with the members of Attac Germany and France, I discover that the presence of a comfortable and communicative group atmosphere is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for movement activity. Individuals are primarily involved in SMOs because they want to change policy and public opinion or to give meaning to their lives. However, this does not imply that the activists devalue communal bonds and a welcoming group atmosphere. Rather, they take both as a prerequisite for engagement. Yet, rifts and atmospheric disruptions can be a sufficient cause for which people leave an organization. In particular, those members who seek policy change are quick to desert a group once it is shattered by internal disharmony.
Notes
1. More generally, the recent literature on social movements (e.g. Tilly Citation2001 and Tilly and Tarrow 2007) laments the lack of studies that account for when and why people participate in SMOs.
2. Attac (the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Help of Citizens) is a contemporary social movement and the largest alter-globalization movement in Europe.
3. In this study, I opt for a rather inclusive interpretation of rational choice theory that goes beyond material benefits. I assume that efficacy and the empirical impact of actions and events is up for subjective interpretation. In this sense, an individual's participation in social movement activities is rational, as long as the person thinks that their involvement leads to meaningful change (see Kim and Bearman Citation1997, Finkel and Muller Citation1998, as well as Lubell et al. Citation2006).
4. Following Klandermans's characterization, I define group identity processes as the activists’ appreciation of their fellow members, the organizational structures and the group dynamics. I do not include the more inclusive personal “identities” such as gender, race and ethnicity into my definition. These personal identities are frequently longstanding and fixed and relate to the community into which a person is born. As such they impact peoples’ values and beliefs (what I label “the ideology motif”) and not the dynamics and human interactions that directly determine a person's degree of ease in an organization.
5. Attac France is organized on rather hierarchical and traditional lines. On the local and the national levels, each chapter has a governing board with a president, vice-president, secretary and treasurer. In contrast, Attac Germany is more grass-roots oriented. There is no governing board in the traditional sense at any level and decisions are passed by the consensus principle.
6. For example, the organization convinced the French leftist parties to condone the idea of a levy on financial transactions, was in the forefront of the mobilization against the appearance of far right candidate Jean Marie Le Pen in the second round of the French Presidential Election in 2002, and was the driving force behind the successful mobilization that led to the rejection of the European Constitution in 2005 by popular vote.
7. For example, Attac helped coordinate the mobilization against the Iraq 2003 war, joined forces with the union to protest the so-called Hartz IV regulations and Agenda 2010, and protested several EU directives (e.g. the Bolkestein Reform) that would deregulate German employment laws between 2004 and 2006. In June 2007, the network successfully organized a counter summit to the G8 meeting in Heiligendam, which attracted 70,000–100,000 protesters and in 2008/2009 Attac successfully coordinated the mobilization against the privatization of the German railway company.
8. The interviews I have cited in the analytical part are for the larger part, from individuals of various levels of engagement, who have been in the organization for some time. The longer-term members are better suited to evaluate the identity motif with regard to the two other motifs, because it takes some time to become familiar with and be able to judge the organizational and interpersonal dynamics in an organization.
9. Aside from motivational questions, I asked respondents, in the actual interview, about their socialization, values and beliefs as well as the mobilizational agents that pushed them toward engagement. However, these other features are analyzed and presented elsewhere.
10. The consensus principle implies that at any level a decision can only be adopted if at least 90% of those activists that are present are in favor of it.
11. Jacques Nikonoff was the controversial president of Attac France from 2002 to 2006.
12. Pierre Khalfa has been an influential figure in Attac. A former union leader, he has been a board member of Attac France and a member of the Scientific Council.
13. Julie gives a clear example of the internal dissonance of the Attac : “During the campaign against the European Treaty, we managed to put all differences aside and fight for a common cause. However, afterward the different opinions resurfaced and Attac was no longer homogenous. These cleavages exploded and led to the crisis inside Attac” (Interview 22/France).
14. Nicolas, one of the members of the internal commission to evaluate the electoral fraud, leaves no doubt that the election was fraudulent. He tells me: “I was a member of the commission that examined the electoral manipulation. You could perfectly determine the ballots that were rigged. I experienced the situation from very close and wrote one of the two reports about the electoral manipulation. The sad reality is that there was some massive vote-rigging” (Interview 23/France).
15. Most of the current Attac members blame Nikonoff for the crisis despite the fact that it is not proven that he committed electoral fraud. Annais expresses that he lost all trust in him: “I do not believe in Nikonoff anymore. I felt betrayed by him. Even if his analysis and ideas are good, I do not want to hear from him anymore” (Interview 10). More drastically, Pierre states: “If Nikonoff were to come to Lyon, I would literally beat him up” (Interview 11).
16. For example, Chantal expresses her displeasure with the events in 2005/2006 when she argues: “The crisis really annoyed me. You have people with a university degree that behave like children. For a while, I could not stand it anymore and became passive. Even now, I still do not feel comfortable running for a national office” (Interview 19).
17. Elise sarcastically adds: “I remember that we discussed dishonest practices inside large companies like ENRON in 2003; then a couple of years later, you have to realize that the same practices happened inside Attac. It is much worse if these combats happen in an organization that wants to improve the world, because it goes against its self-definition” (Interview 14).
18. Pascal summons up these difficult times: “Locally the crisis was hard to sustain. We were not interested in these power struggles, but rather wanted to take actions on the ground. We tried to continue to work and keep up the energy, but it was hard” (Interview 15).
19. Fiona, a member from Paris, was also quite content about how her local committee dealt with the crisis. She reports: “In my local committee we resolved the internal crisis in a dignified way. We had an open debate between the two camps. This created transparency and people still trusted each other. Our good handling of the situation prevented the mass exodus that happened elsewhere” (Interview 18).
20. Roger is one of those ideologically driven members who increased engagement in the aftermath of the crisis. He declares: “At the time, I increased my engagement because I fundamentally believed in Attac's ideas” (Interview 21).