Politicized expertise – an analysis of the political dimensions of consultants' policy recommendations to developing countries with a case study of McKinsey's advice on REDD+ policies

Abstract

This article argues that expertise must be seen as politicized. Most of the existing research on the role of experts in policy-making neglects that there are many political factors which influence what and whose expertise is sought and used. This article looks at the role consultants play in shaping public policy in developing countries. Applying concepts from different disciplines a theoretical framework is developed to examine in what ways such politicized expertise undermines notions of neutrality and legitimacy. This framework is then applied to a case study looking at the advice that McKinsey & Company has given developing countries on their deforestation and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation policies.

Keywords:

• politicized expertise
• expertise
• policy advice in developing countries
• policy-making
• consultants
• McKinsey & Company
• REDD+

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the invaluable feedback and comments I received from my anonymous reviewers. In addition to that I would like to thank Diane Stone, Denis Saint-Martin, Timothy Clark, and Matthias Kipping who I consulted throughout the writing process of this article and who provided very helpful input.

Notes

1. Any reference to “consultants” or “consultancies” in this article refers to private sector consultants.

2. Stone (Stone 2002a, 126) describes this as “the presence of a hegemonic ‘new public management’ discourse”. Over time this becomes systemic as “decision-makers tend to integrate new information into preexisting political agendas and deeply rooted conceptual frameworks” (Lahsen 2010, 162), thereby strengthening the predominance of the neoliberal discourse.

3. However, this often happens at World Bank training facilities as well (Goldman 2006, 230–233)

4. In the following also “McKinsey” or “McKinsey & Co”

5. Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Land Degradation (REDD + ), for an introduction to REDD+ see section 4.1.

6. Personal consultation with some of the authors who have worked on single aspects of the question has confirmed this. For this I am indebted to advice from Diane Stone, Denis Saint-Martin, Timothy Clark and Matthias Kipping.

7. There are several reasons for that. The sheer complexity of many of today's problems and the limits defined by the shortcomings of scientific methodology, for example, have made any claims to an infallible truth harder to sustain (see e.g. Popper 2002).

8. One of the few accounts by scholars to revitalize Gramscian thought can be found in the works of Levy and Newell (e.g. Levy and Egan 2003; Levy and Newell 2002) and Bieler and Morton (e.g. Bieler and Morton 2004).

9. Other authors have put this in starker terms by referring to consultants as “intellectual mercenaries” (Leys 1999; Saint-Martin 2007, 671) or “hired guns [that] politicians can use to bypass reluctant civil servants” (Bakvis 1997, 107).

10. For example because of a lack of understanding of complex scientific findings or limited access to information and discussions within the scientific community.

11. Although I will in some parts refer to the actual recommendations coming out of McKinsey's work, this will first and foremost not be a critique of the company's findings but an analysis of how their advice is politicized. Their actual work has, however received a substantial amount of criticism. For an academic perspective see (Ackerman and Bueno 2011; Kesicki and Ekins 2011), for critique from civil society see (Dyer and Counsell 2010; Greenpeace 2011) and for journalists' accounts refer to (Hari 2011; Morales 2011).

12. This short introduction to REDD+ will by no means be exhaustive but focus on those characteristics which are relevant to the case. Additional literature will be referred to where appropriate. Furthermore, other relevant characteristics of REDD+ will be explained within the discussion of the case study.

13. This short introduction will deal with those aspects of McKinsey & Co most crucial for the analysis. For more background information see Cohen (2005), Bryne (2002), Friga (2008), Hirst (2002), Huey (1993), Jeffries (2003), and McDonald (2009, 2013).

14. McKinsey has since moved away from REDD+ and is focusing more on “green growth” in developing countries.

15. In the following also “abatement curve” or “cost curve”.

16. Taking into consideration the financial crisis, McKinsey has since updated its model (McKinsey & Company 2010a). Given that the updated version does not find any substantial changes regarding their numbers for forestry related abatement (McKinsey & Company 2010a, 5), the older, better documented, version is referred to here.

17. Full disclosure: The author currently works for Greenpeace International.

18. This process can sometimes be rather direct as well. In the case of Indonesia, for example, McKinsey was paid directly by the Norwegian government and without a competitive tendering process to develop a REDD+ strategy (Greenpeace 2011, 13).

19. The DRC's Environment Minister Jose Endundo later confirmed that the country simply adopted McKinsey's scenarios (Ritter 2011).

20. If it is assumed that compensation is based on additionality measured against a baseline and a projected trajectory, a higher projected deforestation rate leaves more room for reduction (and therefore increases compensation payments). Given Guyana's very low actual deforestation rates, if the country wants to maximize its compensation, it is in its interest to be compensated based on a very high projected rate.

21. This refers to the practice of cutting down the vegetation within a certain area of land and then burning the remaining foliage in order to use the resulting ash to fertilize the soil. While this can be a driver of deforestation if done on an industrial level, subsistence farmers usually rotate the areas that are farmed so the soil and vegetation can recover.

22. The only confirmed case of McKinsey working for a company which benefits directly from a lack of deforestation regulation is the company's engagement with the Indonesian conglomerate Sinar Mas which has pulp and paper and palm oil divisions. The disclosed information regarding that cooperation, however, only dates back to the late 1990s (Athale 1998) before McKinsey's involvement in REDD+.

23. Mining, a major driver of deforestation, is not mentioned at all as a cause for deforestation in McKinsey's analysis (McKinsey & Company 2009a).

24. McKinsey's report on Brazil, for example, does not mention the words “indigenous” or “rights” at all (McKinsey & Company 2009b).