The persistence of divided memories – is it unavoidable?

Since a long time, our journal collaborates with Sasa Bozic on his annual event ‘Divided Societies’ at the IUC Dubrovnik. The topic of the 25th event in the series was devoted to a very relevant issue related to the rise of populism and nationalism: the (re-)surgence of memory wars.

This issue of Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research is hence quite timely. As the Brexit and the emergence of nationalist movements, Europe is at the crossroad. Nationalism and populism oppose any deepening of the European Union, or even threaten the mere existence of the European Union. Whilst the UK stumbles to leave the European Union, all over Europe nationalism and anti-EU movements are on the rise. This is not only due to the strength of seduction by charismatic populist, but by policy mistakes by political elites that often ignore the public claim for social and political participation.

Barbara Tuchman warns against what she calls ‘The March of Folly’ (Tuchman, 1985). By no means, the current policy failures – that are to a great extent the cause of the rise of nationalism and of populism – are a new phenomenon. The great historian takes four examples to prove her warning: the famous Trojan horse that, according to Homer, decided a long-lasting war thanks to a quite simple trick, the policy of the Renaissance popes that lead to the Protestant revolution, England’s American colonial policies that ultimately lead to the American independence and, finally, how the US slipped in the Vietnam war.

Thomas Leahy rather argues that the memory wars in the Irish case are rather persistent in politics and play a decisive role as they comprise conflicts between the leading political groups including Sinn Féin, political unionism, the Irish and British governments. Furthermore, these memory wars are dominant in what Antonio Gramsci calls ‘cultural hegemony’: a lot of factors seem to stabilise the conflicting memories across the various populations based of the commemoration of communal suffering.

Jennifer Todd argues that the construction of collective memories impacts on political attitudes, and this is particularly true for the conflict-ridden society in Northern Ireland, which might strengthen even extreme nationalism and promote radical responses. Less so in largely environments like in the Republic of Ireland, where this phenomenon is mostly only observed amongst highly stigmatised groups. Stimulating memory work could help to resolve the problems that are due to the construction of conflicting collective memories. However, under specific conditions nationalism can be used by right-wing populists to increase their influence beyond the traditional nationalist hardliners. Overcoming conflicting memories cannot be imposed top-down, but by encouraging deliberative processes of change through a process of negotiating political agreements by the political elites.

In such a thematic issue, the memory wars in the former Yougoslavia played an important role and continue to do so. In his contribution ‘Memory abuse, violence and the dissolution of Yugoslavia’, Taylor McConnell gives an overview over the issues at stake. He could show that the political mobilisation of both distant and recent memories in Yugoslavia in the late 1980s were quite important elements that explain the outbreak of manifest Balkan wars in the early 1990s. The abuse of memories does continue till nowadays and draws even on far more recent events than the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, or the Second World War.

Dana Dolghin takes the example of the conflict between Hungary and Romania to examine the question whether trans-nationalization can help to overcome opposed historical memories. Both countries joined the European Union and the process suggested a process of reconciliation as well. However, the recent experience shows that the reconciliation was quite superficial and the old rivalry between the two countries was revived for domestic policy power games.

The Irish case is of relevance for contemporary European politics: Under specific conditions, memory wars that in peaceful, stable and prosperous times seem to play a decreasing role can be reactivated by right-wing populists when these conditions change. The abuse of nationalism and hence the re-construction of collective national memories is, as Todd already mentions, not specific for the Irish conflict: As Nikola Petrović shows, Eurosceptic parties and movements combine their tactics of fighting against the European Union using ‘Brussels’ – as synonym for an anonymous European bureaucracy – with their interpretation of European history. His conclusions suggest that that the recent EU crises can be partly explained by the legacies of the European twentieth-century history.

Finally, Werner Wintersteiner examines the role of the arts and, more specifically, of literature in the process of overcoming (or promoting) memory wars. He takes as an example the work of an Austrian writer to analyse Austria’s memory politics after the Second World War. In his optimistic view, literature can successfully contribute to overcome ideologies.

Memory wars are heavily influential and will quite likely persists over time. They can, however, become less import in the policy process and less conscious when all members of the society get a fair share in the wealth of nations, and hence gain economic dignity. In a recent article, Gene Sperling (2019) elaborates the concept of economic dignity for overcoming ideological fights that contribute to the rise of populism and extremism. One does not have to agree with Sperling that economic policies that ensure that people are able to take care for their families; the pursuit of potential and purpose; and economic participation would be the only means to overcome.

ORCID

Ronald J. Pohoryles http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5072-673X