Diaspora, deliberation and democracy: examining externally-sponsored initiatives for the development of local fora in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Abstract

Many democratic countries around the globe guarantee some type of representation for various groups of recognized minorities and to various extents. Those governments enable and/or incentivize their deliberative performances through various participatory democratic instruments, either within the official institutions, or in online platforms, or by partaking in different governance and budgeting processes. Diaspora communities, though do not share most of the characteristics commonly attributed to ‘minorities’, could be theoretically considered as an ‘ex-territorialized minority’ in terms of access to decision-making processes and overall democratic participation. However, diaspora groups functionally appear to be often marginalized in democratic deliberation in the countries of their origin, and only a handful of countries have put in place official policies that address this matter. In this article, we aim to analyse how foreign governments and their aid agencies operating in BiH have contributed to the development of diaspora-friendly democratic deliberation fora for enhanced (handson) practices of localized Bosnian diaspora's engagement in their country of origin. We analyse and compare six selected local communities (municipalities and cities) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, examine the externally-driven municipal institutional restructuring and explore what motivates locals to adopt and accept diaspora as a component of their own local deliberation frameworks.

Keywords:

• Bosnia and Herzegovina
• diaspora
• democracy
• deliberation
• local communities

Introduction

Theories of deliberative democracy, though not universally uniform in methods and evaluation criteria, provide clear guidance for conceptualizing the scope and quality of deliberation aiming to influence policy-making (cf. Goold et al. 2012; Reuchamps and Caluwaerts 2018). Many researchers hold that high-quality deliberation serves as a direct indicator of citizen-oriented and accountable democratic outputs (cf. Nanz and Steffek 2005; Neblo 2005).

Any reasonably balanced public democratic deliberation, as an important component of public policy-making, entails a discussion on deliberative contributions of various stakeholders, including the status and functional positions of minorities. Many democratic countries around the world enable or incentivize deliberative performances through various participatory democratic instruments to various types of recognized minorities, and to various practical degrees (Wheatley 2003; Miller 2018).

Many world governments are progressively using their diaspora communities in deliberate ways to shape both local and national policies as well as to be influenced and shaped by political events in the homeland and to incite actions (Bauböck 2006; Williams 2018) for either economic gains, generating political support (cf. Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019) or to mitigate the negative effects of humanitarian crises. Diaspora communities, though do not share most of the characteristics commonly attributed to widely recognized types of ‘minorities’, could be theoretically considered as an ‘ex-territorialized minority’ in terms of access to decision-making processes and overall democratic participation. However, diaspora groups functionally appear to be often marginalized in democratic deliberation in the countries of their origin, and only a handful of countries have put in place some official policies that effectively address this matter.

The situation in post-conflict settings is even more complex, since diaspora driven or led actions are often tied to those performed by civil society organizations, primarily in various forms of conflict resolution, as well as in sustaining peace and democracy (cf. Orjuela 2006, 6–7; Cochrane 2007, 19). Most conflict-generated diaspora community members were forcefully displaced from their localities of origin, and the need for their direct involvement in decision-making and power-sharing deliberation models ‘back home’ is evidenced (cf. Hasić 2018; Keane 2019).

This paper addresses the underrepresentation of the Bosnian–Herzegovinian diaspora, contextually defined as a minority group, in political and other types of democratic deliberations within a weak and post-conflict country of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We examine how externally driven ‘governance intervention’ helps BiH authorities to create space for diaspora’s active engagement in their country of origin, mainly through establishing channels for democratic and institutional deliberation within cities and municipalities. Our research is focused on Swiss Development Council’s (SDC) sponsored project ‘Diaspora 4 Development’, and is guided by the following research questions: In what ways can externally-driven development projects help to stimulate diaspora’s deliberative engagement in their localities of origin? Can such projects create minimally viable institutional foundations for local democratic deliberation? Can such locally embedded practices sustain themselves and spill over horizontally to other communities and onto higher levels of government once the external funding is no longer available?

We are comparatively exploring 6 municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina that have been directly involved in the SDC’s project. We aim to understand the character of the newly established institutionalized local fora for diaspora deliberation in BiH, and ways in which they accommodate diaspora initiatives locally. Furthermore, we aim to unearth how they relate to the diaspora’s capacity to initiate, act and take part in local decision-making processes. We are equally interested in scrutinizing whether these externally-sponsored institutional changes play a significant role in building enhanced local institutions’ capacity to absorb diaspora’s contributions in shaping localized dynamics of democratic deliberative practices.

Our research contributes to scholarships that address interplays between local actors, democratic deliberation, externally-induced actions and third parties, with a particular focus on issues of subnational agency and ownership in post-conflict settings in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Exploring different venues for co-option of the Bosnian diaspora on a local level ensures more accurate and disaggregated data that can open up and attract new theoretical meanings to local ownership in the deliberative process.

Literature review and research framework

Literature on deliberative democracy practices focuses on the decision-making process that stems from and relates to a fair and reasonable discussion among citizens, facilitating and strengthening citizens’ voices through the inclusion of all people in processes that directly affect public decisions (Gastil and Levine 2005; OECD 2020). In essence, deliberation involves weighing carefully different options, which presupposes accurate and relevant information and a diversity of perspectives. It also entails a shared evaluative framework for reaching decisions, and a requirement for participants to apply these shared criteria to weigh trade-offs and find common ground to reach a group decision (cf. Bone, Crockett, and Hodge 2006; Carson 2017).

The main, often highlighted, similarity between deliberative and participatory democracy is that both posit the direct involvement of citizens, which goes beyond electing representatives (Carson and Elstub 2019), and vote-centric conception of participation in political decision-making (Chambers 2003). Some scholars have suggested ways to combine deliberative and participatory democracy (cf. Bouricius 2013; Elstub 2018; Schecter and Sullivan 2018), such as the use of open and widespread participation at a first stage to develop proposals, followed by focused deliberation among a smaller, representative group of the public to review them, find consensus on final proposals, and decide.

Decision-making, through inclusive and unconstrained participation is particularly appealing to various under-represented groups, which are often marginalized from these processes (Gherghina et al. 2020). Under-represented groups are traditionally referred to as those characterized by widely recognized collective features or group dynamics. Some under-represented groups, though numerous and perceived influential, remain absent from the local democratic processes. Most of the available works on the topic refer to the collective representation issues faced by conventionally conceptualized minority groups (cf. Wheatley 2003; Miller 2018). One other example discussed in the literature refers to diaspora groups and their relations to deliberative processes in their own respective countries of origin (Underhill 2016; Keinan 2017).

Diasporas have a great capacity to act as agents of social change, and their potential to act as mediators between the two countries, with which they have a strong attachment, can enhance the overall values of pluralism and democracy (cf. Shain and Barth 2003, 450). Diasporas can also access major stakeholders through a set of relations and networks can facilitate access to inaccessible thematic areas, and their lobbying can propagate the cause through political channels (cf. Wayland 2004; Adamson 2005; Fair 2005). They can also be heavily involved in the process of lobbying and advocacy for a certain cause that aims to advance their overall engagement in their countries of origin, and their tactics may take different forms such as: raising awareness of the situation in the country of origin through public campaigns, media promotions and other forms of PR; organizing demonstrations for more specific causes; and striving to include certain topics in public education (Baser and Swain 2008, 14–20). There is also empirical evidence showing diasporas’ potential in supporting a society’s post-conflict transformation, mainly by extending the transfer of skills and know-how onto the local elites or by taking up important positions in local governments, academia, entrepreneurship, civil society, etc. (cf. Cheran 2003; Mohamoud 2005, 45; Orjuela 2006).

There is abundant room for determining ways in which different diaspora groups conceptualize their own respective links with their homeland, and what levels of responsiveness and receptiveness they can expect from local authorities (cf. De Vos and Kendall 2012, 11). Diaspora’s role is observed ‘in-between’, inside and from outside contexts, as self-motivated, but also, as both bounded and unbounded (Brubaker 2005), embedded in a notion of ‘affinity’ (Ancien, Boyle, and Kitchin 2009) and ‘electiveness’ (Jöns et al. 2015). The existing studies suggest that diaspora engagement with their homelands is best understood not as something that depends on identification with the homeland or particular ideological basis, which can be triggered in various ways and shaped under different circumstances (cf. Koinova and Tsourapas 2018).

As a response to this challenge, several countries have managed to develop ‘diaspora strategies’, aimed at fostering relationships between home countries, host countries, and their respective diaspora communities. Strategies have emerged in diverse forms, from the highly formalized to light and even informal procedures (Ancien, Boyle, and Kitchin 2009; Boyle, Kitchin, and Ancien 2009; Mylonas 2013; Gamlen 2014; Délano and Gamlen 2014; Margheritis 2015; Adamson 2019), while some of the approaches taken have also been widely critiqued (for instance Sheffer 2010; Brinkerhoff 2012; Gamlen 2013; Pellerin and Mullings 2013). Some authors explored development diaspora governance policies in various states over time (Mencutek and Baser 2017), or their adaptation to subnational levels of decision-making (Hasić 2020).

Understanding the role diasporas, conceptualized as underrepresented groups, can play in shaping norms and structures and how these can be the subject of reinterpretation in various local contexts is particularly relevant in post-conflict societies. The existing body of research aimed at studying the relationship between diaspora groups and post-conflict societies of their origin mainly focuses on economic aspects of their engagement, primarily on remittances and financial involvement (Nyberg–Sørensen, Hear, and Engberg–Pedersen 2002), humanitarian functions (Berdal 2005; Brinkerhoff 2009) or other forms of assistance which might affect the existing balance of economic, political and military reality (Horst 2007). Only a limited number of academic or policy works have dealt with identifying their democratic deliberative potentials (Délano and Mylonas 2019), and even fewer that focus on initiatives aimed at building engagement capacities or interplays with ‘resident’ decision-makers.

Research design and methods

Direct political involvement of BiH diaspora in the post-conflict democratic development of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not yet been objectively and systematically evaluated. Still, their overwhelming success in various economic spheres can serve as an excellent indicator of their overall capacity to contribute to other areas of post-conflict reconstruction, nationally, regionally and locally.

Our key epistemic premise follows the logic of appropriateness and arguing, while our conceptual framework employs both interpretative and institutional analyses (cf. Kellstedt and Whitten 2013). We operate under the assumption that Swiss Development Council’s (SDC) support in stimulating diaspora’s engagement led to an increased level of receptiveness of local communities in BiH towards Bosnian diaspora’s involvement in the local community’s economic development. This has also galvanized opportunities for both diasporic population and local communities to consider options for further integration and incorporation of diaspora groups into local deliberative and decision-making frameworks. Comparative literature on diaspora engagement in their countries of origin (for instance De Haas 2006; Margheritis 2015; Hasić 2016; Gamlen, Cummings, and Vaaler 2019) clearly shows that many governments have been able to harness and utilize diaspora potentials for their own end, and that this can be done at lower levels of government, and not exclusively through national-level policies of diaspora engagement (cf. Hasić 2018).

This research follows a case-oriented approach (George and Bennett 2005) and a structured focus case comparison (Druckman 2005), which examines the role of an externally-induced project and its impacts on deliberative processes in six municipalities in BiH - Jajce, Maglaj, Žepče, and Ključ in the FBiH entity of BiH, and Prijedor and Laktaši in the RS entity.¹ This is an empirically-driven interpretative and institutional analysis of multiple sub-national case studies, which allows for control of variety of political and societal processes of transformations (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014). By analysing relevant documents related to diaspora engagement in local policy-making, as well as survey analysis and e-mail interviews with ‘diaspora officers’ in those six local beneficiary communities in BiH, this paper traces the frames under which the established deliberation platforms (i.e. diaspora offices) that could be used by diaspora to advance their position within their respective communities of origin. Our primary aim is to comprehend both relations and produced outcomes by structuring a minimally sufficient explanation, without attempting to explain the causal mechanisms (cf. Beach and Pedersen 2019).

We use three basic indicators to evaluate the changes within the local institutional set up – organizational development, diversification of resource base, and degree of appropriating policy activities within the relevant areas (Perkmann 2003, 159–160). To be more specific, we examine whether diaspora offices have acquired sufficient levels of organizational development needed to have a relative degree of strategic and operational autonomy vis-a-vis ‘ordinary’ border authorities and to develop as independent units with a clear specialization. In addition, we investigate whether they have diversified resource base and became implementing bodies instead of being simply fora for independent discussions on policies. Finally, we observe whether they achieved a degree of appropriating policy activities that stand out in the policy-making area, compared with other local agents (Perkmann 2007, 12).

This article contributes to the growing scholarly debate on state-diaspora affairs, interplays between local actors, democratic deliberation, externally-induced actions and their institutional management by locals, from a specific focal point set on examining subnational government institutions and the role of government officials in the process.

‘Diaspora 4 development’ and potentials for local deliberations

Past research work that links Bosnian–Herzegovinian diaspora to the fragile post-conflict state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is founded upon a relatively small sample of empirical data, which is almost solely focused on the issues of local economic development (cf. Oruc et al. 2013; Petreski and Jovanović 2013; Efendić, Babić, and Rebmann 2014; Trokic 2016; Williams 2020), while only some are focused on examining the relationships between diaspora groups, relations to their home- or host-country political environments, integration challenges, organizational structures and legal status (cf. Valenta and Ramet 2011; Listhaug and Ramet 2013; Halilovich and Efendić 2019; Karabegović 2019).

Bosnia and Herzegovina, as an idiosyncratic case of a post-conflict country with a large conflict-generated diaspora community, has undergone a distinct diaspora governance transformation in the past 20 years. BiH has experienced several waves of migration across the world, induced by conflict, labour and economy. BiH has a vibrant and growing diaspora population that emerged in the past 25 years (conflict generated and economic). Diaspora communities have demonstrated their potential and their engagement through direct investments and involvement (for instance high remittance levels, humanitarian aid during times of need such, floods 2014). While most of the available works on BiH diaspora focused on their organization, mandates, and initiatives in adoptive countries (Halilovich et al. 2018; Karabegović 2018), specific features related to their externally-driven engagement in various level of governance BiH are yet to be explored.

Up until April of 2017, BiH had no official policies adopted or implemented towards its diaspora population. Political engagement of BIH institutions towards its diaspora communities has been quite limited and underdeveloped, and with viable initiatives to move forward (Halilovich et al. 2018). Institutional capacities at the local levels of government are equally weak. While there is a great awareness about the potential that diaspora can play in economic development, complex administrative systems, the lack of comprehensive diaspora data, the economic and political environment challenge their further involvement (Efendić, Babić, and Rebmann 2014).

Bosnian–Herzegovinian diaspora population, estimated at anywhere between 1.6 million to 2.4 million people, has a limited involvement in democratic processes at home, disproportionate to their overall size and diversity. Despite the fact that they can decide on the outcome of the elections and influence other socio-political processes, their access to and active involvement in deliberations (as well as political participation) is marginal. There are limited institutional measures to stimulate their democratic participation (Hasić 2016).² According to the official data of the BiH Central Election Commission, voter registration has been rapidly declining since 1996. For example, there were 458,000 registered diaspora voters in the first post-conflict elections, and only 88,000 of them in the last general elections held in 2018. The return of ballots is even lower, from 389,000 in 1996 to ∼57,000 in 2018.

Bosnian–Herzegovinian diaspora’s past engagement in local affairs in BiH, through offering financial aid, perspectives and know-how experiences, and encounters with different social and political actors in the country, have also only been marginally explored (cf. Babić 2013; Hasić 2018; Belloni and Ramović 2020). Available documents that assess Bosnian diaspora links to the fragile state of BiH are founded upon a relatively small sample of data, which is almost solely focused on the issues of local economic development, which indicated the need to further consider how BiH diaspora operationalizes their homeland-oriented duty in other areas, especially policy-making based on structures and processes that support deliberation.

The current constitutional set-up, established by the Dayton Peace Accords, has succeeded in institutionalizing ethnic divisions, and the post-Dayton reconstruction process in BiH, continued to further marginalize ‘local voices’. The interplay between the various sets of institutional devices produced a political system where domestic non-cooperation reigns supreme, and where new modes of behavior, once adopted, are not easily given up (Merdžanović 2015). As a result, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s weak institutions are unable to effectively carry out the adopted diaspora engagement policies, as a part of their foreign policy agenda, and thus integrate these within diaspora and development programs (Karabegović and Hasić 2019).

Several international projects³ emerged as a response to the inability of state-level and local institutions to effectively streamline Bosnian diaspora’s engagement in political and social processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Two large international projects, both launched in 2016, completely independently of each other, recognized the outlined issues, and were set to address the developmental cooperation capacities between BiH diaspora and governments at various levels.⁴ The work of these international development agencies and their partner organizations fostered an increased collaboration among various stakeholders in BiH and elevated diaspora governance into one of the driving tools for economic growth, development and skills transfer in the country. While these programs primarily focused on maximizing development, without addressing the reasons for migration (Geiger and Pécoud 2013), they also helped in understanding the impacts diasporas can have on the development of political and democratic deliberative dynamics in the home states.

The Swiss Development Council, financially supported a 4-year-long project that effectively tied its mission, tasks and resources with a consortium of two organizations, the IOM and UNDP, along with the state-level Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees, in charge of diaspora affairs, and several local governments and communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The SDC’s project Diaspora 4 Development (D4D), worth ∼5 million USD, was based on previously conducted project IOM’s program called Migration for Development. The D4D project was set to stimulate diaspora engagement, establish a network of institutional capacities to sustain these efforts in the long term. It also entailed collaboration with the MFA to establish diaspora representative bodies in Germany, Italy, Austria and Sweden to collaborate with institutions in BiH and to further solidify the relationships of diaspora with both government and civil society organizations in BiH.

The D4D project also established a Working Group that ensured projects’ effective streamlining and levels of necessary collaboration networks across different levels of government and institutions.⁵ The project initially began with a diaspora mapping exercise of diaspora development potential in ten different countries, in an effort to improve foreign direct investment from diaspora individuals.⁶ In the next stages, the D4D project focused on collaboration with 16 municipalities throughout BiH to establish and reaffirm the institutional capacities for diaspora direct engagement, thus creating municipal level offices for the delivery of sectorial policies. Their primary function of attracting investments and economic involvement of diaspora communities was additionally expanded to other forms of engagement. Such an approach was intended to ensure the inclusion of diaspora groups in deliberating and contributing to the public policy outcomes, so that they could have a stake in their successful implementation. In the next stages, the D4D project targeted increasing socio-economic opportunities and perspectives for women and men in BiH, reinforcing the strategic continuum and diaspora cooperation instruments, aligning municipal development strategies to the BiH diaspora strategy, providing more and higher quality services to diaspora members, development horizontal initiatives for the transferred business-related know-how and skills to BiH counterparts, etc. The project thus provided technical assistance to the responsible institutions with the aims of operationalizing the measures anticipated in the strategies and set-up the required implementation systems, as well as delivered technical assistance to the involved institutions (D4D Evaluation Report 2020).

We aim to explore how SDC’s externally-driven program on diaspora development, which involved close collaboration of international agents with BiH state-level government ministries and governments of 16 cities/municipalities across BiH, helped to conceptualize ‘local’ incorporation of diaspora deliberation potentials. We are particularly interested in examining links that this project helped to build, by opening up channels for diasporas’ engagement into local democratic practices (cf. De Vos and Kendall 2012, 11). In the following sections, we analyse the SDC’s D4D impact on the local institutional set up – organizational development, diversification of resource base, and degree of appropriating policy activities within the relevant areas.

Unpacking the approaches of local diaspora offices and potentials for enhanced deliberative performances

Diaspora is an unusual social group, often linked with spatial and temporal ‘disassociation’ with localized institutional structures of power, as citizens who have dual citizenship privileges and opportunities, etc. However, the lack of coherent and sustainable approaches toward diaspora groups is often recognized as one of their major grievances. Their self-perception of ‘underrepresentation’ is tied to power struggle that is not always related to their interests or initiatives they promote, but to other’s observations of their social status and their ‘positionality’.

Several states managed to govern diaspora affairs through bilateral treaties and cooperation with international organizations (Gamlen, Cummings, and Vaaler 2019). Because diasporas are considered important for attracting remittances, accounting between 10% and15% of the entire GDP in some developing countries, like Armenia, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, Tajikistan and others (Koinova and Tsourapas 2018), SDC’s ‘Diaspora 4 Development’ project aimed to offer not only a blueprint for enhancing the quality of locally crafted engagement, which not only fosters tools for reaffirming the economic participation of diaspora in local development plans, but it also aimed to encourage the participation individuals and organized diaspora groups in the local public debates on matters of common interest. Unlike in the previous externally and internally induced attempts to ‘mobilize diasporans’ in BiH to take part in the country’s development, this project managed to organize development structures, and engage them with diasporas through facilitated networks of collaboration.

Our research reveals that the majority of respondents in all six investigated municipalities agree that diaspora is currently not, and thus could be more included in the political processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The interviewed diaspora officers also stipulate that their current level of democratic participation is not proportionate to their overall contribution to the development of the country. Most of the local diaspora officers, who operate under unclear legal framework related to their tasks, offered various perspectives on how they practically manage the situations through navigating a maze of bylaws, adopted either at the local levels or higher levels of government.⁷

Examined municipal records provided by the municipal officers on diaspora investments, visits and frequencies of contacts, networks they had established locally and in their adoptive countries, etc., highlight there is no uniform and systemic approach to monitoring the numbers or structure of diaspora individuals groups they actively deal with. Only some of the examined municipalities maintain official and regularly updated archives (Posušje, Ključ, Žepče), while others rely only on estimates and periodic data, sometimes provided by external sources (Maglaj, Prijedor, Jajce). All recognize that inappropriate maintenance of data consequently limits their potential for active engagement of diaspora in local affairs. In this respect, developing and sustaining communication channels are both hard to achieve, and outreach initiatives and monitoring diaspora's involvements in the specific local communities of origin (or beyond) is inhibited by personal and institutional limitations of personnel involved in the process.

Our research findings also underscore that most of the local diaspora officers’ in six examined municipalities have already recognized the intended roles and mechanisms set out by the D4D project, and have actively mobilized on developing other forms of relationship with diaspora groups. Post-neoliberal rationale is prevalent in their responses, particularly when it comes to advancing pragmatic and cost-effective solutions. Due to historical developments and the existence of pre-conflict channels of communication, some of the investigated cases, like Ključ and Prijedor, have shown a greater degree of localized ‘strategic culture’ to engage with their respective diaspora communities, and thus have been able to transform their work more efficiently when compared to others. Diaspora ‘representativeness’, in these particular cases, is designed to encompass the profile of the entire community against census pre-war data, and thus influence the decision-makers to fit and become accountable to the outcomes of their policies (cf. Farrell et al. 2019; Carson and Elstub 2019). As a result, the local institutions are engaged in ‘courting’ their diaspora communities to forge a constructive relationship, and want to avoid sending out messages on how to engage or how best to be involved, but rather to allow them to express and formulate their interests, and then follow through on their initiatives. From a socio-political perspective, their engagement beyond econ-based issues, still remains problematic in some local political discourses.

In the case of post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘internationals’ have generally perceived local agents as unprepared and unequipped to manage the transitional process, while locals have often blamed external actors, who spent considerable amount of time and resources to groom the local political elites in following their ideas of democracy and deliberative practices, and for failing to account for the complexity of local democratic processes. In this context, some municipal diaspora offices (Jajce, Žepče and Ključ) revealed several practical issues related to accommodating diaspora’ group needs, and tailored managerial adjustments that serve their interests to be involved in the public consultations or debates. Introducing practices that address ‘ordinary’ issues with diversified resources and a specialized focus (cf. Perkmann 2003), like e-governance platforms, 24-hour response services, and other forms of direct (in person) engagement, have helped in mounting political and social challenges, enabled entrepreneurial and light-touch tactic in fostering relations with local government bodies, and made diaspora less reliant on using less proxy tools to have their demands or grievances resolved (cf. Délano and Gamlen 2014). However, there are some boundaries set to diaspora’s permanent representation locally, especially in their involvement within budgetary practices (cf. Newton and Geissel 2012). In this respect, claims that motivate diaspora to be and remain engaged in deliberative processes locally are not necessarily perceived as conflicting with the established interests of other local groups that aim to promote their policies. In reality, the employed pragmatism and assumptions related to diaspora’s capability of opening and closing opportunities for other resources (cf. Hollifield 2012) reinforces the local diaspora officials’ perceptions of their potential to influence other types of local policies, which could theoretically work in confluence with the evolving institutional set-ups.

The existing body of literature on diaspora affairs and their engagement with localities of their origin calls for a more nuanced approach to analysing the activities (cf. Leroy and Mohan 2003; Horst 2007), as well as more analysis on power relations, strategies of diaspora inclusions and exclusions in the decision-making processes. Diaspora’s engagement and active role in enhancing the quality of deliberation and institutional cooperation on local levels in BiH have been scattered in the past (Hasić 2016). In this context, deliberative platforms and tools have not been observed as an ‘immediate objective’ of intended change, but rather the result of long-term and careful planning to establish the foundations for institutional development that would entail deliberative mechanisms that are more permanent. With aims of gaining momentum for building a shared consciousness and perceptions of empowerment (cf. Adamson 2005), some municipalities (Prijedor and Ključ), rather than ‘activating diasporas’, have decided to establish an honest two-way working relationship with primary goals of managing expectations. They wanted to first explore what can be achieved with this enhanced deliberation mechanics, before engaging in practices that could effectively lead to failure in fulfilment and the subsequent rejection of the entire pro-active engagement agenda. Their work reflects intents that could help diaspora in setting up businesses and facilitating various forms of knowledge transfer, collective projects development, and ‘brain circulation’, which could further bolster other types of presently absent engagement forms.

The current local political situation for diaspora involvement in BiH is not conducive and offers almost no entry-points for diaspora to voice their group-specific needs and demands. The first post-Dayton state-level foreign policy objectives adopted in 2003 did not specify relations with diaspora populations. Having no financial means to pursue active policies, no developed institutional capacities to further galvanize the relations, the interests of both sides have faded over time, and the BiH’s relationship towards the diaspora has weakened over time (Karabegović and Hasić 2019). In this context, most examined municipalities have occupied the role of honest brokers in the process. The analysed responses and policy documents indicate that the implementation of mechanisms that are intended to incentivize deliberative practices does not always eliminate spaces for other types of counter-actions which would potentially diminish such policy orientation. In other areas of engagement, however, local officials tend to focus on developing bases for inputs that directly relate to creating durable alliances and appropriating policies (Perkmann 2003). In their view, this has been relevant in policy-making and improving the overall image of the local community regionally and abroad, and not only for their ‘own diaspora’ communities, but also among others.

A group of municipalities (Ključ and Maglaj) has also decided to actively pursue alliance-building models, as they realized diaspora matters and their involvement cannot be contained and localized on municipal levels, and especially not centred solely around service points. They initiated certain steps to involve other surrounding municipalities and cantonal institutions in deliberative frameworks. This approach implies local agent’s recognition of the added value of inter-municipal cooperation and involving higher levels of government might bring to their own work, and the need to encompass a larger (broader) outlook into how diasporans and diaspora organizations operate, and what their roles in policy formulation might be.

When it comes to local offices’ capacities to achieve a degree of appropriating policy activities and to stand out as important players in the policy-making area (cf. Perkmann 2007, 12), our research shows that ever since the diaspora offices have been established, there has been an increase in the coherence of activities and communication with other offices on local levels, especially development cooperation, as well as cultural and sports. Such successful horizontal alliance building is considered to be added value to local policy formulation by all interviewed officials, with a potential for further spillover effects. The successes of SDC’s project have attracted a number of other municipalities, which were initially not part of the project, to sign memoranda on cooperation with competent state bodies. Most of the municipalities have incorporated diaspora-oriented policy approaches in their municipal, and some in their cantonal, development strategies. Since the examined municipalities have only ‘opened up’ to diaspora, and not yet invited them to take part in the decision-making processes related specifically to their interests, the local diaspora officials noted that development strategies that include diaspora portfolio have been drafted without the direct involvement of local residents or diaspora members.

Finally, only some municipal diaspora officers (Žepče and Prijedor) anticipate that once SDC’s project is completed, the established public consultation mechanisms would inertly become transparent and inclusive toward all underrepresented diaspora groups that directly benefit from them. Some of the diaspora officers (Jajce) are facing recurrent setbacks in pushing for greater degrees of inclusiveness of diaspora into the local deliberation. They are not certain what exactly their offices will transform into once the D4D project is finally over, since they have practically relied on the project support for several years. Once the external funding is unavailable, all project components are finalized, and international organizations’ engagement is reduced financially and in terms of project guidance, it remains to be evaluated how local communities will adapt and whether they will continue the developed institutional practices.

Conclusion

As the number of studies on diaspora engagement in the public democratic processes of their localities of origin becomes more prominent, there is a growing necessity to consider and evaluate the modalities and types of their involvement. Building empirical evidence and comprehensive theoretical approaches toward diaspora’s engagement requires inspection of new models of deliberative set-ups established in local communities, and in what ways they promote the integration of diaspora communities into local decision-making frameworks.

Our research was focused on close inspection of the externally-driven development project that yielded space for diaspora’s deliberative engagement in their local home communities. Through examination of ‘Diaspora 4 Development’ project impacts in six municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we observed the local institutional transformation of deliberative practices.

Democratic deliberation in BiH is considered to be generally weak and underdeveloped, and many groups are left out of the process. Diaspora, though large in numbers and in potentials to contribute to the quality of economic and political processes, was classified as an underrepresented group, since their participation in local deliberative processes is evidently marginal, and disproportionate to their involvement in economic and other types of post-conflict development in BiH. Given that their engagement in those areas is prominent and growing, there is a need for creating more space where they can strategically participate in decision-making schemes.

Diaspora 4 Development, specifically designed to address key policy challenges in diaspora governance in BiH, is a unique example of how multilateral organizations externally guide post-conflict development schemata and influence their dynamics (cf. De Haas 2006). Our findings show that models of local incorporation could be effective enough to stimulate higher levels of diaspora involvement, bolster other municipalities to get involved, and thus reshape the current democratic deliberation paradigm. Setting up sufficiently operational municipal offices for exclusive engagement with diaspora communities, with operational autonomy and capable of appropriating policy activities, helped to stimulate their overall diaspora involvement. These attempts have been supported by and further endorsed by the state-level Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BiH, and the numbers of municipalities involved in the growing network, which clearly indicates some spillover effects and a potential for higher levels of government to get involved and replicate the diversified resource models.

The research has also highlighted that local communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be empowered to create and provide spaces and opportunities for the engagement of diaspora groups. Although this was not the primary goal of the SDC’s project, the local communities managed to somehow cultivate and shape various deliberative practices by introducing several deliberative tools and building alliances that would foster further engagement. This is reflective of diaspora’s potential beyond economic purposes perceived and expected from local authorities (cf. De Vos and Kendall 2012). The externally-driven policy devolution from international organizations to six local levels of government also enabled effective engagement strategy design. This approach, negotiated in particular local contexts, encompasses diversity in the decision-making processes and promotes inclusion.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This article is based upon work from COST Action “Constitution-making and deliberative democracy” (CA17135), supported by COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology).

Notes on contributors

Jasmin Hasić

Jasmin Hasić works as an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Sarajevo School of Science and Technology, and serves as the Executive Director of Humanity in Action Bosnia and Herzegovina. His research interests include foreign policy, diaspora studies, peacebuilding, and demographic changes associated with post-conflict migration. He is the co-editor of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Foreign Policy Since Independence (Palgrave 2019).

Aiša Telalović

Aiša Telalović works as a program manager at Journalism Development Network. She previously worked at the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNHCR, British Council and various other international organisations. Her research interests include human rights, anti-corruption policies, and administrative law.

Notes

1 We sent a request for access to information of public interest to 32 local diaspora coordinators throughout all administrative parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina – i.e. both her entities (20 from the FBiH and 11 from the RS entity) and the Brčko District, asking them to answer 15 open-ended survey questions focusing on the ongoing cooperation and communication with, as well as participation of diaspora originating from these local communities in local and higher policy deliberations and development-focused efforts. A total of 12 municipalities (37.5%) replied. Only six of the local communities that replied participated as beneficiaries in the SDC Diaspora for Development project 2015–2020: other eight municipalities which participated in the SDC project have not responded to the survey.

2 Koinova and Tsourapas (2018) hold that diaspora voters are important for democracies that have emerged from conflict, such as Croatia and Kosovo.

3 Through its Diaspora Invest project, launched in April 2017, the USAID helps structure, stimulate and support investment by BiH diaspora to contribute to the country’s socio-economic development. USAID’s implementing partner for this 5-year $6.6 million project is Financial Markets International.

4 The USAID’s ‘Harnessing Diaspora for Economic Development’ and Swiss Development Council (SDC) ‘Diaspora for Development’ programs are each worth approximately 5 million USD, to be spent over multiple years and several project stages. USAID’s project is implemented in cooperation with local NGOs in BiH, while the SDC’s project is implemented by the UNDP’s and IOM’s offices BiH, in collaboration with the BiH state-level Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees.

5 This includes representatives of the Presidency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations, Agency for Work and Employment, Agency for Statistics, Foreign Investment Promotion Agency, Directorate for Economic Planning, Central Bank, Foreign Trade Chamber at the state level, as well as representatives of entity governments and Brčko District. In addition to the relevant state institutions, each of the entities will designate three representatives and Brčko District – one representative to be part of the Working Group.

6 The project mapped the Bosnian diaspora in ten countries: Austria, Switzerland, Germany, the United States of America, Australia, Croatia, Serbia, Sweden, Italy and the Netherlands. For more information about the report and the main findings, please see http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/Saopcenja/default.aspx?id=8321&langTag=bs-BA

7 Policy on cooperation with BH diaspora adopted by the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina (all investigated municipalities); memorandum on cooperation in diaspora related affairs between the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of Bosnia and Herzegovina and cities-municipalities (Jajce, Maglaj, Ključ); strategy on migrations and asylum between the Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina and cities-municipalities (Laktaši, Žepče); entity-level strategic plans on cooperation with diaspora (Prijedor); City-municipal action plans on cooperation with diaspora (Maglaj); City-municipal development strategies (Posušje, Maglaj, Žepče); City-municipal statutes (Posušje, Maglaj, Ključ).