The Early Warning System: people’s indirect empowerment to reduce the democratic deficit

Abstract

The EU faces many challenges. Demagogic leaders and parties exploited them politically, lamenting a democratic deficit between the EU and the Member States, which resulted in a European ‘polycrisis’. The Lisbon Treaty’s Early Warning System is a mechanism that helps to foster National Parliaments, thus the relation with legislators and citizens, as well as with the EU. However, this so-called Virtual Third Chamber might be a suitable tool to answer populist claims of democratic deficit. With it, National Parliaments might monitor European activities and proposal-making closer. Not only do they work at the nation-state level, but they are more involved at the inter-state and European levels. The Early Warning System can reduce people’s perceptions of democratic deficit and though indirectly, increase their sense of participation in European policy-making. With the System, the National Parliaments are new (indirect) legislators at the European level, with more opportunities to prevent possible breaches of the subsidiarity principle. The System assures more citizen-institutions integration, resulting in a stronger EU.

KEYWORDS:

• European Union
• Early Warning System
• populism
• third virtual chamber
• polycrisis

Democratic Deficit in the Eurpskeptic Perspective

The European Union is facing today many challenges on many levels. Covid-19 and vaccination, the China–US tense relations, post-Brexit issues, uncontrolled migrations, the post-Global Financial Crisis, the geopolitical vulnerability of the continent to cyberattacks, the conflicts between debtor and creditor countries, the politicization of the concept of Europe, the Euro and the Schengen crises have all contributed to make the EU a weak geopolitical actor. Furthermore, the rise of identarian conflicts and defensive nationalism (Hutter and Kriesi 2019) made things worse in the radicalization of the political debate on the EU. Leaning on populism – a ‘narrow-minded, anti-universalist, nationalistic, anti-foreigner, anti-democratic, reactionary’ (Müller 2017, 20) transversal political doctrine – many demagogic parties have been able to exploit politically all these crises. They boosted electoral consensus through the emphasis on ‘the people’ stressing the European institutions’ discredit, implying a democratic deficit (Moravcsik 2002) between the EU and the Member States. There are differences between nationalism and populism. Nationalism is a sentiment elevating a nation above all others and considering it to be the best of all. Populism is a method to conduct a political offer.

Criticism of the EU and its legitimacy’s lack is used in a populist fashion by both right- and left-wing parties. Some of the right-wing parties combine the populist method with nationalism and ultra-conservatism and xenophobia – portraying the EU as an illegitimate actor stealing nations’ sovereignty. These parties distaste multilateralism and multiculturalism. Their discredit of both European and international institutions had a long-lasting effect and continues to undermine European unity. One of the main populistic accusations towards the European ‘bureaucrats’ is the detachment from people’s needs and problems – including unemployment, health concerns, political identity. Many European citizens are disappointed with the European project and desire to count more on the communitarian choices. The only occasion they got to improve their participation in the European process is during the European elections when MEPs are elected to the European Parliament. However, only rarely European elections are perceived as an element decreasing the democratic deficit (Hix 2008). What Eurosceptic politicians criticize is the lack of ‘representativeness, transparency, and accountability of decision-making processes’ (Zürn 2012, 415) at the European level, as the EU is seen as an authority that imposes obligations to the Member States (Kassim, Peters, and Wright 2000).

However, the debate pro-against Europe should be framed into a national vs. supranational governmental way to seem things. One way for people to count more – decreasing the democratic deficit claimed by many Eurosceptic populists – might be found in Lisbon Treaty’s Early Warning System, through which National Parliaments can exercise an effective action at the legislative level of the EU, constituting a ‘Virtual Third Chamber’ (Cooper 2012). The System came into effect with the Treaty in December 2009 (Kiiver 2012) and made National Parliaments a virtual chamber, next to the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. On paper, the System might be a suitable and efficient response (one of the few) to populist claims of a democratic deficit in the EU, accused to be too distant from its citizens. How then can Early Warning System tackle populistic instances? How does the System respond to populistic and Eurosceptic accuses of democratic deficit within the legislative relation between the EU and National Parliaments? What are System’s pros and cons?

The System seems to be one of the most important innovations of the EU in recent years and it is intended to confer greater legitimacy on European democratic institutions, greater representativeness on National Parliaments in Europe, and greater power and affection to European institutions on European citizens. Since the beginning, the EU has come up against accusations of democratic deficit and elitism, as well as excessive focus on markets, financialization, lack of transparency, too much bureaucratization, unaccountability of the politicians in Brussels. Far from being the best and sole tool for decreasing democratic deficit, the Early Warning System enforces the subsidiarity principle and seeks to harmonize the relationship between the European institutions and the National Parliaments, thus, between the EU and the citizens. Other instruments to increase the participation of parliaments as well as their scrutiny do not seem to have been proposed or entered into force now. In any case, tools such as the Early Warning System are imperfect and insufficient to give concrete answers to a generalized need for more citizen popular representation and involvement within the European institutions and affairs.

The European Parliament, the Lisbon Treaty and the National Parliaments

The deep distrust of the EU institutions fueled by demagogic parties is one of the many faces of the European ‘polycrisis’ (Zeitlin, Nicoli, and Laffan 2019). From a populist perspective, National Parliaments are guilty of being part of an elitist project (Hix 2008), undermining national sovereignty. The radical right frames its arguments in terms of sovereignty, not democracy. It means they would grant more power to the executive (government) and the parliament would lose its centrality in representing people’s choice on how the State should be conducted. The European Parliament is seen as a useless institution stealing sovereignty from the people. Populist parties attempt to answer to problems by finding in the EU the scapegoat of all concerns (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2016). Populist leaders fuel Eurosceptic sentiments, emphasizing a democratic deficit between the EU-level and the Member States, between the EU and ‘the people’, between ‘the people’ and the National Parliaments. Populistic criticism encompasses an EU-level critique and promotes a picture of an elitist union disconnected from the needs of ‘the people’; the lack of democratic legitimacy and transparency; the excessively neo-liberal and market-oriented posture on the one hand, but also accusations of dirigisme on the other. The European Parliament elections in 2019 saw center-right and center-left parties losing their majority (Adler 2019), as Green, liberal and antisystem parties soared.

Euroscepticism triumphed in the last elections and is a potent feature of the European political landscape (Hooghe and Marks 2005), shaking the confidence of the EU itself (Bartolini 2005). Euroscepticism comes from a populistic way to depict the EU. The EU increased its power in policy-making in many fields with time, thus populist parties argue that the EU lacks people’s legitimacy in the decision-making process. National Parliaments play a crucial role within European politics (Raunio 2011), but they lost much of their ability to scrutinize their governments’ conduct of the European affairs (Raunio 2011). The fact that there has been a (national) ‘e-parameterization’ (de Ruiter 2013) is seriously perceived by many European citizens, many of whom think to be irrelevant in the decision-making of the supranational EU (Hooghe 2002). Despite ‘MEPs are elected by EU citizens, the EU’s decision-making procedures are fair and transparent, and the checks and balances in the EU system ensure that policy outcome from the EU are […] close to […] national EU-wide median voter’ (Hix 2008, 595). Lisbon Treaty has been crucial for the current EU’s architecture. Entered into force in 2009, it abolished the three-pillar structure, clarifying the competencies, increasing the EU’s democratic legitimacy (Orlando 2013) – a legitimacy that can be increased if Euroscepticism goes down (Lubbers and Scheepers 2005).

National Parliaments themselves gained the opportunity to closely monitor European activities and proposal-making, as well as getting more indirect involvement in the law-making process. Lisbon Treaty adds new competencies to the National Parliaments, the subsidiarity principle’s custodians (Huysmans and van Gruisen 2020; Jaroszynski 2020). Despite only very few National Parliaments emphasizing being the watchdogs of subsidiarity (Kinski 2020), their role is a capital one. Lisbon Treaty reinforced the EU as a central actor (Niemann 2012), theoretically making the EU more efficient. Further empowering the European Parliament has been a positive outcome of the Treaty, but one of the crucial aspects of the treaty is strengthening National Parliaments’ role within the EU. Lisbon Treaty enhances the cooperation between National Parliaments and the European Parliament (Cooper 2012), shortening the distance between people and European institutions. Under the Treaty, National Parliaments assume a ‘European commitment’, as they move upwards at the European level, acceding to the status of partial legislative actor. The Treaty makes National Parliaments more involved at the European level and affairs. They take part in the implementation of EU policies and affairs.

The Early Warning System and the Virtual Third Chamber

The EU can intervene in Member States’ affairs, but just on the agreed policy matters (Hooghe 2002). If the EU invades Member States’ competencies since Lisbon Treaty a new mechanism can restore the inter-institutional balance. The Early Warning System, a mechanism scrutinizing the EUs’ legislation (van den Brink 2012), might be used as a brake (Orlando 2013) by the National Parliaments to bring an action before the European Court of Justice if the subsidiarity principle is infringed. At the same time, via the System, National Parliaments can actively intervene at the European level. In this way, the Early Warning System might help to reduce the contested democratic deficit. The System is conceived as ‘a single solution to two separate problems – how to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU by giving a greater role to National Parliaments, and how to create a subsidiarity control mechanism without creating any new institutions’ (Orlando 2013, 446). The System is a crucial tool provided by Lisbon Treaty in National Parliaments’ hands, thus indirectly, in people’s hands. With it, the National Parliaments might also receive information and plans over future laws that the European Commission wants to carry out. Since Lisbon Treaty, the Commission must send to National Parliaments drafts of legislative acts and wait for their opinions and must keep them into account.

The System works as a signal to the Commission (van Gruisen and Huysmans 2020a). ‘Anticipating difficult negotiations, the Commission may decide to withdraw its proposal, because it believes that the proposal will fail anyway or because it is likely to be amended far away from its ideal preferences’ (van Gruisen and Huysmans 2020a). When Parliaments receive the draft from the Commission, they scrutinize if it is at odds with both proportionality and subsidiarity principles (Cooper 2012). This empowers National Parliaments, as they not only have a power-check, but also the opportunity to examine pieces of legislation, with the possibility to influence them. Then, the European Commission responds to the objections and proposes its actions; and National Parliaments might complain that the Commission’s counterprojects are unsatisfactory (Cooper 2012). The Early Warning System gives the National Parliaments a new involvement in the Europe-making process and (formally) makes them directly involved in the EU’s law-making, even if the role they have under the System is mainly consultative. National Parliaments’ involvement potentially influences the Commission’s and EU’s policy-making (Karlas 2012). The Parliaments are now not only working at the nation-state level but are more involved in the inter-state and European level, close to the other two legislative chambers of the EU.

The Early Warning System allows National Parliaments to raise objections on the European Commission’s legislative proposals up to eight weeks after receipt of the proposal (van Gruisen and Huysmans 2020a). With the System, the Parliaments enjoy now a wider role in European politics. This results in a possible decrease of the democratic deficit, as the National Parliaments are the expression of the European citizens. National Parliaments at the European level has been defined by Cooper (2012) as a Virtual Third Chamber of the EU. Along with Council and European Parliament, National Parliaments form an imaginary legislative body of the EU. Since the Virtual Third Chamber is ‘virtual’, National Parliaments form a collective body performing crucial parliamentary. Potentially, Early Warning System shifts at the European level the National Parliaments, which now work not just at a national level but become active European actors, acquiring a vertical bottom-up multilevel dimension. Many European citizens should appreciate it. The Virtual Third Chamber plays the role of (partial-indirect) legislator within the European framework. The ‘new chamber’ is not a policy-making organ (Cooper 2012). The Early Warning System does not bring the National Parliaments at the same legislative level as the other two European chambers; it just enables new opportunities.

It will not be a full co-legislator, along with the Council of the EU and the EP (Cooper 2012), but it can strengthen people’s perception to be more included within the European affairs. The National Parliaments constitute together the EU’s Virtual Third Chamber and the role they are given by the Early Warning System empowers the ‘passive’ National Parliaments. Playing a new and more active role within European policy, the new collective of National Parliaments is now part of a new framework of legislative actors at the European level, with the task to scrutinize the European activity and have better considerations of national-popular instances. Finally, through the Early Warning System, the Virtual Third Chamber ‘enables a deliberative exchange that is both horizontal (among National Parliaments) and vertical (between National Parliaments and EU institutions)’ (Cooper 2012, 444). And this might help to reduce the democratic deficit. The Lisbon Treaty has from the outset always aimed to reduce the democratic deficit and the perception of this deficit vis-à-vis citizens vis-à-vis the European institutions. Whether the Treaty has succeeded in lowering the democratic deficit is difficult to say, but the Early Warning System works in this direction.

‘Not Enough’: Early Warning System ‘cons

More confusion and time consumption. With the (partial) National Parliaments’ entrance within the legislative procedure, the new roles, and actors might strengthen the popular feeling of a more bureaucratic and inefficient EU. Adding new competencies to the National Parliaments (included the scrutiny over the subsidiarity principle’s breach) might result in a further complication of the European affairs. Coordination resulting from the Virtual Third Chamber might be a powerful bridge between nations, but coordination and consensus can be very difficult to organize within the Virtual Third Chamber’s framework since National Parliaments are fragmented. If there is more confusion in the processes in the European institutions, this cannot help the parliaments’ perception of the legitimacy of the EU and citizens’ trust in the institutions. The Early Warning System might strengthen democracy but at the price of more institutional confusion. Longer negotiations might mean the other two chambers – Council and European Parliament – cannot agree on a piece of legislation (de Ruiter 2013) and this is time-consuming, undermining people’s trust in the EU and its efficiency.

Inadequacy of the Early Warning System. Being ‘not enough’ could be the accuses to the System. National Parliaments might be accused of not being an ‘equal’ European legislative chamber, compared to the Council and the EP. A further Early Warning System’s limitation is that National Parliaments can only disapprove a measure rather than demanding new EU legislation (de Ruiter 2013). Critics argue that the Early Warning System is more passive than active: and, surely, the Early Warning System influences the European final legislative outcomes (de Ruiter 2013). Early Warning Mechanism is one of the tools that can decrease the democratic deficit between European institutions and citizens of individual countries, but it is certainly not enough, although it is an instrument that indirectly promotes control and more democracy in European institutions. Populist and anti-system parties are likely to say that the System is not enough to reduce the democratic deficit – however, these parties will never be satisfied with the institutional solutions proposed at the EU level.

Practical involvement. Some political parties of MPs could have scarce interest in being involved in the Early Warning System procedure. The System empowers National Parliaments, but these are composed of humans: technicalities can be problematic. The capacity to cope with difficult technical information depends on human resources’ capacities and dedication (de Ruiter 2013). Being just theoretically a Virtual Third Chamber, National Parliaments are more involved in EU affairs and this could strengthen the detachment between people and institutions. Many might complain that the national-state is not the only site of authority anymore (Zürn 2012), but something vertical and transnational; (further) detached from people’s needs and possible political participation. With greater involvement of Parliaments, and therefore of citizens indirectly, democracy in the sense of the power of the people in decision-making processes will ultimately benefit.

Reluctancy or inability in using the Early Warning System process. Only three yellow cards – which prevent a violation of the subsidiarity principle – were issued by the National Parliaments. The first in 2012 (Monti II Regulation), the second in 2013 (European Public Prosecutor’s Office) (Pintz 2015), and the last one in 2016 (Workers’ Directive). This clearly shows that ‘National Parliaments are not only prepared to make use of their new rights but also co-ordinate across national borders’ (Auel and Neuhold 2016, 1552–1555). Despite many complaints about the democratic deficit within European institutions, National Parliaments have not often activated the Early Warning System in these last years. The cure for populistic Euroscepticism could pass through the System, but National Parliaments must use it. Otherwise, it will not make much sense to implement its use on a larger scale, and this might damage the premises the System itself was born from. Three Yellow Cards are not enough to lower the democratic deficit and the perception of the democratic deficit in the European population. Citizens need to know that the Virtual Third Chamber works. Thus, to increase the perception of democracy, the ray of action and activity of the Early Warning System must also be implemented.

‘More Democracy’: Early Warning System ‘pros

Through the Early Warning System, National Parliaments are new partial and indirect legislators at the European level, with more possibility to prevent possible breaches of the subsidiarity principle and influence legislation. As they represent the people’s will and expression, more influencing parliament at the European level will enhance people’s voice at the European level. With the System, parliaments have new roles and tasks to accomplish and have to get used to new procedures. Under Lisbon Treaty, the System ensures the new roles and functions on the European level, strengthening National Parliaments’ – thus people’s – power. If the subsidiarity principle is closely scrutinized, the benefit will be a reduction in the democratic deficit and the empowerment of parliaments as active decision-makers in the European public space.

The Early Warning System is a legislative tool to be brought up as an argument vis-à-vis Eurosceptic accusations (especially right-wing populists that favor sovereignty instead of democracy), as the European integration and the cooperation between states is strengthened (via the Virtual Third Chamber) and the distance between Brussels and citizens is theoretically shortened. The System strengthened the democratic process. The representatives of the citizens can play a major role in European affairs also proposing to modify legislative drafts. The Early Warning System elevates public participation in European affairs because elevates the National Parliaments. If the people count more in the calculations of the institutions in Brussels, then more decision-making power is automatically returned to the people and the democratic deficit is reduced.

Though in a limited way, within the Early Warning System-framework National Parliaments are playing at the European level, and therefore they can get every advantage that comes with it. National Parliaments might also strengthen the European identity, which might be exposed as a positive outcome for tackling Eurosceptic and anti-institutional populist claims. National Parliaments’ intervention in important European issues might be strengthened via the System and the ‘red’ and ‘green’ cards mechanism. The former encompasses that the ‘opinions representing more than 55 percent of National Parliaments’ votes will be ‘comprehensively discussed’ in the Council’ (Auel and Neuhold 2016, 1555), while the latter is that National Parliaments can ‘propose new legislative or non-legislative initiatives, or amendments to existing legislation’ (Auel and Neuhold 2016). A more active, responsive and constructive legislation procedure that entails the National Parliaments strengthens and legitimizes the democratic nature of both the legislative and representative system.

The Early Warning System is a link between the European institutions, but also an alarm device vis-à-vis the European Commission, which ‘as a rational actor, takes these signals into account when deciding to proceed with the legislative process or to withdraw the proposal altogether’ (van Gruisen and Huysmans 2020a). The Commission ‘is more likely to withdraw when the costs of policy adoption are high […], and the proposal is not very salient’ (van Gruisen and Huysmans 2020a). The system has not just a warning function, but also an informational value (van Gruisen and Huysmans 2020b). Informational values strengthen the processes’ transparency, thus contributes to the strengthening the trust in the European institutions and decrease the democratic deficit perception. The System ‘may provide an important signal to a variety of actors about bargaining difficulties that will arise later during negotiations in the Council’ (van Gruisen and Huysmans 2020a).

The Virtual Third Chamber resulting from the scrutinizing activity under the Early Warning System enhances the cohesion between the EU and the Member States, particularly, through the legislative assemblies, creating a general feeling of European ‘we-ness’. ‘Green’ and ‘red’ cards acknowledge the role of the National Parliaments as players (Auel and Neuhold 2016). The fact that governments must ‘reach a quorum’ to get their voice heard, is positive in the sense that they must strengthen their cooperation and coordination within the Early Warning System framework. Strengthening the institutions and the system of checks and balances both at the European and the Member States’ level helps to enhance and to legitimize democracy.

Early Warning System is a legislative value-added tool in the sense that National Parliaments can get more independence from the government. With the opportunity to watch over the legislative procedures from a ‘Virtual Third Chamber view’, the System empowers National Parliaments, thus the citizenship. Indeed, the Virtual Third Chamber provides both a national-domestic insight (Cooper 2012) of the problems and at the same time has a European overview, as it is a cross-European supranational and transnational chamber. The use of the Early Warning System has ‘positive effects on EU scrutiny and increases parliamentary attention and resources devoted to EU issues’ (Auel and Neuhold 2016, 1557). Increasing National Parliaments’ attention on European issues could be a good start for a decrease of populistic Euroscepticism and democratic deficit. The System shortens on paper the distance between the European top institutions and the citizenships via the involvement of the National Parliament in the Communitarian legislative procedure. Providing greater insight through instruments that strengthen interinstitutional transparency and a natural benefit of democracy. And so is strengthening the role of Parliament, which is the expression of the will of the people.

Conclusions

A Eurobarometer November 2021 survey showed that there have been important steps in terms of Europe appeal vis-à-vis important segments of the population (European Union 2021).

Independence of judges and the right to a fair trial (82% for both) are the EU values most highly supported by Europeans, followed by the freedom of thought, expression, and religion (81%), according to the results of this special Eurobarometer survey. At the personal level, taking care of those who are close to them (77%) and overseeing decisions about their life (78%) are the two most important personal values for EU citizens.

In 2019, before the last European parliament’s election, a survey showed that 68% of respondents in the EU believed that their countries benefited from being part of the Union (European Parliament 2019). Another survey by Kantar Public showed that ‘48 percent of EU citizens surveyed agree their voice counts in the EU, while 46 percent disagree […]. 67 percent believe their country has benefited from EU membership […] and 60 percent say being part of the bloc remains a good thing […]. In 2011, at the height of the EU’s financial and economic crises, just 47 percent said EU membership was a good thing’ (Heath 2018). Things are improving, but slowly. There is affection for the EU and the democratic deficit is just one of the many concerns affecting it.

Overall people seem to appreciate being part of the Union. An improvement of the European good image via new tools and instruments might help to correct this gap. However, no matter what instrument the EU will adopt to increase transparency or decrease the democratic deficit, there will be always some parties (such as UKIP in the UK, or Rassemblement National in France, or Lega in Italy) that will simply affirm that ‘this is not enough’ and will not be persuaded by new tools or reforms to increase the EU’s popularity. Things are complex and populist parties discredit and simplify important matters, accusing them of democratic deficit or depicting the EU as a stepmother. Euroscepticism is a challenge for the EU: despite some shortcomings, the Early Warning System might represent a significant step for tackling populistic accuses of the democratic deficit in the EU. Through the System, the Treaty of Lisbon strengthened the National Parliaments’ role (Fromage and Kreilinger 2017). By elevating National Parliaments (expression of people’s will), citizens can be automatic, though indirectly enhanced. The Parliaments can better check the legislative process of the EU and if they work well and use the instrument (the System) they will be successful in avoiding breaches of the principle of subsidiarity while assuring more contact between the citizens and the EU.

With the System ‘for the first time, National Parliaments have the collective power to intervene directly in the legislative process at the EU level’ (Cooper 2012, 447). And this should not be taken for granted. With the Early Warning System, National Parliaments can establish a new political dialogue both with the EU and the citizens at the same time, formally reducing the democratic deficit concerns. Making the National Parliaments a Virtual Third Chamber, the Early Warning System reduces the distances between people and EU, and it helps to feed the concept of sovereignty and the need for citizens to count more in the EU’s decision making. According to many populists, tools like the Early Warning System are neither sufficient nor enough to tackle the European democratic deficit. For them, no system or mechanism will ever shape a new or better EU. On the other hand, Early Warning System-like tools need to be enhanced to tear down the populistic Eurosceptic rhetoric message over the democratic deficit. The establishment of a physical Virtual Third Chamber is unlikely, but it would be desirable that something in this direction is done by the institutions in Brussels. The sources of legitimization and dissatisfaction with the EU are difficult to address and provide concrete answers to, but the Chamber goes in the right direction. A Virtual Third Chamber or an Early Warning System is not enough to give concrete answers to the concerns expressed by the populist parties, but this response from the Brussels institutions is to be considered a good start.

On the other hand, there is no need for other institutions, bodies, agencies, or programs that would add even more weight to the heavy skein of European institutions. One of the criticisms is that the EU is too bureaucratic. The answer could not be through the establishment of a new institutional body, which would be perceived as yet another bureaucratic apparatus. As for the future, National Parliaments should learn to coordinate and use the opportunities offered by the Early Warning System. More yellow cards might be issued over time. National Parliaments ‘as rational actors are expected to make active use of the mechanism and perceive the possibility of triggering a yellow card as a collective good’ (Pintz 2015). The Early Warning System ‘in its current form may actually increase the efficiency of the legislative process’ (van Gruisen and Huysmans 2020a) and it has the objective to increase the EU’s legitimacy, strengthening the role of the National Parliament (van Gruisen and Huysmans 2020a). The System rows towards a ‘more EU’ direction and integration, a decrease of democratic deficit, and enhancement of the National Parliaments’ role at a new European level, while checking subsidiarity principle and the Commission legislative outputs, binding indirectly citizens with the legislative chambers, strengthening the decisions, trust, choices of the community. And the community’s choices are the choices that cascade over ‘the people’.

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Amedeo Gasparini

Amedeo Gasparini, class 1997, freelance journalist, managing ‘Blackstar’, amedeogasparini.com. MA in ‘International Relations’ (Univerzita Karlova, Prague – Czech Republic); BSc in ‘Science of Communication’ (Università della Svizzera Italiana, Lugano – Switzerland); [email protected]