ETSI’s legitimacy as an ESO in times of crisis: commentary on Volpato and Eliantonio, Temple and De Vries

Abstract

This commentary reflects on the contributions by Volpato and Eliantonio, Temple and De Vries, which focus on the important question of the legitimacy of ETSI’s governance. The authors discuss different concepts of legitimacy, confirming its multifaceted character. The commentary sheds light on their relevance to discussions about ETSI's responses and adaptations to the European Union’s demands and expectations set out in the European Union Standardization Strategy. This commentary contributes to this discussion by offering a dynamic account of legitimacy and illuminates how legitimacy demands and dynamics manifest in decision-making processes within ETSI. ETSI only to a certain degree has ceased the opportunity presented by the Standardization Strategy to increase its legitimacy by enhancing its responsiveness to societal stakeholders. Questions are raised for further research about ETSI’s autonomy, the consequences of current and ongoing decision-making for ETSI’s legitimacy, as perceived by the European Commission and other stakeholders, and ETSI’s relative influence and authority in the wider standardization field. It is argued that ETSI's upholding of European values, including respect for human rights, should be a measure of ETSI's legitimacy and rulemaking influence as a European standardization organization within Europe, and globally.

Keywords:

• ETSI
• European Standardization Strategy
• legitimacy
• governance
• organizational resilience
• crisis

1. Introduction

The contributions by Volpato and Eliantonio, Temple and De Vries focus on the question of ETSI’s legitimacy. This is an important discussion, as the demands and criticism by the European Commission directed at ETSI as expressed in the European Union (EU) Standardization Strategy arise in part out of legitimacy concerns. This is apparent from the section of this strategy titled ‘Upholding the integrity, inclusiveness and accessibility of the European standardization system – putting good governance principles in place’ (European Commission 2022). Legitimacy issues surface also in other parts of this strategy, relating to free access to standards and technical expertise (European Commission 2022, 2–4). The three articles provide different perspectives on the legitimacy of ETSI’s governance. In doing so, they provide valuable contributions to debates in academic literature about the legitimacy of European technical standardization.

This commentary aims to contribute to this discussion by offering a dynamic account of legitimacy, which is sociological and empirical in its orientation (Schleifer 2018). More specifically, it reflects on this concept of legitimacy and ETSI's experiencing of a 'legitimacy crisis'. Also, it sheds light on how legitimacy demands and dynamics manifest in (ongoing) decision-making processes within ETSI. These processes are political and shaped by actors or groups with different interests and visions/perceptions about the (legitimacy) problem and existing solutions. This is illustrated by some of the contestations behind ETSI’s reform of its voting rules. The analysis is based on two interviews with the ETSI 3SI Advocate and a representative of ETSI.

This commentary also raises questions for future research about ETSI’s autonomy in European standization, the consequences of decision-making outcomes for ETSI’s (perceived) legitimacy, from the viewpoint of the European Commission and other stakeholders, and ETSI’s relative influence and authority as a European standardization organization (ESO) within Europe, and globally.

2. Legitimacy, a multifaceted concept

As explained in De Vries' contribution (2024), legitimacy is a concept in academic literature that has been given many different meanings, also in relation to standardization (also see, Kanevskaia 2023; Kanevskaia, Delimatsis, and Bijlmakers 2024). Moreover, the legitimacy of an organization may be assessed normatively as meeting certain normative qualities that justify its claim to authority (normative legitimacy) or empirically as its authority being accepted by those who are concerned (social legitimacy). The contributions by Volpato and Eliantonio, De Vries and Temple reaffirm this multifaceted character of the concept legitimacy. The authors adhere to normative concepts of legitimacy but define and assess ETSI’s legitimacy differently. ETSI’s performance is assessed by different legitimacy standards and along different legitimacy objectives/ideals, each of which are associated with different recommended changes.

Volpato and Eliantonio (2024) focus on ETSI’s through-put legitimacy. This concept of legitimacy relates to discussions on 'inclusiveness' in ETSI’s processes. The authors emphasize the need for an open and inclusive standard-setting process that ensures the balance in access and influence by all stakeholders, including societal stakeholders. According to the authors, such a standard setting process can enhance the legitimacy of ETSI by delivering standards that reflect the needs of society at large and the values it seeks to protect. Whilst the authors choose to analyze and assess ETSI’s throughput legitimacy, they also acknowledge the relevance of input and output legitimacy.

For Temple (2024), legitimacy is about ‘openness’ of the process, meaning the smallest company has the same right to be heard in making a new standard as the largest global company, and whether ETSI’s standards are accepted and succeed in the market. Whilst discussions about process legitimacy are relevant, according to the author, the focus in these discussions should be on the 'accessibility' of the standard setting process. This process may contribute to the legitimacy of standards by giving all those affected actors in the ICT ecosystem access to their development. If a standard is to be accepted in the market, these actors must agree to it. According to Temple, this concept was held by the founders at the time of ETSI’s creation and should guide current decision-making as well.

According to De Vries (2024), ETSI standards take on legitimacy ex post their development when accepted in public law. The EU seeks a response to its concerns of unwanted foreign (mainly) Chinese and US influence over ETSI standards in key areas. The author proposes that public regulators make their approval of standards for public use conditional upon these standards meeting certain value driven criteria. De Vries’ concept of legitimacy focuses less on ETSI’s processes (input legitimacy) and more on European governments’ preference for accepting standards for use that meet these criteria (output legitimacy).

This commentary reflects on the relevance of these different normative concepts of legitimacy to discussions about ETSI's responses and adaptations to the EU's demands and expectations set out in the EU Standardization Strategy. In doing so, it relies on a dynamic and empirical concept of ETSI’s legitimacy. The next section reflects on the concept ‘legitimacy’ and ETSI’s ‘legitimacy crisis’.

3. ETSI’s legitimacy ‘crisis’

The concept of legitimacy from a sociological perspective, and used for the purpose of this commentary, is understood as ETSI being ‘perceived as having a right to govern both by those it seeks to govern and those on behalf of whom it purports to govern’ (Black 2008). ETSI seeks legitimacy for its authority to be recognized and accepted in a regulatory and governance context. From this perspective, ETSI depends for its legitimacy on its credibility within, and acceptance by, so-called legitimacy stakeholders in its environment (Black 2008). ETSI has many stakeholders. Those of most immediate concern for this commentary are ETSI’s membership and the European Commission. Whilst the European Commission represents the public interest, ETSI’s membership represents the interests of EU industry and other private stakeholders (ETSI 2023e, article 6.1; Volpato and Eliantonio 2024).

The European Commission, its membership and other actors not only impose (varying) legitimacy claims on ETSI, but also construct and contest the legitimacy of one another (Black 2008, 149). These demands and dynamics are not constant but change over time, and may be triggered especially by high-impact (‘crisis’) events when the ability of the organization to pursue its goals is threatened, and its legitimacy is implicated. Legitimacy evaluations of ETSI by individual stakeholders may be based or cognitive, pragmatic of moral considerations (Suchman 1995).

ETSI serves a dual purpose of developing European standards in support of public policy objectives, and standards that fulfill the needs of EU industry (Baron and Larouche 2023, 21). The European Commission’s perceptions and demands of ETSI are mainly concerned with ETSI’s development of harmonized standards that are intended for regulatory use. These harmonized standards raise and affect ‘public’ concerns and by way of formal reference in EU law, and after their publication in the Official Journal of the EU, can take on ‘public’ legal effects. Industry may not be beholden to the EU’s expectation and demands of these harmonized standards. For instance, recent concerns by industry relate to how demands by the European Commission and HAS consultants judging to what degree harmonized standards comply with essential requirements in EU legislation, may cause delays and additional costs for companies, and may damage the quality of standards, thereby also risking ETSI’s reputation (ETSI 2022).

Currently, legitimacy demands and dynamics are driven in part by external geo-political forces and public actors seeking to influence stakeholders and the global standardization system (Baron and Larouche 2023, 63). The EU standardization strategy was adopted in response to concerns about growing Chinese influence in the development of technology standards in strategic sectors and their use of standards to control economic activity. Standards have taken on strategic relevance. The European Commission seeks to secure a leading position for Europe in the development of standards in strategic areas on which the EU relies for the realization of its ambitions of a climate neutral, resilient and circular economy. The tensions between the EU Commission and ETSI arise out of the former’s concern about ETSI’s weighted voting system allowing non-European industry interests to exercise undue influence over its development of harmonized standards, and stakeholders not having an equal say. There is a clear demand from the European Commission for good governance and administrative principles to be in place, and for ETSI to undergo reform to ‘modernize’ its standardization system to ensure the public and societal interests are fully represented.

The challenges facing ETSI arise out of legitimacy concerns by the European Commission about ETSI as an ESO. According to EU Regulation 1025/2012, ETSI and the other ESOs must adhere to certain ‘governance principles’ (see articles 3–7 of this Regulation). ETSI claiming that it complies with these principles can be considered a normative legitimation strategy. It signals trust to the EU Commission that it can develop standards in the ‘public’ interest in conjunction with its ‘private’ interests (Partiti 2019, 421). Currently, as expressed through its criticism of ETSI in the EU Standardization Strategy, the European Commission’s expectation of ETSI’s implementation of these principles is not being met. According to the European Commission, these principles need to be in place when acting upon standardization requests. ETSI is under pressure to adjust to the demands of the European Commission to meet this ‘responsibility’ that comes with ETSI’s special legal status.

Current legitimacy discussions and the EU Standardization Strategy have implicated ETSI, to a degree that it may be considered in a state of ‘crisis’. ETSI is under pressure to respond and adapt to the European Commission’s requests to not jeopardize its existence as an ESO. ETSI, in pursuit of its legitimacy, must act to justify its legitimacy and authority to set European harmonized standards. In doing so, it must signal its trustworthiness to the public regulator, while responding to legitimacy claims from within the organization, to maintain and expand its standard setting authority and influence in this domain.

The question arises what strategies ETSI employs and how the decisions about these strategies are made. The decision-making process within ETSI is political and shaped by the heterogeneous interests, demands and visions/perceptions of different actors. How legitimacy manifests within these discussions can inform priorities from which strategies are developed, and thus affect the outcome. Also, of relevance is how ETSI’s strategies are legitimated and contested in ways that shape perceptions of ETSI and its legitimacy, by the EU, ETSI and its stakeholders (Delimatsis and Verghese 2024).

4. How legitimacy manifests in current debates within ETSI

Legitimacy within ETSI has manifested mainly in discussions about decision-making by national standardization organizations (NSOs) for matters related to EU policy and improving the inclusiveness within the ESOs, facilitating the voice of societal stakeholders and SMEs to be heard (ETSI 2023d). The issues being discussed are interrelated; rules for the adoption of standards tip the balance of voting power in favor of non-European industry interests at the detriment of civil society stakeholders that do not have an equal say within ETSI. This raises concerns about how ETSI’s development of EU harmonized standards will affect EU public values and interests.

This section will focus on an important discussion within ETSI about increasing the influence of Annex III organizations within ETSI’s processes. Volpato and Eliantonio’s contribution is especially of relevance to this discussion. This section focuses on their findings about ETSI’s throughput legitimacy, and the factual and practical limitations of Annex III organizations. ETSI’s reform of its voting rules will be addressed in the next section, which sheds some light on the dynamics and contestations behind ETSI’s changes to its internal rules in relation to Regulation 2022/2480. That section will illuminate some legitimacy considerations that informed the choice of ETSI over the enactment of these reforms.

4.1. The influence of Annex III organizations within ETSI: legitimacy strategies

As outlined by Volpato and Eliantonio, legitimacy as throughput legitimacy raises the question of whether the design of the process ensures effective participative possibilities for societal stakeholders. Societal stakeholder participation in EU decision-making processes is ‘not only an element of the legitimacy debate, but also a requirement in positive law’. The authors find that ETSI’s direct participation model may be a source of normative legitimacy for the organization; however, Annex III organizations’ limited actual influence in the final decision, and its (constructive) throughput legitimacy, have impacted the overall legitimacy of ETSI, since ‘limited throughput legitimacy undermines public perceptions on legality of the system, regardless of how extensive the input or effective the output’ (Volpato and Eliantonio 2024).

Volpato and Eliantonio find that despite having full membership status and corresponding formal rights to participate, Annex III organizations are restrained for practical reasons related to limited resources and expertise in effectively participating in ETSI’s technical standard setting work. ETSI has granted these organizations additional information and participation guarantees. Yet, these have not lifted these ‘practical and factual’ restraints. According to the authors, in fact, ETSI’s creation of the 3SI Programme and the 3SI Advocate for societal and SME interests may be viewed as a normative legitimation strategy used by ETSI to fend off criticism and contestation about its limited engagement with stakeholders. These measures seem to have had limited effect, as the position of Annex III organizations within ETSI has not improved because of these measures.

ETSI has worked on actions to facilitate the voice of Annex III organizations in ETSI’s governance. An important action was the creation of the subgroup INCLU at the end of 2022, which presented concrete proposals for the implementation of inclusiveness topics within ETSI (ETSI 2023a). A proposal by this group was for the ETSI 3SI Advocate to have a seat at the board, ex officio, without a vote. The ETSI 3SI having such membership in the board would give representation to Annex III organizations at the highest level. It would also ‘ensure ongoing expertise in the Board on societal stakeholder domains’ (ETSI 2023d). This proposal for a revision of ETSI Rules and Procedures was accepted by the ETSI General Assembly in June 2023 (ETSI 2023b, Annex 7, 2). According to the 3SI Advocate, who was interviewed for this commentary, ‘ETSI is trying to make sure that their institutions are as representative as possible’.

Another proposal by the subgroup INCLU was for representatives of all the categories (civil society stakeholders and SMEs) to have a seat at the board. Several reserved seats on the Board may be allocated to specific membership categories or types to ensure their representation (e.g. for users and SMEs). As noted by Volpato and Eliantonio, Annex III organizations or societal stakeholders are not singled out from other users in this regard, and reserved seats might be filled by other members from this user category. INCLU’s proposal was that in case not selected as nominees for a board position through the regular process, representatives from all categories would be added to the list. According to the 3SI Advocate, it was unlikely that Annex III organizations would find the resources to participate in the board however, while the ETSI 3SI Advocate would become an ex officio member anyway. At the time of writing, the ETSI Rules and Procedures (version December 2023) remain unchanged on this point.

4.2. ETSI’s reform of its voting rules: legitimacy dynamics and contestation

To strengthen the integrity of the EU standardization system, the EU adopted an amendment of the Standardization Regulation on December 14th (as Regulation (EU) 2022/2480), to ensure that key decisions in standard setting are taken by the national standard setting bodies from the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA). ETSI has a legal obligation to ensure that its internal procedures are in conformity with this amendment. ETSI adopted changes to its Directives during its General Assembly (GA) meeting in June 2023. As part of this reform, and as outlined by Volpato and Eliantonio, a new procedure was created in the elaboration of European standards in response to the European Commission's request, the Standardisation Request Deliverable Approval Process (ETSI 2023b, Art. 21).

The choice on the preferred changes to ETSI’s Rules of Procedure to adapt to Regulation (EU) 2022/2480 was open for discussion and contestation within ETSI’s membership. According to a representative of ETSI interviewed for this commentary, it is complicated for ETSI to change its Directives because ‘directors are approved by our members’ and getting 900 people to agree with each other is ‘quite a task’. ‘People have their agenda, whether it be the administrations acting, whether it be the manufacturers, whether it be service providers or the public institutions, everybody will have their own vision, their own personal preferences’. ETSI in its decision-making on these reforms has been mainly responsive to the demands by the European Commission, and other organizations representing the ‘public’ interest (Annex III organizations). According to the interviewee, ETSI needs to align with the changes that are imposed on it when it comes to this so-called second domain, in which ‘the sector provides the support and does not decide’.

ETSI’s interaction with the EU in the months leading up to the GA meeting in June 2023 can be considered as cooperative. In April 2023, ETSI solicited the European Commission’s feedback on the proposed changes. In response, the EU provided comments and recommendations, and drafting suggestions. The EU aimed to ‘ease and accelerate’ ETSI’s work in meeting the forthcoming compliance deadline, without prejudicing further comments from any other ETSI member or stakeholder, e.g. the NSOs. The ETSI board decided on 6-7 June 2023 to create a sub-group to analyze the European Commission’s comments and recommendations. ETSI indicated that these comments and suggestions ‘merit full and proper discussion’ and that ‘this would best take place in a dedicated sub-group of the Board’ (Cozigou Gwenole, Letter, May 22nd, 2023).

ETSI was experiencing considerable internal pressure from within its membership to change its voting structures, and to do so in a more inclusive way. According the ETSI 3SI Advocate, ‘the public administrations were coming with a push to get the thing over the line’. For these administrations, achieving compliance with the EU legislation before the proposed deadline was important for ETSI to not risk its status as an ESO. For industry, a main concern was ETSI losing out in receiving future standardization requests by the EU Commission. This was after the EU’s perception of ETSI’s make-up had resulted in the Standardization request in the domain of AI being issued to CEN/CENELEC alone. In what may be viewed as a pragmatic legitimacy consideration, industry sought to support the EU’s demands to avoid similar standardization requests being directed away from ETSI in the future (ETSI 2022).

5. How ETSI's strategies impact its legitimacy

The discussions about ETSI's responses and adaptations to the demands and expectations by the EU set out in the EU Standardization Strategy have not ended at the time of writing. The ETSI system seems to be striving towards being as inclusive of societal interests as possible, which is essential to ensure the public oriented quality of the standards being developed. ETSI has only partially ceased the opportunity presented by the EU Standardization Strategy to build its legitimacy as an ESO, however, most notably by giving Annex III organizations a greater voice in its processes. In the next section, another important response is in focus, ETSI's consideration of values. It is too early to determine how the EU and other stakeholders percieve ETSI's strategies and their implications, and their impact on ETSIs (percieved) legitimacy. Such perceptions will be shaped in part by how those strategies are legitimated and contested (Delimatsis and Verghese 2024). The contributions by Volpato and Eliantonio, Temple and De Vries are primarily addressed to academic scholarship, their perspectives may be of practical relevance too. Stakeholders may relate to them in their understanding and assessment of ETSI's legitimacy. Some reflection follows on Volpato and Eliantonio's assessment of ETSI’s responses and performance, and how those actions may measure up to the objectives/legitimacy ideals of Temple and De Vries.

According to Volpato and Eliantonio, ETSI’s reforms by addressing some of the limitations faced by Annex III organizations previously has enhanced ETSI’s legitimacy performance. ETSI’s recognition of a right for these organizations to directly comment during the newly introduced approval process appears to have improved their position, according to Volpato and Eliantonio. There is thus a possibility that because of this mechanism, the perspectives of the Annex III organizations will be given more consideration. Their voting power has not increased because of these reforms, however. Annex III organizations remain excluded from Weighted National Voting, which is used for decisions related to harmonized standards; the final votes in this decision-making are cast by national delegations from CEPT countries. Their influence in the formation of a national position is limited because of various problems with stakeholder involvement at the national level. Volpato and Eliantonio find that for Annex III organizations, ETSI’s reforms most probably will not be sufficient.

For Temple, what matters more for the legitimacy of ETSI standards than who participates and who votes on the EU harmonized standards is that the standard is widely supported. The author holds a different view as to whom ETSI should facilitate access to in the standard development process and how the balance of stakeholder participation ought to be struck. According to Temple, access should be assessed in function of avoiding ‘doom loops’. The access of stakeholders may affect the adoption of a standard in the market. A relevant consideration is that changes in ETSI’s governance may disincentivize influential industry stakeholders from participating in ETSI (ETSI 2022, 34). Temple emphasizes the importance of these industry participants to ETSI for access to essential patents and their industrial strength for lifting a new telecoms network technical standard out of its doom loop.

According to De Vries, the EU’s main concern is that standardization operates based on European values. De Vries shares Temple’s view that changes in ETSI governance may jeopardize the global relevance of ETSI standards (also see, Loyau and Bijlmakers 2024). The acceptance of ETSI standards in the market is no longer self-evident, and disengagement of industry from ETSI may undermine their use and ETSI’s competitiveness in the international ICT standardization system. De Vries argues that a solution may be better sought outside of ETSI, in governments’ acceptance of these standards for use in governmental ICT systems, and this could involve creating a list of criteria for their (legitimate) adoption. According to the author, a legal framework may be adopted for the EU market, preferrable one that follows the New Approach, setting out the requirement that ICT and telecommunication infrastructure should be interoperable while adhering to European values, leaving further details to be filled in by standardization.

6. Questions for future research

More generally, some future research could shed clarity on the autonomy of ETSI, as a private organization, and its discretion to make choices whether and how to act to legitimate its activities in the domain of EU harmonized standards. One dimension is the political independence of ETSI to make such decisions free from the will of the European Commission. Another dimension is ETSI’s institutional independence to take these decisions autonomously without being subject to (legal) constraints imposed by the EU community. A relevant question in this regard is how existing and emerging legal obligations apply to ETSI, also in light of the ECJ’s judgement in James Elliott v. Irish Aspalt and Public.Resource.Org, Inc. and Right to Know CLG v European Commission. A related question for future research is to what degree ETSI is (legally) bound to uphold European values in its processes, as far as its development of European harmonized standards is concerned, and its implications.

In response to the EU’s requirement to adequately consider values in standardization, ETSI has adopted a document outlining its own values (‘the ETSI values’). ETSI claims that ETSI ‘is based on and follows French and EU law and values’. ETSI refers to the Treaty on European Union, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and other agreements of the Council, indicating how these documents constitute its understanding of European values. ETSI also expressly refers to the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) as providing a reference point. ETSI claims that its governance and processes comply with all relevant EU regulation, including the Standardization Regulation (ETSI 2023c). Further research could examine how European values, and the governance principles in the Standardization Regulation, apply to ETSI as a matter of legal obligation.

The UNGPs are recognized as the authoritative, normative framework guiding responsible business conduct globally. According to the UNGPs, companies have a responsibility to respect all recognized human rights, and must undertake human rights due diligence (HRDD) in order to fulfill this responsibility, with the aim to prevent and address adverse impacts on human rights. A requirement of HRDD is that companies meaningfully engage with diverse stakeholders, including potentially affected rightsholders and civil society (OHCHR 2023, 8-9). HRDD is crystalizing into a legal obligation in developments at the national and EU level, with the EU Corporate Sustainability Directive having been adopted in April 2024. ETSI by ensuring that its open and bottom-up standard developing process is responsive to these societal stakeholders, enables the further embedding of human rights within its organization, standards and practises. Arguably, upholding the UNGPs is a relevant consideration that should inform ETSI’s priorities in responding to the EU Commission’s legitimacy demands, and HRDD being a global standard applicable to all companies, also those of influential (non-)European companies in their consideration of ETSI as the preferred forum (ETSI 2022, 34), and their (political) engagement in standard development (WGBHR 2022).

Future research could examine how the strategies employed by ETSI in response to the EU Standardization Strategy affect the EU’s perception of ETSI’s legitimacy and trustworthiness. The degree to which these strategies reflect and protect European values, including respect for human rights, will likely weight in on this assessment. The EU’s acceptance of ETSI’s authority to develop European standards might be reinforced or legitimated after this crisis episode. ETSI’s enactment of strategies may also affect the allocation in legitimacy and influence between the European Commission, ETSI and the other ESOs (see Cantero Gamito 2024). ETSI operates in a transnational space where multiple standard setting bodies vie for influence. ETSI may compete or cooperate with other ESOs to fulfill EU mandates, or with other SDOs for market influence in domains of standardization. ETSI may also compete or cooperate to legitimize its regulatory functions before the EC and other stakeholders. Illustrative is the EU Commission’s expectation that ESOs ensure coherence and alignment in their fulfillment of standardization mandates, which presupposes close collaboration between the ESOs (Kamara 2024, 15).

7. Conclusion

The legitimacy of ETSI is a prerequisite to exist as an ESO and developer of EU harmonized standards in the public interest, and a measure of its influence within this domain. Current legitimacy discussions have implicated ETSI to a degree that it may be considered in a state of ‘crisis’. The articles by Volpato and Eliantonio, Temple and De Vries provide valuable perspectives, illustrating how ETSI’s legitimacy can be understood and assessed in different ways. In doing so, the authors not only make valuable contributions to academic literature. Their perspectives are of practical relevance, where stakeholders may relate to them in their understanding and assessment of ETSIs legitimacy. Volpato and Eliantonio focus on ‘inclusiveness’ and enhancing legitimacy through societal stakeholder participation. Temple argues that the acceptance of standards in the market is essential for their success and (output) legitimacy and how ‘openness’ of standard development to (economic) actors (in the ICT ecosystem) can foster such market acceptance. De Vries draws focus to how ETSI standards acquire legitimacy when being used by States in support of realizing their legislation and policy objectives, and proposes a solution, which involves States basing their selection of standards on criteria related to democratic and European values and interest, as well as green and social principles.

ETSI’s ability to adapt and evolve in response to drivers and requests from the European Commission and internal stakeholders, to ensure its continued relevance as an ESO, is a component of its success. In the domain of EU harmonized standards, ETSI is to a greater degree bound to meet the expectations and demands of the European Commission than is the case for other ETSI deliverables. ETSI needs to legitimize its priorities in decision-making and the ‘crisis management’ strategies developed therefrom. These strategies in turn may be legitimized or contested by the stakeholders affected by them. Future research could examine the autonomy of ETSI, and its discretion to decide whether and how to respond to the EU's demands and expectations. A relevant question is how European values, and the governance principles in the Standardization Regulation, apply to ETSI as a matter of legal obligation. ETSI only to a certain degree has ceased the opportunities presented by the EU Standardization Strategy to increase its (perceived) legitimacy by enhancing its responsiveness to civil society stakeholders. ETSI's upholding of European values, including respect for human rights, should be a measure of ETSI's legitimacy and rulemaking influence as an ESO in european standardization, and globally.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by H2020 European Research Council: [Grant Number ERC-2016- CoG 725798 - REVEAL].