Worth the Bother? Israeli Experience and the Utility of Special Operations Forces

Abstract

Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have re-opened the debate about the strategic utility of special operations forces (SOF). This article follows the debate and identifies the main factors that contribute to the strategic utility of SOF in various types of conflicts. Drawing upon Israeli experiences with special operations it demonstrates that, contrary to the commonly held view that Israeli SOF have significant strategic utility, Israel is has difficulties utilizing its SOF during large-scale military campaigns, despite their impressive utility in discrete operations. The article draws inferences from the Israeli case regarding the tension between the potential for unique strategic utility of SOF and the desire to have special operations complement the general military effort. The article concludes that the geostrategic environment informs the SOF's strategic utility: the operational concept determines expected strategic utility, and the organizational setting shapes the SOF's ability to fulfil their potential utility.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to acknowledge the generous support of the Daphna and Shlomo Gal Foundation and to thank Sarah Geiger, Dov Tamari, Asaf Hazani, and the anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts of this article. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Israeli Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center, the Israeli Defence Forces, or any other government agency.

Notes

Matthew Johnson, ‘The Growing Relevance of Special Operations Forces in US Military Strategy’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2006), pp. 273–96.

Karen DeYoung and Greg Jaffe, ‘US ‘Secret War’ Expands Globally as Special Operations Forces Take Larger Role', Washington Post, 4 June 2010.

Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare (London: Frank Cass, 1998); Ken Connor, Ghost Force: The Secret History of the SAS (London: Cassell, 2004); Viktor Suvorov, Spetsnaz: The Story Behind the Soviet SAS (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987); Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: Berkeley Books, 2005).

Bernd Horn, ‘When Cultures Collide: The Conventional Military/SOF Chasm’, Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 5, Vol. 3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 3–16; Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978); Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding US Special Operations Forces (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 1997).

William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare Theory and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996); Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996); Colin S. Gray, ‘Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When Do Special Operations Succeed?’ Parameters, Vol. 29 (Spring 1999), pp. 2–24.

Gray, Explorations in Strategy (note 5); James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy:x From World War II to the War on Terrorism (London: Rouledge, 2006); David Thomas, ‘The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-82’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1983), pp. 689–717; Alastair Finlan, Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 12.

Bernd Horn, ‘Theoretical Foundation to Understanding Special Operations Forces’, in Bernd Horn and Tony Balasevicius (eds), Casting Light on the Shadows: Canadian Perspectives On Special Operations Forces (Kingston, Ontario: Defence Academy Press, 2007), pp. 20-21.

William Slim, Defeat into Victory (London: The Reprint Society 1957) pp. 529–30. For similar views, see T.B.L. Churchill, ‘The Value of Commandos’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 65, No. 577 (1950), p. 86; John A. English, A Perspective on Infantry (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 54, and more recently, Jonathan Stevenson, ‘ ‘Special’ Forces: A Corps Deployed Too Broadly', The National Interest, (Nov-Dec 2006), pp. 73–8.

Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action (note 3), p. 11, pp. 7–8. Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press: 2006), p. 18.  

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Publication 1, Special Operations in Peace and War (1996)

Terry White, Swords of Lightning:  Special Forces and the Changing Face of Warfare, (London: Brassey's,  1992); James F. Dunnigan, The Perfect Soldier: Special Operations, Commandos, and the Future of US Warfare (New York: Citadel, 2004).

Edward N. Luttwak, Steven L. Canby, and David L. Thomas, A Systematic Review of ‘Commando’ (Special) Operations, 1939-1980 (Potomac, MD: C. and L. Associates 1982); Marquis, Unconventional Warfare (note 4), p. 46; M.R.D. Foot, ‘Special Operations I’, in Michael Elliott-Bateman (ed.), The Fourth Dimension of Warfare, Vol. I: Intelligence, Subversion, Resistance (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1970, p. 19).

Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action (note 3), p. 11.

Maurice Tugwell and David Charters, ‘Special Operations and the Threats to United States Interests in the 1980s’, in Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz (eds), Special Operations in US Strategy (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1984), p. 34.

Strategic utility is ‘the contribution of a particular kind of military activity to the course and outcome of an entire conflict’. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (note 5), p. 163.

Gray, Explorations in Strategy (note 5), p. 174. He also mentions additional functions such as innovation, contribution to morale, showcasing a force's competence, providing reassurance, and humiliating the enemy.

An example can be seen in US Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Department of the Army, 2008) pp. 4–42.

Steven Lambakis, ‘ “Forty Selected Men Can Shake the World”: The Contributions of Special Operations to Victory’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April 1994), pp. 212–13.

Gray, Explorations in Strategy (note 5), p. 174. Finlan, Special Forces (note 6), p. 9.

It should be noted that the Soviet doctrine was different, and assigned the SOF a strategic role in the war plans. John D. Dziak, ‘The Soviet Approach to Special Operations’, in Barnett, Tovar and Shultz, Special Operations in US Strategy (note 14), p. 96–120.

Richard H. Shultz, The Secret War Against Hanoi (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), p. 277.

Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action (note 3), pp. 232–4; Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), pp. 142–4, 180, 369; Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, The Iraq War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 93–4.

Moshe Betser and Robert Rosenberg, Secret Soldier: The True Life Story of Israel's Greatest Commando (New York: New American Library, 1996) p. 112.

Marquis, Unconventional Warfare (note 4); Johnson, ‘The Growing Relevance’ (note 1), pp. 273–96; Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 312.

Additional factors have contributed to elevated expectations of what SOF might do, for example, the number of conflicts in which the occupation of territory is either not possible or not decisive; heightened public and political caution about incurring civilian and military casualties (the ‘post-heroic army’); and the decrease in conventional troops since the end of the Cold War. These and other factors point to increased importance of SOF.

Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, ‘Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Data Set’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 5 (September 2002), pp. 615–37.

Andrew Feickert, US Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005).

Barry R. Posen, ‘The Struggle against Terrorism Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics’, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001–02), pp. 39–55; Lambakis, ‘Forty Selected Men Can Shake the World’ (note 18), pp. 211–21.

Isaac Ben Israel, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Operation in Iraq’, in Shay Feldman and Moshe Grundman (eds), After the War in Iraq: Defining the New Strategic Balance (Brighton and Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press and Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2003), pp. 69–92; Finlan, Special Forces (note 6), pp. 17–19. 

Plentiful literature exists on the RMA and its various definitions. William A. Owens, ‘The Once and Future Revolution in Military Affairs’, Joint Force Quarterly, No. 31 (Summer 2002), pp. 55–61 and Eliot A. Cohen, ‘A Revolution in Warfare’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2 (March/April 1996), pp. 37–54, provide good descriptions of the general concept.

Finlan, Special Forces (note 6), pp. 96–110.

Stephen D. Biddle, ‘Allies, Air Power, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq’, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Winter 2005–06), pp. 161–2.

Richard B. Andres, Craig Wills, and Thomas E. Griffith, ‘Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model’, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Winter 2005–06), pp. 124–60; Finlan, Special Forces (note 6); Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action (note 3), p. 24.

Biddle, ‘Allies, Air Power, and Modern Warfare’ (note 32), pp. 161–76; Stephen D. Biddle, ‘Special Forces and the Future of Warfare: Will SOF Predominate in 2020?’, Discussion Paper for the NIC 2020 Project, 2004; Michael E. O'Hanlon, ‘A Flawed Masterpiece’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May/June 2002), pp. 54–7; Ron Tira, The Limitations of Standoff Firepower-based Operations, Memorandum 97 (Tel Aviv: The Institute for National Security Studies, 2007).

The phrase was brought by Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough in Barnett, Tovar and Shultz, Special Operations in US Strategy (note 14), p. 299.

Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, and Andrew J. Bacevich. Knives, Tanks, and Missiles (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998); Michael J. Eisenstadt, ‘Israel's Approach to Special Operations’, Special Warfare, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January 1994), pp. 22–9.

Avner Shor, Crossing Borders: Sayeret Matkal and its Founder, Avraham Arnan (Tel Aviv: Kinneret Zmora Dvir, 2008) [Hebrew].

Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources (New York: State University of New York Press 2005), p. 116.

Guy Aviad, ‘The Co-Operation between Helicopters and Land Forces in the Six Days War’, in Haggai Golan and Shaul Shay (eds), Nachshonim: 40th Anniversary to the Six Days War (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 2007) [Hebrew], p. 165.

Ibid., p. 156.

Shor, Crossing Borders (note 37).

Dan Schueftan, Attrition: Egypt's Post War Political Strategy 1967-1970 (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1989), pp. 135–6.

Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition 1969-1970: A Case Study of Limited Local War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 85.

Moshe Zonder, Sayeret Matkal (Jerusalem: Keter, 2000) [Hebrew].

Dani Haloutz, Straightforward (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2010) [Hebrew], p. 467.

Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 99–109; Cohen, Knives, Tanks, and Missiles (note 36); Chris C. Demchak, ‘Technology's Knowledge Burden, the RMA and the IDF: Organizing the Hypertext Organization for Future ‘Wars of Disruption’?', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 2001): pp. 82–146; Tira, ‘The Limitations’ (note 34); Avner Yaniv, Politics and Strategy in Israel (Tel Aviv: Poalim Library, 1994) [Hebrew], pp. 389–90.

Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land? A Critical Assessment of Israel's Foreign and National Security Policy, 1949-2004 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005), Chs 6–7; Martin Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2000), pp. 305–6.

Naturally, these two developments influence each other, and the understanding that the nature of warfare has changed has, in turn, influenced the operational doctrine.

Haloutz, Straightforward (note 45), p. 389.

The committee was appointed after the war to investigate and draw lessons from the failings of the campaign. Eliyahu Winograd, The Inquiry Commission to Examine the Events of the Military Campaign in Lebanon 2006 (Tel Aviv: 2008) [Hebrew], pp. 208, 253.

As this article was being written, the event was still under the investigation by a UN investigation committee and an Israeli governmental investigation committee (Turkel Committee); to date, the committees still haven't released their conclusions.

From a tactical perspective, the performance of Unit 13 was mixed. On the one hand, the unit did not have an alternative plan in the event of a more dangerous scenario. On the other hand, the soldiers quickly adapted to the surprising situation and operated at a highly professional level.

See http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2010/Maj-Gen-res_Eiland_presents_conclusions_examination_team_12-Jul-2010.htm; Stephen D. Biddle, ‘Special Forces and the Future of Warfare: Will SOF Predominate in 2020?’, 24 May 2004, http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_2020_Support/2004_05_25_papers/special_forces.pdf, p. 14.

Gray, ‘Handfuls of Heroes’ (note 5), pp. 2–24.

Biddle, ‘Allies, Air Power, and Modern Warfare’ (note 32), pp. 161–76.

Lebanon is 10,452 km2. The size of the Southern Lebanon, the main battle area, is 750 km2, and the Gaza Strip is 360 km2. Iraq is 438,317 km2; Afghanistan 647,500 km2.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, Joint Publication 3-05, 17 December 2003, http://www.dfic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf

United States Department of Defense, Rescue Mission Report (Washington, DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 60.

Marquis, Unconventional Warfare (note 4), p. 72.

This understanding is prominent in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (note 57), which reads, ‘SOF are inherently joint’ (p. II-2).

Marquis, Unconventional Warfare (note 4).

Stephan Sjöberg, The Evolution of the French Special Forces: Experiences from the Past, Adapted for the Future (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency 2004).

Yoaz Hendel, ‘IDF Special Units: Their Purpose and Operational Concept’, Strategic Assessment, Vol. 10, No. 2 (August 2007), pp. 32–3.

Haloutz, Straightforward (note 45), p . 467.

Gal Hirsch, War Story, Love Story (Tel Aviv: Miskal -Yedioth Ahronoth Books & Chemed Books, 2009) [Hebrew], p. 369.

Gray, Explorations in Strategy (note 5), pp. 167–8.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (note 57), chap. 1.

Ibid., p. III-4.

Gregory, E. Fontenot, J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 2005), chap. 7.

Cohen, Knives, Tanks, and Missiles (note 36), p .23; Winograd, The Inquiry Commission (note 50), p. 357.

Haloutz, Straightforward (note 45), p. 467.

Winograd, The Inquiry Commission (note 50), p. 253.

Amir Buhbut, ‘SOF is Needed in all the IDF’, Maariv [Hebrew], 6 April 2007.

Winograd, The Inquiry Commission (note 50), p. 358.