From Arms Control to Denuclearization: Governmentality and the Abolitionist Desire

Abstract

On 5 April 2009, US President Barack Obama spoke in the Czech Republic, and the speech included the following quite extraordinary pledge: ‘So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.’ Obama renewed the commitment the United States had first made formally by ratifying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to work towards nuclear disarmament, and went further to indicate that the means he would use to reach that goal, in the first instance, would be bilateral arms control negotiations. This article explores the relationship between the practice of negotiated, bilateral, nuclear arms control, and the goal Obama has so clearly set of reaching a world without nuclear weapons. It argues that arms control, understood as a social practice, is ill-suited to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament; that while arms control can produce limits and even reductions in nuclear weapons, it works against the overall elimination of arms. It then sets the practice of bilateral nuclear arms control in the context of the governmental rationality, or governmentality, elaborated by Michel Foucault to argue that nuclear arms control is a governmental technology, rooted much deeper than simply a Cold War diplomatic practice. From there, the article shows that the initial products of Obama's pledge, notably the New START Treaty are another instance of this governmental practice, before concluding with some thoughts on the way towards denuclearisation without passing through Cold War arms control.

Notes

Barack Obama, ‘Remarks By President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, 5 April 2009’, Speeches and Remarks, (Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, 2009), at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered

Ibid.

Article VI of the NPT reads: ‘Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.’ ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, entered into force 5 March 1970, at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/NPTEnglish_Text.pdf

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is also generally seen as a vital cog in the wheel of Cold War arms control was the product of a rather different, multilateral practice. For my discussion of the NPT, see David Mutimer, The Weapons State: Proliferation and the Framing of Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp.63–73; and David Mutimer, ‘Testing Times: Of Nuclear Tests, Test Bans and the Framing of Proliferation’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2000), pp.1–22.

For an extended discussion of the development and centrality of these three principles, and their relationship to deterrence and then arms control, see Mutimer, The Weapons State (note 4), pp.29–43.

Emphasis added. See the Preamble of the ‘Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems’, entered into force 3 October 1972, at: http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html

See Article I of the Protocol to the ‘Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems’, entered into force 24 May 1974, at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/abmprot1.htm

President Ronald Reagan, ‘Address to the Nation on National Security By President Ronald Reagan, March 23, 1983’, at: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/rrspch.htm

Ibid.

Alan B. Sherr, ‘Sound Legal Reasoning of Political Expedient? The ‘New Interpretation’ of the ABM Treaty', International Security, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1986), pp.71–93.

‘Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Together With Agreed Statements And Common Understandings Regarding The Treaty’ (SALT II), signed 18 June 1979, at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/salt2/text/salt2-2.htm

See the Preamble to the ‘Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms’ (START I), signed 31 July 1991, at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start1/text/start1.htm

‘Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms’, signed 3 January 1993, at: http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start2/strt2txt.html

‘Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link’, 20 June 1963, at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/hotline/text/hotline1.htm

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, US Department of State, ‘Narrative: Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link’, at: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4785.htm

As one of the most cited scholars of US nuclear strategy in the Cold War, Colin Gray, put it: ‘Most commentators, and certainly the government of the United States (and NATO), acknowledge the value in the twin concepts of arms race stability and crisis stability.’ Colin S. Gray, ‘Strategic Stability Reconsidered’, Daedalus: US Defense Policy for the 1980s, Vol. 109, No. 4 (1980), p.135.

The online text provided by the US State Department of the SALT II agreement – http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt2-2.html – includes the agreed statements and common understandings with the treaty text to which they refer. Most of the substantive articles of the Treaty have at least one such statement or understanding, and in a number of cases each paragraph in an article is accompanied by a series of statements and understandings. The most extensive set of statements and understandings accompanies Article II, defining the categories of weapons to be controlled. By way of example, the following is Article II, paragraph 7, which defines heavy ICBMs:

7. Heavy ICBMs are ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty. First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch. Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of: a. its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles; b. any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and c. its penetration aids, including devices for their release. Common Understanding. The term ‘other appropriate devices,’ as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 7 of Article II of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second.

For a recent account of the place of verification in the history of arms control, see Richard Dean Burns, The Evolution of Arms Control: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2009), pp.162–81.

These ideas were developed in three sets of lectures, which have recently been published in English: Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975–76 (London: Allen Lane / Penguin, 2003); Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977–78 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); and, Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978–79 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (note 19), p.363. The summaries of the course were published annually by the College. In Foucault's case he tended to write them in June, having delivered the course itself from January through March. They are, therefore, a reflection on the key themes that emerged from the course as it was delivered, rather than a prospective statement of intent.

There is a growing literature which is developing Foucault's ideas on security in the contemporary context. See, for example, Michael Dillon and Andrew Neal (eds), Foucault on Politics, Security and War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); and Elizabeth Dauphinee, and Cristina Masters (eds), The Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (note 19), p.19.

Ulrich Beck has, of course, developed this theme extensively; most notably in his Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992 [1986]).

Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (note 19), p.20.

Airport security measures are the most evident example of the War on Terror's attempt to mask the impossibility of the elimination of risk. Each new ‘threat’, however minor or ridiculous, is met with a thundering response from security state. Someone attempts to wreak havoc with explosive undies, and we now face a virtual strip search, and the prospect of someone ‘touching our junk’ before we fly. No level of risk is deemed acceptable. More broadly, the practices of preemption and prevention seek to eliminate all sources of danger before they can become actual dangers.

Faucault, Security, Territory, Population (note 19), p.19.

Ibid., pp.237–308.

Ibid., p.313.

Ibid., p.315.

See John Ibbitson, ‘Placating Tory base on the census causes Harper government grief’, The Globe and Mail, 19 July 2010, p.A1.

The White House, ‘Joint Understanding’, Office of the Press Secretary, 8 July 2010, at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/The-Joint-Understanding-for-The-Start-Follow-On-Treaty; and New START Treaty ‘Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms’, signed 8 April 2010, at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf

New START (note 31), Preamble.

Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation, US Department of State, ‘Statement of the Russian Federation Concerning Missile Defense’, at: http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/140187.htm

Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation, US Department of State, ‘Statement of the United States of America Concerning Missile Defense’, at: http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/140184.htm

New START (note 31), Preamble.

Ibid., Article II.

Obama, ‘Remarks’ (note 1).

United States Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: DOD, April 2010), p.15.

Daryl G. Kimball, ‘Obama's Nuclear Doctrine Could Boost Reset’, Moscow Times Online, 13 April 2010, at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/obamas-nuclear-doctrine-could-boost-reset/403798.html

Department of Defense, New Posture Review (note 38), p.15.

NATO, ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’, adopted by the Heads of State and Government, Lisbon, 20 November 2010, at: http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf

North Atlantic Council, ‘The Alliance's Strategic Concept: Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C.’, 24 April 1999, para.46, at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm

NATO, Active Engagement (note 41), §7.

Ibid., §10.

Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (note 18), p.19.

I have written elsewhere of the political consequences of ‘proliferation control’, see Mutimer, The Weapons State (note 4).