Pakistan's Nuclear First-Use Doctrine: Obsessions and Obstacles

Abstract

A close look at the literature on Pakistan's nuclear weapons doctrine reveals the ambiguity in Pakistan's nuclear-use options. Pakistani officials and commentators leave open the possibility that Pakistan would use its nuclear weapon first, but it is not clear when, where, or how it would. Others conclude that Islamabad would use its nuclear weapon only as a last resort, but that condition too remains vague. This article examines the puzzle of Pakistan's nuclear weapons use, demonstrating that ambiguity plays a central role in Pakistan's nuclear weapons policy, much as nuclear ambiguity exists in each nuclear weapons state's policy. This article departs from previous research and commentary on Pakistan's nuclear doctrine by introducing the thesis that Pakistan's nuclear ambiguity is real, but far from internationally unique. Pakistan, like the USA at the onset of the nuclear era, relies on nuclear weapons for survival. The development of Pakistan's forces, including tactical nuclear weapons, suggests an emphasis on counterforce targeting. The role of domestic political processes, the civil–military dilemma and its impact on strategic policy in Pakistan, have received considerable attention, but still require untangling. Progress towards no first use probably requires changes to the conventional balance in South Asia, and stronger democratic, civilian rule in Pakistan, free of direct intervention from the army. Finally, global dynamics shaping the salience of nuclear weapons globally cannot be disregarded in any assessment of South Asian and Pakistani dynamics.

Notes

1. Lawrence Freedman, ‘I Exist; Therefore I Deter’, International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1988), pp. 177–95.

2. Rajesh Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009) and Zafar Khan, Pakistan's Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence (London: Routledge, 2014).

3. Viping Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).

4. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

5. Devin Hagerty, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis’, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1996), p. 102.

6. ‘Statement by Nawaz Sharif, May 28 1998’, Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 26 (May 1998).

7. ‘India Asks Pakistan to Accept “No-First Use Pact”’, The Independent (Dhaka), 9 July 1998.

8. Khan, Pakistan's Nuclear Policy (note 2), pp. 88–112.

9. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report 2010 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010).

10. McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, ‘Nuclear Weapons and Atlantic Alliance’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 753–68. For a rebuttal, see Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes and Frans J. Schulze, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A Response to an American Proposal for Renouncing the First Use of Nuclear Weapons’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 5 (1980), pp. 1157–70. Also useful on first use and no first use are Josef Joffe, ‘Nuclear Weapons, No First Use, and European Order’, Ethics, Vol. 95, No. 3 (1985), pp. 606–618; Joseph Rotblat, Nobel Lecture: Remember Your Humanity (Stockholm: Nobel Foundation, 10 December 1995); Robert S. McNamara, ‘The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 1 (1983), pp. 59–80; John Mearsheimer, ‘Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe’, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1984/1985), pp. 19–46; Michael S. Gerson, ‘No First Use: The Next Step for US Nuclear Policy’, International Security, Vol. 35, No. (2010), pp. 7–47; and Stanley Kober, David C. Jones, Easl C. Ravenal, Carl N. Anderson and Donald L. Hafner, ‘The Debate over No First Use’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 5 (1982), pp. 1171–80.

11. Qadar Bakhsh Baloch, ‘Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: The Transformation of Indo-Pak Equation’, Defence Journal (2008), p. 30. Also, see ‘Assessing Pakistan's Nuclear First Use Option’, Defence Journal (September 2004), pp. 12–15. The anonymous analyst stated that,

Pakistan suffers from some very serious strategic imbalances relative to India which could lead to Pakistan reaching her nuclear threshold in a time frame much earlier (first use) than India; firstly, her limited territorial and geographical depth and secondly, her tremendous conventional inferiority.

12. Rodney W. Jones, ‘Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Quest for Assured Nuclear Deterrence – a Conjecture’, Spotlight, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (2000), pp. 1–41.

13. Xue Litai, ‘Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy’, in John Hopkins and Wixing He (eds), Strategic View from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain and China (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995) pp. 167–192; Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘China's New Old Thinking’, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 5–42; Alastair Iain Johnston. ‘Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control’, The China Quarterly (June 1996); Jeffrey Lewis, Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2007); and John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).

14. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report 2010 (note 9).

15. Scott D. Sagan and Jane Vaynman, ‘Introduction: Reviewing the Nuclear Posture Review’, Non-Proliferation Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2011), pp. 17–37.

16. Special Issue on ‘Arms, Disarmament & Influence: International Responses to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review’, The Non-Proliferation Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (February 2011).

17. Interview with Feroz Hassan Khan, former Director of Arms Control and Disarmament in Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division (SPD), September 2012.

18. Abdul Sattar, Zulfiqar A. Khan and Agha Shahi, ‘Securing the Nuclear Peace’, The News, 5 October 1999.

19. Author's interview with Abdul Sattar, former Pakistan's Foreign Minister, September 2012.

20. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, ‘Conceptualizing Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Posture’, India Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2005), p. 156.

21. K. Subrahmanyam, ‘Nuclear India in Global Politics’, Strategic Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12 (1998), p. 2016.

22. Vijai Nair, ‘The Structure of an Indian Nuclear Deterrent’, in Amitabh Mattoo (ed.), India's Nuclear Deterrent, Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: Har Anand Publication, 1999), p. 84.

23. Author's interview with the Pakistani strategic analyst who wanted to remain anonymous, September 2012.

24. Author's interview with Maria Sultan, Director General, South Asian Strategic Studies Institute (SASSI), Islamabad, September 2012.

25. Shireen M. Mazari, ‘Understanding Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine’, Strategic Studies, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (2004), p. 3.

26. Tariq M. Ashraf, Aero-Space Power: The Emerging Strategic Dimension (Peshawar: PAF Book Club, 2003), p. 148.

27. Khalid Kidwai, ‘An Interview with the Italian Research Group Landau Network’, in C.P. Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini (eds), Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan (Landau Network: London, 21 January 2002), p. 7.

28. This was confirmed to author during his interview at the SPD, September 2012.

29. Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control System: Dilemmas of Small Nuclear Forces in the Second Atomic Age’, Security Challenges, Vol. 2. No. 2 (July 2006), pp. 127–8.

30. The former Director General Strategic Plans Division, Lt. General (retired) Khalid Kidwai, recently remarked on this particular aspect at the Workshop on ‘Defence, Deterrence & Stability in South Asia’, 4 December 2014, Islamabad.

31. Author's interview with Pakistan's former ambassador Tariq Osman Hyder, Arms Control and Disarmament, Foreign Ministry of Pakistan, September 2012.

32. For useful discussion on thinking for an actual declaration of Pakistani nuclear doctrinal posture, see the video (in Urdu) ‘Thinking Pakistan’ anchored by Dr Moeed Pirzada, Sochta Pakistan (Thinking about Pakistan), 9 December 2011.

33. Cited in Peter R. Lavoy,‘Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine’, in R. Dossani and H.S. Rowen (eds), Prospects for Peace in South Asia (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 283.

34. The terms ‘absolute first use’ and ‘no-early first use’ are borrowed from the key readings with regard to the production of this piece. See, for example, Bundy et al., “Nuclear Weapons and Atlantic Alliance” (note 10) and Gerson, ‘No First Use’ (note 10), pp. 7–47. Also, Khan, Pakistan's Nuclear Policy (note 2), pp. 88–112.

35. See ‘Assessing Pakistan's Nuclear First Use Option’, pp. 12–15.

36. This danger is also viable for the established nuclear weapon states as long as nuclear weapons exist in their military and political discourses. See Mearsheimer, ‘Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe’ (note 10); Gerson, ‘No First Use’ (note 10); and Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Case for No First Use’, Survival, Vol. 51, No. 3 (2009), pp. 175–6.

37. Rizwana Abbasi, Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo: Regional Deterrence and International Arms Control Regime (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2012).

38. Nuclear weapons are not used first to either terminate an already waged war nor have they been used to begin with one at least in South Asian case. Also, in the many military crises during the Cold War time. However, many may say that the USA used nuclear weapons first to terminate an already waged the Second World War when two atomic bombs were dropped in Japanese cities, that is, Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

39. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 21–8 and Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 35–55.

40. Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960) and K. Knorr, ‘Limited Strategic War', in K. Knorr and T. Read (eds), Limited Strategic War: Essays in Nuclear Strategy (New York: Pall Mall Press, 1962), pp. 3–31.

41. Shireen M. Mazari, ‘India's Nuclear Doctrine in Perspective and Pakistan's Option’, The Defence Journal (1999) and Farah Zahra, ‘Pakistan's Road to a Minimum Nuclear Deterrent’, Arms Control Today, July/August 1999, pp. 1–8.

42. U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara defined the level of damage needed as destruction of ‘one-quarter to one-third of the Soviet population and about two-third of Soviet industrial capacity’. See Desmond Ball, ‘The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983’, in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (eds), Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 69.

43. Zafar Khan, ‘Cold Start Doctrine: The Conventional Challenge to South Asian Stability’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2012), pp. 577–94.

44. Chakma, ‘Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine’ (note 29), p. 129.

45. Abhijit Singh stated that,

 … there will be a strong ethical constraint that India would feel while counter-attacking with a high yield strategic weapon, in response to a first Pakistani strike by a low yield TNWs (Tactical Nuclear Weapons) … it would be hard for India's political masters to justify the annihilation of a whole Pakistani city by SNW (Strategic Nuclear Weapons). (‘Pakistan: Testing of Tactical Nuclear Weapons’, India Defence Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2011), pp. 1–4)

46. On neo-culturalism, see Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (Ithaca, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996); Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Post-war Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); and Richard M. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).

47. A Pakistani expert on security studies stated that there is a growing debate on the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons for counterforce targeting to offset its adversary's conventional forces followed by its war fighting doctrinal procedure, such as CSD. 2011 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 28–29 March 2011. On the American posture of counterforce targeting with tactical nuclear weapons, see Desmond Ball, Deja VU: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration (Santa Monica, CA: Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1974) and Desmond Ball, ‘Counterforce Targeting: How New? How Viable?’, Arms Control Today, February 1981.

48. Rifaat Hussein, Pakistan retains its nuclear options open and upgrades its nuclear weapons programme. See 2011 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 28–29 March 2011.

49. Author's interviews with Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Khalid Iqbal, Feroz Hassan Khan, and Rizwana Abbasi, September 2012.

50. Sattar, Khan and Shahi, ‘Securing the Nuclear Peace’ (note 18).

51. Ashraf, ‘Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces’ (note 26).

52. Baloch, ‘Beyond Nuclear Deterrence’ (note 11).

53. Interview with Zafar Iqbal Cheema, September 2012.

54. Mearsheimer, ‘Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe’ (note 10), p. 33.

55. Recently, a Pakistani Chinese-made F-7PG training aircraft crashed killing its crew, the seventh crash in six months, indicating how ageing conventional capabilities need transformation if Pakistan's security planners are to improve its conventional balance with India. This also indicates how Pakistan cannot afford to spend much on modern conventional forces. See ‘Pakistan Air Collision Kills Four Pilots’, The Dawn, 15 May 2012 and ‘Pilot Killed in a PAF Plane Crash’, The Dawn, 8 February 2012.

56. The factor of Pakistan's conventional weakness has been stated by a majority of Pakistani security planners and think-tank institutes during the author's field work. Author interview with Khalid Rehman Director General of Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) and Shaheen Akther, Institute of Regional Studies (IRS), Islamabad, September 2012.

57. For instance, in the case of America's and NATO's shifting security options, emphasizing conventional forces with high technology over nuclear weapons, many insisted on development and deployment of technology which could help deter conventional attack. See Benjamin F. Schemmer, ‘NATO's New Strategy: Defend Forward, But Strike Deep’, Armed Forces Journal International (November 1982), pp. 50–68; Schemmer, ‘Defend Forward, But Strike Deep – Part II’, Armed Forces Journal International (December 1982), pp. 68–73, 92; and Schemmer, ‘Defend Forward, But Strike Deep – Part III’, Armed Forces Journal International, January 1983, pp. 48–54. Also see ‘Defending NATO’, The Wall Street Journal, 19 November 1982, p. 30.

58. It is because of these scenarios and numerous other factors, a number of articles appeared critiquing the applicability of technology and modernity to the then USA and NATO conventional forces as being the technological solution to the former Soviet conventional forces. See, for example, Steven L. Canby, ‘The Conventional Defence of Europe: The Operational Limits of Emerging Technology’, Wilson Centre Working Paper No. 55 (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 1984); and Daniel Goure and Jeffery R. Cooper, ‘Conventional Deep Strikes: A Critical Look’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1984), pp. 215–48.

59. Peng Guangqian and Rong Yu, ‘Nuclear No-First-Use Revisited’, China Security, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2009), p. 86.

60. Brain Cloughley, A History of Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 340.

61. Author's interview with Usman Iqbal Jadoon, Director Arms Control and Disarmament, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry, September 2012.

62. Ibid., 22.

63. Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan’, Survival, Vol. 40, No. 2 (1998), pp. 96–113.

64. Timothy D. Hoyt, ‘Strategic Myopia: Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine and Crisis Stability in South Asia’, in Lowell Dittmer (ed.), South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, China (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 120.

65. Sandeep Dikshit, ‘Zardari Says He Is Against Nuclear Warfare’, The Hindu, 23 November 2008.

66. For interesting accounts on Pakistan's strategy and classification of handling these security policies from day-to-day basis, see Mahmud Ali Durrani, ‘Pakistan's Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons’, Cooperative Monitoring Centre Occasional Paper 37, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, July 2004.

67. For interesting piece on Pakistan's SPD, which was previously named Combat Development Directorate (CCD), see ‘SPD & CCD’, The Global Security, August 2011.

68. Hasan Askari Rizvi states, ‘The military stands a better chance of wielding influence on key policy decisions and allocation of resources from the side-lines. This saves the military from hazards of direct assumption of power and gives space to elected civilians.’ Rizvi, ‘On Civil-Military Relations’, Pakistan Today, December 2011.

69. Author's interview with Dr Aman Rashid, Director General Disarmament, Foreign Ministry of Pakistan, September 2012.

70. For details on the Pakistan's civil–military relations, see Bindanda M. Chengappa, Pakistan: Military Role in Civil Administration (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995); Talat Syed Hussein, ‘Pakistan Hedged on Obvious Bet’, The Nation, 29 May 1998; Rizvi, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan’ (note 63); and Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).

71. Zafar Khan, ‘Emerging Shifts in India's Nuclear Policy: Implications for Minimum Deterrence in South Asia’, Strategic Studies Journal, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2014), pp. 94–112.

72. A Pakistani scholar at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, stated that,

They [Pakistanis] would like to maintain a posture of credible minimum deterrence and this credible minimum deterrence is actually not very static, which essentially means that if India were to engage in a strategic nuclear modernisation, then the number game can actually change. There are several other elements, but this is the main thrust of the nuclear doctrine [emphasis author's].

2011 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 28–29 March 2011.

73. Author's interview with various key respondents such as Khalid Banuri, Adil Sultan, and Zafar Ali of SPD, and Ambassador Tariq Osman Hyder, Dr Aman Rashid, and Osman Jadoon of Pakistan's Foreign Ministry agreeing somewhat to the preceding points, September 2012.

74. Dean Nelson and Ben Farmer, ‘Pakistan Threatens Nuclear Arms Race over India Deal’, The Telegraph (London), 28 January 2011.

75. Author's interview with Mansoor Ahmed who specializes in Nuclear Studies, September 2012.

76. Ibid.

77. In addition to the American–India nuclear deal, India consistently modernizes its conventional forces. ‘India, Russia Sing Deals on Fighter Jets, Nuclear Energy’, The Dawn, 21 December 2010 and ‘India Tests Nuclear Capable Missile’, The Dawn, 22 December 2010.

78. Mirza Aslam Beg, ‘Responding to Indo-US Defence Pact’, The Dawn, 11 August 2005.

79. Author's Interview with Noman Sattar Islamabad, September 2012.

80. Author's interview with Zulfqar Khan, Ministry of Defence, September 2012.

81. Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era (note 3), p. 80.