Strategic Uncertainty and Missile Defence: Revisiting the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate

Abstract

Strategic uncertainty remains a significant challenge for defence planners and national leaders responsible for developing and acquiring future military capabilities. Concerns in the United States over missile proliferation during the 1990s were embodied in the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which predicted the emergence of a long-range ballistic missile threat by 2015. Comparing the NIEs predictions with the actual evolution of the threat reveals not only an overly pessimistic evaluation but also politicization of the intelligence assessment. At the time of its release, the report added to a growing sense of vulnerability and further encouraged policy-makers to make suboptimal missile defence acquisition decisions. In particular, the worst-case scenario thinking exemplified by the 1999 NIE contributed to an unnecessarily rushed testing programme, the premature deployment of homeland missile defence and an oversized system in Europe. Although missile defence may have strategic value, the rush to deploy has resulted in a costly and less effective military capability due to unfounded fears of strategic surprise and entrenched notions of the ballistic missile threat. Strategic uncertainty will always be a challenge, but focusing solely on developing capabilities with less regard to the actual threat environment is a recipe for costly and ineffective weapons systems.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. For example, see Michele Flournoy (ed.), QDR 2001: Strategy Driven Choices for America's Future (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2001) and Michael O'Hanlon, The Science of War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

2. Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015 (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 1999).

3. Andrew Futter, Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy (London: Routledge, 2013); Michael Mayer, US Missile Defense Strategy: Engaging the Debate (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2015). Reuben Steff, ‘Cooperative Ballistic Missile Defence for America, China, and Russia’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 34, No. 1 (2013), pp. 94–119; and Ernest Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Technology in Search of a Mission (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2002).

4. Ryan Henry, ‘Defence Transformation and the 2005 Quadrennial Defence Review’, Parameters, Winter (2005–2006), pp. 5–15.

5. Stephan De Spiegeleire, ‘Ten Trends in Capability Planning for Defence and Security', The RUSI Journal, Vol. 156, No. 5 (2011), p. 20.

6. Michael Fitzsimmons, ‘The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning’, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Winter 2006–2007), p. 135.

7. Ibid., p. 136.

8. Douglas Jehl, ‘CIA Nominee War of Budget Cuts’, New York Times, 3 February 1993.

9. Joseph Cirincione, ‘Assessing the Assessment: The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate of the Ballistic Missile Threat’, The Nonproliferation Review, Spring (2000), pp. 125–137.

10. Bradley Graham, Hit to Kill (New York, NY: Public Affairs: 2001), pp. 30–70.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 39.

13. Greg Thielman, ‘Rumsfeld Reprise? The Missile Report That Foretold the Iraq Intelligence Controversy’, Arms Control Today, 1 July 2003.

14. Ibid.

15. National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments (note 2).

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Cirincione, ‘Assessing the Assessment’ (note 9).

19. National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015 (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 1999).

20. William Cohen, ‘US Defence Secretary NMD Testimony’, Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 48, July 2000.

21. Phillip H. Gordon, ‘Bush, Missile Defence, and the Atlantic Alliance’, Survival, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 17–36.

22. For more on the Patriot's performance, see Steve Hildreth, Kinetic Energy Kill for Ballistic Missile Defense: A Status Overview (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007).

23. Gordon, ‘Bush, Missile Defense, and the Atlantic Alliance’ (note 21).

24. Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defence Review Report 2001 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defence, 2001); Robert Gates, Ballistic Missile Defence Review (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defence, 2010).

25. ‘Defence and Deterrence Posture Review’, Press Release (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 20 May 2012.

26. See Leon Sloss, ‘The Strategist's Perspective’, in Ashton Carter and David N. Schwartz (eds). Ballistic Missile Defence (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 24–48.

27. William Perry, ‘Nuclear Proliferation and Ballistic Missile Defence’, Speech at George Washington University, Washington, DC, 25 April 1996.

28. See Larry Welch et al., Report of the Panel on Reducing Risk in Ballistic Missile Defence Flight Test Programs, February 1998 (Washington, DC: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, U.S. Department of Defense, 1998), available from Federation of American Scientists, http://fas.org/spp/starwars/program/welch/welch-1.htm. THAAD underwent a slight name change during the Bush administration, shifting from ‘theatre’ to ‘terminal’.

29. Gates, Ballistic Missile Defence Review (note 24); Chuck Hagel, ‘Missile Defense Announcement’, Press Conference on 15 March 2013, Arlington, TX.

30. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘Ballistic Missile Defence’, from NATO website.

31. Steve Fetter, ‘Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction’, International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 5–42.

32. International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Chapter Six: Asia', in James Hackett (ed) The Military Balance 2015 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies and Routledge, 2015), pp. 207–302. The report also notes that February–September 2014 marked “the most intense rocket and missile testing the nation has ever conducted. More than one hundred Scud and Nodong ballistic missiles and other rockets were launched during this period, all in breach of UN sanctions”.

33. Markus Schiller, ‘Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat’, RAND Corporation, 2012.

34. Gates, Ballistic Missile Defense Review (note 24), p. 4.

35. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat Report, NASIC 1031-0985-13 (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio: National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2013), p. 19.

36. James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, 26 February 2015.

37. Steven Hildreth, Iran's Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs, CRS Report 7-5700 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 2012).

38. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat Report (note 35), p. 19.

39. James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment (note 36).

40. Robert Jervis, ‘Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2006), pp. 3–52.

41. Richard K. Betts, ‘Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11 and Iraq's Missing WMDs', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 122, No. 4 (2007–2008), pp. 585–606.

42. Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 76.

43. Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts (New York, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 8–11.

44. Ibid., pp. 91–104.

45. Paul Kaminski, ‘Ballistic Missile Defense Program Review', Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, 6 March 1996.

46. Larry Welch et al., Report of the Panel on Reducing Risk in Ballistic Missile Defense Flight Test Programs, Washington DC, 1998.

47. Larry Welch et al., National Missile Defense Committee Review Report, Washington, DC, November 1999.

48. See, for example, Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency, GAO-12-486 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, April 2012).

49. Ronald Kadish, ‘Testimony: Missile Defense Program and Fiscal Year 2004 Budget', Before the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee, Washington, DC, 9 April 2003.

50. Graham Spinardi, ‘Ballistic Missile Defence and the Politics of Testing: The Case of the US Ground Based Midcourse Defence’, Science and Public Policy, Vol. 35, No. 10 December 2008, pp. 703–715, p. 714.

51. National Intelligence Council, ‘Foreign Missile Developments’ (note 2).

52. Hans Kristiansen, ‘The Protection Paradox’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2013.

53. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2015, Washington, DC, April 2015; Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. Washington, DC, February 2012.

54. Bradley Roberts, ‘Regional Responses to National Missile Defense: China’, in James J. Wirtz and Jeffery A. Larsen (eds), Rocket's Red Glare, edited by James J.™Wirtz and Jeffery A.™Larsen, pp.™183–212. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 183–212, p. 204.

55. Dean Wilkening, Ballistic Missile Defense and Strategic Stability, Adelphi Paper 331 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies and Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 72.

56. A few examples include Thom Shanker, ‘US Accord with Japan Over Missile Defense Draws Criticism in China’, New York Times, 17 September 2012; Scott Snyder, ‘North Korea's Missile Threat and China's Objections to South Korea's Missile Defense’, Forbes, 13 February 2015.

57. See also Steff, ‘Cooperative Ballistic Missile Defence’ (note 3).

58. National Intelligence Council, ‘Foreign Missile Developments’ (note 2).

59. Clapper, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment (note 36).

60. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (note 26), p. 18.

61. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence (note 42), p. 35.

62. Thielman, ‘Rumsfeld Reprise’ (note 13).