Russia's pivot to China goes astray: the impact on the Asia-Pacific security architecture

ABSTRACT

High-level declarations in Moscow and Beijing on the steady progress in upgrading their strategic partnership depart increasingly far from the reality of shrinking economic ties and diverging political perspectives. In late 2014, the dynamic development of this partnership appeared to have the potential of becoming a major shift in the fluid security balance in the Asia-Pacific region; in late 2015, however, the concerned neighbours have more reasons to worry about the deformations in the development of Russia–China relations. President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping are eager to demonstrate perfect personal rapport but their mutual trust is open to doubt and their views on priorities of domestic and international order are in fact strikingly dissimilar. The deep contraction of trade and the lack of interest from Chinese investors propels the Russian leadership towards increasing the emphasis on the security dimension of the partnership, and this makes Russia one of the key sources of instability in the Asia-Pacific region and a challenge to the East Asian peace. It is also entirely possible that the Russian challenge to the stability of the world system would result in strengthening of the key institutions of its governance, thus leaving the revisionist Russia in isolation.

As recently as late 2014, the dynamic and determined development of the strategic Russia–China partnership appeared to have the potential of becoming a major shift in the fluid security balance in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, both states opposed the world order shaped by the alliance of Western powers and controlled by the United States, and joint efforts of these two permanent members of the UN Security Council, who proclaimed adherence to values of sovereignty and non-intervention, were set to influence transformation of many conflicts, particularly in their common neighbourhood. Russia's resolute engagement in a confrontation with the West caused by its assault on Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, compelled it to make a further upgrade of its relations with China in order to avoid international isolation and to add strength to its revisionist course. There was, however, an essential asymmetry in this upgrade, which was far more important for Moscow than for Beijing, so the Russian leadership had to accept the increasing dependency of a junior partner, while pretending that the principle of equality was strictly maintained in this relationship. Yet by the end of 2015, it had become clear that the attempt to compensate for the breakdown of ties with Europe by executing a ‘pivot’ to China had essentially failed.

Three turns of events illuminated this failure. The first one was the vote in the UN Security Council on establishing a tribunal for examining the crime of shooting down the MH17 flight over Eastern Ukraine; China abstained leaving Russia alone to exercise its veto right.¹ Moscow expressed complete understanding of Beijing's position but the fact that China refused to be associated with Russia's defiance of international law amounted to a major diplomatic setback. The second turn of events was the turmoil on the Shanghai stock exchange in summer 2015, which brought into focus the slowdown of China's economic growth and made it necessary to acknowledge the sharp decline of bi-lateral trade. Mainstream Russian experts are inclined to play down this economic volatility but they are increasingly concerned about Beijing's lack of interest in helping Russia overcome its deepening social and economic crisis.² The third clear signal of failure was the striking divergence of mutual opinions, according to the authoritative Pew Research Center poll: in Russia, positive views on China increased from 64 per cent in 2014 to 79 per cent in 2015, while in China, positive views on Russia decreased from 66 per cent in 2014 to 51 per cent in 2015.³

This distortion of the mutually beneficial pattern of ever-closer partnership has taken both partners by surprise. The Chinese leadership while sticking to the discourse of best-ever relations, gives due attention to Russia's economic decline and prepares for new sharp turns in its political behaviour, undesirable as those may be from Beijing's point of view, which puts a premium on predictability.⁴ The Russian leadership has no choice but to insist on the shining prospects of the alliance-building with China, while at the same time feeling increasing need to prove to Beijing its value as the main strategic partner. This urge to demonstrate to China the ability to play a major role on the global arena despite the economic weakness was quiet probably one of the main drivers for executing the hastily planned intervention in Syria in October 2015.⁵

Russia's on-going military experiments in the Middle East are generally beyond the scope of this article, but what is essential for this analysis is Russia's increasingly pronounced emphasis on using military force as the most reliable instrument of its policy of sustaining and prevailing in the confrontation with the West. This emphasis induces a change of character of the Russian partnership with China, in which the hard-security rather than trade-and-investment dimension is becoming the dominant feature. It is possible to assume that this securitization resting on a shaky economic foundation would make the partnership less stable while also generating risks for the dynamic and conflict-laden region of East Asia. Russia on its own is too weak to make a major impact on the trajectory of managing conflicts and prioritizing the goal of growth that has been prevalent in this region for the last third of a century. China, however, already finds it useful to point to the recklessness of Russia's behaviour in order to illuminate moderation and self-restraint of its own course; it may find it opportune to exploit Russia's dependency and propensity to risk-taking for changing the pattern of military demonstrations and diplomatic maneuvering around particular hot spots in the common neighbourhood.

This very recent shift in the character of Russia–China partnership has not as yet found a proper reflection in academic literature, which has been over the last few years generally very attentive to the development of relations between these two global powers. The vastly predominant theme in this literature is certainly the spectacular growth of China's power, and while for those who explored the prospect of ‘peaceful rise’ Russia was a variable of minor relevance, those who stick to the classical realist paradigm of clash between rising and declining power tended to pay more attention to Russia.⁶ The latter generally tended to assume that ‘Russia is fearful of China's meteoric modernization’ and even entertained an idea that nationalistic and assertive China ‘could unintentionally mobilize a powerful coalition of neighbors against itself’, which could include Russia.⁷ A more balanced perspective was captured by Bobo Lo's notion of ‘axis of convenience’, which described the relationship as ‘ambiguous, full of contradictions both implicit and explicit’.⁸

The Moscow-driven upgrade of the strategic partnership in the mid-2014 challenged this perspective and gave prominence to analysis that urged the American leadership to take seriously and to confront the emerging Russia–China ‘alliance’.⁹ Some shrewd voices even called for a determined effort towards rapprochement with Beijing that would derail the partnership and leave aggressive Russia in isolation.¹⁰ Looking at the execution of this upgrade at the end of 2015, it is easy to dismiss such recommendations as over-reaction to misconstrued threat. The key issue for analysis at the start of the year indeed appeared to be the impact of the strengthening ties between Russia and China on security relations in East Asia; but presently, the question is rather about the consequences of the failure to strengthen these ties and the tendency to compensate for this failure by focusing the partnership on security matters.

This article attempts to suggest an answer to this question and aims at examining the impact of the asymmetric and generally unsuccessful construction of Russia–China super-partnership on the near-term evolution of the complex security interactions in East Asia. The point of departure is the analysis of the increasingly dissimilar views in Moscow and Beijing on the character of shifts in the global system, which brings up the issue of the role of two leaders in shaping these views. The next section looks into the perceptions of the military force as an instrument of policy and into the availability of military instruments. Then comes the assessment of economic trends and limitations for executing political ambitions, leading to the conclusion on the risks from this distorted partnership for the East Asian peace.

Not quite a meeting of revisionist political minds

The vision of ‘multi-polarity’ of the global system used to provide a common and convenient reference point for both Russia and China for the last 15 years as they imagined themselves as leaders among the motley crowd of ‘emerging powers’. There is still plenty of habitual references to this vision, particularly at the BRICS summits, but the proposition on ‘emerging’ looks increasingly problematic, for instance for Brazil in the midst of recession, while Russia finds its international status declining even faster than its economy.¹¹ There have always been significant differences in the interpretation of the notion of ‘multi-polarity’, and for China the key point was to establish that its ‘peaceful rise’ was not violating the ‘harmony’ in the global order and only added to its position as one of the legitimate ‘centres of power’. Russia entertained the vision of a growing competition in the ‘polycentric’ world between the established and emerging powers, particularly for natural resources, and insisted that its interests in that competition could only be secured by the readiness to use military force.¹²

That Russian vision mixed together over-confidence in its own entitlement to the ‘Great Power’ status and deepening worries about not being recognized ‘as equal’ by the United States, which since the Soviet times were seen as the main counter-part, despite the miniscule volume of trade. The key element in the Russian version of ‘multi-polarity’ was, accordingly, the decline of American dominance over global affairs, and that emphasis secured for Moscow useful political connections with various anti-American sentiments in the Middle East, Latin America, and even Europe, particularly in the mid-2000s, during the George W. Bush presidency.¹³ China was also prone to remonstrate against American ‘hegemony’ but its relations with the United States have been developing on the solid and expanding foundation of economic ties. The Ukraine crisis has sharply exacerbated these differences: As Russia entered into the new confrontation with the West, China advanced the proposition for building a ‘new type of great power relations’ with the United States.¹⁴

The Russian leadership prefers not to notice the plain fact that Russia had no place in the Chinese ‘big picture’ of global leadership and has laboriously escalated the anti-American rhetoric decrying the evil nature of US-manipulated globalization and accusing the United States of harbouring intentions to destroy Russia because of its richness in natural resources.¹⁵ As McFaul and Stoner argue, nothing in this escalation is caused by actual American steps or even assumed intentions, it is driven entirely by the need in sustaining domestic ‘patriotic’ mobilization and the desire to prove loyalty to the Kremlin.¹⁶ Yet, Moscow continues to insist that its aggression against Ukraine constitutes first and foremost a departure from the unfair rules of the ‘unipolar world’, while in reality its violations of international law undermine the centrality of UN in the evolving global system and devalue Russia's own pledges to uphold this centrality.¹⁷

China is not prepared to go that far in assaulting the foundations of the global system, which secures the best possible conditions for its rise, and prefers to pursue evolutionary rather than revisionist aims. At the same time, Beijing is clearly dissatisfied with the regional order in East Asia and has carefully prepared historical-political grounds for taking a revisionist stance, focussing particularly on the humiliations of the ‘unequal treaties’ of the mid-XIX century, including the Aigun treaty with Russia (1858).¹⁸ This significant differences are captured in the assessments underpinning American strategic planning, so that high-ranking American military commanders repeatedly describe Russian aggressive revisionism as an ‘existential threat’, while characterising China's military build-up in less loaded terms and focussing on the South-China Sea conflicts.¹⁹

This differentiation of threat intensity might seem to be a matter of parochial judgement but it captures more than just the difference between China's habitual understatement of its strength and Russia's desire to punch way above its weight. It also reflects the significant divergence in the position of the two powers on the most fundamental trend in security posture in East Asia, which is often overlooked in current analyses focused on particular spikes in geopolitical tensions or loud quarrels over petty incidents. For the first three quarters of the XX century, East Asia was the theatre of wars of different nature, from the colonial Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905) to the American war in Vietnam (1955–1975). Since the 1980s, however, the number of wars and the scale of human casualties have sharply declined as negotiations and peace processes of various kinds brought resolutions of protracted conflicts, most recently in the Philippines with the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro signed in March 2014. This drastic reduction of armed conflict is often referred to as East Asian Peace, and China has played a crucial role in bringing it about.²⁰ Indeed, it was China's turn towards economic reforms orchestrated by Deng Xiaoping that has set it on the path of careful management of external conflicts, so that the short war with Vietnam in early 1979 remains the last entry in its track record of engagement in violent conflicts.

The most basic premise of the phenomenon of East Asian Peace is the opportunity to harvest tangible benefits from rapid economic development secured by the shift of political priorities from conflict manipulation and militarization to domestic reforms.²¹ Russia has missed on that opportunity more than once; indeed, the USSR opted for invading Afghanistan the same year that China opted for launching economic reforms. Moscow made a half-hearted effort to join the Asia-Pacific success story at the start of this decade, in particular in the context of hosting the APEC summit in Vladivostok in September 2012. It was reluctant, however, to embark on the path of reforms necessary for improving the investment climate, while the turn in its course marked by the annexation of Crimea has amounted to all intents and purposes to sacrificing the goals of modernization and attempting instead a ‘patriotic’ mobilization in the context of confrontation with the West.²²

Beijing observes this abrupt abandonment of the fundamental aim of ensuring fast economic growth with amazement and concern, since in China's own policy the priority of stable development remains unshakeable and all but sacred. By the end of 2015, it had become clear that the price of Russian reckless revisionist move was much higher than Putin's government had expected as several quarters of zero growth from the middle of 2013 were followed by five quarters of a steady decline of the GDP, which is set to continue into 2016. At the same time, it also became clear that ‘patriotic’ mobilization was successful in terms that even on the background of significant contraction of real income, public support for the policy of confronting the West and personally for Putin remained solid.²³ The first of these observations fits into the Chinese preferences for staying the course of restraint in projecting power, but the second encourages bolder experimenting, and balance is inevitably a question of personal judgements.

Hardly a beginning of a beautiful friendship

Both President Vladimir Putin and President Xi Jinping find it opportune to demonstrate great pleasure from their invariably friendly and remarkably numerous meetings (including five meetings in 2015), but the sincerity of these feelings is open to reasonable doubt. The two men are of about the same age, but the dissimilarities in their upbringing, background, early careers and family values are too many to elaborate upon in this format. Two features of their rise to power are of importance for the analysis of hidden tensions in the partnership, and the first one is the character of their selection for the top job. Vladimir Putin arrived to the Kremlin in the first day of 2000 with no experience in leadership through a haphazard process of choices not of his making.²⁴ Xi Jinping was steadily rising in the party ranks and was carefully groomed as a successor through the usual non-transparent but consensual process. Therefore, where one has developed a deep mistrust in the quasi-democratic political process and experienced the shock of suddenly becoming a ‘great leader’, the other has gained respect for the workings of the party-political machine and the confidence of self-made man.

The second feature is the duration of the hold on power, and what is striking here is that Xi Jinping was duly appointed as the General Secretary of the CPC exactly a year after Vladimir Putin had concluded that he could not step away from the position of power, which he had occupied for two terms and effectively controlled during Dmitri Medvedev's presidency, without a grave personal risk. Xi's ascendance was seen inside the country as a natural transfer of power to the ‘Party of Princelings’ and welcomed by external partners, including USA, as a sure sign of stability of the ‘peaceful growth’.²⁵ Putin discovered that his return to the Kremlin was a bitter disappointment to the urban middle classes in Moscow and to Western peers.²⁶ The Chinese system of rotation of the leadership, which has uplifted Xi Jinping to the summit of power and compels him to select a successor already in 2017, is therefore, not just foreign to Putin's system of power but also a challenge to the carefully cultivated ‘personality cult’.

One important point of agreement between the two leaders is the deep aversion to, and deep worries about public protests and ‘colour revolutions’, which Putin first encountered in the streets of Dresden in 1989, while the Chinese leaders carry the suppressed memories of the Tiananmen massacre in the same year. There is a strong tendency in both leaderships to see Western conspiracies behind the explosions of public discontent, and specifically in the collapse of Viktor Yanukovich government in Kiev in February 2014.²⁷ At the same time, while Putin is inclined to believe in American involvement in every revolutionary situation, from the civil war in Libya in the mid-2011 to the demonstrations in Yerevan in the mid-2015, the Chinese leadership has a more nuanced view. In the Middle East in particular, Beijing cannot subscribe to ideas of deliberate American efforts to spread chaos, which are quite popular in Moscow, and to all intents and purposes relies on American efforts to preserve stability for securing the uninterrupted flow of oil from the Gulf. This implicit dependency makes Xi Jinping far more circumspect about challenging American dominance in maintaining the world order than Putin, even if the political class in Beijing might find his escapades against ‘hegemonism’ quite entertaining.²⁸

There are also remarkable similarities in the propensity of the two leaders to using history as an instrument of policy, which came to the fore in the propaganda campaigns centred on the staging of two victory parades – in May 2015 in Moscow and in September 2015 in Beijing.²⁹ While the point in both campaigns was to ensure domestic consolidation around the parade-glorified leadership, it was noticeable that in China the key message was about overcoming the legacy of ‘humiliation’, and in Russia – about recycling the reflections on the greatest moment in Soviet history.³⁰ These peculiarities in propaganda themes point to a significant divergence: Xi Jinping seeks to project an image of the future as a continuation of the present successes (which appears to be entirely possible), while Putin aims at replacing a non-existent vision of the future with a compilation of images of the past.³¹

Where differences in the two political mind-sets are particularly pronounced is the economy, which Xi Jinping takes very seriously indeed, and Vladimir Putin is rather irritated about. This irritation is caused by the inability to comprehend the fundamental drivers of Russia's economic decline, which is badly aggravated by the consequences of the Ukraine crisis, including sanctions. In Putin's ‘inner circle’ of cronies and courtiers, false hopes for the ‘inevitable’ rebound of oil prices are mixed with strikingly primitive perceptions of the global economy, as exemplified by the argument of Sergei Naryshkin, the Chairman of the State Duma and former chief of the presidential administration, about the Washington's goal of ruining other nations because of the huge American sovereign debt.³² For the Chinese officials and experts, such views are not just flabbergasting but also quite dangerous, in the sense of underpinning decisions propelling the Russian economy further into degradation.³³ From the Chinese perspective, a major factor that determines Russia's economic decline is rampant corruption, while in Moscow the severe anti-corruption campaign in China is typically seen as means of strengthening Xi Jinping's grasp on power.³⁴ There is certainly far more to the Chinese policy of exterminating corruption than personal agenda of Xi Jinping, who is still seen by the seasoned Kremlin courtiers as a newcomer to the top political level.³⁵ Chinese corruption is as much of an inherent feature of its political system as is the Russian corruption, but there is little or no useful connections between the corrupt business–political networks in the two states, and this disconnect translates into a lack of common ground for the two leaders, who position themselves very differently towards these networks.³⁶

While the Chinese leadership is firm set in the thinking that places an absolute priority on economic development, it also understands the rationale of resorting to a nationalist mobilization in order to distract the ‘masses’ from the deterioration of economic situation; it is also aware of a certain fascination with Putin's political style among the Chinese urban middle classes. In this respect, the sudden turmoil in China's economy in the mid-2015 now informs a different assessment by Chinese policy-makers of Putin's behaviour than the sceptical disapproval at the start of the year. The question is whether Xi Jinping and his team could be interested in launching their own revisionist experiments along the lines drawn by Putin – and the answer depends both upon the turn of economic fortunes and upon the availability of military instruments.

Continuation of failed policies by unreliable military means

Russia certainly has very different and remarkably rich experience in employing military force towards political ends in the quarter century of its post-Soviet history than China. Nobody in Putin's ‘inner circle’ of loyal lieutenants has a military background (much the same way as in China, where lawyers rather than engineers are now dominating in the top elite), while many come from KGB/FSB and other special services, but he is inclined nevertheless to see the Armed Forces as useful and reliable instrument of policy.³⁷ While the Second Chechen War (1999–2004), which helped Putin to establish his grasp on power, provided a lesson in paying huge costs for a military solution to a local conflict, the war with Georgia (2008) informed about the feasibility of a quick victory through an application of overwhelming force.

That swift victory led not to a celebration of Russia's might but first to a radical military reform (launched in autumn 2008), and second to a massive 2020 State Armament programme (approved in autumn 2011). In hindsight, it is possible to argue that the reform, while lacking a coherent design and inflicting much pain in the officer corps, has brought a significant improvement in combat capabilities, as demonstrated, for instance, in the efficient deployment into the Crimea.³⁸ As for the rearmament, that master-plan appeared too heavy even in the relatively favourable economic situation at the start of the decade, and presently the implementation of high-cost arms acquisition projects is a major factor in aggravating the economic crisis, while political orders prevent any revisions.³⁹ It is indeed quite disruptive to cut down funding for large-scale programmes mid-way in the implementation, but it is essential to note that the current confrontation in the ‘Western front’ has little if anything to do with the rationale of their development. Indeed, the Russian–United States ‘reset’ was blossoming at that time, and no worrisome military modernization in the United States, first of all in the strategic forces, demanded such a huge effort as the one that Russia committed to in 2011.⁴⁰ It stands to reason to suggest that it was the Chinese military modernization, which was gathering speed at that time and has accelerated since, that constituted the main rationale for Russia's rearmament, even if this reason has never been officially stated.

At the start of the 2010s, Moscow was preparing to perform its own strategic ‘pivot’ to Asia-Pacific, and while it was the September 2012 APEC summit in Vladivostok that served as the focus of these preparations, reinvigoration of the military power projection capabilities was a major part of the ‘go-East’ plan. It had remained on track until the early 2014, but it is easy to establish that the course of the ‘hybrid war’ in Eastern Ukraine has severely affected the build-up of Russian military means in the Far East. Battalion tactical groups from the tank brigades in the Eastern Military District were transported by rail to strengthen the grouping deployed on the borders with Ukraine and engaged in such hard battles as Debaltsevo (in February 2015) taking serious casualties.⁴¹ Attempts to demonstrate air might while economizing on logistics produced a series of plane crashes in summer 2015, including the loss of two Tu-95MS strategic bombers assigned to the Ukrainka air base, Amur oblast.⁴² The cancellation of the deal on building in France two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships is a major blow on Russian Pacific Fleet, which presently has no hope for getting any new major surface combatants to replace the ageing hulls.⁴³

These setbacks came together with the political need in upgrading the partnership with China and complicated the execution of the sequence of steps in expanding military cooperation, including joint exercises. It is significant that the character of these exercises changed in 2015 from ‘counter-terrorist’ drills on land (involving a couple of battalions) to joint naval operations, first in the Black Sea/Mediterranean, and then in the Sea of Japan, which certainly resonates with numerous maritime disputes in East Asia.⁴⁴ Moscow has also abandoned its reservations against exporting to China its most technologically advanced weapon systems, so several new deals, including on 24 Su-35 fighters and on the delivery of an undisclosed number of S-400 Triumph surface-to-air missile batteries, were signed in 2015 or announced as forthcoming.⁴⁵ The bottom-line in the Moscow debates on these sales is that in only a few years, China might be able to develop its own high-tech weapon systems for air defence, so it is better for Russia to enter this market, while it is still open.⁴⁶

This new arms export policy does not signify a disappearance of concerns about Russia's strategic weakness in Asia-Pacific and in particular, about the vast disparity of military capabilities vis-à-vis China.⁴⁷ Russian High Command is perfectly aware of the progress in modernizing China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and understands that even the most extraordinary efforts would not produce anything resembling a balance of conventional forces, so that only high uncertainty about the non-strategic nuclear forces underpins the stability of the neighbourhood between the severely depressed and depopulating Far East and the fast-growing North-Eastern China with the population of 110 million people.⁴⁸ One particular feature of Russian strategic assessments of China is very low understanding among the top brass of professional culture in the PLA and the political profile of Chinese military, so the very limited military-to-military contacts (including the carefully choreographed exercises) cannot produce anything resembling trust-based relations.⁴⁹ For the Russian High Command, the proposition on paying greater attention and concentrating greater resources towards the Far East remains abstract and even senseless, as most of their combat experience was gained in the Caucasus, while presently they have to devote all their efforts to the ‘hybrid war’ in Eastern Ukraine and to the show of force aimed at deterring NATO on the Western ‘theatre’.

A new chapter in the Russian saga of power projection was opened in October 2015 with the launch of limited but high-profile military intervention in Syria. The drivers for this high (and definitely underestimated)-risk enterprise were complex and murky, but one relevant for this analysis was generated in the Russia–China relations. The preparations for the intervention were started in earnest only after Putin's return from the military parade in Beijing on 3 September, and it would not be fanciful to suggest that observing this prodigious show he discovered not only the discomfort of the status of a subordinate and not-so-great power, but also the need to prove to his host Russia's value as a strategic partner. The Kremlin is perfectly aware that China is very sensitive to conflict developments in the Middle East, not least due to the massive oil flow, and was eager to demonstrate capacity and political will to interfere in these developments implicitly indicating that Beijing is missing both.⁵⁰ China was probably impressed with the swiftness of Russian military deployment, but within a month it became clear that the course of civil war in Syria did not change in a significant way, and in the second month the intervention run into trouble as a Su-24 bomber was shot down by a Turkish F-16 fighter triggering a severe political crisis. Beijing, therefore, provided a modicum of political support for the Russian endeavour (but certainly not for its quarrel with Turkey) but generally has kept a distance from it indicating its preference for a coalition including the key Arab states.⁵¹

Chinese military may be badly lacking first-hand combat experience but its High Command would hardly miss the flaws in Moscow's risk assessments and the deterioration of Russian military capabilities in the last two years due to high stress and declining funding. Whatever the trajectory of Russian intervention in Syria (and new setbacks are definitely in the making), it has further diminished Russia's capacity for power projection in the East Asia.

Economic ties fail to follow political orders

The main content of Russia's ‘pivot’ to China was supposed to be produced by the deepening and widening of economic relations, and there was no shortage of political promises in this regard. The energy sector was seen as the central direction for this expansion, and since on both sides the main movers in this sector were state-controlled corporations, the execution of the plans should have gone promptly. It was the much-trumpeted USD 400 billion gas deal signed in May 2014 that was presented as a breakthrough to a new level of cooperation and symbol of the upgraded partnership.⁵² The long-discussed fundamentals of this deal were reasonably sound, even if the schedule for developing two new gas-fields in Eastern Siberia (Chayandinskoe and Kovyktinskoe) and laying the 4,000km long pipeline (proudly called Sila Sibiri or Power of Siberia) was extremely optimistic. What that mega-project did not make possible for Russia was the capacity for diverting the export flow of gas from the increasingly hard European market eastwards, so President Putin spared no effort in order to convince Xi Jinping to make the second gas deal that would include the pipeline for delivering the gas from Yamal to Xinjiang.⁵³ Beijing had very little interest in this ‘Western corridor’ but preferred not to expose disagreements, so in the course of Putin's visit to Beijing in November 2014, a memorandum of understanding was signed without any hard details on prices, volumes or timetables.⁵⁴

By the mid-2015, however, it had become clear beyond wishful doubt that the grand Moscow design for developing the ‘green’ hydrocarbon resources in Eastern Siberia and quickly expanding the energy export to Asia-Pacific and to China first of all had failed.⁵⁵ The slide of oil prices to the low plateau of USD 50 per barrel not only undermined the cost-effectiveness of pipeline projects but also reduced the inflow of petro-revenues for the federal budget to such level where even Putin's direct order for ensuring proper funding for the strategically prioritized enterprise could not be fulfilled.⁵⁶ Beijing withdrew its vague promise for a pre-payment (the figure of USD 25 billion was leaked by Gazprom sources) and showed little interest in investing in the gas production projects.⁵⁷ Chinese partners have been following very carefully the impact of Western sanctions on the operations of Gazprom and Rosneft (even if officially Beijing disapproves of the sanctions regime) and make sure that they have zero exposure to the fast-aggravating problems.⁵⁸ At the very end of 2015, Gazprom had to cancel the USD 3 billion contract on constructing four elements of the Sila Sibiri pipeline (total length about 800km), thus guaranteeing at least a two year delay from the scheduled deadline in 2018 – and quite possibly indicating its inability to deliver on the contractual obligations.⁵⁹

In the big picture of China energy balance, the plan for opening a gas pipeline connection with Russia in the first half of the next decade is indeed a minor detail, so Beijing is prepared to shrug off delays with implementation and breakdowns of deals, which are seen in Moscow as crucially significant. The setbacks in the energy cooperation translate, in the meanwhile, into general scepticism of Chinese investors to entering the far-from-friendly Russian market, particularly since Chinese banks are very cautions in opening credit lines for such investment.⁶⁰ According to Russian official statistics, the volume of Chinese direct investments into Russia amounted to mere USD 800 million in 2014 (about 0.7 per cent of the total volume of Chinese investments abroad), and 330 million in the first half of 2015, so that the accumulated sum reached USD 8.7 billion.⁶¹ What was even more striking was the deep contraction of trade by 29.5 per cent in the first three quarters of 2015 (after remaining flat in 2014 at USD 88.4 billion), as comparing with the decline of 38.5 per cent in the trade with the EU, affected by the sanctions.⁶² It was not only the decline of price on Russian oil that caused this contraction but also the devaluation of Russian currency, which resulted in the contraction of demand on imported goods, so Russia is reduced to the fifteenth place in the list of Chinese economic counter-parts.⁶³

The reduction of bilateral economic relations is determined first of all by the deepening recession in Russia, but what makes this trend politically embarrassing is the commitment on the highest level to secure an expansion of trade and investment. The Russian leadership tries to pretend that the goal of building a solid economic foundation for the upgraded partnership remains valid, but the Chinese leadership takes a more pragmatic attitude focussing on the projects in Central Asia incorporated into the grand plan of Silk Road Economic Belt.⁶⁴ The sudden turmoil in the Shanghai stock market in the mid-2015 made the Chinese government keen to minimize every potential negative impact, including the exposure to the Russian crisis, and many Chinese investors have become even more reluctant to take risks in joint projects with Russian counter-parts.

One particular area where this contraction of Chinese interest makes a difference is the Arctic. Russian ambitious plans for developing its High North and turning the Arctic into a major feature of its global profile had to be curtailed due to the withdrawal of many Western partners, and expectations in Moscow about replacing them with Chinese investors are increasingly frustrated. Inflated assessments of hydrocarbon reserves constitute a big part of the foundation for these plans, and presently Rosneft and Gazprom have to discontinue exploration of the Barents, Kara and Laptev seas shelf because of American and European sanctions. After the collapse of the off-shore Shtokman project in 2013, the most important enterprise in the vast region has been the Yamal-LNG project, in which Chinese CNPC was invited to acquire the 20 per cent stake.⁶⁵ Presently, the project led by privately-owned NOVATEK (hit by American sanctions) is experiencing delays and issues with funding, and the new deal on selling 10 per cent of stakes to the Silk Road Fund cannot resolve the problem of negative cost-efficiency on the current price level.⁶⁶ This setback derails Russian plans for revival the Northern Sea Route (Sevmorput), which are fully integrated into the investment-heavy programme for upgrading the military infrastructure in the High North.⁶⁷ The decline (instead of expected fast growth) of maritime traffic on the Sevmorput and the disappearance of energy prospects leave the modernization of the Northern Fleet and construction of new air and naval bases as the main direction of Russian policy – and this militarization of the Arctic does not answer the Chinese views on the gradual advancement into this ‘global common’.

Conclusion: derailed partnership as a risk factor for the East Asian peace

High-level declarations in Moscow and Beijing on the steady progress in upgrading the strategic partnership depart so far from the reality of shrinking economic ties and diverging political perspectives that the question about the trajectory of this important bilateral quasi-alliance acquires importance for security situation in the troubled north-eastern corner of the Asia-Pacific region. The neighbours were recently worried about the extra-fast moving rapprochement between two hugely asymmetric powers, and now they have reasons to worry about the setbacks and deformations of this process.⁶⁸

The non-arrival of Chinese investments and the delay combined with devaluation of the flagship gas deal leave Moscow with the problem of proving its value to Beijing as a strategic partner. The intervention in Syria and pro-active manoeuvring in the Middle East cannot quite resolve it because China is primarily interested in Russia not interfering with delicate balances of interests and not acting as a spoiler in conflict management. Lacking useful levers in other regions, Russia may feel compelled to abandon its position of benevolent neutrality in the various maritime disputes in East Asia. It can certainly do very little there in terms of power projection, but can deliver unambiguous support for China's stance, which could make a difference, as far as Beijing is concerned. Moscow may be reluctant to take such position regarding the overlapping disputes in the South-China Sea as it would ruin its relations with Vietnam – an old ally and one of the few states that remains positively inclined toward Russia.⁶⁹ It would have fewer if any reservations against coming on China's side in the East China Sea disputes, and the recently demonstrated readiness to dismiss the incentives for resolving the old quarrel offered by Japan – as well as warnings not to make another high-level visit to the Kuril islands – may be an indication of readiness to back China in the next escalation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute.⁷⁰ The new emphasis in the Russian-Chinese military exercises, which included an amphibious operation on a Russian beach of the Japan Sea in August 2015, may be another indication of the same readiness.⁷¹

China is certainly far more cautious than Russia in projecting power for political purposes, and it has not seen much need in relying on military might – much the same way as Russia had seen very limited need in that until the unfortunate turn of economic fortunes and political trends in the beginning of Putin's new presidency. The newly revealed weakness of China's economic posture creates a significant uncertainty about the officially drawn plans for sustaining the strong growth and achieving a new quality of it. The slowdown is still a long way from anything resembling a recession, but the Chinese leadership is hardly in a position to wait and see how the fine-tuned combination of state regulation and market forces works.⁷² Xi Jinping and his predecessors have experimented with limited nationalistic mobilizations and might discover strong incentives for launching a larger-scale one – and Russia's on-going efforts at sustaining such mobilization, which secures extra-high approval ratings for Putin in the course of deepening recession, could provide some useful clues. While Beijing has clearly disapproved the forceful annexation of Crimea, the fact of profound confrontation between Russia and the West objectively increases its opportunities and incentives for forceful moves, if only because the United States has to deal with the ‘existential’ threat from Russia.⁷³

A different sort of risk comes from the periodic increase of Russia's military activities, which were particularly intense in the Baltic theatre (up until the launch of Syrian intervention), but have been on the rise in the Far East as well. Engaging in deliberately provocative demonstrations Moscow is seeking to convert its readiness to accept high risk of incidents into a political advantage.⁷⁴ These efforts have yielded few dividends but they have increased the possibility of technical failures and seriously aggravated the risk of misreading accidents as enemy actions.⁷⁵ Russia's propensity to see the United States as a direct threat to its interests and assets in Asia-Pacific could overlap in such a high-uncertainty situation with the propensity of the North Korean leadership to manipulate military provocations leading to an uncontrollable escalation of tensions.

It is entirely possible that the Russian challenge to the stability of the world system would result in strengthening of the key institutions of its governance, thus leaving the revisionist Russia in isolation. China, for that matter, may discover that a too close partnership with Russia involves political entanglements and reputation damage, and might prefer to let the partnership become looser. Both Russian experts and Western observers point out that the economic track of the partnership is underperforming so much that the ‘strategic’ character is compromised.⁷⁶ Moscow is set to boost the security dimension of the wobbling partnership, focussing on military brinksmanship vis-à-vis the United States, but Beijing is not necessarily interested in such securitization.⁷⁷ China has its own military issues with USA, particularly in the South-China Sea, but it wants to be able to control the escalation calibrating carefully every step – and cannot trust Russia in managing these delicate strategic matters.

Finally, a massive negative impact on the stability in East Asia could be delivered by Russia's sinking into violent turmoil following the breakdown of Putin's regime. The combination of the deepening economic recession (which eliminates the possibility to tame discontent by distributing the petro-revenues) and the evolving confrontation with the West (which hits the interests of many elite groups) increases the tendency of the very isolated leader and the very tight circle of Kremlin courtiers to act aggressively and pre-emptively, ignoring expert warnings about consequences. Russia is certainly significantly more internally coherent than the Soviet Union was; however, the deeply corrupt regime implicated in grave international crimes is unlikely to release its grasp on power without a fierce fight, and an explosion of violence in Moscow might resonate very destructively in the heavily militarized Far East, which is tenuously connected with the European part of Russia. China would be very directly exposed to the chaos to the North of its historically dubious borders, which might make the temptation to take advantage of this state failure irresistible.

Acknowledgements

This article is based on the paper presented at the Fifth East Asian Peace conference in Singapore, 6–8 November 2015. The author is grateful for the comments from Dan Slater, two CSP referees and Aaron Karp. Support for my research on Russia–China relations from the Norwegian Defense Ministry is deeply appreciated.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a Research Director and Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). He is also a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the Brookings Institution (Washington, DC) and a Senior Research Associate at the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI, Paris). His research on Russia-China relations is supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. His weekly column appears in Eurasia Daily Monitor.

Notes

1 Chinese media provided just bare facts of this proceedings; see Shi Xiaomeng, ‘Russia Vetoes Draft UN Resolution on Setting Up Tribunal for Crashed Malaysian Plane MH17’, Xinghuanet, 30 July 2015; one sharp Russian comment is Alexander Baunov, ‘Non-guilty Plea: Why Russia is Against the International Tribunal on the Boeing Tragedy’, Carnegie.ru, 29 July 2015, (in Russian).

2 A good example of such concerns is Fedor Lukyanov, ‘Unpredictable China’, Forbes.ru, 14 October 2015, (in Russian).

3 See Bruce Stokes, ‘Russia, Putin held in Low Regard around the World’, Global Attitudes and Trends, Pew Research Center, 5 August 2015. These data correspond with opinion polls in Russia, which show the increase of positive attitude to China from 55 per cent in November 2013 to 64 per cent in November 2014 and 83 per cent in November 2015; see ‘Possibility of Military Clashes between Russia and NATO, and China’, Levada.ru , 21 November 2015, (in Russian).

4 Characteristic in this regard was the publication by the Chinese official news agency Xinhua of a critical analysis (in Russian) of the prospects of Russian economy immediately after the working visit of Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev to Beijing in December 2015; see Yu Zhao, ‘Is Russia able to Pass the Test of the Difficult Crisis?’, Xinhua Russian News, 17 December 2015, (in Russian). This signal produced a bout of anxiety in Moscow; see Andrei Ivanov, ‘China Writes off the Russian Government’, Svobodnaya pressa, 18 December 2015, (in Russian).

5 As will be shown later, the preparations for this intervention were rushed after Putin's return from the military parade in Beijing on 3 September towards the deadline set by his speech at the UN General Assembly on 28 September; on this connection, see Shannon Tiezzi, ‘Does China Approve of Russia's Airstrikes in Syria?’, The Diplomat, 8 October 2015.

6 For a thoughtful evaluation of the ‘peaceful rise' proposition, see Barry Buzan, ‘China in International Society: Is “Peaceful Rise” Possible?’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2010), pp. 5–36; an influential critical view is John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Can China Rise Peacefully?’, The National Interest, 25 October 2014, who certainly elaborated the paradigm of geopolitical rivalry in his classical and recently revised opus The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 2001).

7 See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2012), on pp. 77 and 85.

8 See Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and New Geopolitics (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs and Brookings Institution, 2008), p. 2.

9 See Douglas E. Schoen and Melik Kaylan, The Russia-China Axis: The New Cold War and America's Crisis of Leadership (New York: Encounter Books, 2014).

10 See George Soros, ‘A Partnership with China to Avoid World War’, The New York Review of Books, LXII/12 (9 July–12 August 2015), pp. 4–8. Discussing the strength and weakness of Russia–China partnership at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Japan in December 2015, I also encountered the questions about the need for and the means of splitting this alliance-in-the making.

11 Moscow expected to gain a boost for its status by hosting the summits of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Ufa in July 2015, but had little success; see on that Alexei Malashenko, ‘Dead-ends of Non-Western Integrations’, Novaya gazeta, 7 August 2015, (in Russian).

12 My evaluation of the risks inherent to such a vision is in Pavel K. Baev, ‘Leading in the Concert of Great Powers’, in Elana Wilson Rowe and Stine Torjesen (eds), The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 58–68. This worldview is reconfirmed in the new National Security Strategy, approved by Putin in the last day of 2015; see Mark Galeotti, ‘Russia's New National Security Strategy: Familiar Themes, Gaudy Rhetoric’, War on the Rocks, 4 January 2016.

13 One useful analysis of the not entirely rational centrality of that issue is Andrew C. Kuchins, ‘US-Russia Relations: Constraints of Mismatched Strategic Outlooks’, in Anders Åslund, Sergei Guriev and Andrew C. Kuchins (eds), Russia after the Global Economic Crisis (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2010), pp. 241–256.

14 On the ambivalent responses in the US on this proposition, see Cheng Li and Lucy Xu, ‘Chinese Enthusiasm and American Cynicism: The “New Type of Great Power Relations”’, China & US Focus, 4 December 2014.

15 In Putin's ‘narrow circle' of courtiers, Vladimir Yakunin (who was abruptly expelled from this circle in October 2015) argued most passionately against the vices of globalization and Nikolai Patrushev elaborated on US plans for destroying Russia; see on that Danila Galperovich, ‘Vladimir Putin's Inner Circle Decries the USA’, Voice of America, 13 August 2015.

16 See Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner, ‘Who lost Russia (this time)? Vladimir Putin', The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 2015), pp. 167–187.

17 Dmitri Trenin, ‘Russia Breaks with the Unipolar System', Carnegie.ru, 19 March 2015, (in Russian) examines the motivations behind this determined challenge to the global system; my views on the departure from own principles are in Pavel K. Baev, ‘Russia Insists on Own Impunity, Gains Pariah Status’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 3 August 2015.

18 Useful overview of historical grievances in the context of present-day tensions is Elena Masyuk, ‘To Love a Dragon’, Novaya gazeta, 4 July 2015, (in Russian).

19 One influential expert view on this threat assessment is Michael O'Hanlon, ‘We Need to Get Serious about Russia, Now’, Politico Magazine, 12 July 2015.

20 For in-depth research of this trend, visit the website of the East Asian Peace Program at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/eap/).

21 Several useful examinations of this premise can be found in the special section on the East Asian peace in the Winter 2015 issue of Global Asia; see, in particular, Stein Tønnesson, ‘Explaining East Asia Developmental Peace: The Dividends of Economic Growth’, Global Asia, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter 2015), pp. xx.

22 See Ulrich Speck, ‘Russia's Challenge to the International Order', Intersection, 13 August 2015.

23 Opinion polls registered the increase from 32 per cent in December 2014 to 48 per cent in December 2015 in the share of families that experienced a decline in income; see Marina Krasilnikova, ‘A Hard Year: How the Russians Deal with the Crisis’, RBC.ru, 25 December 2015, (in Russian). At the same time, Putin's approval rating in December 2015 remained at the astounding level of 85 per cent; see ‘December Ratings of Approval and Trust’, Levada.ru, 23 December 2015, (in Russian).

24 The best source on Putin's character in the opinion of this author, is Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Washington, DC: Brookings Press, 2015); this second edition of their book takes into account his performance in crisis management in 2014.

25 On the emergence of the political clique known as the ‘Party of Princelings', see Jeremy Page, ‘Children of the Revolution’, Wall Street Journal, 26 November 2011.

26 The logic of Putin's decision to reclaim the presidency and the consequences of that comeback are examined in Vladimir Gelman, ‘The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 32, No 2 (forthcoming).

27 One point that came up repeatedly in my interviews with experts and officials in Beijing in November 2014, was the comparison between alleged Western manipulations of the ‘Euro-Maidan' in Kiev and the ‘Umbrella movement' in Hong Kong.

28 On the convenience for Chinese leaders of Putin's sharp anti-American rhetoric, see Michael Schuman, ‘Xi and Putin convenient Friendship’, New Yorker, 15 May 2015.

29 One sharp examination of these campaigns is Stein Tønnesson, ‘WWII Celebration Plans by Putin and Xi to Score Points’, YaleGlobal, 13 November 2014.

30 On the various political motivations in the use of history, see Olga Malinova, ‘The Past that Stays: What the Politicians Look for in History’, Forbes.ru, 2 February 2015, (in Russian).

31 On the remarkable reluctance in the Russian political class to contemplate the trajectory of development toward a plausible future, see Andrei Yakovlev, ‘Crisis in the Heads: Russian Elite has lost the Image of Future’, Forbes.ru, 25 December 2015, (in Russian).

32 This argument is critically examined in Tatyana Stanovaya, ‘Naryshkin Responds: What is the Meaning of the Threats to the West from the Chairman of the State Duma’, Slon.ru, 10 August 2015, (in Russian).

33 Yan Chen, deputy head of Russian Studies Center at the East China University, argues that regime survival is now the key determinant of Russia's domestic and foreign policy, adding that from the point of view of economic development, China has time at its disposal, and Russia does not. See Yan Chen, ‘On China-Russia Cooperation’, Lecture at the School of Civil Education, Polit.ru, 3 July 2015, (in Russian).

34 One example of the latter interpretation is Vasily Kashin, ‘What are the Purges in Chinese Special Services About’, Carnegie.ru, 3 March 2015, (in Russian).

35 See William H. Overholt, ‘The politics of China's Anti-corruption Campaign', East Asia Forum, 15 September 2015.

36 A useful comparison can be found in Grigory Golosov, ‘A Real Binder: Why Russia and China cannot Curb Corruption’, Slon.ru, 28 April 2015, (in Russian).

37 The change in the professional background with the advancement of a new generation of Chinese leadership was identified already at the start of the decade; see Amanda Liu, ‘Lawyers are taking over China's Government’, Newsweek, 7 September 2009. On the prevalence of officers from special services in Putin's government, see Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap, ‘The Siloviki in Putin's Russia: Who They are and What They Want’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter 2007), pp. 83–92; one more recent snapshot is Fred Weir, ‘Oligarchs out, siloviki in? Why Russia's Foreign Policy is Hardening’, Christian Science Monitor, 2 February 2015.

38 My mid-way assessment of the progress in executing the reform is in Pavel K. Baev, ‘The Continuing Revolution in Russian Military Affairs: Towards 2020’, in Maria Lipman and Nikolai Petrov (eds), Russia in 2020: Scenarios for the Future. (Washington, DC: CEIP, 2011), pp. 349–370; I have recently revisited this issue in Pavel K. Baev, ‘Ukraine: A Test for Russian Military Reform’, Russie. Nei.Reports No. 19, May 2015 (IFRI: Paris).

39 One competent evaluation of the current military-economic over-stretch is Sergei Guriev, ‘Russia's Indefensible Military Budget’, Project Syndicate, 14 May 2015.

40 On the long pause in US investment in the nuclear capabilities, see Steven Pifer, ‘Obama's Faltering Nuclear Legacy: The 3 R's’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 2015), pp. 101–118.

41 A lengthy interview with a survivor of that battle appeared in fiercely independent Novaya gazeta; see Elena Kostychenko, ‘We All knew what we are Going into and what could Happen’, Novaya gazeta, 4 March 2015, (in Russian).

42 See Matthew Bodner and Aaron Mehta, ‘Op Tempo, Sustainment Flaws Hit Russian Air Force', Defense News, 12 July 2015.

43 See Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘What to Expect from Russian Pacific Fleet in 2015', The Diplomat, 2 March 2015.

44 On the Mediterranean exercises, see James Holmes, ‘Why are Chinese and Russian Ships Prowling the Mediterranean?’, Foreign Policy, 15 May 2015; one useful Russian evaluation of the maritime disputes in East Asia is Andrei Gubin, ‘Military Multi-polarity in the South-China Sea’, RIAC Analysis, 1 July 2015, (in Russian).

45 See Paul N. Schwartz, ‘Russia Announces sale of S-400 to China', CSIS Blog, 30 June 2015.

46 This argument is developed in Vasily Kashin, ‘The Delivery of S-400 to China: A New Front of the Cold War?', Carnegie.ru, 19 April 2015, (in Russian).

47 One Moscow expert, who persistently elaborates on these concerns, is Aleksandr Khramchihin; see, for instance, ‘Courting a New Ally Moscow could Alienate a Strategic Partner', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 7 August 2015, (in Russian).

48 See Vasily Kashin, ‘Modernization of the PLA: A Matter of Concern?', RIAC Analysis, 8 October 2014, (in Russian).

49 There is, for that matter, hardly any insightful interpretation of the on-going reshuffling in the Chinese military leadership; see on that Cheng Li, ‘Promoting “Young Guards”: The Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leadership’, China Leadership Monitor, 13 August 2015.

50 On the praise for Russia's pro-active move in Chinese social networks, see Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, ‘Chinese Netizens are Cheering for Putin's Syria Campaign’, Foreign Policy, 16 October 2015.

51 Chinese official publication China Military Online found it opportune to disprove rumours about planning an intervention referring to anonymous ‘scholars'; see Zhang Tao, ‘Scholars Refute Rumor about China Military Intervention in Syria’, China Military Online, 13 October 2015.

52 One competent and typically upbeat Russian evaluation is Alexei Grivach, ‘What the Gas Contract with China means for Russia’, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 3 (2014), (in Russian).

53 For useful elaboration on this never concluded deal, see Alexei Mastepanov, ‘On the Features of the Contract of the Century’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 October 2014, (in Russian).

54 My interviews in Beijing in October 2014 were affirmative on the lack of interest. The agreement was nevertheless interpreted in Europe as a challenge to its energy security; see Lucy Hornby, ‘Putin Snubs Europe with Siberian Gas Deal that Bolsters China Ties’, Financial Times, 10 November 2014.

55 See Vladimir Milov, ‘Russia's New Energy Alliances: Mythology versus Reality’, Russie.Nei.Visions No. 66 (Paris: IFRI), July 2015.

56 See Maria Bondarenko and Lydmila Podobedova, ‘Putin Instructed the Government to Provide State Support to the “Sila Sibiri” pipeline', RBC.ru, 10 August 2015, (in Russian).

57 This change of attitude is identified in Edward C. Chow and Michael Lelyveld, ‘Russia-China Gas Deal and Redeal’, CSIS Commentary, 11 May 2015.

58 One competent evaluation of the impact of the sanctions on Gazprom's projects oriented towards Asia is Mikhail Krutihin, ‘US Sanctions have Cancelled Gazprom's New Projects in Asia', Finanz.ru, 13 August 2015, (in Russian).

59 The lucrative contract was originally granted without any bidding to Stroigazmontazh company controlled by Arkady Rotenberg, one of the corrupt oligarchs included in the United States and EU sanctions lists; see Timofei Dzyadko and Lyudmila Podobedova, ‘Gazprom Cancelled the Largest Contract in its History’, RBC.ru , 29 November 2015, (in Russian).

60 In the words of Yuri Soloviev, deputy chairman of the VTB bank, ‘China's ambiguous position regarding Russian banks in the wake of US and EU sanctions is a key issue holding back progress toward greater bilateral cooperation’. See Yuri Soloviev, ‘Unlocking the Potential of Russia-Asia Cooperation’, FinanceAsia, 16 June 2015.

61 See ‘In the first half of 2015, the volume of accumulated Chinese direct investments in Russia's economy was above 8 billion dollars’, Russian Ministry of Economic Development, 2 September 2015, (in Russian).

62 See ‘On the current economic situation and foreign economic relations’, Russian Ministry of Economic Development, 14 December 2015, (in Russian).

63 See Sergei Tsyplakov, ‘Downward Trend in Russian-Chinese Trade’, Interfax, 3 August 2015, (in Russian).

64 Russian officials were ready to acknowledge only temporary corrections in this big political goal; see Olga Solovyeva, ‘Changes in China's Foreign Trade are Dangerous for Russia', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 July 2015, (in Russian). On the Russian consent for China's expansion in Central Asia, see Elena Kuzmina, ‘Are the Eurasian Integration and the Silk Road Compatible?’, Russian Council on International Affairs, 26 November 2015, (in Russian).

65 Political support for this high-cost project secured by Gennady Timchenko (one of the oligarchs personally sanctioned by United States for alleged ties with the Kremlin) has been crucial from the initial stage; see Hitoki Nakagawa, ‘Honey-moon for Russia-China cooperation in the Arctic’, Asahi Shimbun, 15 May 2015.

66 See Timofei Dzyadko, ‘Russian Energy Complex has Found New Chinese Partners’, RBC.ru, 17 December 2015, (in Russian).

67 For a useful overview of these plans and programs, see Juha Jokela (ed.), ‘Arctic Security Matters', EU ISS Report No. 24, 17 June 2015.

68 One sharp reflection on this in the Japanese media is Bjorn Duben, ‘Why Russia's Swing Toward China is a Mirage’, The Japan Times, 10 July 2015.

69 We have recently examined this triangular interplay in Pavel K. Baev and Stein Tønnesson, ‘Can Russia Keep its Special Ties with Vietnam while Moving Closer and Closer to China?', International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (May 2015), pp. 312–325.

70 Russian Foreign Ministry dismissed in an unusually harsh way the Japanese demarche against the third visit of Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev to the Kuril islands in August 2015, which effectively derailed the plan for organizing Putin's visit to Japan; see on that Vasily Golovin, ‘Japan Remembers the Bombing of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk', Moscow Echo, 12 August 2015, (in Russian).

71 See Vladimir Muhin, ‘Chinese Marines Land in Primorye: Armies are Preparing for Conflicts in Asia-Pacific Region', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 August 2015, (in Russian).

72 There is much analyses on the root causes and possible aggravation of this slowdown; see for instance, Mike Bird, ‘China's Economy is Hitting a Wall’, Business Insider, 18 June 2015. The analysis on the possible impact on China's policy has only begun; see David Dollar, ‘China's Rise as a Regional and Global Power Enters a New Phase’, Order from Chaos, 20 June 2015.

73 A peculiar disagreement about defining the Russian threat was developing during Summer 2015 in Washington DC between the top brass, who insisted on the term ‘existential', and politicians, who preferred softer terms; see Karoun Demirjan, ‘Russia or ISIS? Who is America's No. 1 enemy?', Washington Post, 4 August 2015.

74 One sharp analysis of these risks can be found in the European Leadership Network report; see Ian Kearns, Lukas Kuelsa and Thomas Frear, ‘Preparing for the Worst: Are Russian and NATO Military Exercises Making War in Europe more likely?’, ELN Report, 12 August 2015.

75 As Aleksandr Golts, one of Russian leading military experts, argues a technical catastrophe similar to the August 2000 Kursk submarine sinking (which even then many admirals were inclined to blame on a hostile NATO hit-and-run) could today lead to a full-blown conflict. See Aleksandr Golts, ‘If Kursk Sank Today, it could Set off War', The Moscow Times, 17 August 2015.

76 One sober Russian assessment is Alexander Gabuev, ‘Turn to Nowhere: The Results of Russian Policy in Asia in 2015', Garnegie.ru, 29 December 2015, (in Russian); for a sceptical Western view, see ‘Snow Job', The Economist, 2 January 2016.

77 This divergence is examined in William Courtney, David Sedney, Kenneth Yalowitz and Stephen Young, ‘How Durable is the China-Russia “Friendship”?’ The RAND blog, 13 May 2015.