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ABSTRACT
The effort to degrade and defeat the Islamic State is like many other multilateral military efforts – characterized by widely varying contributions to the effort. This article seeks to understand the patterns of contributions. Three sets of explanations are applied: the lessons of Afghanistan and Libya, variations in how potential contributors feel the threat posed by the Islamic State, and domestic political dynamics. While there may be some political processes that overlap with the big lessons and with the threat of the Islamic State, the patterns of contributions thus far suggest that the key drivers of reactions to the Islamic State are the desire not to repeat Afghanistan combined with some impetus provided by Islamic State attacks in the various homelands. The conclusion suggests some policy implications as well as some ideas for future research.
Acknowledgements
I am most grateful to Stephanie Soiffer for her research assistance and to Carleton University’s Paterson Chair for funding her work. I am also indebted to my co-author on the NATO project,Footnote50 David Auerswald, for the many conversations that inform my perspective here.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Stephen Saideman holds the Paterson Chair in International Affairs at Carleton University's Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. His most recent books are NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (with David Auerswald) and Adapting in the Dust: Lessons Learned from Canada's War in Afghanista. He tweets at @smsaideman and blogs at saideman.blogspot.com.
Notes
1. Criticisms focused on both the conduct of the air campaign and on the aftermath. Some criticized the airstrikes for causing civilian casualties, C.J. Chivers and Eric Schmitt, ‘In Strikes On Libya By Nato, An Unspoken Civilian Toll’, New York Times, 17 December 2011, p.17. Others, especially Russia and China, were upset that the mission went beyond protecting civilians as it facilitated regime change. Geir lfstein and Hege Føsund Christiansen, ‘The Legality of the Nato Bombing in Libya’, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 62, No. 1 (2013), pp.159–71.
Others criticize the effort for being incomplete – for ending before Libya had stable institutions. For broader criticisms see Alan J. Kuperman, ‘A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing Nato’s Libya Campaign’, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Summer 2013), pp.105–36; and Horace Campbell, Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya (New York: NYU Press, 2013).
2. NATO has institutions where all members have a say in decisions: the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee. It also has clear chains of command running from Brussels to Mons (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe) to Naples (regional command). Coalitions of the willing, even those that use American combatant commands as a backbone, lack such clear input processes for members.
3. For a good summary of Russian efforts up to the date this article was submitted, see Michel Birnbaum, ‘Weeks After “Pullout” from Syria, Russian Military Is As Busy As Ever’, Washington Post, 12 April 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/weeks-after-pullout-from-syria-russian-military-is-as-busy-as-ever/2016/04/11/d150a004-fd77-11e5-a569-2c9e819c14e4_story.html?tid=ss_tw (accessed 12 April 2016).
4. Orianna Pawlyk, ‘Air Force F-16s Fly the Most Sorties Against ISIS, B-1s Drop Most Bombs,’ AirForce Times, 24 March 2016, http://www.airforcetimes.com/story/military/2016/03/24/air-force-f-16s-fly-most-sorties-against-isis-b-1s-drop-most-bombs/82212394/ (accessed 28 March 2016).
5. The data for the figure comes from http://airwars.org/data/ (accessed 22 April 2016).
6. Kathleen J. McInnis, ‘Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State’, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, 13 April 2016.
7. This table is largely based on McInnis, ‘Coalition Contributions’ with some updating. Other sources indicate only twelve countries have conducted airstrikes, Hermela Aregawi, ‘Operation Inherent Resolve: A Year Fighting ISIL’, Al Jazeera, 14 August 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/third-rail/articles/2015/8/14/operation-inherent-resolve-a-year-of-fighting-isis.html (accessed 28 March 2016).
8. Belgium participating in the bombing effort with six F-16s from October 2014 to June 2015. With the attack in Brussels, Belgium has announced that it will return the F-16s and re-join the bombing campaign in July, http://www.mil.be/nl/irak-0 (accessed 22 April 2016).
9. Canada was, besides the USA, the only country willing to bomb targets in Iraq and Syria until recently. Canada pulled its 6 F-18s out of the bombing effort in February 2016.
10. Denmark withdrew its F-16s in October 2015 but has decided to return them.
11. I address the Special Operations Forces occasionally, but since information is scarce about the secret operatives, I focus on the more public efforts.
12. The data for the figure comes from http://airwars.org/data/ (accessed 22 April 2016).
13. David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
14. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).
15. Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan (note 7), p.31, quoting an officer at NATO headquarters in Mons, Belgium.
16. The phrase is deceptive since it does not restrict countries from deploying Special Operations Forces or training units. It is meant to convey that a country is not deploying conventional troops to engage in combat operations.
17. For recent work that delineates the lessons to learn from these missions, Mungo Melvin, ‘Learning the Strategic Lessons from Afghanistan’, The RUSI Journal Vol. 157, No. 2 (2012), pp.56–61. Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga and James Russell, (eds), Military adaptation in Afghanistan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013); Kjell Engelbrekt, Marcus Mohlin and Charlotte Wagnsson, The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign (New York: Routledge, 2013); Christopher S. Chivviss, Toppling Qaddafi Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); and Danielle L. Lupton, ‘Lessons in Failure: Libya Five Years Later’, Poltical Violence @ a Glance, 15 April 2016, https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/04/15/lessons-in-failure-libya-five-years-later/ (accessed 23 April 2016).
18. The realization that Canada was paying a higher price than most of the allies perhaps helped to undermine Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s enthusiasm for the war. See Stewart Bell, ‘Memo to Stephen Harper in 2007 Downplayed a Canadian Casualty Rate in Afghanistan up to 10 Times Higher than Allies’, National Post, 18 June 2013, http://news.nationalpost.com/news/memo-to-stephen-harper-in-2007-downplayed-a-canadian-casualty-rate-in-afghanistan-up-to-10-times-higher-than-allies (accessed 13 April 2016) for the realization, and for Harper’s declining interest, see Stephen M. Saideman, Adapting in the Dust: Lessons Learned from Canada's War in Afghanistan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016).
19. Spain, Hungary and other relative free riders rarely get as much attention for their caveats and other restrictions.
20. Roger Cohen, ‘Leading From Behind’, New York Times, 31 October 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/01/opinion/01iht-edcohen01.html?_r=0 (accessed 13 April 2016).
21. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
22. For the sake of brevity, I do not address the patterns of change over time, but others might to see if the rise and fall of ISIS is associated with increased or decreased participation.
23. For a series of figures and data on the airstrikes, see Airwars.Org at http://airwars.org/data/ (accessed 13 April 2016). As of April 19, the USA has engaged in 3512 strikes on targets in Syria, and the rest (Canada, Australia, France, UK, Saudi, Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain and Turkey) account for 227. The contrast with the Iraq effort is stark as the two lowest efforts and, as it happens, the two interrupted missions, Belgium’s and Denmark’s, combine to be more than the total of the non-US strikes in Syria.
24. Again, see Airwars.org. Also, see Nick Thompson, ‘War on ISIS: Why Arab States Aren’t Doing More’, CNN, 17 December 17 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/10/middleeast/isis-what-arab-states-are-doing/ (accessed 13 April 2016).
25. For a thorough examination of the foreign fighter challenge, see the US House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee, ‘Final Report of the Task Force on Combatting Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel’, September 2015.
26. Italy is listed as having provided fighter aircraft, but the available reports do not list Italy as having engaged in airstrikes.
27. Turkey’s airstrikes have been aimed in large part at the coalition’s allies – the Kurds – rather than the Islamic State.
28. The data on foreign fighters comes from The Soufran Group, Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq, December 2015, soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf (accessed 13 April 2016). The Bahrain data comes from Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, ‘Foreign Fighters in Iraq & Syria: Where Do They Come From?’ http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html (accessed 13 April 2016).
29. I have placed the countries with no data on foreign fighters in the lowest category given that it is most likely that countries with no data are those with less severe foreign fighter problems. To be clear, in all of the correlations reported, those countries with missing data are dropped.
30. The correlations reported here are just to provide an idea, as the data used to do these modest analyses is hardly complete. The observations included are those listed Table 2: the countries likely to become involved based on proximity and then including those distant countries that are involved.
31. Aaron Y. Zelin, ‘Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; Steep Rise Among Western Europeans’, ICSR Insight, 17 December 2013, http://icsr.info/2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fighters-syria-steep-riseamong-western-europeans/ (accessed 23 April 2016).
32. Data on attacks comes from Ray Sanchez, Tim Lister, Mark Bixler, Sean O'Key, Michael Hogenmiller and Mohammed Tawfeeq, ‘ISIS Goes Global: 90 Attacks In 21 Countries Have Killed Nearly 1,400 People’, CNN, 17 December 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-around-the-world/ (accessed 13 April 2016).
33. Jordan joined the coalition before being attacked and then became more involved, if only briefly, after one of its pilots was tortured and killed after crashing in IS territory.
34. Ben Doherty and others, ‘France Launches “Massive” Airstrike on Isis Stronghold of Raqqa’, The Guardian, 16 November 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/16/france-launches-massive-airstrike-on-isis-stronghold-in-syria-after-paris-attack (accessed 5 April 2016).
35. Peter Carty, ‘Belgium Confirms It Will Resume F-16 Airstrikes on Isis in the Wake of Brussels Attacks’, International Business Times, 25 March 2016, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/belgium-confirms-it-will-resume-f-16-airstrikes-isis-wake-brussels-attacks-1551595 (accessed 4 April 2016).
36. Actually, many countries have been hit by Islamic State attacks but have not joined the coalition’s most intense efforts, including Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Tunisia.
37. Sonia Farid, ‘Egypt vs. ISIS: Is Sinai now an official battlefield?’ Al Arabiya English, 5 April 2016, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2015/07/11/Egypt-vs-ISIS-Is-Sinai-now-an-official-battlefield-.html (accessed 5 April 2016). Also, see Jared Malsin, ‘Inside Egypt’s Blacked-Out War With ISIS-Affiliated Militants’, Time, 27 December 2015, http://time.com/4157435/isis-isil-egypt-sinai/ (accessed 5 April 2016).
38. David Schenker, ‘Lebanon: The Syrian War’s Next Casualty?’, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 10 December 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/lebanon-the-syrian-wars-next-casualty (accessed 5 April 2015).
39. Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan (note 7), Ch. 8.
40. Tom Batchelor, ‘Dutch Declare War On Isis With Vow To Send Fighter Jets To Bomb Syria’, Express, 29 January 2016, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/639252/Islamic-State-Netherlands-send-fighter-jets-fight-ISIS-Daesh-Syria (accessed 5 April 2016).
41. For an analysis of similar balancing acts but focusing on countries’ relationships with the USA and how the requirements of that relationship interact with domestic politics, see Stéfanie Von Hlatky, American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
42. Regardless of using the total number of refugees or the natural log of refugees received or interacting with regime type, results were far from significant. I used data from the United Nations High Commission on Refugees: http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series (accessed 13 April 2016).
43. For good reviews, see Jack S. Levy, ‘Domestic Politics and War’, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1988), pp.653–73; James D. Fearon, ‘Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations’, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1998), pp.289–313; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, ‘Domestic Explanations of International Relations’, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2012), pp.161–81.
44. Sarah E. Kreps, ‘Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for Nato-Led Operations in Afghanistan’, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 6, No. 3 (July 2010), pp.191–215.
45. Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan (note 7).
46. Brian C. Rathbun, Partisan Interventions : European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
47. Reports have varied, but see the following: Carla Babb, ‘How Involved Are US Special Forces in Fight Against Islamic State?’, Voice of America, 22 January 2016, http://www.voanews.com/content/united-states-special-forces-fight-islamic-state/3159470.html (accessed 15 April 2016). Chris Hughes, ‘SAS Heores Blown Up in ISIS Ambush on Top Secret Mission in Iraq’, Mirror, 5 February 2016, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/sas-heroes-blown-up-isis-7318678 (accessed 15 April 2016); Cameron Stewart, ‘Ramadi: Australian Special Forces Helped to Retake Iraqi City’, The Australian, 31 December 2015, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/ramadi-australian-special-forces-helped-retake-iraqi-city/news-story/4a1dc79a2583b7527dff3eef9bb15de8 (accessed 15 April 2016). David Pugliese, ‘Canadian Special Forces Help Fight Off “Significant” ISIL Attack in Iraq’, Ottawa Citizen, 18 December 2015, http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/breaking-canadian-special-forces-in-ground-battle-with-isil-in-northern-iraq (accessed 15 April 2016). Associated Press, ‘Libyan Officials: French Special Forces on Ground Fighting ISIS’, Military.com, 24 February 2016, http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/02/24/libya-officials-french-special-forces-ground-fighting-is.html (accessed 15 April 2016).
48. The coding here focuses on late 2014 and does not include changes since then. Polity IV data was used to code democracies from other regimes (Armenia fell just short of the standard level of 6 on – 10–10 polity scale). For the dataset, see http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html (accessed 22 April 2016). To code presidential or parliamentary, I used www.semipresidentialism.com, and recoded semi-Presidential systems as Presidential since most tend to give the executive much latitude in military affairs. In the set of cases here, all of the cases in this column are semi-presidential except for the USA
49. Sarah Kreps, ‘When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan’, Security Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2008), pp.531–67 and Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions After the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); and Patricia A. Weitsman, Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, And Institutions Of Interstate Violence (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).
50. Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan (note 7).