The pitfalls of learning from historical experience: the British Army’s debate on useful lessons for the war in Afghanistan

ABSTRACT

Why do armies often fail to transmit and coherently apply lessons from their past? Using the concept of ‘layered organizational culture’, this article formulates a pioneering theoretical argument to explain how military organizations learn from their historical experience. Analysing empirical material from internal debates within the British Army, the article observes an inherent incompatibility between lessons gleaned from, on the one hand, the Anglo-Afghan Wars and, on the other hand, British counterinsurgency campaigns after 1945. This is less a result of actual differences in the external context but of changing organizational ‘filters’: different layers of military organizational culture result in different ways of selecting and transmitting relevant lessons from warfare experience. Older and newer cultural layers can interact and thus contribute to incoherent strategy-making in the present. This argument is illustrated by reviewing the layering process within the British Army since the 19th century. The article shows a shift from emphasizing the specificity of local contexts towards the application of universal principles. This has contemporary relevance: co-exisiting yet incompatible historical lessons contributed to significant incoherence in operational strategy during the initial months of the British deployment in Afghanistan in 2006.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the editor as well as the three anonymous reviewers for providing detailed feedback. Parts of this research are based on the doctoral thesis Using Historical Experience: The British Army and the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan (EUI 2012). Acknowledgement goes to the doctoral supervisor, Prof. Pascal Vennesson, for his precious support during this project. Earlier versions of this manuscript have been presented at the research colloquium of the Department of International Relations and European Integration at the University of Stuttgart (13 May 2013), at the seventh ECPR General Conference in Bordeaux (4–7 September 2013), and at the workshop ‘Knowledge Production in Conflict and Intervention: The Art of Composing the Picture’ at the Hugo Valentin Centre of the University of Uppsala (2–3 June 2014). I thank the participants and organizers of these events, especially Gilles Bertrand, Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, Mathias Delori, Cathleen Kantner and Roland Kostić, for valuable comments and feedback.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Note on contributor

Eric Sangar is a FNRS Research Fellow at the Tocqueville Chair in Security Policy of the University of Namur, where he pursues a research project on the socializing effects of collective memory in discourses on contemporary armed conflicts. Previously, he worked as a research associate at King’s College London, as a Fernand Braudel postdoctoral fellow at the Institute of Strategic Research (IRSEM) in Paris, and as a research associate at the Department of International Relations and European Integration of the University of Stuttgart. He holds an MA degree in International Security from Sciences Po Paris and a doctoral degree from the European University Institute in Florence. The book version of his thesis, entitled ‘Historical Experience: Burden or Bonus in Today’s Wars?’, was published by Rombach in 2014.

Notes

1. Fred M. Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013).

2. John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005 (2002)).

3. Eric Sangar, Historical Experience—Burden or Bonus in Today’s Wars? The British Army and the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan (Freiburg: Rombach, 2014), pp.114–36.

4. This number is exhaustive. The criteria include all uses of historical experience pertaining to conflicts fought by the British to defend the colonial empire; Northern Ireland is excluded, because it cannot be considered a ‘historical’, that is a terminated conflict.

5. Paul Adams, ‘The Military View of the Empire 1870–1899: As Seen through the Journal of the Royal United Services Institution’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 143, No. 3 (1998), pp.58–64; Harald Potempa, ‘Der Kleine Krieg in der deutschen Militärpublizistik: Das Militär-Wochenblatt 1871–1900’, in Uwe Hartmann, Helmut R. Hammerich, and Claus von Rosen (eds), Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2010 (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2010).

6. Kate Utting, ‘Beyond Joint—Professional Military Education for the 21st Century: The United Kingdom’s Post-Defence Training Review Advanced Command and Staff Course’, Defence Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2009), p.310.

7. Prior to the ISAF deployment, the British Army had fought three wars in Afghanistan (1839–1842; 1878–1880; 1919).

8. Land Warfare Development Group, Britain and Russia in Afghanistan—Historical Lessons (Warminster: Land Warfare Centre, 2010), p.39.

9. Ibid.

10. A. Crawley, ‘Are the Lessons Learned by the British During the Three Afghan Wars Relevant Today?’, Defence Research Paper, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham, 2006, pp.21–2.

11. Keith Stanski, ‘“So These Folks Are Aggressive”: An Orientalist Reading of “Afghan Warlords”’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2009), pp.73–94; Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp.143–70.

12. P.D. Fryer, ‘What Can a Historic Analysis of the Conflicts within the Pashtun Tribe Tell Us About Afghanistan Today?’, Defence Research Paper, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham, 2008, pp.40–1.

13. A. Crawley, Are the Lessons Learned by the British During the Three Afghan Wars Relevant Today? (note 10), p.19.

14. D. Orr Ewing, ‘Compare and Contrast Britain’s Current Involvement in Afghanistan with the Anglo-Afghan Wars and the Russian Campaign’, Defence Research Paper, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham, 2007, p.32.

15. See: Chris Tripodi, ‘Peacemaking through Bribes or Cultural Empathy? The Political Officer and Britain’s Strategy Towards the North-West Frontier, 1901–1945’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2008), pp.123–51.

16. R.C. Taylor, ‘Does the British Empire Experience of the Pathans Offer Any Lessons to Current British Operations Amongst the Pashtun?’, Defence Research Paper, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham, 2009, p.10.

17. Emma Frost, ‘Is a Lack of Cultural Awareness Undermining the United Kingdom’s Efforts to Achieve Success in Iraq and Afghanistan?’, Defence Research Paper, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham 2009, p.36.

18. A.J.H. Lefever, ‘Is Current British Military Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Doctrine Still Valid within the Contemporary Operating Environment of Afghanistan?’, Defence Research Paper, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham, 2008, p.23.

19. R.C. O’Connor, ‘What Is the Contemporary Relevance of the British Counter Insurgency Campaigns of the Post Colonial Period?’, Defence Research Paper, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham, 2003, pp.29–30.

20. Land Warfare Development Group, Historical Lessons from Gated/Protected Communities in Counter-Insurgency Operations (Warminster: Land Warfare Centre, 2010), p.1.

21. Land Warfare Development Group, Historical Lessons from the Use of Indigenous Forces in Counter-Insurgency Operations—Ten Case Studies (Warminster: Land Warfare Centre, 2010), p.50.

22. Learning is usually defined as ‘the acquisition of new knowledge or behavior that leads to a change in behavior’. See: William W. Jarosz and Joseph S. Nye, ‘The Shadow of the Past: Learning from History in National Security Decision Making,’ in Philip E. Tetlock et al. (eds), Behavior, Society, and International Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.130.

23. Theo Farrell, Frans P.B. Osinga and James A. Russell (eds), Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

24. Sergio Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge: Organizational Learning in the British Army?’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 37, Vo. 1 (2013), pp.30–64; Daniel Marston, ‘Adaptation in the Field: the British Army’s Difficult Campaign in Iraq’, Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2010), pp.71–84; Victoria Nolan, Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency: The British Army and Small War Strategy since World War II (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012).

25. A.R.D. Sharpe, ‘“Great Britain Has Lost an Empire and Not Yet Found a Role.”: How Well Has the British Experience Prepared It for Its Self-Appointed Role as Principal Advisor to the United States on the Imposition of Pax Americana?’ (London: Royal College of Defence Studies, 2005); Robert M. Cassidy, Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice after the Cold War (Westport: Praeger, 2004), p.77.

26. Jonathan B.A. Bailey, ‘Military History and the Pathology of Lessons Learned: The Russo-Japanese War, a Case Study’, in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich (eds), The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

27. John Kiszely, ‘Learning About Counter-Insurgency,’ The RUSI Journal, Vol. 151, No. 6 (2006), pp.16–21; Richard Hart Sinnreich, ‘Awkward Partners: Military History and American Military Education’, in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich (eds), The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

28. Elizabeth Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995), pp.69–70.

29. Jeffrey W. Legro, ‘Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II’, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1994), p.116.

30. John A. Lynn, Battle, a History of Combat and Culture (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003); Theo Farrell, The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005); Theo Farrell, ‘Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2001), pp.63–102.

31. Mats Alvesson, Understanding Organizational Culture (London: Sage, 2013), pp.138–9.

32. James P. Walsh and Gerardo Rivera Ungson, ‘Organizational Memory’, The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1991), pp.64–5.

33. Peter H. Wilson, ‘Defining Military Culture’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 72, No. 1 (2008), p.34.

34. Stephen Van Evera, ‘The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War’, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1984), pp.58–107.

35. Eric Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p.15.

36. Kathleen Thelen, ‘Timing and Temporality in the Analysis of Institutional Evolution and Change’, Studies in American Political Development, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2000); Kathleen Thelen, ‘How Institutions Evolve’, in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

37. Jeroen van der Heijden, ‘Institutional Layering: A Review of the Use of the Concept’, Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2011), p.11.

38. Thelen, How Institutions Evolve (note 36), pp.226–7.

39. For an overview, see van der Heijden, Institutional Layering (note 37).

40. Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War: from the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005); Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: the Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1986).

41. Necessarily, this section will simplify a complex organizational history. The objective here is the analysis of the evolution and interaction of only those layers of organizational culture that led to the transmission of the widely diverging lessons described above.

42. Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), p.87.

43. Adrian W. Preston, ‘British Military Thought, 1856–90’, Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, Vol. 89 (1964), pp.57–73.

44. T.R. Moreman, ‘“Small Wars” and “Imperial Policing”: The British Army and the Theory and Practice of Colonial Warfare in the British Empire, 1919–1939’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1996), p.125.

45. Adams, The Military View of the Empire 1870–1899 (note 5), p.60.

46. C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (London: General Staff—War Office, 1906 (1899)), p.23.

47. Quoted in: Edward M. Spiers, ‘Between the South African War and the First World War, 1902–14’, in Hew Strachan (ed.), Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of War in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 2006), p.31.

48. Tarak Barkawi, ‘Culture and Combat in the Colonies: The Indian Army in the Second World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2006), p.346.

49. This led to a fragmentation of operational approaches in colonial conflicts that resulted even in diverging choices of tactical formations and means of attack. See: Anthony Clayton, The British Officer: Leading the Army from 1660 to the Present (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2006), pp.128–9.

50. Edward M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, 1868–1902 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), pp.289–90.

51. David French, Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, and the British People C.1870–2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.178.

52. Martin J. Bayly, ‘The “Re-Turn” to Empire in IR: Colonial Knowledge Communities and the Construction of the Idea of the Afghan Polity, 1809–38’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2014), pp.443–64 .

53. The Indian Army itself was not officially part of the British Army until the Indian Mutiny of 1857. The contingents participating in the invasion of Afghanistan were mostly formed of non-European soldiers led by British officers.

54. Douglas M. Peers, Between Mars and Mammon: Colonial Armies and the Garrison State in India, 1819–1835 (London/New York: Tauris, 1995), p.7.

55. Stanski, An Orientalist Reading of ‘Afghan Warlords’ (note 11), p.88.

56. Corinne Fowler, Chasing Tales: Travel Writing, Journalism and the History of British Ideas about Afghanistan (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008), p.26.

57. Annie Besant, England, India and Afghanistan (London: Freethought Publishing Company, 1878), p.52.

58. Andrew Skeen, Lessons in Imperial Rule: Instructions for British Infantrymen on the Indian Frontier (Barnsley: Frontline Books, 2009 (1932)); Passing It On: Fighting the Pashtun on Afghanistan’s Frontier (Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2010 (1932)).

59. David French, ‘Big Wars and Small Wars between the Wars, 1919–39’, in Hew Strachan (ed.), Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of War in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 2006), pp.39–40.

60. Ibid., p.40.

61. David French, Army, Empire, and Cold War: The British Army and Military Policy, 1945–1971 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.54.

62. David French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945–1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.34.

63. Ibid., p.35.

64. Those principles were essentially those presented in the discussion above,

including identification of the essentially political nature of the problem, the primacy of civil control, the coordination of civil and military activity, the emphasis on intelligence, the separation of the insurgent from the mass of the people, the battle to win ‘hearts and minds’, appropriate and proportionate military response and political reform to prevent a resurgence of the problem.

See Gary Sheffield, ‘Doctrine and Command in the British Army: A Historical Overview,’ in Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (ed.), ADP Operations (Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence, 2010), p.E-6.

65. Daniel Marston, ‘Lost and Found in the Jungle: The Indian and British Army Jungle Warfare Doctrines for Burma, 1943–5, and the Malayan Emergency, 1948–60’, in Hew Strachan (ed.), Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of War in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 2006), p.103.

66. Ibid., p.106.

67. Sheffield, Doctrine and Command in the British Army (note 64), p.E-7.

68. French, Army, Empire, and Cold War (note 61), p.118.

69. For a more detailed analysis of this impact, see Sangar, Historical Experience (note 3), pp.85–95.

70. Paul Dixon, ‘The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: “Hearts and Minds” from Malaya to Afghanistan?’ in Paul Dixon (ed.), The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan (Houndmills/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p.29.

71. Richard Cobbold, ‘RUSI Interview with General David Richards’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 152, No. 2 (2007), pp.24–33.

72. Dixon, The British Approach to Counterinsurgency (note 70), p.31.

73. Quoted in: Anthony King, ‘Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British Military Operations in Afghanistan’, International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2 (2010), p.319.

74. Stuart Tootal, Danger Close: Commanding 3 Para in Afghanistan (London: John Murray, 2010), p.26.

75. Dixon, The British Approach to Counterinsurgency (note 70), p.32.

76. Sangar, Historical Experience (note 3), pp.137–67.

77. Mike Martin, A Brief History of Helmand (Warminster: Afghan COIN Centre, 2011).