Reconsidering minimum deterrence in South Asia: Indian responses to Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons

ABSTRACT

India’s nuclear doctrine and posture has traditionally been shaped by minimum deterrence logic. This logic includes assumptions that possession of only a small retaliatory nuclear force generates sufficient deterrent effect against adversaries, and accordingly that development of limited nuclear warfighting concepts and platforms are unnecessary for national security. The recent emergence of Pakistan’s Nasr tactical nuclear missile platform has generated pressures on Indian minimum deterrence. This article analyzes Indian official and strategic elite responses to the Nasr challenge, including policy recommendations and attendant implications. It argues that India should continue to adhere to minimum deterrence, which serves as the most appropriate concept for Indian nuclear policy and best supports broader foreign and security policy objectives. However, the form through which Indian minimum deterrence is delivered must be rethought in light of this new stage of regional nuclear competition.

KEYWORDS:

• India
• Pakistan
• deterrence
• nuclear weapons
• nuclear doctrine

Acknowledgements

This article is based upon a paper presented at the British International Studies Association annual conference in Edinburgh, June 15–17, 2016. The author is grateful to Rajesh Basrur, Martin Bayly, Nicolas Blarel, Ian Hall, Anit Mukherjee and Bhubhindar Singh for their comments on an earlier version of this article, and to the editor and anonymous reviewers for their comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Frank O’Donnell is Lecturer in Strategic Studies at Plymouth University at the Britannia Royal Naval College. He conducts research on Indian and Asian security, and has recently published on Indian nuclear strategy and force development in Asian Survey, Comparative Strategy, Orbis, and Survival journals. He has previously taught at the U.K. Joint Services Command and Staff College, and been Visiting Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Jawaharlal Nehru University and University of Calcutta. He holds a Ph.D. in Defence Studies from King’s College London.

ORCiD

Frank O’Donnell http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7832-1697

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute External Research Associates Program [grant number W911S0–14-P-0138].