Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia: Toward an institutional perspective

ABSTRACT

America’s alliances in Europe and East Asia all involve some institutional cooperation on U.S. nuclear weapons policy, planning or employment—from consultative fora in Asia to joint policy and sharing of nuclear warheads in NATO. Such cooperation is often analyzed through the prism of “extended nuclear deterrence,” which focuses on the extension of U.S. security guarantees and their effect on potential adversaries. This article argues that this underplays the importance of institutional factors: Allies have historically addressed a range of objectives through such cooperation, which has helped to catalyze agreements about broader alliance strategy. The varied form such cooperation takes in different alliances also flows from the respective bargaining power of allies and the relative importance of consensus, rather than perceived threats. The article concludes that nuclear weapons cooperation will remain crucial in successful U.S. alliance management, as allies negotiate their relationship with each other in the face of geostrategic change.

KEYWORDS:

• Nuclear weapons
• alliances
• institutions
• NATO
• Asia
• deterrence

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the editor-in-chief of Contemporary Security Policy and two reviewers for detailed comments on an earlier draft of this article. They also thank Jason Sharman for comments on a previous version, and Helen Taylor and Kate Grayson for valuable research assistance.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Stephan Frühling is an Associate Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, and Associate Dean (Education) in the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. Stephan was a member of the Australian Government’s external panel of experts on the 2016 Defence White Paper, and the 2015 ‘Partner across the globe’ research fellow in the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome. He was the Deputy Director (Education) of the Coral Bell School of Asia-Pacific Affairs in 2016; the inaugural Director of Studies of the ANU Master in Military Studies program at the Australian Defence Force’s Australian Command and Staff College from October 2011 to June 2012, and the Deputy Director of Studies until the end of 2013. Stephan was Managing Editor of the journal Security Challenges from 2006 to 2014.

Andrew O’Neil is Professor of Political Science and Dean (Research) in the Griffith Business School at Griffith University. Before entering academia, Andrew worked for Australia’s Department of Defence as a strategic analyst, and he is a former member of the Australian Foreign Minister’s National Consultative Committee on International Security Issues. He is the author of Asia, the United States and extended deterrence: Atomic umbrellas in the 21st century (Routledge, 2013) and co-editor of Middle powers and the rise of China (Georgetown University Press, 2014). He is former editor-in-chief of the Australian Journal of International Affairs.

ORCID

Stephan Frühling http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9305-7342

Andrew O’Neil http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7327-2312

Notes

1 Despite their theoretical and practical significance, alliance institutions in general, and the institutional differences between U.S. alliances in particular, have attracted little attention in the literature. The classic piece is Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002), but this focuses on the multilateral character of NATO.

2 Although Australia is not currently under conventional threat, geographical distance from its allies means that the country cannot ignore that possibility for the future. Historically, Australia has looked to tactical nuclear weapons as being of potential use in its immediate defense against superior conventional forces. Indeed, it is one of the few U.S. allies that can credibly threaten to use nuclear weapons in or around its own territory with little risk of collateral damage (Frühling, 2010).

3 Observations based on conversations between the authors and senior Australian officials. See also Frühling (2013).

Additional information

Funding

Research for this article has been funded as part of the Australian Research Council project DP140101478 Extended Nuclear Deterrence and the Restraint of Non-Nuclear Allies: Material Cooperation and Strategic Dialogue.