Goodbye to all that? Institutionalist theory, U.S. alliances, and Donald Trump

ABSTRACT

In an important and stimulating article, Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neil argue in favor of applying institutionalist theory to understand the alliance politics of U.S. nuclear weapons strategy. But what promise does institutionalist theory really hold in thinking about highly unequal alliances nested in their particular threat environments? I argue that much work remains to be done to determine how much better institutionalist variables explain intra-alliance dynamics over alternative arguments that emphasize power and interests. Balances of power and the nature of threat environments may already account for key aspects of extended deterrent relationships supported by the United States in Europe and Asia. Ironically, the implication of this more traditional interpretation of alliances is that more continuity than change will characterize how Donald Trump will manage U.S. security relationships as President.

KEYWORDS:

• Trump
• nuclear
• alliances
• proliferation
• institutionalism

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the editor-in-chief of Contemporary Security Policy for comments on an earlier draft.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Alexander Lanoszka is Lecturer in the Department of International Politics at City, University of London. His research addresses international security, alliances, U.S. foreign policy, and East Central European defense issues. He previously has held postdoctoral fellowships at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Dartmouth College after having finished a PhD in Politics from Princeton University. He has published in International Security, Security Studies, International Affairs, Survival, and other peer-reviewed journals. He is completing a book manuscript on alliances and nuclear proliferation.