Missile defense and strategic stability: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea

ABSTRACT

South Korea is threatened by its troubled relationship with North Korea. North Korea possesses a large cache of missiles as well as chemical and biological weapons, and the future potential to mount nuclear weapons on its missiles. The United States is also challenged because of its defense commitments to Seoul. As a countermeasure, the United States and South Korea decided to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defenses in South Korea. However, China has objected. Chinese scholars believe the THAAD radar would be able to track Chinese inter-continental ballistic missiles, thereby weakening their deterrent. A technical analysis does not support this assertion. However, it is vital for South Korea, given its proximity and economic interdependence, to reassure China. South Korea should highlight that THAAD will be deployed by the United States Forces Korea and is not a commitment by Seoul to become part of U.S.-led missile defenses in the Asia-Pacific.

KEYWORDS:

• Ballistic missile defense
• Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
• South Korea
• China
• strategic stability
• extended deterrence

Acknowledgements

Jaganath Sankaran is grateful to the Social Sciences Research Council (SSRC) and the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP) for their support. Both authors would like to thank the Editor-in-Chief of Contemporary Security Policy and the three anonymous reviewers for their comments. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not represent those of the SSRC, the Japan Foundation for Global Partnership, Los Alamos National Laboratory, the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Department of Energy, or any other U.S. government agency.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Jaganath Sankaran is a Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) at the University of Maryland, College Park. He has held postdoctoral positions at the RAND Corporation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, and the National Security Education Center and National Security Office at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Bryan L. Fearey is the Director of the National Security Office at Los Alamos National Laboratory. He has served at Los Alamos National Laboratory for nearly 30 years. Previously, he served as Arms Control R&D Program Manager for the Department of Defense and as U.S. Science Advisor for START and INF Treaty negotiations in Geneva.

ORCID

Jaganath Sankaran http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9685-2595

Notes

1. The source (“US will Pay,” 2016) points out that the commentary was posted under the name Zhong Sheng, which translates to “voice of China,” apparently a nom de plume that is often used to give the Communist Party’s view on foreign affairs.

2. Schiller, while acknowledging some level of speculation, suggests that there are only hundreds of SCUD B models, around 100 SCUD C models, a few dozen SCUD D/ER models, a few dozens of Nodong, around two Taepodong-II, and a small number of Musudan missiles in North Korean inventory. Furthermore, he argues that “only a small number of [North Korea] launch crews can be well trained … the lack of crew training will result in moderate results at best, with handling failures and low accuracy. If missile are produced in North Korea, they are not of excellent reliability and accuracy because of the lack of firing table creation and lot acceptance tests” (Schiller, 2012, p. 66).

3. For a study on how North Korea might use its nuclear weapons and damages such a use might cause, see: Bruce W. Bennett (2010).

4. A single THAAD battery consists of six to nine launchers, 48–54 missiles, and a fire control including an Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and control Model 2 (AN/TPY-2 radar) (O’Neill, 2011, p. 8; “Strategic Weapons: China,” 2015; “THAAD Battery to,” 2015).

5. Similarly, Hyun (2015) suggests that THAAD could have a range of 3000 kilometers.

6. On China’s conventional missile capabilities, see: Chase, Erickson, & Yeaw (2009, pp. 72–73). For some preliminary discussions on Chinese conventional missile doctrine, see: Lewis (2014, p. 112).

7. For a skeptical viewpoint on the conclusions of the international investigation, see: Lee and Suh (2010).

8. According to Sessler et al. (2000): “A sharply pointed cone-sphere [approximation to a warhead] will have a nose-on RCS … about 0.00009 m² for an X-band radar.” However, it is conceivable that for very few and specific trajectories that emerge from the South-eastern part of China, the RCS might be quite high momentarily. That possibility does not weaken the broad conclusions made above.

Additional information

Funding

The SSRC and the Japan Foundation CGP supported Jaganath Sankaran’s research efforts for this paper through the Abe Fellowship program.