ABSTRACT
This article examines contemporary modes of American warfare. It posits the concept of “vicarious warfare” as a means of capturing prominent patterns in warfighting approaches. Although rooted in long-standing traditions of military practice, vicarious warfare is sufficiently novel as to be identifiable as a distinct phenomenon. The precise manifestation or combination of vicarious methods vary according to the specific circumstances and political contexts prevailing in different theaters. However, America’s general preference is to fight its wars by delegating tasks to proxies and limiting exposure of its own military to danger. Where U.S. forces are employed directly, this takes place largely in the shadows. Such approaches have clear attractions, offer undoubted tactical advantages, and permit successive administrations to maintain a persistent tempo of operations that evades rigorous democratic scrutiny. Yet, prominent cases and numerous studies suggest that vicarious warfare has a high potential to generate counterproductive effects and significant strategic harm.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Professor Caroline Kennedy, the two anonymous reviewers and the editor for valuable comments on drafts of this article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Thomas Waldman is a lecturer in security studies at Macquarie University. He has experience working in and on Afghanistan, having conducted research there in 2007, 2010, 2012, and 2014. His work currently focuses on military strategy and contemporary warfare. He is the author of two books: Understanding Influence: The Use of Statebuilding Research in British Policy (with Sultan Barakat and Andrea Varisco, Ashgate, 2014) and War, Clausewitz and the Trinity (Ashgate, 2013).
ORCID
Thomas Waldman http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2718-245X