Deterrence or taboo? Explaining the non-use of nuclear weapons during the Indo-Pakistani post-tests nuclear crises

ABSTRACT

The literature on the India–Pakistan nuclear conundrum has neglected the impact of the international normative environment on India and Pakistan’s nuclear behavior. This article fills that gap, by looking at the impact of the nuclear taboo on Indo-Pakistani strategic interactions during the 1999 Kargil war and the 2002 border standoff. The nuclear taboo, rather than nuclear deterrence, explains the non-use of nuclear weapons. During both crises the nuclear taboo entered the decision-making process instrumentally, in the form of perceived reputational “costs.” The Indian and Pakistani emerging nuclear doctrines endanger a fragile nuclear taboo that would be strengthened by a bilateral non-first use accord. Whether India and Pakistan can move from an instrumental to a substantive acceptance of the nuclear taboo will depend on whether the United States and the other nuclear weapon states, included in the Nonproliferation Treaty, play the role of norm entrepreneurs and strengthen the nuclear taboo at the global level.

KEYWORDS:

• India
• Pakistan
• nuclear weapons
• nuclear taboo
• nuclear deterrence
• nuclear crises

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Hylke Dijkstra, Aaron Karp, and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and helpful suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Mario E. Carranza (Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Chicago, 1987) teaches in the Department of History, Political Science, and Philosophy at Texas A&M University-Kingsville. His articles on nuclear proliferation in South Asia have appeared in The Nonproliferation Review, Asian Survey, International Politics, and Contemporary Security Policy. His publications include India-Pakistan Nuclear Diplomacy: Constructivism and the Prospects for Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament in South Asia (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order: Creating a Robust Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Arms Control Regime (Ashgate, 2009), “Condemned to Eternal Confrontation? Beyond the Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Conundrum,” Contemporary Security Policy (December 2015), and “Rising Regional Powers and International Relations Theories: Comparing Brazil and India’s Foreign Security Policies and their Search for Great-Power Status,” Foreign Policy Analysis (April 2017).