Making nuclear possession possible: The NPT disarmament principle and the production of less violent and more responsible nuclear states

ABSTRACT

This article interrogates the disarmament principle under Article VI of the NPT, drawing attention to how the disarmament discourse shapes and reproduces the nuclear status quo. Building on the work of Kimberly Hutchings and Maja Zehfuss, I argue that the disarmament discourse renders nuclear possession more acceptable. It enables nuclear states to present themselves as less violent and more responsible actors glossing over the nature of possessing nuclear weapons. Using a feminist poststructuralist lens and examining empirical illustrations, the article explains how declarations of strict observance of the disarmament principle reaffirm traits and values that underpin social expectations of what is considered ethical and appropriate in nuclear politics. Moreover, it shows how the rhetorical commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons reinstitutes and preserves existing understandings around nuclear responsibility that define the bounds of acceptable nuclear possession, perpetuating the dominant status quo.

KEYWORDS:

• Nuclear weapons
• disarmament
• norms
• poststructuralism
• non-proliferation treaty
• feminism

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Thomas Gregory and Treasa Dunworth for their helpful comments, as well as the two anonymous reviewers and the editors for their challenging and insightful feedback. Thanks to Maria Rost Rublee, Catherine Eschle, and Shine Choi for some helpful suggestions during the initial stages of this project. I am also grateful to participants of the British International Studies Association – Global Nuclear Order Working Group Annual Conference, 2–3 December 2021, for their excellent questions and valuable feedback.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Sudan have never joined the treaty while North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003.

2 I recognize that since the end of the Cold War the nuclear-armed states have significantly reduced their arsenals. However, nine countries still possess roughly 13,150 nuclear warheads and recent data demonstrates that the pace of reduction in the case of the five NPT nuclear-armed states is actually slowing (Federation of American Scientists, n.d.). The article critiques the insufficient progress toward nuclear disarmament and recent changes introduced to some states nuclear doctrines that perpetuate the continuous rebuilding of nuclear weapons.

3 While some do not self-identify as “responsible” all refer to their commitments to the NPT and its disarmament principle. In a report that engages with the framework of responsibility talk, Brixey-Williams and Wheeler (2020) argue that “officials from every declared nuclear possessor have at one time or another described their state as a ‘responsible nuclear weapons state’ or with an equivalent form of words” (p. 22).

4 The body of literature on nuclear norms advances important understandings of the standards of appropriate behavior in nuclear politics, drawing attention to the role of non-proliferation, non-use (nuclear taboo), and disarmament norms in influencing state behavior (Müller & Wunderlich, 2013; Rublee, 2009; Tannenwald, 1999). While I engage with the idea of what passes as normal in nuclear politics, I am not directly engaging with the constructivist work on nuclear norms. Nonetheless, the arguments and analysis advanced in this article offer a valuable framework that can be used to expand on the nuclear norms conversation.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Carolina Panico

Carolina Panico is a doctoral candidate in Politics and International Relations at the University of Auckland, New Zealand. Her research focuses on nuclear disarmament, the global nuclear order, and norm dynamics.