Emerging technology and the cult of the offensive

ABSTRACT

Military organizations are generally defined by a “cult of the offensive.” For cyberspace, this gives rise to an empirical puzzle, at least in the United States. What accounts for the early restraint and skepticism about cyber offense publicly expressed by many US military cyber leaders? In this article, I explore the US military’s approach to cyberspace as a theory-developing case study. I examine more than a decade of public discourse among senior military leaders about when and how the military should employ cyber force. I argue that, in the formative years of US military cyber organization, the military’s predisposition to the offense was challenged by other cultural and institutional influences, especially from the signals intelligence and strategic nuclear communities. Moreover, this influence shaped the public discourse even after US military cyber organizations gained greater autonomy and turned toward more objectively offensive strategies. This suggests implications for theory and policy.

KEYWORDS:

• Cult of the offensive
• cybersecurity
• military strategy
• civil–military relations

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. I am also grateful to Brandon Valeriano, Michael Poznansky, and Shawn Lonergan for their feedback on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Finally, I would like to thank the incredible research assistants who were instrumental in helping to collect information about military cyber discourse, including Christina Harward, David Eckl, Griffin Utz, Sophie Bryant, and Virginia Lo.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Stanton Foundation.