The emergence of stability: deterrence-in-motion and deterrence reconstructed

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Notes

See Keith B. Payne and C. Dale Walton, ‘Deterrence in the Post-Cold War World’, in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen and Colin S. Gray (eds), Strategy in the Contemporary World. An Introduction to Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Stephen J. Cimbala, The Past and Future of Nuclear Deterrence (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); Max G. Mainwaring (ed.), Deterrence in the 21st Century (London: Frank Cass, 2001); and George Quester, Deterrence before Hiroshima (New York: 1966).

Payne and Walton, ‘Deterrence in the Post-Cold War World’, p.165; and John Garnett, ‘Introduction’, in John Garnett (ed.), Theories of Peace and Security. A Reader in Contemporary Strategic Thought (London: Macmillan, 1970), p.19.

See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd edition (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989); John S. Duffield, ‘The Evolution of NATO's Strategy of Flexible Response: A Reinterpretation’, Security Studies, Vol.1, No.1 (Autumn 1991), pp.132–56; David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1983); Shaun R. Gregory, Nuclear Weapons Operations and the Strategy of Flexible Response Nuclear Command and Control in NATO (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Fred C. Ikle, ‘Can Nuclear Deterrence last out the Century’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.51, No.2 (Jan. 1973), pp.267–85; and Helga Haftendorf, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966–1967 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

Richard J. Harknett, James J. Wirtz and T.V. Paul, ‘Introduction: Understanding Nuclear Weapons in a Transforming World’, in T.V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett and James J. Wirtz (eds), The Absolute Weapon Revisited. Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998), p.1.

Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p.xviii; and Richard K. Betts, ‘The Concept of Deterrence in the Postwar Era’, Security Studies, Vol.1, No.1, (Autumn 1991), p.27.

It has been noted by several authors that many themes associated with deterrence, including critical commentaries, originated in key texts largely produced in a period from 1957 to 1966. Among these were: Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1957); Albert Wohlstetter, ‘The Delicate Balance of Terror’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.37, No.2 (Jan. 1959), pp.211–34; Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press, 1960); Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960); Pierre Gallois, The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age, translated from French by Richard Howard (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961); Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961); Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962); Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor, Arms and Stability in Europe (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963); Morton Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963); Philip Green, Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1966); Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966); and Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).

Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p.xviii.

Nikolai Sokov, review of Pavel Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Forces (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), The Nonproliferation Review, Vol.9, No.1 (Spring 2002), p.172 and endnote 2. See also David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Murray Feshbach (ed.), National Security Issues of the USSR (Dordrecht, Boston and Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987); John Baylis and Gerald Segal (eds), Soviet Strategy (London: Croom Helm, 1981); Jennifer G. Mathers, The Russian Nuclear Shield From Stalin to Yeltsin (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with St Antony's College, Oxford, 2000); Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988), esp. pp.215–26; Mary Kaldor, The Imaginary War. Understanding the East–West Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), ch.11; and Derek Leebaert (ed.), Soviet Military Thinking (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981).

David Holloway, ‘Soviet Nuclear History. Sources for Stalin and the Bomb’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No.4 (Fall 1994), pp.1–9.

See Joseph S. Nye, ‘Nuclear Learning and U.S.–Soviet Security Regimes’, International Organization, Vol.41, No.3 (Summer 1987), pp.371–402.

See Joseph S. Nye, ‘Nuclear Learning and U.S.–Soviet Security Regimes’, International Organization, Vol.41, No.3 (Summer 1987), pp.382–3.

See Joseph S. Nye, ‘Nuclear Learning and U.S.–Soviet Security Regimes’, International Organization, Vol.41, No.3 (Summer 1987), p.382.

In the Western context, this began with the publication of Bernard Brodie's edited volume, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace) in 1946 and continued throughout the Cold War. See Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1961); John J. Weltman, ‘Nuclear Devolution and World Order’, World Politics, Vol.32 (Jan. 1980), pp.169–93; Lawrence Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order (Washington, DC: John Hopkins University Press, 1987); Jorn Gjelstad and Olav Njolstad (eds), Nuclear Rivalry and International Order (London: Sage, 1996); and William Walker, ‘Nuclear order and disorder’, International Affairs, Vol.76, No.4 (Oct. 2000), pp.703–24.

For an overview of the Western literature on world order ideas see Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). On the notion of international order see Ian Clark, Reform and Resistance in the International Order (Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 1980); and Nicholas J. Rengger, International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order (London: Routledge, 2000).

See also Bernard Brodie and Eilene Galloway, The Atomic Bomb and the Armed Services (Washington, DC.: Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, Public Affairs Bulletin No.55, May 1947). For background on the thinking of Brodie and others during this early nuclear period see Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983). On the idea of revolutionary change in military technology see Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), ch.2; Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1989); and Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (eds), The Sources of Military Change. Culture, Politics, Technology (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

Harknett, Wirtz and Paul (eds), ‘Introduction: Understanding Nuclear Weapons in a Transforming World’, pp.5–6.

Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971 [1959]), p.151.

Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (London: Chatto and Windus, 1946), foreword.

John Simpson, ‘The UN's Role in Disarmament: Retrospect and Prospect’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.15, No.1 (April 1994), pp.55–67.

George H. Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy. The First Twenty Five Years (New York: The Dunellen Company, 1970), pp.36–7; Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts. An Introduction to Theory and History (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), p.120; and Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Conclusion’, in John Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May and Jonathon Rosenberg (eds), Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb. Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp.260–71. For background see John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), ch.8.

Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, p.121.

Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun. The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995).

Viktor Adamsky and Yuri Smirnov, ‘Moscow's Biggest Bomb: The 50-Megaton Test of October 1961’, Cold War International History Project, No.4, pp.3, 19–21.

John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament: A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp.100–101; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p.388; and Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, pp.294–5.

Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.390.

Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.300.

Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.300.

Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.300.

Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p.394.

John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1959), p.22.

For discussion of this approach see Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking About Strategic Culture’, International Security, Vol.19, No.4 (Spring 1995), pp.32–64; Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Michael C. Desch, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’, International Security, Vol.23, No.1 (Summer 1998), pp.141–70; Colin S. Gray, ‘Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back’, Review of International Studies, Vol.25, No.1 (Jan. 1999), pp.49–70; Theo Farrell, ‘Culture and Military Power’, Review of International Studies, Vol.24, No.3 (July 1998), pp.407–16; and Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities, Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).

See Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options, Rand R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1977); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979); Ken Booth, ‘The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed’, in Carl C. Jacobsen (ed.), Strategic Power USA/USSR (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp.121–30; Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (London: Hamilton Press, 1986); John Erickson, ‘The Soviet View of Deterrence’, Survival, Vol.14, No.6 (1982), pp.242–51; Gerald Segal, ‘Strategy and Ethnic Chic’, International Affairs, Vol.60 (1984), pp.15–30; and David T. Twining, ‘Soviet Strategic Culture’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol.4 (1989), pp.169–88.

For a discussion of the issues surrounding rationality see Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (New York: Sage, 1977); John Garnett, ‘Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions’, in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams, Contemporary Strategy. Theories and Policies (London: Croom Helm, 1975), pp.16–19; Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism; John Steinbrunner, ‘Beyond Rational Deterrence: The Struggle for New Conceptions’, World Politics, Vol.28 (1976), pp.223–45; Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and James G. Blight and David A. Welch, ‘Risking “The Destruction of Nations”: Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis for New and Aspiring Nuclear States’, Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp.811–50.

Buzan and Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics, p.170.

See Snyder, Deterrence and Defense; Schelling, Arms and Influence; Phil Williams, ‘Deterrence’, in Baylis, Booth, Garnett and Williams, pp.75–6; and Stephen J. Cimbala, ‘Deterrence and Friction: Implications for Missile Defense’, Defense and Security Analysis, Vol.18, No.3 (2002), p.203.

Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, p.187.

Bruce M. Russett, ‘The Calculus of Deterrence’, in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp.359–69.

Richard Betts indicates that this issue emerged in the 1950s and concerned two types of deterrence: ‘at one level was “basic,” “central,” or “passive,” or “Type I” deterrence, meaning the prevention of enemy nuclear attack on the homeland by the threat of second-strike retaliation. At another level was “extended,” “active” or “Type II” deterrence, meaning the prevention of enemy attack on allies. The great debate which has persisted ever since has been whether both sorts of deterrence could or could not be accomplished with reliance on nuclear threats.’ Betts, ‘The Concept of Deterrence in the Postwar Era’, p.29.

For a discussion see Buzan and Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics, ch.10.

Zagare and Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence, p.8

Zagare and Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence, p.16.

Mikhail Milstein, ‘The Problem of Strategic Stability’, in Joseph Rotblat and Sven Hellman (eds), Nuclear Strategy and World Security, Annals of Pugwash 1984 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985), p.14.

Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p.199.

Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p.199. See also, Robert Ayson, ‘Bargaining With Nuclear Weapons: Thomas Schelling's “General” Concept of Stability’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.23, No.2 (June 2000), pp.48–71.

See Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: The 20th Century Fund, 1961); Donald G. Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York: George Braziler, 1961); Bull, The Control of the Arms Race; Roger K. Smith, ‘The Marginalization of Superpower Arms Control’, Security Studies, Vol.1, No.1 (Autumn 1991), pp.37–53; Emmanuel Adler, ‘The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control’, International Organization, Vol.50, No.1 (Winter 1996), pp.101–45; Stuart Croft, Strategies of Arms Control: A History and Typology (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966), pp.33–40; John Baylis, ‘Arms Control and Disarmament’ in Baylis, Wirtz, Cohen and Gray (eds), Strategy in the Contemporary World, pp.191–7; and Robert Hunt Sprinkle, ‘Two Cold Wars and Why they Ended Differently’, Review of International Studies, Vol.25, No.4 (October 1999), pp. 637–9.

A number of these themes are outlined in John Garnett, ed., Theories of Peace and Security: A Reader in Contemporary Strategic Thought (London: MacMillan, 1970).

Eric Herring, Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995).

Phil Williams, ‘Crisis Management’, in Baylis, Booth, Garnett and Williams, Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies, p.153.

See: Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management. A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983); Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1985); Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?, Occasional Papers 8 (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Feb. 1990); and Christoph Bluth, The Nuclear Challenge. US–Russian strategic relations after the Cold War (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), p.14.

Samuel Wells, for example, considers that the ‘Cuban missile crisis had a generally sobering effect on both sides’; Samuel Wells, ‘Nuclear Weapons and European Security during the Cold War’, in Michael J. Hogan (ed.), The End of the Cold War. Its Meaning and Implications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.71. The October 1962 crisis is probably the most documented of all such crises that occurred during the Cold War. Among the many commentaries on this event are: Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Norton, 1971); Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971); Lawrence Freedman, ‘Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy’, International Affairs, Vol.52 (1976), pp.434–49; Amos Perlmutter, ‘The Presidential Political Center and Foreign Policy’, World Politics, Vol.27 (1974), pp.87–106; Steve Smith, ‘Allison and the Cuban Missile Crisis’; James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Noonday, 1990); and Graham T. Allison and Philip D. Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edition (New York: Longman, 1999).

John Newhouse, The Nuclear Age. From Hiroshima to Star Wars (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), pp.13, 150–60. Taliaferro also notes the seriousness of the Berlin crisis in 1961. See Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘Realism, Power Shifts, and Major War’, Security Studies, Vol.10, No.4 (Summer 2001), pp.167–70 especially.

Scott D. Sagan and Jeremi Suri, ‘The Madman Nuclear Alert. Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969’, International Security, Vol.27, No.4 (Spring 2003), pp.150–83.

Raymond L. Garhoff, ‘On Estimating and Imputing Intentions’, International Security, Vol.2 (Winter 1978), pp.22–32.

Derek Leebaert, ‘The Context of Soviet Military Thinking’, in Leebaert, Soviet Military Thinking, p.13.

Daniel Frei (with Christian Catrina), Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War, UNIDIR, Geneva, 1982, p.ix. See also Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993). For a discussion of crisis control initiatives see Richard Smoke, ‘Crisis Control Measures’, in Rotblat and Hellman, Nuclear Strategy and World Security, pp.28–39.

Matthew Woods, ‘Invisible Weapons, Visible Choices: Unpacking the New Deterrence’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.18, No.3 (Dec. 1997), pp.1–37.

Colin S. Gray, ‘The Arms Race Phenomenon’, World Politics, Vol.24, No.1 (Oct. 1971), pp.39–79; Albert Wohlstetter, ‘Is There a Strategic Arms Race’, Foreign Policy, No.15 (Summer 1974), pp.3–20; Marek Thee, Military Technology, Military Strategy and the Arms Race (London: Croom Helm, 1986); Lewis F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1960); and Deborah Shapley, ‘Technology Creep and the Arms Race’, Science, 201, pp.1102–5, 1192–6.

James DeNardo, ‘Complexity, Formal Methods, and Ideology in International Studies’, in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds), New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), p.127.

John H. Barton and Lawrence D. Weiler (eds), International Arms Control. Issues and Agreements (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).

For an early discussion of how the ‘nth country problem’ was viewed, see Bull, The Control of the Arms Race.

See Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, ‘Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability’, World Politics, Vol.16 (1964), pp.390–404; Waltz, ‘The Stability of the Bipolar World’; and Richard N. Rosecrance, ‘Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.10 (1966), pp.314–27.

The NPT defined a NWS as a state that had exploded a nuclear weapon or other explosive nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967. All other states that ratified the Treaty had to do so as NNWS. This raised questions thereafter about how to engage with states that produced a nuclear weapon or nuclear device after that date. See John Simpson and Tony McGrew (eds), The International Nuclear Non-proliferation System: Challenges and Choices (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984). See also George Bunn, Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Russians (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); William Epstein, The Last Chance, Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control (New York: The Free Press, 1976); Stephen Lee, ‘Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Entitlement’, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol.9 (1995), pp.101–31; Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1987), ch.6; David A.V. Fischer, Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: The Past and the Prospects (New York and London: Routledge, 1992); and Mohamed I. Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vols 1 and 2 (London: Oceana, 1980).

John Lewis Gaddis, ‘The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future’, in Hogan, The End of the Cold War, p.22.

Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

John D. Orme, ‘The War That Never Happened: Structure, Statesmanship, and the Origins of the Long Peace’, Security Studies, Vol.10, No.4 (Summer 2001), p.124.

John Lewis Gaddis, ‘The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System’, International Security, Vol.10, No.4 (Spring 1986), pp.99–142. See also John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

Charles Kegley, The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections (New York: HarperCollins, 1991). While Orme acknowledges the contribution made by authors such as Gaddis on the reasons for the ‘long peace’, he considers that the argument indicating that this outcome was due to bipolarity and nuclear weapons has been overstated. Rather, the absence of overt war between East and West ‘rested not solely on the strength of deterrence, but also on the weakness of any motive to alter the status quo’. He argues that both the United States and the Soviet Union had no pressing desire to overturn the post-Second World War settlement on the division of Europe. This provided the basis for what he terms, ‘divisible security’, a situation that satisfied the minimal security objectives of the two states. Orme also suggests that there were ‘four potential sources of instability: Germany, Eastern Europe, the shifting nuclear balance, and the problem of Berlin’. Orme, ‘The War That Never Happened’.

John E. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989). Elsewhere, Mueller has made a distinction between ‘essential’ and ‘complete’ irrelevance in the context of nuclear weapons. As he explains, ‘while I maintain that nuclear weapons have been essentially irrelevant to the course of post-World War II history, I do not maintain that they have been completely irrelevant. The question in all this is not whether nuclear weapons have made any difference whatever, but whether they have been a crucial – determining – influence in keeping leaders cautious and the world free from major war.’ John Mueller, ‘Epilogue’, in John Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May and Jonathon Rosenberg (eds), Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.278. For a discussion of these themes see: Robert Jervis, ‘The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons. A Comment’, International Security, Vol.13, No.2 (Fall 1988), pp.80–90; and John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.311–12.

See Richard Ned Lebow, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Cold War’, Review of International Studies, Vol.25, Special Issue (Dec. 1999), pp.21–39.

Gaddis, Gordon, May and Rosenberg (eds), Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb.

Ernest R. May, ‘Introduction’, in Gaddis, Gordon, May and Rosenberg (eds), Cold War Statesmen Confront The Bomb.

Gaddis, We Now Know, p.258.

For a discussion and details of the agreements see Lewis A. Dunn, Controlling the Bomb. Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), pp.18–21; Scott D. Sagan, ‘Rules of Engagement’, Security Studies, Vol.1, No.1 (Autumn 1991), pp.78–108; Kurt M. Cambell, ‘The U.S.–Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities’, Security Studies, Vol.1 No.1 (Autumn 1991), pp.109–31; Robert E. Osgood and Jonathon Tucker, Force, Order and Justice (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1967); Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley and Alexander Dallin (eds), U.S.–Soviet Security Cooperation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); David Dewitt and Hans Rattinger (eds), East–West Arms Control. Challenges for the Western Alliance (London: Routledge, 1992); and Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control. A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, (London: Sage, 1994).

For a discussion of these positions see Regina Cowen Karp (ed.), Security with Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on National Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1991); Regina Cowen Karp (ed.), Security Without Nuclear Weapons. Different Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1992); and John Baylis and Robert O'Neill (eds), Alternative Nuclear Futures. The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).