Deterrence asymmetry and other challenges to small nuclear forces

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Notes

Some, like John Mueller, however have argued that nuclear weapons were irrelevant in preventing major wars after the World Wars. ‘The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Post War World’, International Security (Fall 1989), pp.55–79. It is unlikely that it holds good for SNFs due to their numerous wars.

One of the reasons for this could be alignment of the other NWS (except China) with the superpowers leading to an envelopment of the individual identities within the bloc under the overpowering presence of the superpower. Hence it could be said that NATO, to an extent, led to a loss of the individual identities of France and Britain.

See P.K. Ghosh, ‘Emerging Trends In Nuclear Triad’, Strategic Analysis, Vol.25, No.2 (May 2001) pp.265–7.

For details see ibid. pp.247–51.

Though they are estimated to have around 200 warheads in their stockpile and according to a report a complete triad of delivery platforms. For details of the Israeli nuclear arsenal see Hans M. Kristensen and Joshua M. Handler, Tables for Nuclear Forces, SIPRI Year Book 2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p.483.

Rodney W. Jones, ‘Small Nuclear Forces’, in Rodney W. Jones (ed.), Small Nuclear Forces and US Security Policy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984), p.1.

Rajesh Rajgopalan, ‘Nuclear Strategy and Small Nuclear Forces: The Conceptual Requirements’, Strategic Analysis Vol.22, No.7 (Oct. 1999), footnote 2, p.1128.

For details of nuclear arsenals and their associated delivery platforms see Ghosh, ‘Emerging Trends In Nuclear Triad’, pp.247–55, 262–4. Also see Kristensen and Handler, Tables for Nuclear Forces, pp.469–71, 475–8.

The term ‘reducing’ has been used in the sense of a reduction in nuclear arsenal capability and not necessarily deterrence capability, which in itself is a debatable topic. These countries have adopted a ‘minimalist’ posture as it has been felt that it can provide them with adequate ‘credible’ deterrence even with this dramatic reduction in their nuclear weaponry.

This would effectively rule out possession of crude ‘nuclear weapons’ by non-state actors from this definition.

Cold War history is replete with such examples as the Cuban missile crisis wherein the United States had reconciled themselves to a negotiated settlement despite their ability to totally annihilate the USSR. The fear of some Soviet nuclear weapons getting through and destroying a few American cities was probably the major factor that led to this decision.

See McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New Delhi, Affiliated East West Press/in co-operation with Random House, New York, 1989) p.592. He has expressed similar views in his other essays.

Rajgopalan, ‘Nuclear Strategy and Small Nuclear Forces’ p.1117.

See Jasjit Singh, ‘Challenges of Strategic Defence’, Frontline, April 11–24 1998.

See Jasjit Singh, ‘Challenges of Strategic Defence’, Frontline, April 11–24 1998.

Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More may be Better, Adelphi Paper 171 (London IISS, Autumn 1981) pp.5, 7.

Singh, ‘Challenges of Strategic Defence’.

P.K. Ghosh, ‘Revisiting Gunboat Diplomacy: An Instrument of Threat or Use of Limited Naval Force’, Strategic Analysis, Vol.23, No.11 (Feb. 2001), pp.2013–14.

Waltz, ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, p.17.

David J. Karl, ‘Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers’, International Security, Vol.21, No.3 (Winter 1996), p.96.

Karl, ‘Proliferation Pessimism’ pp.96–7.

Ronald F. Lehman, ‘A North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program; International Implications’, Security Dialogue, Vol.24 (Sept. 1993), p.270.

Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Perils of Proliferation: Organisation Theory, Deterrence Theory and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, International Security, Vol.18, No.4 (Spring 1995), pp.74–85.

Peter D. Feaver, ‘Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers’, International Security, Vol.22, No.2 (Fall 1997), p.188.

Karl Kaiser, ‘Non Proliferation and Nuclear Deterrence’, Survival, Vol.31 (March/April 1989), pp.126–7; Lewis A. Dunn, Controlling the Bomb; Nuclear Proliferation in 1980s (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), pp.71–5.

Karl, ‘Proliferation Pessimism, pp.104–5.

Jordan Seng, ‘Less is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear States’, Security Studies, Vol.6, No.4 (Summer 1997), p.63.

Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Data Book Vol.5, British French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p.374.

Kristensen and Handler, Tables for Nuclear Forces, p.483.

Seng, ‘Less is More’, p.89.

As stated in Art. 2 of the Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine presented by the NSAB on 17 Aug 1999, available at <http://www.meadev.gov.in/govt/indnucld.htm>.

This view has been propounded by many, including K. Subramanyum in his ‘Nuclear Force Design and Minimum Deterrence Strategy’, in Bharat Karnad (ed.), Future Imperiled: Indian Security in the 1990s and Beyond (New Delhi: Viking Penguin India, 1994), pp.191–4.

Gurmeet Kanwal, Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal, (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2001), pp.143–7. Positive control concerns the proper authorization of nuclear operations while negative control seeks to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use or possible theft of these weapons.

For a detailed view of the numerous events associated with this see John Wilson and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp.60–72, 137–50.

See S. Srinivasan, ‘India Developing Launch Engine’, <http://www.space.com>, 23 Oct. 2001 and ‘HAL Developing Indigenous Cryo-engine for GSLV’, The BusinessLine (internet edition) (24 Jan. 2001) and ‘Indigenous Cryogenic Engine to be Ready by 2004’, Times of India (8 Dec. 2001). The impression that the development of this technology would give India the ability to develop ICBMs is only partially true as these cryo-engines are rarely if ever used in ICBMs. However, the basic technology for putting a geostationary satellite into orbit and that of an intercontinental ballistic missile is essentially the same. Hence, theoretically, India is capable of developing an ICBM. Also see Raj Chengappa, ‘India is Now A Space Power’, India Today, 30 April 2001.

See ‘India's Param 10000 Super Computer’ at <http://www.webspawner.com>.

The Missile Technology Control Regime is not a ‘treaty’ in the truest sense of the word, it is more of an alliance. In 1991, China had agreed to support the MTCR conditionally and in February 1992 provided a commitment in writing to the US that it would adhere to the clauses of the MTCR. This led the US to lift missile-related sanctions against China in June 1992. However, despite this and in complete violation of the MTCR, the Chinese have transferred missiles and missile-related technology to Pakistan. For a more detailed treatment see Savita Pandey, ‘Missile Technology Control Regime: Impact Assessment’, Strategic Analysis, Vol.22, No.6 (Sept. 1999), pp.923–45.

For a more detailed view see Congressional Record, ‘Chinese Nuclear Exports to Pakistan’ (Senate, 7 Feb. 1996), pp.S1070, S1071, S1072 (this includes Bill Gertz, ‘China Nuclear Transfer Exposed: Hill Expected to Urge Sanctions’ Washington Times, 5 Feb. 1996; and R. Jeffery Smith, ‘China Aids Pakistan Nuclear Program’, Washington Post, 7 Feb. 1996) available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996-cr/s960207b.htm>. Also see K. Subramanyam, ‘The China Factor’, Economic Times, 22 Jan.1999.

For details see Stephen I. Schwartz, ‘A Very Convenient Scandal’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.55, No.3 (May/June 1999), and Jeffrey Richelson, ‘Perspective: Uncertain Damage’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.55, No.5 (Sept./Oct. 1999), pp.17–19.

See Leonard S. Spector, ‘Repentant Nuclear Proliferators’, Foreign Policy, No.88 (Fall 1992), pp.3–20.

According to Stephen I. Schwartz, who, along with his team, carried out a four-year study into nuclear related costs estimates in US and published his major findings, Atomic Audit: The Cost and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998) p.3. In the US out of the total $5.5 trillion spent on nuclear related projects since 1940 only 7 per cent or $409.4 billion was spent on building nuclear weapons.

For more detailed treatment of costs of nuclear delivery systems and unavailability of estimated nuclear cost expenditures of most states see P.K. Ghosh, ‘Economic Dimension of the Strategic Nuclear Triad’, Strategic Analysis, Vol.26, No.2 (Apr–Jun 2002), pp.227–93. 

See Itty Abraham, Pakistan–India and Argentina–Brazil: Stepping Back from the Nuclear Threshold, Occasional Paper No. 15 (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Institute, 1993) as cited in Seng, ‘Less is More’, p.67.

For detailed approach to the triad legs see Ghosh, ‘Economic Dimension of the Strategic Nuclear Triad’.

Bharat Karnad, ‘Going Thermonuclear: Why, With What Forces, at What Cost’, U.S.I. Journal, Vol.128, No.3 (1998), p.315. For a more detailed approach see P.K. Ghosh, ‘India Pakistan Nuclear Parity: Is it Feasible or Necessary’, Strategic Analysis, Vol.25, No.4 (July 2001) pp.524–5.

As stated in ‘Pakistan retains failed N-state image’, The Times of India, 19 May 2001.

Seng, ‘Less is More’, pp.63, 72.

Scott D. Sagan, Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) p.264.

PALs are essentially interlocks. Electronic later generation PALs ensure that weapons cannot be launched without codes being directly transmitted from central authorities. PESs ensure that individual launch operators cannot launch weapons without concurrence of other operators in the same command. For a more detailed description of PALs and associated devices see Peter Stein and Peter D. Feaver, Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Evolution of Permissive Action Links, CSIA Occasional Paper, No.2, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1987).

Seng ‘Less is More’, p.90.