United states nuclear strategy in the twenty-first century

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Notes

This patch, worn by members of the JSTPS who worked at the Strategic Air Command (SAC), is now a symbol of a bygone era. JSTPS was the Joint Staff organization at SAC charged with generating the Single Integrated Operations Plan. Today their functions have been transferred to J5, US Strategic Command.

The last significant departure in US nuclear policy, strategy and doctrine occurred on 27 September 1991 when President George H.W. Bush announced a series of unilateral initiatives: (1) eliminating tactical nuclear weapons deployed with US military units; (2) ending strip alert for the US strategic bomber force; (3) accelerating force reduction called for by START I; and (4) canceling several strategic systems (e.g., rail-mobile MX, Midgetman and the short-range-attack missile II). These initiatives virtually ended the US nuclear force modernization program and were a significant first step in a decade of force reductions. See Ronald E. Powaski, Return to Armageddon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.130–33.

Excerpts from the classified version of the report were first reported in the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times. Most of the NPR text has been posted on the globalsecurity.org website at ⟨http://globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm⟩. This quotation is taken from that text cited as the NPR's Executive Summary on p.1, which was released by the Department of Defense. Other quotations come from the global security website, although the authors have no way to confirm whether this is the actual report.

Robert Joseph, ‘The Changing Political–Military Environment’, in James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen (eds), Rockets' Red Glare: Missile Defenses and the Future of World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), pp.55–78; and Bradley Graham, Hit to Kill (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).

Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (1 Jan.–30 June 2000, Central Intelligence Agency.

News transcript from the White House; President Bush press conference transcript from 13 March 2002.

Nuclear Posture Review, p.16. By contrast, the NPR does not depict Russia as a country of immediate or even potential concern.

News transcript from the United States Department of Defense, J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy, Wednesday, 9 Jan. 2002, p.3.

For a discussion of how risk communicates commitment see Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); and Deborah Larson, ‘Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty’, International Organization, Vol.41, No.1 (Winter 1987), pp.27–60.

Richard Harknett, ‘State Preferences, Systemic Constraints, and the Absolute Weapon’, in T.V. Paul, Richard Harknett and James J. Wirtz (eds), The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1998), pp.47–72.

James Wirtz notes taken at the 12th Annual International Arms Control Conference, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 18–20 April 2002.

Department of Defense news transcript, 9 Jan. 2002, p.6.

The concept of dissuasion is a new term in US doctrine. It apparently suggests that US military forces will be so technologically and operationally superior, that potential competitors will abandon efforts to challenge the United States. We would observe that the efforts at dissuasion might simply channel the military strategies and capabilities of potential competitors away from US strengths to attack US vulnerabilities, i.e., to adopt asymmetric strategies.

Nuclear Posture Review, pp.12–13.

Department of Defense news transcript, 9 Jan. 2002, p.8.

The Nuclear Posture Review states (p.32) that there are 8,000 warheads in the active nuclear stockpile. Presumably, these warheads form the backbone of the responsive force. The Natural Resources Defense Council estimates the hedge force may total as many as 15,000 warheads. See NRDC Backgrounder, ‘Faking Nuclear Restraint: The Bush Administration's Secret Plan for Strengthening US Nuclear Forces’, 13 Feb. 2002.

Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Senate Armed Services Hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review, 14 Feb. 2002, p.4.

Nuclear Posture Review, pp.46, 34–5.

John H. Cushman, Jr, ‘Rattling New Sabers,’ New York Times, 10 March 2002.

Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St Martin's Press, 1989), pp.76–169.

The NPR, however, explicitly mentions the idea of developing an earth-penetrating nuclear device to target underground facilities housing WMD. This idea probably is a reflection of simple operational necessity rather than strategic choice. Some bunkers are so well constructed and deeply buried, they require enormous explosive energy to be efficiently coupled to the ground to destroy them; i.e., a relatively large earth-penetrating nuclear warhead is needed to guarantee their destruction.

James J. Wirtz, ‘Counterproliferation, Conventional Counterforce and Nuclear War’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.23, No.1 (March 2000), pp.5–24

For President Bush's West Point speech see ⟨http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html⟩.

Nuclear Posture Review, pp.12–13.

Phillip Bleek, ‘Nuclear Posture Review Leaks; Outlines Targets, Contingencies,’ Arms Control Today, Vol.32, No.3 (April 2002), p.1.

Powaski, Return to Armageddon, pp.207–8.

Discriminate Deterrence: Report of The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, co-chairmen Fred C. Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, Jan. 1988.

Russian officials have apparently adopted this sort of nuclear doctrine.