Japan: Harmony by accident?

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Notes

1. Israel has been developing the Arrow anti-tactical missile system and the Tactical High Energy Laser system cooperatively with the US. See the contribution of Reuven Pedatzur in this issue.

2. ‘Defense Chief Given Missile-Intercept Role’, The Japan Times, 23 July 2005. For the outline of the bill see also ‘Rapid Missile Defense Response Set’, The Japan Times, 9 Feb. 2005; ‘Missile Defense and Civilian Control’, The Japan Times, 19 Feb. 2005.

3. See the contribution of Rajesh Rajagopalan in this issue.

4. Entering the development phase has been widely considered the same as a deployment decision in Japan, because Japan has never failed to deploy any military equipment co-developed with the US. See on the development of the US–German–Italian Medium Extended Air Defense System the contribution of Bernd W. Kubbig and Axel Nitsche on Germany in this issue.

5. Yoichi Funabashi, ‘Tokyo's Temperance’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer 2000), pp.137–9; Hideaki Kaneda, Dandō Misairu Bōei Nyūmon (Tokyo: Kaya Shobō, 2003), pp.6–7.

6. For the development of Japan-US BMD cooperation, see Takashi Kawakami and Ken Jimbo, ‘Dandō Misairu Bōei to Nichibei Dōmei’, in Satoshi Morimoto (ed.), Misairu Bōei: Atarashii Kokusai Anzenhoshō no Kōzu (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūjo, 2002), pp.263–72; Ken Jimbo, ‘A Japanese Perspective on Missile Defense and Strategic Coordination’, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp.57–8; Michael Swaine, Rachel Swanger and Takashi Kawakami, Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), pp.29–32; Masamitsu Yamashita, Susumu Takai and Shuichiro Iwata, TMD: Sen'iki Dandō Misairu Bōei (Tokyo: TBS Britannica, 1994), pp.201–22.

7. Another, albeit minor, pillar was National Missile Defense (NMD). Some Japanese, especially government officials, preferred to use the term BMD rather than TMD, since what the US called TMD equals a national MD for Japan because of its comparatively small territorial size.

8. Although WESTPAC had been in effect dealing with TMD in its later years (Yamashita, Takai and Iwata, TMD, pp.117–22 [note 6]), Japanese defence industries were very cautious at this point about making a drastic step that might damage their commercial interests, primarily because this official request of Aspin's followed an informal one made in spring 1993 as part of the ‘Perry Initiative’, which would be renamed ‘Technology-for-Technology Initiative’ later. See Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp.139–42. Besides, the Japanese government was concerned that there were so many problems, legal, financial, political and diplomatic, to overcome.

9. Gordon R. Mitchell, ‘Japan-U.S. Missile Defense Collaboration: Rhetorically Delicious, Deceptively Dangerous’, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter 2001), p.86.

10. Paul Beaver, ‘Japan Weighs up Missile Defense Options’, Jane's Defense Weekly, Vol. 22, No. 6 (Aug. 1994), p.21; see also Steven A. Hildreth and Jason D. Ellis, ‘Allied Support for Theater Missile Defense’, Orbis, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp.108–11.

11. Interviews with Japan Defence Agency officials, 1997–98.

12. ‘Bei no Dandō Misairu Bōei Kōsō Sanka Handan Miokuri’, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 3 June 1997.

13. Interview with a Japan Defence Agency official, 1998.

14. For the debate over the new guidelines, Barbara Wanner, Debate on Guidelines Bills and Japan's Defense Role Picks up Steam, JEI Report No. 15 (Washington, DC: Japan Economic Institute, 16 April 1999), pp.1–14; Tsuneo Akaha, ‘Beyond Self Defense: Japan's Elusive Security Role Under the New Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Nov. 1998), pp.461–83.

15. Originally the principles, established in 1962, were to prohibit arms exports to certain countries, and then in 1976 they came to be applied to any arms exports to any countries, including even such purely defensive equipment as helmets. In 1983, Japan made it possible to transfer limited military technologies only to the US.

16. Nakatani reportedly said to Secretary of Defence Donald H. Rumsfeld: ‘If Japan is to own a missile defense system, it should be used to protect Japan's territory and be operated by Japan on its own initiative.’ Quoted in ‘Missile Defense Would be Solo’, The Japan Times, 24 June 2001; see also Masahiko Hisae, 9.11 to Nihon Gaikō (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2002), pp.157–60.

17. Richard P. Cronin, Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 2002), p.11; see also, Hisae, 9.11 (note 16) pp.164–7.

18. For example, the Agency stated in its White Paper: ‘Generally, the implementation of technical research and development and deployment of equipment passes through the three steps of “research and study”, “development” and “mass production and deployment”. This cooperative technical research is at the level of “research and study” to further ensure the technical possibilities of BMD, etc. The transition toward the development stage and the transition toward the deployment stage are judged separately after an extensive examination.’ Defense of Japan 2001 White Paper (Summary), chap. 4, sec. 4  < www.jda.go.jp/e/pab/wp2001/youyaku/by1304040000.htm > .

19. Axel Berkofsky, ‘US Turns up Missile Defense Pressure on Japan’, Asia Times Online, 19 Nov. 2002,  < www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/DK19Dh01.html > .

20. Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, Joint Statement, 16 Dec. 2002,  < www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0212.html>>, emphasis added.

21. ‘Ishiba Won't Rule Out Upgrade for Patriot Defense System’, The Japan Times, 5 April 2003.

22. ‘Japan Urged to Adopt U.S. Missile Defense’, The Japan Times, 14 June 2003.

23. The Defence Agency's request of 142 billion yen ($1,290 million) was reduced to 107 billion yen ($972 million) approximately, partially due to the considerable rise of the yen in the preceding few months. See ‘Misairu Bōei Rainendo Yosan 900-1000 Okuen wo Keijō’, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 16 Dec. 2003.

24. The cabinet decided that the joint research would remain at the research phase.

25. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, 19 Dec. 2003  < www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2003/1219danwa_e.html > .

26. Dan Blumenthal, ‘The Revival of U.S.-Japan Alliance’, Asian Outlook (Feb./March 2005), p.3. For the implications of the new Programme Outline within the context of the Japan-US alliance, see also, Hiroshi Nakanishi, ‘Tenkanki ni okeru Nichibei Kankei no Tenbō’, Kaigai Jijo, Vol. 53, No. 3 (March 2005), pp.17–30; Koji Murata, ‘Nichibei Dōmei: Kokueki to Seido no Saranaru Kyōyū ni Mukete’, Gaiko Forum, No. 200 (March 2005), pp.32–7.

27. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, 19 Dec. 2003 (note 25).

28. Ohno said that it would be enough to add a protocol. See ‘Chōkan Kaiken Gaiyō’, 17 Dec. 2004,  < www.jda.go.jp/j/kisha/2004/12/17.pdf>;.

29. ‘U.S. Wants Japan to Help Develop Updated Missiles’, The Japan Times, 11 Jan. 2005.

30. ‘Defense Agency Wants 5 Trillon Yen’, The Japan Times, 1 Sept. 2005. The US Department of Defense calls BMD cooperation with Japan the Japanese Cooperative Program.

31. ‘Ohno Chōkan Kaiken Gaiyō’, 19 July 2005,  < www.jda.go.jp/j/kisha/2005/07/19.htm >  see also ‘MHI to Get License to Produce PAC-3 Interceptor Missiles’, The Japan Times, 20 July 2005.

32. ‘New Defense Laws Best Unused’, The Japan Times, 16 June 2004.

33. For instance, the report of the Advisory Group on Defence Issues, called the Higuchi Report, submitted to Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in August 1994, emphasized the importance of BMD. This report became famous for its emphasis on multilateralism, causing strong caution in Washington. It may be less known that the report stressed the importance of cooperating with the US, concerning BMD. See Advisory Group on Defense Issues, The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21^st Century (12 Aug. 1994), as translated in Appendix A, in Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green (eds), Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1994), p.52.

34. In the 1999 edition of the defence white paper, the Japan Defence Agency changed the range of the Nodong from 1,000 km to 1,300 km, stating that ‘almost all areas of Japan could be within its range’. It also read that ‘it can be judged that North Korea is likely deploying’ Nodong missiles. See Bōei Hakusho, 1999, chap. 3, sec. 2,  < http://jda-clearing.jda.go.jp/hakusho_data/1999/honmon/main/at1101030200.htm > .

35. To be sure, anti-North Korean feelings in Japan had fairly intensified by the time Koizumi visited Pyongyang. For instance, when Japan Coast Guard vessels sank an unidentified vessel in a firefight in December 2001, which later proved to be a North Korean spy ship, the Japanese public hardly denounced this ‘use of force’. Instead, many Japanese pressed the government to utilize this incident as leverage to solve the abduction issue.

36. It is widely speculated in Japan that North Korea tried in vain to settle the matter by sending five abductees back to Japan with their families taken as hostages, and unwillingly providing allegedly forged death certificates, the remains of a male abductee which later proved to be a female's, and other allegedly false information. Such insincerity and imprudence by North Korea made the Japanese public indignant.

37. As stated above, the PAC-3 was used in the 2003 Gulf War, ‘but a complete analysis of its effectiveness is not yet available’. Amy L. Freedman and Robert C. Gray, ‘The Implications of Missile Defense for Northeast Asia’, Orbis, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 2004), p.339. For a cautious view, see Wade Boese, ‘Patriot Scorecard Mixed: PAC-3 Use Limited’, Arms Control Today, Vol. 33, No. 4 (May 2003),  < www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_05/pac3_may03.asp > . With regard to Standard Missile (SM)-3, the interceptor of Sea-based Midcourse which Japan is to deploy, a recent article points out that SM-3 will be most likely unable to reach the trajectory of the Nodong (‘Nihon no Misairu Bōei Shisutemu ha “Nodon” ni Todokanai’, Shūkan Ekonomisuto, Vol. 82, No. 22 13 April [2004], pp.46–8), but no debate has occurred.

38. A former Defence Agency official recently told the author that the Agency initially had no intention to introduce the PAC-3.

39. However, the Defence Agency does not necessarily seem to be in rush to start actual deployment of PAC-3 systems. This supposedly suggests that the deployment decision might have been urged by pressure from Japanese defence industries as well as the US.

40. Masahiro Akiyama, Nichibei no Senryakutaiwa ga Hajimatta: Anpo Saiteigi no Butai Ura (Tokyo: Aki Shobō, 2002), pp.242–3. He says: ‘Although I do not think there was no effect, it was not an immediate reason for the agreement to revise the guidelines.’ On the contrary, Michael J. Green suggests that the crisis facilitated the Japanese government's decision to initiate the revision. See Michael J. Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp.89–90.

41. Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21^st Century, 17 April 1996  < www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/sengen_.htm > .

42. For a detailed analysis on this issue, see Masahiko Sasajima, ‘Japan's Domestic Politics and China Policymaking’, in Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson (eds), An Alliance for Engagement: Building Cooperation in Security Relations with China (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2002), pp.96–9.

43. On 15 August 2005, the 60th anniversary of the end of the war in the Pacific, Koizumi did not visit the shrine dedicated to the souls of Japanese military casualties, including convicted Class-A war criminals of the Second World War. Instead, the Prime Minister issued another apology for wartime atrocities and stressed the importance of regional cooperation with neighbouring countries for future peace and stability, explicitly mentioning China and South Korea. See Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, 15 Aug. 2005,  < www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2005/08/15danwa_e.html > . This can be seen as a reflection of changing public attitudes, considering that the Lower House election was scheduled for mid-September. ‘For Koizumi, Yasukuni Risks Far Outweigh Benefits’ The Japan Times, 16 Aug. 2005.

44. Kiichi Fujiwara, Sensō wo Kioku Suru: Hiroshima, Horokōsuto to Genzai (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2001), pp.143–96.

45. Kori Urayama, ‘China Debates Missile Defence’, Survival, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Summer 2004), pp.131–2; see also Sasajima, ‘Japan's Domestic Politics’ (note 42) pp.99–101.

46. Taku Ishikawa, ‘Nichi-Bei-Chū Kankei to Dandō Misairu Bōei: “Kokka Anzenhoshō” heno Kōtai?’, Kaigai Jijo Kenkyūjo Hōkoku, No. 35 (March 2001), pp.174–5.

47. Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism (note 40) pp.103–105.

48. Yoichi Funabashi, ‘From Japan Bashing to Japan Surpassing’, International Herald Tribune/Asahi Shimbun, 30 March 2004.

49. Atsushi Kusano of Keio University ascribes this change largely to the roles played by the coalition governments since 1993, when the ‘1955 system’ characterized by the Liberal Democratic Party's monopoly of power collapsed. See Atushi Kusano, Renritsu Seiken (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 1999), esp. part. 3.

50. For the distinction between ‘deterrence by denial’ and ‘deterrence by punishment’, see Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975 [1961]), pp.14–6; see also Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St Martin's Press, 1989), pp.112, 444n; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), pp.543–83.

51. Taku Ishikawa, ‘Reisengo no Yokushi Taisei to Dandō Misairu Bōei’, in Satoshi Morimoto (ed.), Misairu Bōei: Atarashii Kokusai Anzenhoshō no Kōzu (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūjo, 2002), pp.207–31; id., ‘Nichi-Bei-Chū Kankei to Dandō Misairu Bōei’ (note 46), pp.169–85.

52. Israel's BMD policy can be explained by the same token. See the contribution of Reuven Pedatzur in this issue. Like Israel, South Korea and Taiwan have faced a proximate threat with ballistic missiles. Consequently both have shown interests in BMD, and American forces in South Korea have already introduced the PAC-3. However, they are too close to their respective missile threat to be defended by any missile shield effectively. For this point, see, for instance, Michael D. Swaine with Loren H. Runyon, ‘Ballistic Missiles and Missile Defense in Asia’, NBR Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 3 (June 2002), pp.63–9.

53. Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, 19 Feb. 2005  < www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm > .

54. The shift has been accelerated since September 11. For a view that suggests that the preemptive doctrine, often regarded as ‘a sign of the collapse of the logic and policy of deterrence’, is an extension of the shift. Galia Press-Barnathan, ‘The War against Iraq and International Order: From Bull to Bush’, International Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2004), pp.195–212.

55. Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation (New York: St Martin's Press, 1998), p.40.

56. Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.), Japan's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs), p.24.

57. Ibid., p.39; see also, Seiichiro Noboru, ‘2000 nen NPT Unyō Kentō Kaigi wo Furikaeru’, Gaiko Forum, No. 145 (Sept. 2000), pp.34–9.

58. Nobuyasu Abe, ‘Misairu Fukakusan Doryoku no Kongo no Hōkōsei’, Kokusai Mondai, No. 461 (Aug. 1998), pp.37–8.

59. Ichiro Ogasawara, ‘Tairyō Hakai Heiki no Kakusan to Nihon no Seisaku’, Kokusai Mondai, No. 529 (April 2004), p.76.

60. Ibid., p.76; see also Directorate General, Japan's Disarmament (note 56) p.194.

61. Kaneda, Dandō Misairu (note 5) p.227; Noboru Hoshuyama, ‘Kaku Kakusan Bōshi to TMD Dōnyū’, Voice, No. 250 (Oct. 1998), pp.134–42. The recent volume of the Defence Agency's public relations magazine carries a comic story on BMD. This story emphasizes the limitation of the MTCR and the Hague Code, saying: ‘The point is these rules are not treaties but nothing more than political agreements’. ‘Yoku Wakaru BMD’, Securitarian, No. 544 (March 2004), p.12. It is not certain if by such an argument the public, supposedly aware that North Korea has been a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, would be convinced.

62. Yukiya Amano, ‘Nihon ga Dekirukoto 6tsu no Teian’, Gaiko Forum, No. 182 (Sept. 2003), p.31.

63. Of course, there still remain some slightly more cautious views in the government. For instance, the Foreign Ministry states that the Japanese government ‘hopes that the missile defense issue will be dealt with in a manner conducive to the improvement of international security environment, including in the areas of arms control and disarmament’. Japan's Position on the Missile Defense Plan,  < www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq1.html>>, although this document was posted on the website while Makiko Tanaka was Foreign Minister, who sometimes criticized missile defence.

64. The party emphasizes that BMD accords with Japan's spirit of a strictly defensive policy. See ‘Dandō Misairu Bōei no Dōnyū ni Tsuite’, 19 Dec. 2003,  < www.dpj.or.jp/seisaku/gaiko/BOX_GK0132.html > .

65. Akihisa Nagashima, Nichibei Dōmei no Atarashii Sekkeizu (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 2002), p.180.

66. Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism (note 40) pp.4–9.

67. Ibid., p.5.

68. For example, Fumio Kyuma of the Liberal Democratic Party, a former Defence Agency Director General and an influential ‘defence zoku’ (zoku means politicians with special influence in a specific policy area), said at a symposium held in Washington that within his party there was a growing call to reconsider the three arms export principles, raising Japan's commitment to BMD as a primary reason. Takashi Nishioka of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries followed suit, expressing a strong fear that it would be very difficult to maintain the level of Japan's defence technology without relaxing the three principles. Fukushiro Nukaga, also a former Defence Agency Director General, emphasized the need to reconsider the ban on exercising the right to collective self-defence, concerning the Self-defence Forces' peace keeping and humanitarian activities overseas. See ‘Buki Yushutsu’, Mainichi Shimbun, 7 May 2004. The whole event can be viewed on the website of the Heritage Foundation,  < www.heritage.org/Press/Events/ev050504a.cfm>;.

69. Of course, government officials and politicians do not explicitly mention this implication, but some pro-BMD analysts do suggest that missile defence can be a useful substitute for a nuclear deterrent. Kaneda, Dandō Misairu (note 5) p.226–9.

70. Nisohachi Hyodo, ‘TMD Gensō kara Mezameyo!: Nihon no “Kakubusō” Hōki de Warau no ha Dareka’, Seiron, No. 368 (March 2003), pp.134–42.

71. For instance, Yoshihisa Hurukawa of the Liberal Democratic Party recently indicated the need for missiles with conventional warheads in a Lower House committee. Anzenhoshō Iinkai Kaigiroku, 12 May 2005,  < www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/001516220050512010.htm > .

72. Seiji Maehara of the Democratic Party expressed a fear of losing autonomy especially in terms of intelligence. ‘Fuanteika suru Sekai to Atarashii Kyōi’, Chūō Kōron, Vol. 119, No. 10 (Oct. 2004), p.57. This explains partly, why some nationalists, such as Shintaro Ishihara, favour Japan's own development of BMD, and why the Defence Agency Director General Nakatani tended to stress Japan's ‘own initiative’, as previously mentioned. Hisae, 9.11 (note 16) pp.157–67; Masahiro Matsumura, Nichibei Dōmei to Gunji Gijutsu (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1999), pp.79–87. Yet, there is a view that Japan has successfully met its needs through ‘subordination’. Edward J. Lincoln, ‘Japan: Using Power Narrowly’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Winter 2003–04), pp.111–27.

73. Eugene A. Matthews, ‘Japan's New Nationalism’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2003), p.74. This article seems to underestimate the fact that such a shift has been occurring under the persistent constraints derived from the continuities mentioned above. Somewhat by contrast, Thomas U. Berger's analysis of Japan's strategic culture seems to overemphasize the continuities, anti-militarism in particular. See Berger, ‘Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan’, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp.317–56. Christopher P. Twomey perhaps precisely presents a more complicated view. While it has engaged in balancing, Japan has been and will likely be ‘circumscribed’, due to the enduring effect of ‘socialization’ against an assertive foreign policy, which is likely to lead to more audacious balancing: Twomey, ‘Japan, a Circumscribed Balancer: Building on Defensive Realism to Make Predictions about East Asian Security’, Security Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer 2000), pp.167–205. Akihiro Sadō aptly points out that the quest for autonomy has been constrained by the centrality of the US. See Sadō, ‘“Jishu Gaikō” wo Towareru Nihon’, in Tomoyuki Kojima and Isami Takeda (eds), Higashi Ajia no Anzenhoshō (Tokyo: Nansōsha, 2002), pp.123–31. Thus, the degree and the velocity of the shift in the attitudes of the Japanese should not be overemphasized, though the shift is undeniably taking place.

74. ‘Kahansū ga Kenen no Bōei Seisaku’, Asahi Shimbun, 17 March 1985.

75. ‘Jimin Shijisō ga “Rihan”’, Asahi Shimbun, 14 March 1987.

76. Shin'ichi Kitaoka, ‘Futsū no Kuni’ he (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2000). He attributes this change largely to the end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War. See Nihon no Aidentiti, Coordinated by Ken'ichi Ito (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Fōramu, 1999), p.236.

77. To be sure, Ozawa's idea of ‘normal country’ did not require a constitutional revision. He argued – and still does – that even under the present Constitution, the Self-defence Forces would be able to engage in military operations as long as the UN authorized those actions. See Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994), esp. part 2.

78. ‘Jieitai Rikai Chakujitu ni Shinka’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 3 June 2004.

79. At first, a 70 per cent majority was opposed to the dispatch, but by the beginning of 2004 a majority came to support it, according to various polls.

80. ‘SDI Hyōka ni Mayoi’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 29 April 1985.

81. ‘Naikaku, Seitō Shijiritsu Chōsa Kekka’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 25 March 2003.

82. ‘Nichibei Kyōdō Yoron Chōsa’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 19 Dec. 1999.

83. The strong resentment of the DPRK, rather than the fear of it, among the public can be found in a poll started in April 2003 on the Internet, according to which 41.2 per cent think that Japan should have nuclear weapons to counter the North Korean threat. See Japan Today, < www.japantoday.com/e/?content=vote&id=137 > . However, this should not be overemphasized, as an analyst argues: ‘Despite growing domestic sentiment to amend the constitution, the nuclear option for Japan would be extremely unlikely unless the security commitments made under the American-Japan treaty were somehow to lose credibility.’ Peter Van Ness, ‘Hegemony, Not Anarchy: Why China and Japan are Not Balancing US Unipolar Power’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2002), p.139; see also Andrew L. Oros, ‘Godzilla's Return: The New Nuclear Politics in an Insecure Japan’, in Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson (eds), Japan's Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21^st Century (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), pp.49–63; Matake Kamiya, ‘Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter 2002–03), pp.63–75.

84. The changes have been indicated in several publications. See Yuichi Hasegawa (ed.), Nihon Gaikō no Identity (Tokyo: Nansōsha, 2004), esp. pp.179–206, 241–79; Mel Gurtov, Pacific Asia? Prospects for Security and Cooperation in East Asia (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), pp.141–60; Stuart Harris and Richard N. Cooper, ‘The U.S.-Japan Alliance’, in Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb (eds), America's Asian Alliances (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), pp.54–5.

85. Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism (note 40) p.6 (emphasis in original).

86. For this concept, see James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Continuity and Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), esp. pp.210–42, 333–87; James N. Rosenau and W. Michael Fagen, ‘A New Dynamism in World Politics: Increasingly Skillful Individuals’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Dec. 1997), pp.655–86.

87. Alexander E. Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp.391–425.

88. Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism (note 40) p.34.

89. Shigeru Ishiba, Kokubō (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2005), p.31. He uses ‘sama’, sarcastically of course, which is probably a more formal courtesy title in Japanese than ‘Mr’ might sound.

90. Katsu Furukawa, Japan's View of the Korea Crisis, 25 Feb. 2003,  < www.cns.miis.edu/research/korea/jpndprk.htm > .