Emerging from the shadow of war: A critical perspective on DDR and weapons reduction in the post-conflict period

Abstract

Drawing on a wide range and multidisciplinary literature, this essay provides an overview of post-conflict armed violence. It then introduces a critical review of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and weapons reduction activities – two comparatively new interventions championed by development donors ostensibly to reduce armed violence and secure the peace.

Notes

1. World Bank, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, DC: World Bank: 2003), p.159, for example, claims that ‘a structured DDR process, which demobilizes combatants in stages and emphasizes their ability to reintegrate into society, may reduce the risk of ex-combatants turning to violent crime or rejoining rebel groups in order to survive’.

2. Some analysts have pointed to ‘peace agreements’ as a conventional indicator of the ‘shift’ from ‘active’ to ‘post’ conflict. Other benchmarks of transition include arbitrary temporal thresholds or concrete activities on the ground such as ceasefires, donor pledges, the holding of negotiations, levels of foreign investment, elections, development interventions and various types of weapons reduction, demobilization and reintegration efforts.

3. These excess deaths include fatalities caused by the spread of infectious diseases, destruction of assets, the dismantling of livelihoods and the diversion of scarce resources away from basic services. Genocide and massacres are confusingly excluded because of their extraordinarily controversial nature, and that they often far exceed all other types of ‘conflict-related’ victimization. See Human Security Centre, 2005 Human Security Report: War and Peace in the 21st Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

4. Katherine Aguirre, Robert Muggah, Jorge Restrepo and Michael Spagat, Colombia's Hydra: The Many Faces of Gun Violence. Small Arms Survey 2006: Unfinished Business (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) find, however, that in the case of Colombia's conflict, ‘combatant’ fatalities often exceed non-fatal injuries during attacks, clashes and combined events since the late 1980s – sometimes as high as a ratio of 5:1.

5. In the case of the 1991 Gulf War: ‘[t]here were relatively few deaths (approximately 56,000 to military personnel and 3,500 to civilians) from direct war effects. Post-conflict violence accounted for approximately 35,000 deaths. The largest component of deaths in this reconstruction derives from the 111,000 attributable to post-war adverse health effects. Of the total excess deaths in the Iraqi population, approximately 109,000 were to men, 23,000 to women, 74,000 to children’. See Beth Daponte, ‘A Case Study in Estimating Casualties from War and its Aftermath: The 1991 Persian Gulf War’, Medicine and Global Survival, Vol.3, No.2 (1993), available at <http://www.ippnw.org/MGS/PSRQV3N2Daponte.html> (accessed February 2005). A recent survey supported by the Small Arms Survey also indicates that Iraq has registered a 58-fold increase in the rate of violent death in the intervening period following the US intervention in March 2003. See Les Roberts, ‘Mortality Before and After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: Cluster Sample Survey’, Lancet, Vol.364 (Autumn 2004), pp.1857–1864. Though the majority of violent deaths can be attributed to aerial weaponry and artillery, independent sources nevertheless reported some 3,000 gunshot-related deaths in Baghdad during the first eight months of 2004.

6. There continues to be some dispute about where ‘war-related deaths’ begin and end. Direct ‘war-related’ or ‘battle’ deaths and disabilities are notoriously difficult to measure with any certainty – though many have tried. They can extend on a continuum from intentional fatal injuries sustained during pitched battles to excess deaths. See, for example, Bethany Lacina and Niels Gleditsch, Measuring War: A Typology and a New Dataset of Battle Deaths (Oslo: Centre for the Study of Civil War, 2004). Also consult Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey: Weapons at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) and Human Security Centre, Human Security Report: War and Peace in the 21st Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

7. See Jenny Pearse, ‘Peace-Building at the Periphery: Lessons from Central America’, Third World Quarterly, Vol.20, No.1 (1999), pp.51–68.

8. Anke Hoeffler and Marta Reynal-Querol, ‘Measuring the Costs of Conflict’, Mimeo (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2003), p.4.

9. See Joanna Santa Barbara, ‘The Psychological Effects of War on Children’, in Barry S. Levy and Victor W. Sidel (eds.), War and Public Health (Oxford: Oxford University Press and the American Public Health Association, 1999) and Miriam Sabin, Barbara Lopez Cordoza, Larry Nackerud, Reinhard Kaiser and Luis Varese, ‘Guatemalan Refugees Twenty Years Later: Factors Associated with Poor Mental Health Outcomes’, Journal of the American Health Association, Vol.290 (2003), pp.635–642.

10. For example, in a recent longitudinal survey of returning US soldiers and marines from Iraq (n: 1,509) and Afghanistan (n: 1,962), between 66 and 97 per cent claimed to have been shot at. What is more, up to 95 per cent of the respondents were exposed to dead bodies and human remains and as many as 28 per cent claimed to be themselves responsible for the killing of a non-combatant. See Charles Hoge et al., ‘Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health Problems and Barriers to Care’, New England Journal of Medicine, Vol.351, No.1 (2004), pp.13–22; Declan Butler, ‘Admission on Gulf War Vaccines Spurs Debate on Medical Records’, Nature, Vol.390 (1997), pp.3–4; and Center for Disease Control, ‘Health Status of Vietnam Veterans: Psychological Characteristics’, Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol.259, No.18 (1988), pp.2708–2714.

11. See, for example, the Small Arms Survey website <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org> for a comprehensive review of participatory research and armed violence. See Emile Lebrun and Robert Muggah, ‘Silencing Guns: Local Perspectives on Small Arms and Armed Violence in Rural South Pacific Communities’, Occasional Paper No.15 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005). Also consult Robert Muggah, Listening for Change: Participatory Evaluations of DDR and Arms Reduction in Mali, Cambodia and Albania (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2005).

12. For example, the CDC has observed how in recent years there has been an increased frequency of rape and sexual violence reported in conflict and post-conflict settings alike – much of it perpetrated at gunpoint. See, for example, <http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ierh/Research&Survey/WarRelated.htm>.

13. See, for example, David Atwood, Anne-Katherin Glatz and Robert Muggah, ‘Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand’, Occasional Paper No.18 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2006). Also consult Robert Muggah, ‘Regulating Small Arms: Assessing Normative Progress on Reducing Supplies, Effects and Demand’, in Thomas Biersteker, Peter Spiro, Chandra Sriram and Veronica Raffo (eds.), International Law and International Relations: Bridging Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2006).

14. See, for example, Robert Muggah, Jorge Restrepo, Keith Krause and Michael Spagat, ‘Colombia's Chimaera: Reflections on Human Security and Armed Violence,’ Human Security Bulletin (2006), available at <http://www.humansecurity bulletin.info/page230.htm>.

15. See, for example, Atwood et al., ‘Demanding Attention’, and Robert Muggah and Jurgen Brauer, ‘Diagnosing Small Arms Demand: A Multidisciplinary Approach’, Discussion Paper No.50 (Durban: School of Economics, University of Natal South Africa, June 2004).

16. See Jurgen Brauer and Robert Muggah, ‘Completing the Circle’, in this volume.

17. For example, in El Salvador between June 2001 and May 2002, some 3,704 persons entered the state public health system with firearm injuries while 7,592 entered with injuries caused by sharp objects such as knives and machetes. Victimization surveys undertaken during this period indicate that the use of firearms in self-defense often lead to higher death rates than when where no weapons were present.

18. See, for example, World Bank, Breaking the Conflict Trap (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003).

19. See Douglas Pedersen, ‘Political Violence, Ethnic Conflict and Contemporary Wars: Broad Implications for Health and Well Being’, Social Science and Medicine, Vol.55 (2002), pp.175–190; David Archer and Richard Gartner, ‘Violent Acts and Violent Times: A Comparative Approach to Post-War Homicide Rates’, American Sociological Review, Vol.41 (1976), pp.937–960; and Hazem Ghoborah, Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, ‘Civil Wars Kill and Maim People – Long After the Shooting Stops’, American Political Science Review, Vol.97, No.2 (2003), pp.189–202.

20. See Caroline Moser, ‘Urban Violence and Insecurity: An Introductory Roadmap’, Environment and Urbanization Brief No.10 (London: International Institute for Environment and Development, 2004); and Cathy McIlwaine and Caroline Moser, ‘Violence and Social Capital in Urban Poor Communities: Perspectives from Colombia and Guatemala’, Journal of International Development, Vol.13, No.7 (2001), pp.965–984.

21. See Bill Godnick et al., ‘Balas perdidas el impacto del mal uso de armas pequenas en Centroamerica’ (Geneva and London: Small Arms Survey and IANSA, 2003); and Suzette Grillot et al., ‘A Fragile Peace: Guns and Security in Post-Conflict Macedonia’, Special Report No.4 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2004).

22. Guha-Sapir Debra and Willem van Panhuis, Armed Conflict and Public Health: A Report on Knowledge and Knowledge Gaps (Brussels: CRED, 2002), pp.37–43.

23. See Robert Muggah with Martin Griffiths, ‘Reconsidering the Tools of War: The Humanitarian Impacts of Small Arms and Light Weapons’, ODI Network Paper No.39 (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2002).

24. See Joanna Macrae, ‘Aiding Peace … and War: UNHCR, Returnee Integration, and the Relief-Development Debate’, Working Paper No.14 (Geneva: UNHCR, 1999).

25. This appears to be a general consensus, notwithstanding the on-going terminological and conceptual confusion over what precisely ‘post-conflict’ means in practice.

26. See, for example, Small Arms Survey, 2005 Small Arms Survey: Weapons at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) and the DPKO Best Practices website at <http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/>.

27. According to the World Bank, Breaking the Conflict Trap, however, where armed conflicts ended with negotiated settlements – rebel integration occurs in about 50 per cent of the cases. Without treaties, integration is rarer – in about one-seventh of cases.

28. Nicole Ball has described the security sector as including: the security forces (military, paramilitary, police), the agencies of government and parliament responsible for oversight of these forces, informal security forces, the judiciary and correction system, private security firms and civil society. See Nicole Ball, ‘Transforming Security Sectors: the IMF and World Bank Approaches’, Conflict Security and Development, Vol.1, No.1 (2001), pp.45–60.

29. There are eight Millennium Development Goals that range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015. See, for example <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>.

30. United Nations General Assembly, Note by the Secretary-General, A/59/565, 2 December 2004.

31. See Mary Anderson, How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999) and OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Guidelines on Helping Prevent Deadly Conflict (Paris: OECD DAC, 2001).

32. There have been 49 UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions since the early 1950s – the majority of which, some 37, have taken place since the end of the Cold War.

33. See UN, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa (New York: DPA, 1998).

34. See Kees Kingma (ed.), Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Development and Security Impacts (Houndmills: MacMillan, 2000) and Mats Berdal, ‘Disarmament and Demobilization After Civil Wars’, Adelphi Paper No.303 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

35. Though ‘no statistical analyses of the effects of military integration on the likelihood of war recurrence are available, in several cases military integration is associated with a lowered rate of war recurrence’ (World Bank, Breaking the Conflict Trap, p.149).

36. World Bank, Breaking the Conflict Trap. But despite its considerable investment in demobilization and reintegration of both vulnerable groups and combatants, the World Bank has never explicitly addressed the disarmament component of DDR. The main reason for this omission can be traced to the nature of its mandate. Its Operational Manual states: ‘[i]n view of its mandate, the Bank does not engage in peacemaking or peacekeeping, which are the functions of the United Nations and certain regional organizations. It also does not provide direct support for disarming combatants’. See World Bank, Post Conflict Reconstruction: the Role of the World Bank (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998). Some insiders argue that this is more a matter of the Bank not wishing to become involved in the reputation-related risks associated with practical disarmament than a mandate constraint (Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey: Weapons at War). The fact that the World Bank promotes DDR, but does not explicitly support disarmament, has lead in some cases to considerable confusion and poorly executed interventions. See also Nat Colletta et al., Case Studies in War to Peace Transitions: the Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996).

37. World Bank, Breaking the Conflict Trap, p.159.

38. See Sami Faltas et al., ‘Removing Small Arms from Society: A Review of Weapons Destruction and Destruction Programs’, Occasional Paper No.2 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2001).

39. There are a number of ‘best practices’ emerging from community-based and voluntary collection programs. Among these are the importance of using community sources to identify where to search; placing a higher premium on gun seizures compared to prosecution; emphasizing both deterrence and referral to social services; training (police) officers and ensure departmental support; securing and maintaining community participation and support; and ensuring robust record-keeping, monitoring and evaluation. See Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey: Weapons at War.

40. See Small Arms Survey, 2002 Small Arms Survey: Counting the Human Costs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Faltas et al., ‘Removing Small Arms from Society’; Sami Faltas and Paes Wolf-Christian, ‘Exchanging Guns for Tools’, BICC Brief No.29 (Bonn: BICC, 2004); and Sarah Meek, ‘Buy of Barter: The History and Prospects of Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes’, ISS Monograph Series No.22 (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 1998).

41. DfID, ‘Tackling poverty by reducing armed violence: recommendations from a Wilton Park’, London, 2003, available at <http://www.smallarmsnet.org/Reports/wiltonpark.pdf>.

42. See Colletta et al., Case Studies in War to Peace Transitions.

43. Some governments continue to insist that weapons should not be destroyed either because they are government property or because such a course of action would necessitate additional defense expenditure and thus, perversely, fuel the (legal) arms trade.

44. See Robert Muggah, ‘The Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’, Study commissioned by UNDP and the World Bank (Manila: World Bank, 2004).

45. Some have criticized the Liberia DDR operation for being more concerned with political expediency and rapid implementation than with meaningful transformations in security. See, for example, Eric Berman and Nicolas Florquin (eds.), Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2004).

46. It is worth emphasizing the variety of discrete ‘missions’ that are expected of DDR within a peace operation. For example, the so-called DDRRR intervention in DRC is focused on at least two groups – the ‘foreign armed groups that should not be reintegrated into the local community, but sent back to their countries of origin’ as well as erstwhile Congolese combatants. But DDR is also being carried out in parallel with ‘the complementary process of creating a new, unified national armed forces out of the various bits and pieces of armed groups and forces left over from the end of the war’. While DDR is being supported by the World Bank's MDRP and a number of donors with over US$200 million made available, the parallel process is not being funded, supported, or controlled by any others than the DRC government, itself divided and lacking capacity. Paradoxically, ‘army integration is forging ahead, while the DDR languishes’, though few are able to adequately explain why this is the case. Interview with MONUC DPKO officer, November 2005.

47. A matter of considerable debate is how to determine whether an individual seeking DDR- or weapons reduction-related assistance is a combatant or not. In the absence of credible registries and lists, the World Bank (Breaking the Conflict Trap) claims that such criteria can include: ‘self-identification, proven affiliation with a known armed group, and/or proof of military ability, such as weapons handling. Especially for special projects involving irregular forces, particular attention needs to be paid to avoiding the creation of perverse incentives (i.e., individuals or groups arming themselves in order to subsequently benefit from a program of demobilization)’ (p.160). But designation of status is often exceedingly difficult in practice. See Center for International Cooperation and Security, The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes (Paris: CERI, 2004); and Steffen Jensen and Stepputat Finn, Demobilizing Armed Civilians, Center for Development Research Policy Paper (Copenhagen: CDR, 2001).

48. See World Bank, Breaking the Conflict Trap.

49. UNDP has expressed particular concern about the dangers of DDR being perceived as an ‘entitlement’ for armed elements. See Robert Muggah and Peter Batchelor, Development Held Hostage: The Socio-Economic Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Human Development (New York: UNDP, 2002).

50. James Milner, ‘The Militarization and Demilitarization of Refugee Camps and Settlements in Guinea 1999–2004’, Background Paper (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2004); Ryan Nichols, ‘DDR in Liberia’, Background Paper (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2004).

51. It should be mentioned that the issue of ‘small arms and light weapons’, including their collection, destruction and exchange for development incentives, has recently become an OECD-DAC thematic priority. Please refer to OECD/DAC, 'Small Arms and Light Weapons', Issues Brief: Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention, OECD, Paris, 2005, available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/27/35034375.pdf>.

52. It should be noted that the Brahimi Report made special mention of the importance of financing reintegration as part of the UN General Assembly assessed peacekeeping budget, though the UN continues to be plagued with difficulties in effectively financing DDR. The Stockholm Initiative for DDR (SIDDR) has also recently issued a number of reports on the budgeting for DDR, available at <http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/04/39/67/67a542a2.pdf>.

53. See Nicky Hitchcock, ‘Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: The Case of Angola’, Peacekeeping Note, Issue 1 (Durban: ACCORD, 2004).

54. Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey: Weapons at War.