The Blue, Green, and Brown: Insurgency and Counter-insurgency on the Water

Abstract

It is not only the security forces that can make effective use of the sea. The aim of this article is to explain the concept of maritime insurgency and to make clear the nature of the current threat. It uses historical and contemporary examples to illustrate both why and how insurgents have sought to use coastal and inland waters and the high seas, to further their aims. It suggests that the maritime insurgent activity currently taking place is difficult to separate from the wider problems of criminality and disorder at sea, and that, given the speed of political and technological change, there is no reason the intensity of irregular conflict that has been experienced by land forces could not in future be replicated at sea. It argues, furthermore, that because insurgents do not recognise territorial boundaries and treat all three types of water – blue, green, and brown – as a continuum, naval forces need to be prepared to do the same.

Notes

1. Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp.1–4.

2. Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgency Movements, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).

3. Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (London: Constable & Robinson, 1982), p.19. However, one of Nelson's other victories, the Battle of the Nile, does demonstrate decisive effect on land. By destroying the French fleet at Aboukir Bay, the Royal Navy isolated the French force from its home base. Without hope of re-supply or evacuation, Napoleon was forced to abandon his troops and return to France, ending all hope of occupying Egypt and putting pressure on the British position in India.

4. Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004), p.14

5. For a detailed history of this campaign see Chester G. Hearn, Grey Raiders of the Sea (Camden, ME: International Marine Publishing, 1992).

6. The position of the Lincoln administration was that the Confederacy had no legal existence but was an illegal product of rebellion. It was only the reality on the ground and the threat of retaliation if it attempted to try Confederate combatants for murder that forced it into a de facto recognition of belligerency, something it never acknowledged de jure. William H. Roberts, Now For The Contest: Coastal & Oceanic Naval Operations in the Civil War (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), p.121.

7. James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Penguin, 1990), especially p.307. In this case, guerrilla conflict led to banditry rather than the other way around. The James and Younger brothers and their gangs, for example, emerged out of the pitiless conflict in Missouri. Ibid., p.292.

8. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, pp.547–8. For a more detailed account see Hearn, Grey Raiders, pp.100, 151–2, 183 and 214–5; also Roberts, Now for the Contest, p.134.

9. For examples of the pride and consternation they caused – particularly the Florida and the Alabama – see Hearn, Grey Raiders, pp.66–7, 91, 93 and 110; Roberts, Now for the Contest, pp.132–3.

10. The Confederacy did use this method once, to capture the Chesapeake off Cape Cod in 1863, and planned to use it again in 1864 to capture Pacific coastal mail steamers, but the group involved was captured. Roberts, Now for the Contest, p.135.

11. Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, Trends in Maritime Violence (Coulsdon: Jane's Information Group, 1996) pp.90–4. Brian M. Jenkins et al., ‘A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks and other Criminal Actions against Maritime Targets’ in B.A.H. Parritt (ed.), Violence at Sea (Paris: ICC Publishing, 1986), p.69.

12. Ibid., pp.11, 29, 33–6. Other accounts include Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Gollancz, 1998), p.145; and James Cable, Navies in Violent Peace (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp.94–5.

13. ‘Somalia’s dangerous waters', BBC News report, 26 September 2005, available at ⟨http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4283396.stm⟩; Marcus Hand, ‘Somali pirates move even further from the coast’, Lloyd's List, 14 November 2005.

14. James P. Duffy, Hitler's Secret Pirate Fleet (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), pp.180–1.

15. ‘Somalia struggles with sea security’, Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, 27 April 2006, available at ⟨http://www.fairplay.co.uk/⟩

16. On Confederate tactics see Hearn, Grey Raiders, pp.173–4.

17. Confidential interview, shipping company director, July–August 2005; also ‘LPG ship hijacking flares warning’, Fairplay, 5 May 2005, available at ⟨http://www.fairplay.co.uk/⟩.

18. J. Peter Pham, ‘The War on Terrorism's Forgotten Front’, World Defense Review, 20 April 2006, available at ⟨http://www.reportingwar.com/pham042006.shtml⟩; Andrew MacGregor, ‘Islamists and Warlords Clash in Mogadishu’, The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus, Vol.III, Issue 17 (2 May 2006), available at ⟨http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/com77e.htm⟩.

19. Confidential interview, Royal Navy (UK) officer, April 2006.

20. David W. Munns, ‘121,000 Tracks’, Sea Power, Vol.48, No.7 (July 2005).

21. For more information on AIS see International Maritime Organization (IMO), ‘Automatic Identification System’, at ⟨http://www.imo.org/dynamic/mainframe.asp?topic_id = 754⟩ and US Coast Guard Navigation Center, What is the Automatic Identification System (AIS)? Available on its website ⟨http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/enav/ais/⟩. AIS is limited to VHF range, that is, about 20 nautical miles. The IMO hopes to introduce a new system, Long-Range Identification and Tracking, that will be global in scope. See IMO, ‘Long range identification and tracking’, at ⟨http://www.imo.org/Safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id = 905⟩. Most importantly this, unlike AIS, would not be a broadcast system and therefore would be unavailable to unauthorized recipients.

22. For a useful survey on masters' attitudes to AIS see Robert H. Allan, ‘Automatic Identification System (AIS): Research from the Bridge’, 2004, available at ⟨www.nautinst.org/ais/docs/research From Bridge.doc⟩.

23. ‘Terror alert as police seize cargo ship’, BBC News, 21 December 2001, available at ⟨http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/21/newsid_2539000/2539557.stm⟩; John Steele, ‘Security alert as Channel ship is seized’, Daily Telegraph, 22 December 2001.

24. See, for example, ‘Owners and seafarers share ISPS concerns’, Lloyd's List, 10 May 2006.

25. The other six groups listed by Rohan Gunaratna are Chechen groups, ETA, Hamas, Hezbollah, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and another Philippine group, the New People's Liberation Army. Rohan Gunaratna, ‘The Asymmetric Threat from Maritime Terrorism’, Jane's Navy International, October 2001, p.26. Lee Cordner, ‘Maritime Terrorism: The Next “Soft Target”?’, Defence and Foreign Affairs Daily, 9 December 2003, concurs with Gunaratna's assessment, save that he rates Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as a group with a currently unused maritime capability. JI came close to attacking maritime targets in 2001, when its planned suicide mission against US warships visiting Singapore was disrupted; Barry Wain, ‘Strait talk’, Far East Economic Review, 22 April 2004. See also Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2002), p.189. Rupert Herbert-Burns suggests 36 groups ‘have conducted maritime attacks, have the capacity to do so or routinely use the maritime domain for logistical and financial support’. Rupert Herbert-Burns, ‘Terrorism in the Early 21st Century Maritime Domain’, in Joshua Ho and Catherine Zara Raymond, The Best of Times, The Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing and Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005), pp.157–8.

26. R. Hariharan, ‘Sri Lanka: How Strong are the Tigers?’, South East Asia Analysis Group Note No. 297, 28 February 2006, available at ⟨http://www.saag.org/%5Cnotes3%5Cnote297.html⟩. Evidence of the continuing importance of that the group places on control of the sea flank can been seen in its demand that the ceasefire monitors grant the Sea Tigers equal status with the Sri Lankan Navy. P.K. Balachandran, ‘LTTE wants monitors to protect Sea Tiger vessels also’, HindustanTimes.com, 13 May 2006, available at ⟨http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1697281,001302310002.htm⟩ and ‘Soosai reiterates sovereign right to seas bordering Tamil Homeland’, TamilNet, 13 May 2006, available at <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid = 13&artid = 18111> .

27. For a detailed review of the LTTE's maritime capability and its influence on other maritime groups see Martin N. Murphy, ‘Maritime Threat: Tactics and Technology of the Sea Tigers’, Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol.18, No.6 (June 2006), pp.6–10. See also Anthony Davis, ‘Tamil Tigers seek to rebuild naval force’, Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol.17, No.3 (March 2005), p.39; and two articles by Rohan Gunaratna: ‘The Asymmetric Threat from Maritime Terrorism’, pp.24–9, and ‘Trends in Maritime Terrorism – the Sri Lankan case’, Lanka Outlook, Autumn 1998, pp.27–9 available at ⟨http://www.is.lk/is/spot/sp0316/clip8.html⟩.With regard to the submarine find in India see Gunaratna, ‘The Asymmetric Threat from Maritime Terrorism’, p.28. On the find in Thailand see Anthony Davis, ‘Tracking Tigers in Phuket: A secret Tamil guerrilla base embarrasses Bangkok’, Asiaweek.com, Vol.29, No.23 (16 June 2000), available at ⟨http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0616/nat.security.html⟩.

28. Confidential interview, regional expert, June 2004.

29. ‘Sri Lanka's Tigers on the loose’, The Economist Global Agenda, 28 December 2005; Peter Foster, ‘Revenge attacks on Tigers as army chief is hurt in blast’, Daily Telegraph, 26 April 2006; Rahul Bedi, ‘Refugees facing bleak future as Tigers hit back’, Sunday Telegraph, 1 May 2006.

30. P.K. Balachandran, ‘Tsunami did not wreck our navy: LTTE’, HindustanTimes.com, 1 January 2005, available at ⟨http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1179373,001301540003.htm⟩.

31. Hariharan, ‘Sri Lanka: How Strong are the Tigers?’.

32. Confidential interview, intelligence officer, August 2005.

33. For a history of GAM until 2003, see Kirsten E. Schulz, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization (Washington DC: East-West Centre, 2004) available at ⟨http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/PS002.pdf⟩. On the peace agreement see ‘Indonesia agrees Aceh peace deal’, BBC News, 17 July 2005, available at ⟨http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4690293.stm⟩.

34. Gareth Evans, ‘Aceh is building peace from its ruins’, International Herald Tribune, 23 December 2005. However, like all such accords, difficulties are emerging. See International Crisis Group, ‘Aceh: Now for the hard part’, Asia Briefing No.48 (29 March 2006), available at ⟨http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/b48_aceh_now_for_the_hard_part.pdf⟩.

35. ‘GAM relies on … gun-runners operating along the rugged coastline to fuel their rebellion’, Paul Dillon, ‘Piracy disappears in tsunami's wake’, AlJazeera.net, 31 January 2005, available at ⟨http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/5F174A5E-0812-40C1-9CA4-3F09F7D4FFEE.htm⟩.

36. Kate McGeown, ‘Aceh rebels blamed for piracy’, BBC News report, 8 September 2003, available at ⟨http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3090136.stm⟩.

37. Ibid.; also Catherine Zara Raymond, ‘Piracy in Southeast Asia: New Trends, Issues and Responses’, Harvard Asia Quarterly, 9 February 2006.

38. Confidential interview, regional expert, July 2005; also Anthony Davis, ‘Piracy in Southeast Asia shows signs of increased organisation’, Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol.16, No.6 (June 2004), p.39.

39. ‘Indonesian rebels deny carrying out pirate attacks in Malacca Strait’, Channel News Asia, 17 March 2005, available at ⟨http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/137752/1/.html⟩.

40. Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003) pp.110–13, and Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2005), p.21; Peter Chalk, ‘Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol.24, No.4 (1 July 2001), p.249.

41. For further background on the Janjalani brothers, one the founder and the other his successor, and the changing status of the ASG's Islamist priorities, see Rommel Banlaoi, ‘Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case’, paper presented at the symposium ‘The Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia’ organised by the Institute of Defense Analyses, Kuala Lumpur, 18–20 April 2005, pp.2, 4–5, 7–8. On the influx from the MILF, see ibid., p.10. See also Abuza, Balik Terrorism, pp.2–20, 27–8, where he disagrees with Banalaoi on the detail of the group's internal structure.

42. ‘Abu Sayyaf claims responsibility for ferry blast’, Fox News report, 29 February 2004.

43. Banlaoi, ‘Leadership Dynamics’, pp.12, 17. Abuza, Balik Terrorism, p.1, reports 194 dead.

44. See the comment on mixed motives in ‘Kidnappers make ransom demand after hostage grab on Malaysian resort’, CNN.com, 27 April 2000, available at ⟨http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/southeast/04/27/philippines.hostages/⟩.

45. On al-Nashiri's importance and his role within al-Qaeda see The 9/11Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Authorized Edition. (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 2004), pp.152–3.

46. Walter Jayawardhana, ‘Tamil Tiger leader says Osama bin Laden-led al Qaeda copied terrorist tactics from Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’, Go2lanka.com, 12 December 2002, available at ⟨http://www.go2lanka.com/stories/021212.html⟩; see also Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Sea Tiger success threatens the spread of copycat tactics’, Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol.13, No.3 (March 2001), pp.12–16; 9/11Commission Report, pp.190–1; Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House Trade Paperback, 2003), pp.31–3; Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (London: The Free Press, 2004), p.213; Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, pp. 49, 140.

47. For accounts of the attack see ‘Craft “rammed” Yemen oil tanker’, BBC News report, 6 October 2002; Philip Smucker, ‘We were bombed, says oil tanker captain’, Daily Telegraph, 8 October 2002.

48. ‘Al Qaeda, tanker insurance rates, mines among key war concerns’, Oil and Gas Journal, 31 March 2003; Michael Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), p.18; and John C. K. Daly, ‘Al Qaeda and Maritime Terrorism (Part I)’, The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Vol.1, No.4 (24 October 2003), p.2.

49. For a fuller discussion of the marine insurance market's response, see Martin N. Murphy, ‘Slow Alarm: The Response of the Marine Insurance Industry to the Threat of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism’, Maritime Studies, No.148 (May/June 2006).

50. On his arrest see ‘Top al-Qaeda operative arrested’, CNN.com, 22 November 2002 available at ⟨http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/11/21/alqaeda.capture/⟩; ‘Al-Qaeda operative talking’, CNN.com, 23 November 2002, available at ⟨http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/11/22/alqaeda.capture/⟩.

51. Daly, ‘Al Qaeda and Maritime Terrorism (Part I)’, pp.1–2; Vijay Sakhuja, ‘Casablanca: Al Qaeda's Maritime Node’, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Article No. 1039, 21 May 2003; ‘Morocco “uncovers al-Qaeda plot”’, BBC News report, 11 June 2002 available at ⟨http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2037391.stm⟩; see also the reports in the compendium edition of the Gibraltar Panorama for w/c 6 June 2002: ‘Claim that al-Qaeda team visited Gibraltar’ and ‘Terror plan in Gibraltar Strait’ available at ⟨http://www.panorama.gi/archive/020610/updates.htm⟩.

52. Confidential interview, intelligence officer, August 2005; also ‘Syrian admits Israeli cruise ship plot in Turkey’, International Herald Tribune, 12 August 2005; Murad Sezer, ‘Terror suspect: “I was going to attack Israeli ships”’, USA Today, 11 August 2005.

53. Quoted in Jim Garamone, ‘Maritime ops in Middle East have deterrent effect’, American Forces Information Service News Articles, 27 April 2006, available at ⟨http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2006/20060427_4952.html⟩.

54. Martin N. Murphy, ‘Maritime Terrorism: The Threat in Context’, Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol.18, No.2 (February 2006), pp.23–4.

55. For more information on the attacks on the Khawr al-Amaya and Al-Basra Oil Terminals see ‘Al-Qaida 'claims Iraqi boat attack’, AlJazeera.net, 26 April 2004, available at ⟨http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/BE4B1C81-DC6E-4ECA-AE34-5B6C2A200F55.htm⟩; ‘Blasts target Iraqi oil terminals’, BBC News, 25 April 2004, available at ⟨http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3656481.stm⟩.

56. For background on Operation Active Endeavour, see ⟨http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/ActiveEndeavour/Endeavour.htm⟩.

57. Michael Lindberg and Daniel Todd, Brown-, Green- and Blue-Water Fleets: The Influence of Geography on Naval Warfare, 1861 to the Present (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), pp.170–2.

58. Richard Brooks, ‘Admiral Beatty and Brown Water: The Sudan and China, 1896–1900’ in Peter Hore, Seapower Ashore: 200 Year of Royal Navy Operations on Land (London: Chatham Publishing, 2001), pp.164–180; Michael Lindberg and Daniel Todd in ibid., pp.179–82; Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p.266.

59. James D. Ladd, SBS: The Invisible Raiders (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1983), pp.153–64.

60. ‘The War against Sukharno: “The Navy's Here: Royal Navy Operations”’. Available at ⟨http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Borneo/RN.hetm⟩. For more details on the Confrontation, see Tim Benbow, ‘Maritime Forces and Counter-Insurgency’, in this volume.

61. Charles W. Koburger, Jr., The French Navy in Indochina: Riverine and Coastal Forces, 1945–54. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1991), pp.51–67.

62. Thomas J. Cutler, Brown Water, Black Berets. (Annapolism, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), pp.139–40.

63. Ibid., pp.72–3, 159; Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (New York: William Morrow & Co, 1994), pp.825–6.

64. Ibid., pp.235–8, 240–50.

65. Ibid., pp.191–9; Ladd, SBS, p.155.

66. ‘The IRA's store of weaponry’, BBC News, 14 August 2001, available at ⟨http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/1482426.stm⟩.

67. Graham Usher and Julian Borger, ‘Israel halts Palestinian arms ship’, Guardian, 5 January 2002. For more details on this and a previous incident see 'Weapons found on the ‘Karine-A’ and ‘Santorini’, WarOnLine, 20 July 2002, available at ⟨http://www.waronline.org/en/analysis/pal_weapons.htm⟩. Despite these setbacks Palestinian groups have continued to try to bring in arms by sea; see ‘Israel intercepts Hizballah shipment to Palestinians’, ICT News & Commentary, 24 May 2003, available at ⟨http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?idk = 900⟩.

68. Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade, pp. 14–15.

69. For example, Martin Bright, Nick Harris and Nick Paton Walsh, ‘Hunt for 20 terror ships’, Observer, 23 December 2001; John Mintz, ‘Al-Qaeda Fleet Takes Terrorist Threat to Sea’, smh.com. 1 January 2003, available at ⟨http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/12/31/1041196641696.html⟩.

70. Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgency Movements, p.119.

71. For more detail on these operations, see Murphy, ‘Maritime Threat: Tactics and Technology of the Sea Tigers’, pp.6–7.

72. Peter Chalk, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's International Organisation and Operations – A Preliminary Analysis, Canadian Security Intelligence Service: Commentary No.77 (Winter 1999), pp.5–6, available at ⟨http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/comment/com77_e.html⟩.

73. Menefee, Trends in Maritime Violence, pp.90–4.

74. ‘Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation’ now referred to more generally as SUA or sometimes the ‘Rome Convention’. For the full text, see ⟨http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id = 259&doc_id = 686⟩; see also Tullio Treves, ‘The Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation’ in Natalino Ronzitti (ed.), Maritime Terrorism and International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990), pp.69–90.

75. For a review of the weaknesses in the current international maritime legal regime and the recent changes see Martin N. Murphy, ‘Piracy and UNCLOS: Does international law help regional states combat piracy?’, in Peter Lehr (ed.), Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp.155–182.

76. Michael Bruno, ‘US maritime awareness a “vulnerability”’, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, 16 May 2006.