The European Union and Counter-insurgency: Capability, Credibility, and Political Will

Abstract

Contemporary counter-insurgency (COIN) operations demonstrate the necessity of ensuring that military lines of activity are coordinated with wider political, economic, and diplomatic strands. Some observers see the European Union (EU) as being uniquely well placed to provide such policy coordination because of its ability to draw on a wide range of civil and military capabilities. This article argues that the EU's potential as a significant and credible COIN actor is, in fact, severely undermined, both by a failure to develop the capabilities required to conduct sustained high-intensity military operations, and also by a strategic discourse that sees such activity as either illegitimate, too problematic, or outside the mission framework typology that has underpinned the development of the EU's security and defence policies. The lack of consensus on an approach, and the absence of the political will to develop one, suggests that, with respect to highly challenging contemporary COIN operations, the EU has little to offer.

Notes

1. Comments by Lieutenant General David Richards, ‘UK general warns over Afghanistan fighting’, Guardian, 10 August 2006.

2. WEU Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992, ‘Petersberg Declaration’, reproduced under ‘The Treaty and Key Texts’, at <www.weu.int>.

3. Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), Article J.7.2., reproduced at, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm>.

4. See Richard G. Whitman, ‘NATO, the EU and ESDP: An Emerging Division of Labour?’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.25, No.3 (December 2004), p.435.

5. Martin Ortega, ‘Beyond Petersberg: missions for the EU military forces’, in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.) EU Security and Defence Policy: The first five years, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), p.75.

6. Ibid. p.74.

7. Seville European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 21–22 June, 2002, reproduced at, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/docCenter.asp?lang = en&cmsid = 245>.

8. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Article 40, reproduced at, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm>.

9. Part III, Article III-210, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm>.

10. Ibid.

11. Francois Heisbourg, ‘The “European Security Strategy” is not a security strategy’, in A European Way of War (London: Centre for European Reform, 2004), p.27.

12. ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’, 12 December 2003, reproduced at, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/docCenter.asp?lang = en&cmsid = 245>, pp.3–5.

13. ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, September 2002, reproduced at, <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.

14. Julian Lindley-French, ‘The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and Soft Security Dynamics in the 21st Century’, European Security, Vol.13, No.1–2, (2004), p.5.

15. ‘European Security Strategy’, p.11.

16. Ibid., p.12.

17. Ortega, ‘Beyond Petersberg’, p.88.

18. See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/docCenter.asp?lang = en&cmsid = 245>.

19. BBC World Service report by Martin Plaut, reproduced at, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/docCenter.asp?lang = en&cmsid = 245>.

20. See Paul Cornish, and Geoffrey Edwards, ‘The Strategic Culture of the European Union: a progress report’, International Affairs, Vol.81, No.4, (2005), p.808.

21. Bastian Giegerich, and William Wallace, ‘Not Such a Soft Power: the External Deployment of European Forces’, Survival, Vol.46, No.2, (Summer 2004), p.165.

22. Mary Kaldor, and Andrew Salmon, ‘Military Force and European Strategy’, Survival, Vol.48, No.1, (Spring 2006); and Mary Kaldor, ‘Principles for the Use of the Military in Human Security Operations’, in Anthony D. McIvor, (ed.), Rethinking the Principles of War, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005).

23. Kaldor, ‘Military Force and European Strategy’, p.19.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid. p.22.

26. Ibid.

27. Janne Haaland Matlary, ‘When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?’, Security Dialogue, Vol.37, No.1, (2006), p.117.

28. For an excellent development of the notion of the reciprocal nature of conflict see, Hew Strachan, ‘Making Strategy: Civil-Military Relations after Iraq’, Survival, Vol.48, No.3, (Autumn 2006).

29. British–French Summit, St Malo, Joint Declaration, 3–4 December 1998, reproduced at <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename = OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c = Page&cid = 10070293>.

30. Ibid.

31. Cologne European Council Conclusions, 3–4 June 1999, reproduced at, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/docCenter.asp?lang = en&cmsid = 245>.

32. Helsinki European Council Conclusions, 10–11 December 1999, reproduced at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/docCenter.asp?lang = en&cmsid = 245>.

33. Declaration on EU Military Capabilities, External Relations Council, May, 2003, reproduced at, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/docCenter.asp?lang = en&cmsid = 245>.

34. Ibid.

35. See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/docCenter.asp?lang = en&cmsid = 245>

36. See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/docCenter.asp?lang = en&cmsid = 245>.

37. Ibid.

38. Lawrence Freedman, ‘Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine?’, in A European Way of War, (London: Centre for European Reform, 2004), p.21.

39. European Defence: A proposal for a White Paper, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004).

40. The scenarios are delineated in ibid., pp.71–80.

41. Ibid., p.78, (emphasis in the original).

42. Ibid., p.80.

43. Ibid., p.70.

44. See Sean Kay and Sahar Khan, ‘NATO and Counter-Insurgency: Strategic Liability or Tactical Asset?’, in this collection.

45. ‘Conclusions and Recommendations’, ibid., p.125.

46. Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power, (London: Atlantic Books, 2004), p.3.

47. This refers to Clausewitz's famous quote that, ‘war is … a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means’, Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.87.

48. This point is expanded in Matlary, ‘When Soft Power Turns Hard’, p.111. The notion of the EU as an arena is vividly articulated in Bernard Connelly's The Rotten Heart of Europe: The Dirty War for Europe's Money (London: Faber & Faber, 1996), which traces the politics of the Exchange Rate Mechanism battles of the 1980s and early 1990s.

49. For a particularly trenchant criticism of a recent EU deployment see, Jean-Yves Haine and Bastian Giegerich, ‘In Congo, a cosmetic EU operation’, The International Herald Tribune,13 June, 2006.

50. ‘Conclusion’, in A European Way of War (London: Centre for European Reform, 2004), p.64.

51. The European Defence Agency, ‘An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs’, in <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/docCenter.asp?lang = en&cmsid = 245>, 3 October, 2006, p.13.

52. General James Jones, ‘US envoy attacks British truce with Taliban’, Daily Telegraph, 25 October 2006.

53. I am indebted to Matlary, ‘When Soft Power Turns Hard’, p.106, for this felicitous phrase.